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International Human Rights Law has come
of Age
VED

P. NANDA*
I.

International human rights law has come of age. There has been a
transformation of the subject since 1963-64 when I attended the first ever
seminars on the subject offered by the late Egon Schwelb at Yale Law
School.' As Deputy Director of the Division of Human Rights at the
United National Secretariat, Schwelb was a practitioner of Human
Rights. He was also a meticulous scholar who thoroughly probed the jurisprudential aspects of human rights and conducted a comprehensive inquiry into the strengths and weaknesses of the discipline, then in a nascent stage of development. The course was primarily structured, in a
historical context, on the developments in the field since the inception of
the United Nations, especially since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The focus was on the United Nations and Europe. Conventions adopted at the United Nations, the progress on the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and on the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural rights, the case law of
the European Commission and Court of Human Rights, and regional experimentation in Latin America were then the major areas covered. The
concentration was on civil and political rights.
The last 20 years have witnessed the maturing of the discipline.
Courses and seminars on international human rights are being offered in
an increasingly large number of law schools.2 Voluminous literature on
the subject, rich in substance and varied in scope, exists3 and is growing
* Professor of Law and Director, International Legal Studies Program, University of
Denver College of Law.
1. See Schwelb, Teaching the Law Relating to the InternationalProtection of Human
Rights: An Experiment, 17 J. LEGAL ED. 451 (1965). See also The Teaching of the International Law of Human Rights, 11 HOWARD L. J. 527 (1965). Human Rights was not a separate category in the Index to Legal Periodicalsuntil 1964.
2. See Lillich, The Teaching of InternationalHuman Rights Law in U.S. Law Schools,
77 Am. J. INT'L L. 855 (1983).
3. See, e.g., M. McDoUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. Chen, Human Rights and World Public
Order (1980); Vincent-Daviss, Human Rights Law: A Research Guide to the Literature, 14
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each year. Intersection between U.S. constitutional law and human rights
law is being recognized." Our domestic courts have begun to acknowledge
the existence of applicable norms of customary international law pertaining to human rights.5
Centers for human rights study, especially at Columbia and the University of Cincinnati Law Schools are noteworthy. At Strasbourg, a summer human rights institute is held yearly. Students can earn a Master of
Law degree in human rights at many universities. Several journals exclusively cover developments in human rights law, while others publish occasional symposia, and frequent articles and developments on various aspects of human rights.
A network of practitioners, specializing in the practice of human
rights law, is growing in the United States. In the United States and
abroad several international human rights law groups are actively engaged in advocacy. Several law schools, notably Columbia and Denver,
offer clinics in the practice of human rights law. The U.S. Institute of
Human Rights has been active for the last decade. At the annual meeting
of the American Society of International Law in April 1985, an interest
group on human rights advocacy was established, which crew the largest
number of scholars and practitioners attending the various interest group
meetings. An impressive range of interests was represented by those in
attendance.
The range of issues discussed under international human rights law is
growing as well. Along with civil and political rights, inquiry also has been
increasingly focused on economic, social and cultural rights. Emerging
new areas under investigation include the right to development and the
right to peace.
Accompanying these desirable developments are the growing pains
and discipline is still experiencing. Cohesion is lacking and conceptual
problems and challenges of implementation are formidable. To illustrate,
each year students at the Graduate School of International Studies at the
University of Denver where George Shepherd and I annually teach a
course, "Human Rights and the Third World," challenge the concepts,
theories and premises we put forward and take issue with us on our analysis and conclusions. Varying degrees of disagreements are evident on issues such as the definition of human rights, the establishment of priorities, and the selection of appropriate means for the promotion and
protection of human rights. I was struck with a similar lack of consensus

N.Y.U. J. INT'L L & POL. 299, 487 (1981); 15 id. at 211 (1982).
4. See H. HANNUM, MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
TIONAL LAW

AND U.S. CONSTITU-

(PAIL 1985).

5. See, e.g., Burke, et al, Application of InternationalHuman Rights Law in State and
Federal Courts, 18 TEx. INT'L L. J. 291, 315-22 (1983); Symposium on International
Human Rights in State Courts, 18 INT'L LAW. 59 (1984); Symposium-Federal Jurisdiction, Human Rights, and the Law of Nations, Essays on Filartigav. Pena-Irala,11 GA. J.
INT'L & COMP.

L. 305 (1981).

1984

HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

on these issues at a recent meeting in Denver hosted by the Institute of
International Education and the University of Denver College of Law.
There were present students from over 30 countries who after graduating
from U.S. universities were returning to their homelands.
II.
The symposium that follows discusses wide-ranging aspects of international human rights. Subjects addressed include "Development as an
Emerging Human Right under International Law," "The Right to Communicate," "Influencing U.S. Foreign Policy on Human Rights," and
"Trade Union Rights in... Poland and the [International Labor Organization]." In addition, three articles with comparative or regional orientation-an article on gender discrimination in a comparative setting, an appraisal of the exercise of advisory jurisdiction by the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights, and a comment on the Marckx case in which the
European Court of Human Rights declared Belgian illegitimacy statutes
violative of the European Convention on Human Rights-, and a report
on an international human rights clinic at the University of Denver College of Law round off the symposium.
The Symposium opens with a study of the right to development
under international law. The author recognizes the lack of precision with
respect to the term development; however, he rejects the narrow definition of development under which the preoccupation was on economic
growth, accepting instead the broader approach to the development process under which an increasing emphasis is "on human beings and the
human potential as the basis, the means, and the ultimate purpose of the
development effort."6
Next he discusses in a historical setting the relationship between development and human rights. His inquiry is focused primarily on the efforts undertaken at the United Nations. He suggests that both aspects of
development-international and national-should be given equal attention, and concludes that "the development of the individual. . is a prerequisite to the development of every society and the world community."
Finally, he addresses the role of international role in ensuring that
"the realization of equity and justice both domestically and in the international arena" be realized. He calls for further studies and action by the
and
nongovernmental
Nations,
regional
organizations
United
organizations.
Christopher Docksey studies sex discrimination in Britain, the
United States and the European community. His inquiry is focused on
legal responses to the common problems of gender discrimination which
arise in these countries. After a thorough analysis of both statutory and

6. Soedjatmoko, The Human and Cultural Dimensions of Development: Accomplish-

ments and Failures,in A SocIETY
19 (1983).

FOR INTERNATIONAL D-VELOPmEN7. PROSPECTUS
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judicial responses, he concludes on an optimistic note: "[Tihere seems to
be a growing acceptance of the concept of comparable work, without
which pay equity is impossible. In the area of equal pay, more than any
other, there are grounds for cautious optimism that injustice may be significantly mitigated by law over the next few years."
Howard Anawalt faces the same initial difficulty in the right to communicate as was confronted earlier in the right to development, that of a
lack of consensus on definition. He, however, considers an emerging consensus on defining the right in terms of two concepts-access and participation. Still he finds a divergence of views among the major proponents
of the three identifiable approaches on the issue-the western point of
view with its focus on communication freedom as a political process, as a
set of journalistic freedoms, and an important commercial activity; the
development point of view espoused by the Third World which emphasizes the role of communications in the creation and preservation of national identity and national economic and social strength; and the Soviet
point of view reflecting a strong orientation toward preservation of public
order. This leads to a different emphasis under each approach on the
freedom to initiate message and the need to control content of message in
the name of public order. Anawalt concludes that further efforts be directed not in the elaboration of new international norms but in exploring
means of implementation which are effective.
Otwin Marenin addresses an important question: "What can be done
by members of the public to encourage the salience of human rights as a
foreign policy goal?" After providing a refreshing analysis of the Reagan
administration's approach to human rights, he outlines the difficulties one
faces in shaping and influencing U.S. foreign policy on human rights. His
conclusion is that one's work on influencing this policy is effective when it
is "based on a clear understanding of how the complex foreign policy process works, what its limitations are and when advocacy is fuelled by the
indignation which all violations of human rights deserve."
Bert Lockwood provides an illuminating study of the first two advisory opinions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Suggesting
that these decisions have important implications for the eventual acceptance by member states of the Court's compulsory jurisdiction, and for the
future development of procedures for the protection of human rights in
the hemisphere, he concludes that the Court is "off to a good start."
David Wi":_
presents with clart;y a case qtudv of Poland's conflict
with the International Labor Organization on trade union rights. After
detailing the pertinent ILO prescriptions on the subject, its investigation
of the alleged violations of trade union rights by the government of Poland, the government's refusal to cooperate with the investigation, the
recommendations of the ILO Commission of Inquiry, Wirth considers Poland's notice of withdrawal from the ILO to be an inappropriate response.
He suggests that "[i]nstead of withdrawing from ILO, the Policy government might more profitably invest its effort in working with the Organization once again to begin to establish a trade union environment consis-
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tent with fundamental principles of freedom of association."
Marc Salzberg comments on the Marckx case in which the European
Court of Human Rights declared that Belgian illegitimacy statutes violated the European Convention on Human Rights. Salzberg provides an
interesting historical background to the decision and updates the reader
on subsequent decisions in European national courts. He considers the
decision a landmark and finds the Court's success remarkable, attributing
it to the confidence and respect that it has gained among member states
because of its usually cautious and well-reasoned approach.
The symposium concludes with a report on a human rights clinic offered at the University of Denver College of Law in the summer of 1983.
Thirteen students were enrolled in the clinic. They worked on nine
projects ranging from a complaint to the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights prepared pursuant to ECOSOC Resolution 1503 on behalf of a
Russian citizen, a brief prepared on behalf of the KaNgwane people for
submission to the South African government, and an opinion on Argentina's then proposed amnesty law, to two briefs prepared on behalf of
Haitian and Salvadoran refugees seeking political asylum and an amicus
brief prepared for presentation to the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights. The instructors share their experience with and offer suggestions
to law teachers who might contemplate offering such a clinical experience
to their students.
III.
The subjects addressed in the symposium cover a wide spectrum.
Two common features underly these articles: the need to (1) strengthen
and build on the fragile consensus that seems to be developing on several
aspects of human rights, and (2) explore effective means of implementation. International lawyers have an important role in working toward the
realization of both these objectives.

Development as an Emerging Human Right
Under International Law*
VED

I.

P.

NANDA**

INTRODUCTION

A number of recent studies have linked development, human rights
and international law.' The United Nations has been the leading initiator
of these studies, 2 but some nongovernmental organizations such as the
International Commission of Jurists and a few publicists have also contributed to the ongoing dialogue on the nature of the evolving right to
development.' This article will survey the major issues in the development-human rights discussion, especially as they relate to the needs of
developing countries. Additional questions will be raised and recommendations offered for further study.
II.

DEVELOPMENT AND ITS STATUS TODAY

Development theory and practice continue to generate intense debate. Although it no longer is fashionable to equate development with
economic growth or economic development,4 most development projects
* This article is an adapted version of a chapter by the author entitled, "Development
and Human Rights: The Role of International Law and Organizations," from a forthcoming
book HUMAN RIGHTS AND THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT (G. Shepherd and V.
Nanda eds. 1985).
** Professor of Law and Director, International Legal Studies Program, University of
Denver College of Law.
1. See, e.g., Report of the Secretary-General, The International Dimensions of the
Right to Development as a Human Right, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1334 (1979), Study by the
Secretary-General, The Regional and National Dimensions of the Right to Development as
a Human Right, U.N. Docs. E/CN.4/1421, 1980 and E/CN.4/1488, (1981); INTERNATIONAL
COMMISSION OF JURISTS,

DEVELOPMENT,

HUMAN RIGHTS,

AND THE RULE OF

LAW (1981); Es-

piell, The Right of Development as a Human Right, 16 TEX. INT'L L. J. 189 (1981); Van
Boven, The Right to Development and Human Rights, 28 INT'L COMM'N JURISTS REV. June
1982, at 49; de Vey Mestdagh, The Right to Development, NETH. INT'L L. REV. 30 (1981);
RICH, The Right to Development as an Emerging Human Right, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 287
(1983). For earlier writing, see M'Bay, Le Droit au developpement comme un droit de
l'homme, 1972 R. DR. L'HOMME 503; Schachter, The Evolving InternationalLaw of Development, 15 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1976).
2. See supra note 1.
3. See supra note 1.
4. See, e.g., I. Adelman and C. Morris, Economic Growth and Social Equity in Developing Countries, (1973); I. ADELMAN AND S. ROBINSON, Income DistributionPolicy in Developing Countries, (1979); G. FIELDS, Poverty, Inequality, and Development, (1980); INCOME
DISTRIBUTION AND GROWTH IN THE LEss-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, (C. Frank Jr. & R. Webb ed.
1977); W. LOEHR AND J. POWELSON, The Economics of Development and Distribution
(1981), FROM DEPENDENCY TO DEVELOPMENT, (H. Munoz ed. 1981); Cline, Distributionand
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still are designed to accomplish economic goals. However, one critic,
Claude Alvares, recently observed that:
[flor the first time since the onset of the industrial age, it [is now]
becoming possible to describe subsistence values and their positive
qualities without being scorned or dismissed as regressive. The established dichotomies -backward-forward, traditional-modern, primitive-sophisticated, developing-advanced, inferior-superior, - [have]
lost the sharp dividing lines that once separated them. 5
He even questions whether economic development is a desirable objective in itself.' The term "development," as used in this article, is defined not by reference to the goals of economic growth and economic development alone. Rather, it refers to the development of human beings,
an end towards which economic development may be but a singular
means.7 As a working definition, Johan Galtung's conceptual framework
of development is accepted here. Galtung's proposition is that
development
stands for the development of human beings and not for the development of countries, the production of things, their distribution within
social systems or the transformation of social structures. These may
be means towards the end but they should not be confused with the
end, which is that of developing the entire human being and all
human beings. 8
Thus, although the focus is on the satisfaction of human needs, this concept of a needs-oriented development "should not be identified with the
satisfaction of 'minimum needs,' for what is wanted is more than a minimum level of satisfaction." 9
The need to emphasize the element of human development was recently recognized by the United Nations General Assembly when, at its
35th session, it adopted the International Development Strategy, declar-

Development: A Survey of the Literature, 1 J. DEv. EcON. 359 (1975); HEWLETT, Human
Rights and Economic Realities: Tradeoffs in HistoricalPerspective, 94 POL. Scl. Q. 453
(1979); AND RANIS, Equity and Growth: New Dimensions of Development, 19 J. CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 558 (1975). As an illustration of the position before the shift, see, e.g., H. JOHNSON, Money, Trade and Economic Growth, (1962), cited in Hewlett, Human Rights and
Economic .uiies: Trd--------------in -,
l Pernctive. 94 POL. Sci. Q. 453, 456 (197):
"[T]here is likely to be a conflict between rapid growth and an equitable distribution of
income; and a poor country anxious to develop would probably be well advised not to worry
too much about the distribution of income."
5. Alvares, Deadly Development, 11 DEv. F., Oct. 1983, at 3.4.
6. Id. at 4. Alvares asserts: "Unless the case against development is taken up in earnest before it is too late, the elite will solve it in the manner they have always preferred, at
the expense of the rest."
7. See infra notes 105-20 and accompanying text.
8. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, Development, Environment and
Technology-Towards a Technology for Self-Reliance, 3 (1979) (footnote omitted).
9.

Id.
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ing that the "development process must promote human dignity."' 10 Acknowledging that development embodies both economic and social objectives, it added: "The final aim of development must be the continuing
increase in the well-being of the entire population on the basis of its full
participation in the process of development and a fair distribution of the
benefits therefrom."'" And it mandated that, in providing technical and
financial support to accomplish these objectives, the international community is to pay "due respect to the cultural identities of nations and
peoples."' 2
Granting that macro issues such as economic growth and capital formation are likely to remain the focal point of developmental efforts in
many developing countries, one cannot escape noting that developing
countries' economic situations have been rather bleak in the recent past,
and their future prospects do not look bright. To illustrate, when the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD VI)
met in Belgrade from June 6 to July 3, 1983, it concluded with no reported significant progress for developing countries on the items discussed there - the world economic crisis and recovery measures, commodities and trade, money and finance."3
The lack of progress at UNCTAD VI, compounded with sluggish
growth during the 1970s, has resulted in worsening economic conditions
for the low-income countries. The World Bank reported in 1981 that for
most low-income countries, slower growth was the rule during the 1970s.
Without capital to cover current account deficits, and with little capacity
to increase exports in the short run, they found the tighter external environment difficult. The African countries had the slowest growth, most frequently as a result of domestic rather than external causes; their GNP
per person rose by only 0.5 percent a year in the 1970s. In several countries per capita income and food production actually fell.1 4 In its next
report in 1982, the World Bank was not hopeful for their long-term prospects either, stressing the worldwide "concern with the growing gap between rich and poor.""
One advisor to the Secretary-General of UNCTAD and a participant

10. See U.N. Gen. Ass. Res. 35/56 (1980), para. 8. See G.A. Res. 35/56, para. 8 (1980).
11. Id. para. 42. See also id. para. 8.
12. Id. para. 42.
13. See UNCTAD Trade and Development Report, The Current World Economic Crisis, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/TDR/3, pt. I (1983); Editorial, 17 J. WORLD TRADE L. 375 (1983):
"It was not expected that a great deal would emerge from the Conference, but it was at least
assumed that the continuation of the North-South dialogue would result in some general
conclusions being arrived at as to the diagnosis of the present economic situation and some
assessment made of measures that would have to be taken in the long or short term by
governments. But no such diagnosis could be agreed." See also C. Lawson, The Future of
East-South Trade after UNCTAD VI, 6 Third World Q. 145 (1984).
14. WORLD BANK, World Development Report 1981 112-13 (1981).
15.

WORLD BANK, World Development Report 1982 30 (1982).
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in the Brandt Commission,"8 D. Avramovic, commented in early 1983:
[Tihe present pressure on the balances of payments of developing
countries is no less than during the great depression of the 1930s:
their export commodity prices other than oil are in real terms almost
as low; the interest rates on their debts are in real terms as high; and
the proportion of their exports absorbed by debt service is even higher
than in the 1930s in a sample of countries for which a long-run comparison can be made. Currency devaluation, difficulties of maintaining
debt service payments, and import and exchange restrictions are on
the increase. Major deflation is now underway in many developing
countries. '7
The World Bank's annual report, World Development Report 1983,"
notes that not since the end of World War II has Third World development experienced such a setback as in 1982.19 The United States under
the Reagan administration, however, has recently decided to reduce its
contribution to the IDA [International Development Agency], the World
Bank affiliate which lends money to 40 of the world's poorest countries-whose per capita income average is about one dollar a day - at no
interest and with fifty years to repay.20 The United States contribution to
the IDA is required to be kept at 750 million dollars a year for three years
as of July 1, 1984. Secretary of State George Schultz had urged the
United States to contribute 950 million dollars, while the World Bank
had hoped for a sum of one billion dollars. 2 In 1983 the U.S. Congress
had appropriated 950 million dollars to the IDA as the United States'
contribution. In total, the IDA will have 9 billion dollars, rather than the
12 billion dollars sought by the other donor nations, to spend over the
next three years in its development projects.22 The following two statements highlight the impact of such an action. The World Bank's 1983
report estimates that
even with an annual GDP [Gross Domestic Product] growth rate of 5
to 6 percent between 1975 and 2000, more than 600 million people will
remain below the poverty line in developing countries in the year
2000, unless the pattern of growth is modified to put more emphasis
on poverty alleviation. The current projections clearly suggest more
moderate growth prospects and thus reinforce the need for policies
not only for stimulating growth but also for curbing population

16. For the report, see Independent Commission on International Development Issues,
North-South: A Programmefor Survival (1980). For the second report of the Brandt Commission, see Common Crisis, North-South: Co-operation for World Recovery, (1983).
17. D. Avramovic, Development Policies for Today, 17 J. WORLD TRADE L. 189, 192
(1983) (footnote omitted).
18.

WORLD BANK, World Development Report (1983).

19. Id. at 125.
20. Francis, U.S. reduces aid to World Bank, sending ripples around the globe, Christian Science Monitor, January 16, 1984, at 9.
21. Id.
22. Id.
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growth and meeting basic needs.2
The President of the World Bank, A.W. Clausen, remarked on January 26, 1984:
The low income countries of Africa have been suffering steady declines in per capita income for 10 years! Per capita food production
has been falling over the past 20 years, and the cost of food imports is
now equivalent to a quarter of all the development assistance that Africa receives. Rising commodity prices may give Africa a bit of relief
in 1984, but we still expect no growth in per capita income. In most
African countries, political conditions are fragile, institutions and
human resources are already strained, and population is expected to
more than double by the end of the century. Some developing countries in other regions also face bleak prospects.24

III.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS

The linkage between development and human rights is unambiguously reflected in the recent United Nations General Assembly resolution
adopted at its 37th session in December 1982, in which the Assembly declared that the right to development "is an inalienable human right," and
emphasized that "the United Nations should give attention not only to
the human rights aspects of development but also the development aspects of human rights. 2 5 The Assembly requested the Commission on
Human Rights to take necessary measures to promote the right to development and welcomed the decision of the Commission that the Working
Group of Governmental Experts on the Right to Development should
continue its work with the aim of presenting as soon as possible a draft
resolution on the right to development." Earlier, the U.N. Economic and
Social Council had approved the decision of the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights to establish a group of experts" and had asked the group
to pay particular attention to the obstacles encountered by developing
countries in their efforts to secure the enjoyment of human rights.2"
The United Nations has explicitly enunciated and reiterated the notion of an inseparable link between human rights and development only
recently. However, the close relationship between the two concepts has
been acknowledged in U.N. deliberations regarding development ever

23. World Bank Report, supra note 18, at 39.
24. Address by A. W. Clausen, PriorityIssues for 1984 (Remarks before the European
Management Forum, Davos, Switzerland, Jan. 26, 1984, mimeo World Bank), 3.
25. See G. A. Res. 37/199 (December 1982).
26. See id. paras. 6, 7, 8 and 12. It should be noted that the Commission on Human
Rights, at its 39th session, held from January 31 to March 11, 1983, decided to renew the
mandate of the Working Group of Experts with the task of preparing a draft declaration on
the right to development. See U.N. Comm'n Hum. Rts., Res. 1983/15, U.N. Doc. E/1983/13,
E/CN.4/1983/60, 1983, at 139.
27. See ECOSOC Decision, 1981/149, of May 8, 1081.
28. Id. See also U.N. Comm'n Hum. Rts., Res. 36/XXXVII, of March 11, 1981.
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since the development planning efforts were being formulated and crystalized in the late 1950s. In order to analyze a few selected issues of this
relationship in an historical context, this section is divided into six parts:
(1) The Relationship between Civil and Political Rights and Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights; (2) Trade-Offs between Economic Development and Human Rights; (3) Human Rights and International Development Planning Policies and Practices; (4) The Basic Needs Approach to
Development; (5) Participation as an Important Factor in the Development Process; and (6) Human Rights and Individual and Collective Aspects of Development.
1. The Relationship Between Civil and Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
Although historical antecedents of these rights provide us with rich
source material to enhance our understanding of the evolutionary
processes at work, 29 they fail to explain the dynamics of their interrelationships in the recent past. Though two separate covenants were drafted
by the UN embodying civil and political rights and economic, social and
cultural rights, 0 empirical data do not support the assertion that either
set of rights is a prerequisite to the enjoyment of the other. Additionally,
it can be persuasively argued that neither set of rights is to be accorded a
priority by states, for neither by itself will suffice to accomplish the goal
of providing an individual the opportunity to realize his or her potential
as a human being.
A state party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (CPR) is under the obligation "to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the .. . Covenant."'" Further, it undertakes to adopt such legislative measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized
in the Covenant.
On the other hand, a state party to the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR) is obliged to "take steps
. . . to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present
Covenant by all appropriate means."3 2 Similarly a state party to the CPR
may not derogate from its obligations unless measures it takes are "[iln
time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the

29.

See, e.g., D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in International Law, 82

COLUM. L. REV. 110 (1982); Henkin, Rights: Here and There," 81 Colum. L. Rev., 1582
(1981).
30. For the texts of the covenants, see 21 U.N. G.A.O.R. Supp. 16, at 49-60, U.N. Doc.

A/6316 (1966). See generally Humphrey, The Implementation of International Human
Rights Law, 24 N.Y.L.ScH.L.REv. 31 (1980); Nanda, Implementation of Human Rights by
the United Nations and Regional Organizations, 21 DE PAUL L. REV. 307 (1971).
31. Id. at art. 2(1), pp. 52, 53.
32. Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 2, p. 49.
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existence of which is officially proclaimed, '33 and such measures are not
discriminatory nor inconsistent with their other obligations under international law.3 4 In contrast to the stringent mandatory duties set forth in
the CPR, the standards for derogation under the ESCR are rather vague.
The Covenant provides that a state party "may subject such rights only
to such limitations" which are determined by law, are compatible with
the nature of the rights accorded under the Covenant, and which are
solely for the purpose of promoting the general welfare in a democratic
society. 35
Thus it can be argued that the nature and scope of civil liberties
accorded under the CPR 36 (e.g., the right to life and freedom of expression; the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; the right of
peaceful assembly; prohibitions of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment; prohibition of slavery, arbitrary arrest and detention; and retroactive criminal legislation) are at variance with the
guarantees provided under the ESCR 37 (e.g., the right to work and social
security; the protection of the family; the right to an adequate standard
of living; the right to health, education and cultural life). The rights
under the former are tangible and meaningful, for they are precise, immediate and readily enforceable. The rights under the latter, however, with a
few exceptions, are amorphous and contingent, and non-enforceable by
legal procedures. These social and economic guarantees are to be progressively realized, awaiting their realization and implementation upon the
happening of certain events, including the availability of "international
assistance and co-operation" and national resources. 38 Consequently, it
can be argued that the ESCR embodies long-term aspirations which are
not ripe for immediate implementation and which, in the near future,
could not be realized owing to the lack of resources and legal procedures
necessary for their enforcement.3 9
Although, for a number of years, the implementation of economic,
social and cultural rights did not receive the same kind of attention at the
U.N. as was accorded to the implementation of civil and political rights, it
is noteworthy that in 1977 the United Nations General Assembly adopted
a resolution which succinctly states that both civil and political and economic, social, and cultural rights are indivisible, interdependent and inalienable, and which recognizes the urgency of implementing and protect40
ing all rights included within the two categories of fundamental rights.

33. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 4 (1).
34. Id.
35. Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 4.
36. See Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 6-27.
37. See Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, arts. 6-15.
38. Id., art. 2(1).
39. See, e.g., the discussion at the 67th annual meeting of the American Society of
International Law on Economic Development and Human Rights: Brazil, Chile, and Cuba,
67 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 198 (1973).
40. Gen. Ass. Res. 32/130 of Dec. 16, 1977, para. 1.
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Since the late 1970s, efforts to attain implementation of ESCR rights
have included discussion by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights of an
agenda item which addresses the attainment of rights contained within
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the ESCR, and the inherent problems faced in their implementation. 4' The U.N. Economic and
Social Council (ECOSOC) has accorded special attention to the subject
by designating a 15-member Sessional Working Group of Governmental
Experts on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The working group studies the subject
and seeks reports from states parties and U.N. specialized agencies. Its
assigned task is to make suggestions and recommendations to the
2
ECOSOC.'
2.

Trade-Offs between Economic Development and Human Rights

The emerging development strategies, with their emphasis on the
human dimension of development, reflect a shift from earlier development strategies. Those schemes assumed that there are unavoidable
trade-offs between economic development and human rights, and that,
consequently, the sacrifice of civil liberties, equity and distributive justice
at the altar of economic growth is a necessary evil for developing countries, at least during a transitional stage of development. The case of Brazil is often cited as a primary example of this former development ideology in action. Sylvia Ann Hewlett commented that, in Brazil
it seems that an exclusionary and repressive regime was a necessary
condition for successful stabilization . . . , and that, in its turn, successful stabilization was an essential prerequisite for a new cycle of
capitalist growth within this Third World nation ....
43 [Because]
there is no natural affinity among economic growth, political freedom,
and social justice in development processes, 4 . . . [t]he great majority
of governments have pursued developmental strategies that have permitted very little filtering down of the fruits of economic growth to
the bulk of the population. Available evidence points overwhelmingly
to the fact that in capitalist Third World nations growth has been
accompanied by a massive concentration of wealth and a drastic increase in inequality; thus, 'millions of desparately poor people
throughout the world have been hurt rather than helped by economic
45

development."

Another commentator at the American Society of International Law
in 1973 observed that:

41. For the discussion of this agenda item, agenda item 8, at the 39th session of the
U.N. Commission on Human Rights, see Report of the 39th Session of the Commission on
Human Rights, ESCOR Supp. (No. 3) at 33, U.N. Doc. E/1983/13, E/CN.4/1983/60 (1983).
42. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1983/SR. 17, at 3 (1983).
43. Hewlett, Human Rights and Economic Realities: Tradeoffs in HistoricalPerspective 94 POL. Sci. Q. 453, 471 (1979).

44.

Id., at 453 (footnote omitted).

45.

Id. at 471.
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the Brazilian army has, perhaps unwittingly and unknowingly, been
made the guardian for a dynamic but highly exploitative economic
system, favoring a small minority of the nation. Political repression
and economic exploitation thus go hand in hand. Brazil is creating a
Scandinavian-sized consumer economy superimposed on an Indonesian-sized pauperized mass, presided over by a cruel and increasingly
isolated army."
Another observer has reached a similar conclusion after comparing
data from Brazil, Chile and Cuba. He notes that while sacrifices of human
rights does not appear to jeopardize rapid growth, rapid growth does not
"necessarily foster human rights. ' '4 7 He finds no historical justification for
48
the assumption that one gain must be sacrificed to achieve another.
Similarly, Robert Goodin challenges economists who presume that
49
rapid economic growth is incompatible with fundamental human rights.
Goodin illustrates "reasons internal to economic theory itself for doubting
that repression produces economic miracles,' 50 and suggests that the assumptions underlying the assertions that deprivation of human rights
would speed economic development "look fairly implausible for the general case.""1 These assertions are that such deprivations would further
capital accumulation, curb population growth, eliminate periodic distortions in the economy through the curtailment of electoral competition
and political rights, reduce economically harmful trade union agitations
and unrest, reduce the crime rate and its economic costs by limiting civil
liberties, and encourage foreign investment by curtailing political rights
and therefore curbing political instability. 52
To illustrate his theory, Goodin challenges the argument that capital
accumulation would be speeded by deprivation of civil liberties and distributive justice by suggesting that the argument is at best of limited
value, applying only, if at all, in those nations which have chosen to pursue a capital-intensive development strategy. Moreover, Goodin states
that the argument is most likely based on fallacious assumptions. He
questions the proposition that the well-off have a lower propensity to consume, and urges that with respect to the consumption activities of the
poor, these activities should be counted as an investment in "human capital. ''15 Finally, he observes that "assuming that the wealthy were more
inclined to save, the capital accumulation argument for restricting rights

46. Tyson, Economic Growth and Human Rights in Brazil: The First Nine Years of
Military Tutelage, 67 AM. Soc'Y INr'L L. PROC. 208, 213 (1973)..
47. Trubek, When is an Omelet? What is an Egg? Some Thought on Economic Development and Human Rights in Latin America, 67 Am.Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 198, 200 (1973).
48. Id., at 226.
49. Goodin, The Development-Rights Trade-Off: Some Unwarranted Economic and
Political Assumptions, 1 UNIvRsAL HUM. RTS. 31 (1979).
50. Id., at 31-32.
51. Id., at 32.
52. Id., at 33-41.
53. See id., at 33-34.
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presupposes that they would save within their own country."54 Since a
typical developing country does not usually have "very secure futures
markets," and is full of uncertainties, he argues that the rich might be
driven to spend "'as though there were no tomorrow' or to stash the cash
under their beds."5 Goodin continues to question some economists assumptions" by noting that a developing nation which pursues economic
growth by restricting fundamental rights probably incurs stiff costs of oppression, wiping out any marginal gains.5" Whether such costs outweigh
the economic benefits is a question that he would leave for empirical determination in each particular case, but he cautions that we "must not
simply assume them away if we want to make sound policy
58
recommendations."
Finally, based on evidence from a number of English-speaking countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Rhoda Howard suggests:
The 'right to development,' touted by African elites as a prerequisite
to the more traditional human rights, may well be merely a cover for
denial of those basic civil and political liberties which will allow the
dispossessed masses to act in their own interests. To wait for economic development, including a 'basic needs' oriented redistribution
of wealth, to occur before allowing for civil and political liberties is to
invite the possibility that such redistribution will never occur. Even in
socialist societies, elites entrench and perpetuate themselves. Without
human rights, the evidence suggests, economic growth may occur but
economic development will not. 'Full bellies' require political participation and civil liberties.59
It is submitted that although the debate on the human rights-economic development tradeoffs will continue, it seems fair to observe that
the proponents of economic growth at the cost of civil and political liberties have failed to prove the soundness of their position.
3. Human Rights and International Development Planning Policies and Practices
In 1961 the U.N. General Assembly designated the 1960s as the
United Nations Development Decade." In articulating the strategy for
the development decade, the Assembly recognized the undertaking contained in the U.N. Charter "to promote a social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom." 61 However, no mention of human rights
was made, and it was only four years later that the General Assembly

54.
55.
56.

Id., at 34.
Id.
Id., at 41-42.

57.
58.

Id.
Id.

59. Howard, The Full-Belly Thesis: Should Economic Rights Take Priority Over Civil
and Political Rights? Evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa, 5 HuM. RTS. Q. 467, 478 (1983).
60.
61.

G. A. Res. 1710 (XVI) (1961).
Id., G. A. Res. 2027 (XX) (1965).
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adopted a resolution recognizing the need to devote special attention, on
both the national and international levels, to the promotion of human
rights within the context of the development decade. Earlier, however, a
1960 U.N. Report on development activities 2 clearly identified the link
between human rights and development:
One of the greatest dangers in development policy lies in the tendency
to give to the more materials aspects of growth an overriding and disproportionate emphasis. The end may be forgotten in preoccupation
of the means. Human rights may be submerged and human beings
seen only as instruments of production rather than as free entities for
whose welfare and cultural advance the increased production is intended. The recognition of this issue has a profound bearing upon the
formulation of the objectives of economic development and the methods employed in obtaining them. Even where there is recognition of
the fact that the end of all economic development is . . . the growth
and well-being of the individual and larger freedom, methods of development may be used which are a denial of basic human rights.63
Before the U.N. adopted its strategy for the Second Development
Decade in 1970,6" the General Assembly proclaimed the Declaration on
Social Progress and Development (DSPD).6 5 The DSPD linked human
rights and development issues directly, stating that "[slocial progress and
development shall be founded on respect for the dignity and value of the
human person and shall ensure the promotion of human rights and social
justice.6 6 However, while the strategy acknowledged the need to distribute
wealth equitably and recognized that "the success of international development activities will depend in large measure on . . . the promotion of
human rights for all members of society,"6 it paid no specific attention to
the issue of civil and political rights. Subsequently, in preparation for the
strategy for the Third Development Decade, a 1979 study by the U.N.
Secretary-General68 stated that "promotion of respect for human rights in
general, including the human right to development, should be prominent
stated objectives of a new international development
among the
'
69
strategy.
In 1980, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights invited the preparatory committee for the Third Development Decade "to pay due attention
to the integration of human rights in the development process. '7 0 The
General Assembly took on this challenge by responding in the Interna-

62. See U.N. Doc. E/3347/Rev. 1 (1960).
63. Id.., para. 90.
64.

G. A. Res. 2626 (XXV) of Oct. 24, 1970.

65. G. A. Res. 2542 (XXIV), 1969.
66.
67.

Id., art. 2.
Supra note 64, para. 5.

68. Report of the Secretary-General, The InternationalDiscussions of the Right to
Development as a Human Right, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1334 (1979).
69.

Id., para. 303.

70.

Pursuant to Res. 7 (XXXVI) (1980).
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tional Development Strategy for the Third Development Decade7' that
human dignity must be promoted by the development process. 72 Earlier,
in fact, the U.N. General Assembly had adopted a resolution stating that
"human rights questions should be examined globally, taking into account both the over-all context of the various societies in which they present themselves as well as the need for the promotion of the full dignity
of the human person and the development and well-being of the
73
society."
The pre-eminent question remains: what role has official development assistance played in the promotion of human rights? The 1979
study by the U.N. Secretary-General7 attempted to analyze such a role
and concluded that "there is widespread international interest in the concept of forging closer links between the promotion of human rights and
the provision of official development assistance. 76 The study, however,
acknowledged that its analysis of the relevant issues was not comprehensive. It recommended that the U.N. Commission on Human Rights undertake "a more detailed study of the relevant issues with a view to formulating general principles and criteria which might guide future
bilateral and multilateral assistance arrangements, insofar as they seek to
promote human rights in general, and the human right to development in
76
particular.
4.

The Basic Needs Approach to Development

The International Labor Organization (ILO) and the World Bank
have been in the forefront of articulating the "basic needs" approach. 7e
The basic needs concept encompasses all those needs, both material and
non-material, the fulfillment of which is essential for self-realization.
However, it is imperative that the basic needs approach to development
not be used as an excuse for defining development objectives as meeting
merely the minimum needs for subsistence of the people in developing
countries.7 9 This concern was succinctly stated in the Programme of Ac-

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
"76.
78.

G. A. Res. 35/56 (1980).
Id., para. 8.
G. A. Res. 32/130, para. 1(d) (1977).
See supra note 68.
Id., para. 279.
Id.
See generally ILO, MEETING BASIC NEEDS, STRATEGIES FOR ERADICATING MASS
POVERTY AND UNEMPLOYMENT, (1977); World Bank's working papers produced in mimeo
form in 1977, entitled BASIC NEEDS: A PROGRESS REPORT: THE DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF A
BASIC NEEDS APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT; GLOBAL ESTIMATES FOR MEETING BASIC NEEDS;
INTERNATIONAL

IMPLICATIONS

FROM DONAR

COUNTRIES AND

AGENCIES OF

MEETING BASIC

NEEDS, cited in U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1334, para. 172, footnote 107 (1979).
79. See, e.g., a criticsm of the approach in Gauhar, What is Wrong with Basic Needs?
4 THIRD WORLD Q. xxi (1982); "What is wrong with 'Basic Needs'? It is a diversion and a
cold- blooded strategem. It carves people into layers of poverty-relative and absolute, sets
up arbitrary statistical criteria of judging levels of growth and, in the end, aims at amelioration rather than the eradication of poverty."
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tion adopted in 1976 by the ILO.0 ' "The concept of basic needs should be
placed within a context of a nation's overall economic and social development... ; it should be placed within a context of national independence,
the dignity of individuals and peoples and their freedom to chart their
destiny without hindrance." ' Earlier, a group of economists and social
and natural scientists emphasized in the Cocoyoc Declaration that "development should not be limited to the satisfaction of basic needs. There are
other needs, other goals, and other values. Development includes freedom
of expression and impression, the right to give and receive ideas and
82
stimulus.
In defining basic rights and basic needs, Article 2 of the ILO's Programme of Action includes certain minimum requirements for private
consumption and certain essential services provided by and for the community at large as part of such material needs. 8 However, Johan Galtung
and Anders Wirak suggest that human rights and human needs should be
seen as two different concepts.8 4 They list needs under the headings of
security needs, welfare needs, identity needs, and freedom needs,8 5 and
proposes a set of needs "that might be considered as important candidates on the world waiting list for processing into rights."8 6
Even if a development strategy based on political repression could
perhaps succeed in meeting basic needs in a narrow quantitative sense,
there is a sound basis for arguing that this would be an unacceptable option. The point was forcefully made by Jose Diokno, a Filipino leader who
criticized one of the justifications given for authoritarianism in Asian developing nations. Diokno blatantly cited as a falsehood the notion that
"developing countries must sacrifice freedom temporarily to achieve the
rapid economic development that their exploding populations and rising
expectations demand. '8 7 Instead, he proposed
"[A]uthoritarianism is not needed for developing; it is needed to perpetuate the status quo. Development is not just providing people with
adequate food, clothing, and shelter; many prisons do as much. Development is also people deciding what food, clothing and shelter are ad-

80. See G. A. Res. 31/176 (1976), in which the Programme of Action was endorsed by
the U.N. General Asseembly. The Programme of Action is contained in U.N. Doc. E/5857

(1976).
81. U.N. Doc. E/5857, art. 5 (1976).
82. The Cocoyoc Declaration adopted on October 12, 1974, is reprinted in U.N. Doc.
A/C.2/292 (1974).
83. U.N. Doc. E/5857, art. 2 (1976).
84. Galtung and Wirak, On the Relationship between Human Rights and Human
Needs, Paper 5578/CONF. 630/4, 1978 at 1, cited in U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1334, 1979, para.
165, footnote 91).
85. Cited in U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1334, 1979, para. 166, footnote 71.
86. Id.
87. Remarks of Jose W. Diokno, cited in Alston, Development and the Rule of Law:
Prevention versus Cure as a Human Rights Strategy, in INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAw 31, 57 (1981).
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equate, and how they are to be provided." 88
Thus, it seems essential that recognition be accorded to the indivisibility of human rights and the protection of civil and political rights guaranteed in the development process.
5.

Participationand the Development Process

The recognition of the importance of popular participation in the development process and in the realization of human rights is reflected by
the attention the subject has received at the United Nations in recent
years. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights discussed the topic as an
agenda item in February 1983. 89 Earlier, in May 1982, an international
seminar on the subject was held in Yugoslavia, which concluded that popular participation was essential for the development and realization of
human rights.9 0 The U.N.'s interest can be traced back to 1975 when it
issued a report 91 and ECOSOC passed a resolution.2 The U.N. report emphasized the importance of "active and meaningful involvement of the
masses of people" in the developmental decision-making process and in
the implementation of resulting programs and projects.9 3 The ECOSOC
resolution emphasized the importance of the governments' role in promoting and effectuating popular participation. Such promotion must include both full recognition of civil, political, social, economic and cultural
rights and, through innovative measures, structural and institutional
changes, reform and development. Also, governments should endeavor to
involve actively all segments of society through educational activities.
Since the ECOSOC resolution, the U.N. General Assembly has adopted
several resolutions.94 The most recent requests the U.N. Secretary-General to undertake a comprehensive analytical study on the subject, to be
submitted to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights.9 5
The link between human rights and participation has been recognized in several U.N. instruments. The Proclamation of Teheran,9 6 the
Declaration of Social Progress and Development,97 the International Coy-

88. Id., at 53-54.
89. See Report of the 39th Session of the Commission on Human Rights, ESCOR
Supp. (No. 3) at 23, U.N. Doc. E/1983/13, E/CN.4/1983/60 (1983).
90. See U.N. Doc. A/37/442 €STPO(1982).
91. See POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN DECISION-MAKING FOR DEVELOPMENT, U.N. Sales
No. E. 75. IV. 10, 1975. See also U.N. Doc. E/CN.5/532, entitled, PopularParticipationand
its PracticalImplications for Development.
92. G. A. Res. 1929 (LVIII) of May 6, 1975.
93. Popular Participation in Decision-Making for Development, supra note 91, at 4.
94. These include G. A. Resolutions 32/130 of Dec. 16, 1977; 34/46 of Nov. 23, 1979;
and 37/55 of Dec. 3, 1982.
95. See Draft Res. 1, supra note 41, at 1.
96. See Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF. 32/41, 1968, U.N. Sales No. E. 68. XIV. 2 (1968).
97. The Declaration was adopted by G. A. Res. 2542 (XXIV) (1969) and endorsed
again in G. A. Res. 32/117 (1977). Article 5 states that social progress and development
require the full utilization of human resources, including especially, "(c) The active partici-
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enant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights9", the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 9 and the International Development
Strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade' 00 all refer to
and recognize participation in development as a human right. In 1980, the
UNESCO general conference referred to participation in a resolution as
to be "regarded both as a human right and a means for the exercise of
human rights."''
Similarly, the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights noted in its 1980 report that "neglect of economic and social
rights, especially when political participation has been suppressed, produces the kind of social polarization that then leads to acts of terrorism
by and against the government."' 10'
The Yugoslavian representative at the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights discussed the Yugoslavian seminar on popular participation and
made a distinction between the right to participate and actual participation by all citizens:
Citizens at the grass-roots level could not be expected to participate
actively unless there were concrete advantages in doing so and their
experience in the course of participatory activities confirmed their
hopes. As long as people felt that they were agents in control of their
own destiny rather than objects of manipulation or passive recipients
of development, they could accept sacrifices and disruption of their
10 3
way of life.
Popular participation, as a basic human right, is a precondition for
economic and social development. It is an essential component of the
right to development. Since it is such an important component, the right
must not be illusory. For meaningful participation, and hence meaningful
development, the participation must allow the individual to meaningfully
contribute to, rather than being manipulated by, the participating process. Because the individual should be the principal beneficiary of societal
development, the individual should have the opportunity to participate in
the national development decision-making process and in the implementation and monitoring of such plans.

pation of all elements of society ... in defining and in achieving the common goals of development with full respect for the fundamental freedoms embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."
98. Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, arts. 8 (right to form trade
unions), 13 (right to education), and 15 (right to enjoy the benefits of science and culture).
99. Covenant on Civil and Political Right, arts. 19(1) (right to hold opinions); 19(2)
(right to freedom of expression); 21 (right to peaceful assembly); 22 (right to freedom of
association); and 25 (right to participate in the electoral process).
100. See supra note 10, para. 82.
101. G. A. Res. 3/01.3, para. (e) 1980, see also ILO, Employment, Growth and Basic
Needs: A One-World Problem, (1976).
102. OAS Doc. OEA/Ser. G, CP/Doc. 1110/80, at 142 (1980).
103. U.N. Doc., E/CN.4/1983/SR.18, at 5 (1983).
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6. Human Rights and Individual and Collective Aspects of
Development
The discussion on the relationship between human rights and individual and collective aspects of development has centered around the
right to development. Since voluminous literature already exists on the
subject,104 this discussion is confined to selected aspects of the relationship, especially the recent deliberations at the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights.
The right to development has been characterized as a right to the
"realization of the potentialities of the human person in harmony with
the community."' 0 5 It has also been understood as a process designed to
create conditions in which every person can enjoy and exercise all his or
her human rights, including economic, social, cultural, civil, and political
rights.' 08 As we shall see, there is a clear implication that everyone has
the right under international law to participate in and benefit from development to improve the quality of his or her life.
The right to development has evolved from the right of political communities, states, and peoples subjugated to foreign and colonial domination, and it is articulated in the demands of the NIEO and the Charter of
Economic Progress.10 7 The right to development is now considered to be
integrated into an economic, social, cultural and political context which
includes and transcends economic growth and has both individual and
collective dimensions. This has no doubt been the result of several U.N.
initiatives. To illustrate, in 1977 the U.N. Commission on Human Rights
recommended to ECOSOC that, in cooperation with UNESCO and other
institutions, the Secretary-General should investigate the right to development.'08 This was followed by the 1979 report of the U.N. SecretaryGeneral which contains perhaps the most thorough and detailed explanation of the right to development."' In addition, a 15 member working
group of governmental experts continues to work on a draft declaration
on the right to development." 0
While the working group continues its efforts toward finding a consensus on the content of the draft declaration,"' it is useful to recall that
support for the right to development can be found in several existing in-

i04. See the authorities cited in note i, supra.
105. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1334, para. 27 (1979).
106. See generally Seminar on the Relations that Exist Between Human Rights,
Peace and Development, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/SER.A/10 (1981).
107. See Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, art. 16, G. A. Res. 3281
(XXIX) (1974).
108. U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Res. 4 (XXXIII) (1977).
109. See Report of the Secretary General, supra note 68.
110. See Report of the Working Group of Governmental Experts on the Right to Development, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1983/11 (1982).
111. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G. A. Res. 217 (III), arts. 1, 22, 26, 28,
and 29 (1948).
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ternational instruments-the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, " 2
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 13
the U.N. Charter," 4 the African Charter on Human and People's
Rights," 5 and several resolutions and declarations adopted at the United
Nations and in other U.N. bodies. "'
The discussion on the draft declaration at the 1983 session of the
U.N. Commission on Human Rights showed convergence on certain issues
although there remained divergent viewpoints on several others. " ' Several delegates described the right to development as a "synthesis right,"
encompassing the sum of the conditions and obligations which would allow the effective realization of other fundamental human rights. Some
called it a new right. Some defined it as "a right of solidarity," while
others called it a right belonging to a "third generation of human rights,"
which includes the right to peace, environmental protection, and the common heritage of mankind.
While the point was repeatedly made that respect for human rights is
a prerequisite for development of the human personality, the individual
dimension of the right to development was emphasized by several delegates. Others, however, focused their attention on the collective aspects of
the right. According to the former, the right to development means the
right of each individual to have the opportunity to develop his or her full
potential. The latter, however, stresses the right of each state, irrespective
of its economic and political system or its level of development, to have
an equal opportunity to attain a level of development at which the full
and free development of the full potential of the human person is possible. Accordingly, genuine development and personal fulfillment can only
be achieved in a social context and through the attainment by the people
of rights such as the right to self-determination, and to permanent sovereignty over natural resources. Reference thus would be primarily to arti-

112. For example, the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights refers to the
relationship between human rights and development by recognizing the human right to an
adequate standard of living and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. It also
recognizes, in art. 11, the importance of international cooperation to implement this human
right. See generally id., arts. 1, 2, 3, 6, 11, 22, and 23.
113. Preamble, art. 22, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev. 5, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 58
(1982).
114. U.N. Charter, arts. 1(1), 2(1), 55 and 56.
115. See, e.g., G. A. Resolutions 3201 and 3202 (SVI) of May 1, 1974; 3281 (XXIX) of
Dec. 12, 1974; 3362 (S-VII) of Sept. 16, 1975; 32/150 of Dec. 16, 1977; 34/46 of Nov. 23, 1979;
35/56 of Dec. 5, 1980; and 37/55 of Dec. 3, 1982. For the appropriate resolutions of the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights, see Resolutions 2 (XXXI) of Feb. 10, 1975; 4 (XXXIII) of
Feb. 21, 1977; 4 and 5 (XXXV) of March 2, 1979; 6 and 7 (XXXVI) of Feb. 21, 1980; 36
(XXXVII) of March 11, 1981; 1982/17 of March 9, 1982; and 1983/14 and 1983/15 of Feb.
22, 1983. For the activities of other U.N. bodies, see U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1334, 1979, Annex 1,
at 1-8.
116. Report of the Independent Commission of International Development Issues,
North-South: A Programme for Survival (1980).
117. For a report on their work, see supra note 110.
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cle 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provides that
everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights
and freedoms set forth in the Declaration could be fully realized.
Notwithstanding different approaches inherent in developing the
right, there seems to be wide agreement that the right to development
must be considered a comprehensive right: one which includes the material as well as the moral and intellectual dimensions for individuals, societies, and the international community. Similarly, notwithstanding different viewpoints on whether the right to development should be considered
as a synthesis of all human rights proclaimed in the Universal Declaration
and the Covenants or as a new human right, there seems to be consensus
that it has both quantitative and qualitative aspects. Moreover, the consensus is that the development process should be seen as a dynamic and
continuous one, encompassing the realization of all human rights and
designed to benefit all members of society without discrimination. Thus,
the ultimate objective of development is to provide a maximum degree of
freedom and dignity for human beings and to secure the development and
well-being of societies to achieve a better quality of life for all.
It seems desirable that both international and national aspects of development be given equal attention and that it be recognized that, in the
last analysis, it is the development of the individual which is a prerequisite to the development of every society and the world community. Thus,
the right of development can best be viewed as the right of everyone to
benefit from an order that ensures that both sets of rights - economic,
social and cultural, and civil and political - are fully implemented.
IV.

APPRAISAL AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The preceding discussion has illustrated the wide range of issues related to the relationship between development and human rights which
are currently being addressed in the international arena. A consensus
seems to be emerging that all human rights are interdependent, indivisible and of equal importance. There is an enhanced recognition that respect for human rights is a prerequisite for the development of the
human personality. Consequently, an individual's right to development
places a concomitant duty on the state to ensure to each individual the
full and free right of participation and benefit from the development pro-

cess of tlhe society

whole.

In order that the enjoyment of human rights be fully realized by all
peoples, both internal and external conditions must be accorded equal
importance. If development is to be considered in terms of "the pursuit of
happiness," it is essential that the focus be on the human person and not
on the structures which should serve him or her. This implies that realization of one set of rights is not to be made dependent upon the realization of the other, for civil and political rights have no meaning unless the
satisfaction of basic material needs is ensured, and vice versa. Thus the
right to life, health, education, security, and employment, housing and
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the enjoyment of an adequate standard of living and the development of
the human personality are all of equal weight. In this context, a warning
contained in a U.N. report of two decades ago,118 about the dangers inherent in development policy, is pertinent even today:
One of the greatest dangers in development policy lies in the tendency
to give to the more material aspects of growth an overriding and disproportionate emphasis. The end may be forgotten in preoccupation
with the means. Human rights may be submerged and human beings
seen only as instruments of production rather than as free entities for
whose welfare and cultural advance the increased production is
intended."'
The U.N. Commission on Human Rights is the proper body to seek
assurances from states that no development policy shall be established or
implemented which involves violations of the civil and political or economic, social and cultural rights of its population or individuals. Appropriate monitoring mechanisms to ensure that states comply with this
norm should also be established.120
High on the agenda for international action should be the realization
of equity and justice both domestically and in the international arena.
Thus, on the international plane, the need is to promote national and
collective self-reliance of the developing countries, to abolish old and new
forms of domination, and to offer special assistance to the developing
countries. Nationally, it is essential that programs of social and economic
reform are instituted so that the right of each individual to have the opportunity to develop his or her full potential becomes a reality. It is imperative that further studies and action focused on the effective means to
implement these objectives be undertaken not only by the United Nations and regional intergovernmental organizations but by nongovernmental organizations as well.

118. For discussions on the draft, see U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1983/SR.17, 18, 19, 20 (1983).
The following discussion is based on the comments of the delegates, reported therein.
119. Five-year Perspective, 1960-1964, U.N. Doc. E/3347/Res. 1.
120. Id., para. 90.

Sex Discrimination in Britain,
the United States and
the European Community
CHRISTOPHER A. DOCKSEY*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1957, six European states signed the Treaty of Rome' and established thereby the European Economic Community or "Common Market,

"a Community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its own
personality, and its own legal capacity."' 2 The European Community is an
economic confederation aimed ultimately at a "United States of Europe," and its founding fathers drew up the Treaty as an embryo Constitution,4 left deliberately open ended to allow the Community to develop
and to achieve aims unforeseen in 1957. The European Community 5 cur* Christopher Docksey is a Lecturer in Law at the University of Exeter. LL.M., University of Virginia, 1976; M.A., Cambridge University, 1974; Visiting Professor of Law, Marshall-Wyethe School of Law & William and Mary School of Law, 1982-83. Mr. Docksey is a
member of the English and Welsh bars.
1. The Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community Mar. 25, 1957,
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 298 U.N.T.S. 11. [hereinafter
cited as the Treaty of Rome or EEC Treaty].
2. Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L. [1964] E. Comm. J.Rep. 585, 593, 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R.
425, 455 (1964). See infra note 11.
3. "We must build a kind of United States of Europe." Speech by Winston Churchill,
Zurich University (Sept. 19, 1946). The first step by the Six was to place national coal and
steel production under a common supra national authority, the European Coal and Steel
Community, in 1951, See infra note 5. Attempts at political integration via a European
Defense Community and a European Political Community were set back by the collapse of
the European Defense Treaty in 1954, but were resumed by the Six at the Messina Conference in June, 1955. The Conference resolved to "pursue the establishment of a United Europe through the development of common institutions, a progressive fusion of national economies, the creation of a Common Market and harmonisation of social policies," and led to
the Treaty of Rome in 1957, note 1 supra.For the historical background, see R. MAYNE, THE
RECOVERY OF EUROPE 194573 (rev. ed. 1973); R. VAUGHAN, TWENTIETHCENTURY EUROPE:
PATHS TO UNITY (1979).

4. "[T]he EEC Treaty has, in a sense, the character of a genuine constitution, the constitution of the Community ... but for the greater part, the Treaty has above all the character of what we call a 'loi-cadre;' and this is a perfectly legitimate approach when one is
dealing with a situation of an evolutionary nature such as the establishment of a Common
Market ....
" Submissions of Advocate General Lagrange, Flaminio Costa v. E.N.E.L., 3
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 425, 442 (1964).
5. The "Community" consists of three Communities: Coal and Steel (The Treaty Instituting the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S 140); the European Economic Community (note 1 supra); and, Euratom (The Treaty Creating the European Atomic Energy Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 169). Since 1967 the
Communities have been administered by common institutions - A Commission, Council,
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rently has ten member States, e with two more to follow shortly, 7 and today it resembles a functional quasifederal entity8 rather than a simple
international economic confederation such as E.F.T.A. s or G.A.T.T.1"
The quasi-federal nature of Community law, commonly known as
"functional federalism", flows from its status as a new, independent and
autonomous legal order,1" and is supreme over the national law of the

Parliament, and Court of Justice. See Convention on Certain Institutions Common to the
European Communities, Mar.25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 267, and Treaty Establishing a Single
Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities (Merger Treaty), Apr. 8,
1965, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd 5179). For a discussion of the Communities and their
Institutions, See P.S.R.F MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW (3rd ed. 1980).
See also D. LASOK & J.W. BRIDGE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITmES (3d ed. 1982).
6. Denmark, Eire and the United Kingdom joined in 1973. See Treaty of Accession to
the European Economic Community, Jan. 22, 1972, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179).
Norway signed, but was unable to ratify the Treaty, following a negative Referendum, and
did not become a member. Greece joined in 1981. See Second Treaty of Accession, May 28,
1979, 291 O.J.L. 9 (Nov. 19, 1979).
7. It was hoped that Spain and Portugal would become members of the Community
simultaneously in 1983, but complex negotiations have delayed both applications and it also
seems likely that Portugal will be ready in advance of Spain. See School's Brief: The Enlarging of Europe, The Economist, Dec. 18, 1982, at 58-9, col. 3.
8. The Community was also labelled early on a "prefederal association." Mueller-Graff,
Direct Elections to the European Parliament, 11 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 1, 5 (1979). See
Bride, American Analogues in the Law of the European Community, 11 ANGLO-AM. L.R.
131 (1982).
9. Concerned about the impact of the original European Economic Community on
trade, the seven countries of Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland,
and the United Kingdom joined in a cooperative regional economic integration movement,
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), under the Stockholm Convention in 1960.
Convention Establishing the European Free Trade Association, Jan. 4, 1960, 370 U.N.T.S. 3.
Later joined by Finland and Iceland, the EFTA sought to remove internal barriers to trade,
such as tariffs and quantitative import quotas, and to this extent has been largely successful. Unlike the EEC, EFTA has not sought to achieve political union. See S. ROBOCK, K.
SIMMONDS & J. ZWICK, INTERNATIONAL BusiNEss AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 135-36
(rev. ed. 1977).

10. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. Pts. 5 & 6,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 186, commonly known as GATT, is the principal multilateral
arrangement directed toward establishing a free system of trade by substantially reducing
tariffs and other nontariff barriers to trade and by eliminating discriminatory treatment.
Becoming effective in 1948, GATT now has over eighty members. The Agreement provides
governing the conduct of international trade in the areas of customs, licensing, government
procurement, and such; and (3) consultations among Members to establish policies and resolve disputes. See generally K. W. DAM, THE GATT; LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION (1970); J. H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT (1969); S.
ROBOCK, K. SIMMONDS & J. ZWICK, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 127-30 (rev. ed. 1977); H. STmNER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS

1141-75 (2d ed. 1976).
11. See Flaminio Costa, 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 425, 439 (submissions of Advocate General Lagrange). This case is the cornerstone of the doctrine of supremacy; the Court of Justice declared:
[T]he Treaty instituting the E.E.C. has created its own order which was inte-
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member States.12 One of the principal areas of Community "federal" jurisdiction is the improvement and harmonisation of "social" law, which
includes the enhancement of protection against sex discrimination in the
workplace. The law here is of special interest to Americans, because it not
only draws from American jurisprudence but also has something to offer
in return.
One member State, the United Kingdom, developed an advanced
code of gender discrimination protection before the relevant Community
Law became operative. British Ministers travelled to the United States to
examine American law in this area, and the relevant British legislation,
though obviously targeted on specific local needs and tradition,"8 drew

grated with the national order of the memberStates the moment the Treaty
came into force; as such, it is binding upon them. In fact, by creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its own personality
and its own capacity in law, apart from having international standing and more
particularly, real powers resulting from a limitation of competence or a transfer of powers from the States to the Community, the member-States, albeit
within limited spheres, have restricted their sovereign rights and created a
body of law applicable both to their nationals and to themselves. The reception, within the laws of each member-State, of provisions having a Community
source, and more particularly of the terms and of the spirit of the Treaty, has
as a corolary the impossibility, for the member-State, to give preference to a
unilateral and subsequent measure against a legal order accepted by them on a
basis of reciprocity.
Id. at 455. Cf. Wyatt, New Legal Order or Old?, 7 EUR. L. REV. 147 (1982).
12. Flaminio Costa, 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 455. See also Amministrazione delle Finanze
dello Stato v. Simmenthal S.p.A. (No. 2), [1978] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 629, 23 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 263 (1978), currently the highwater mark of the doctrine of supremacy, see Note, Has
the "Incoming Tide" Reached the Palace of Westminster?, 95 L.Q. REv. 167 (1979). Within
its own terms, Community law is supreme over any form of prior or subsequent national
law, and national courts in practice give effect to this doctrine. J. USHER, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND NATIONAL LAW: THE IRREVERSIBLE TRANSFER

(1981). Although supremacy is

limited to the scope of Community Law, that scope, in areas such as social and commercial
law, is constantly increasing, e.g., remarks of Lord Denning M.R. in H.P. Bulmer Ltd. v. J.
Bollinger S.A., [1974] Ch. 401, at 418:
[T]he Treaty covers only those matters which have a European element....
The Treaty does not touch any of the matters which concern solely England
and the people in it. These are still governed by English law. They are not
affected by the Treaty. But when we come to matters with a European element, the Treaty is like an incoming tide.
13. It should be strongly emphasized, however, that sexism in both systems has operated in a very similar manner in both countries in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries.
Women were simultaneously excluded from the legal profession in the United States,
Bradwell v. The State, 83 U.S. 130 (1873)(Illinois state law prohibiting women from practicing law upheld), and from the medical profession in Scotland, JexBlake v. Senatus of the
University of Edinburgh, 11 M. 784 (1873). Women had to wait half a century to gain the
right to vote, in 1918 in the United Kingdom and 1920 in the United States. For a comparative history of women and the law up to the present, see A. SACHS & J. WILSON,SEXISM AND
THE LAW, A STUDY OF MALE BELIEFS AND JUDICIAL BIAS (1978).
It made no difference whether the judges were operating in the context of the
British system which enshrines the supremacy of Parliament, or whether they
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heavily on American theory and practice. Indeed, as will be seen, the
British legislation sought to improve upon perceived inadequacies in
American law. However, the European Community provisions were developed independently of U.S. law and have led to a series of cases from the
United Kingdom seeking to strike down provisions of United Kingdom
law allegedly inconsistent with Community law."' By an ironic twist of
fate, American theory has been used by the European Court of Justice to
analyze the inadequacy of provisions of United Kingdom law; provisions
inspired by American jurisprudence. This article will review the legal responses to common problems of gender discrimination arising in the
United States, Britain, and the European Community.

II. THE LEGAL STRUCTURES' 5
The United States has enjoyed a system of federal anti-discrimination law for almost two decades. In 1963, the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1933 (FLSA) s was augmented by the Equal Pay Act 17 which required
that men and women performing "equal work" in the same establishment
should receive equal pay."8 An aggrieved party may resort to the federal
courts under the normal FLSA procedure.' 9 The second major anti-discrimination statute, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, was passed the following year, 1964.0 Under Title VII, it is an unfair employment practice
for those covered by the legislation 21 to discriminate in employment opportunities: hiring, firing, conditions in employment, promotion, benefits,

functioned in terms of the American Constitution guaranteeing individual
rights ....
The prevailing conception of womenhood proved to be a far more
compelling determinant of judicial behavior than the terms of the statute or
the words of the Constitution!
Id. at 225-26.
14. MacCarthy's Ltd. v. Smith, [1979] 3 All E.R. 325 (C.A.), [1981] 1 All E.R. 111
(E.C.J.), 120 (C.A.), noted in Schofield, 9 INDUS. L. J. 173 (1980); Worringham v. Lloyds
Bank Ltd., 27 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 293 (E.A.T.), 302 (C.A.) (1980), [1981] Indus. Cas. R. 558
(E.C.J.), [1982] Indus. Cas. R. 299 (C.A.); Jenkins v. Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Ltd.,
[1980] INDUS. REL. L.R. 6 (E.A.T.), 31 COMM. MKT. L.R. 24 (E.C.J.) (1981), [1981] INDUS.
CAS. R. 715 (E.A.T.), noted in 4 EUR. L. REV. 193 (1980)(Court of Justice decisions); Eileen
Garland v. British Rail Engineering Ltd., [1979] Indus. Cas. R. 558 (C.A.); [1982] INDUS.
CAs. R. 420 (E.C.J. and H.L.) Burton v. British Railways Board; [19821 Indus. Cas. R. 329
(E.C.J.). It is not surprising that the United Kingdom has provided all the recent art. 177
references to the Court of Justice in this arena; (see note 35, supra), the British legislation
is extensive and specific, was passed without reference to the developing European legislation, and provides easy and swift remedial access.
15. For a broad survey of legal protections in the United States and the United Kingdom, see Covington, American and British Employment DiscriminationLaw: An Introductory Comparative Survey, 10 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 359 (1977).
16. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1976).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(1976). Pub. L. No. 8838 (1963), 77 Stat. 56.
19. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)(1976).
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(17) (1976).
21. See infra note 28.
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etc.-on the ground, inter alia,22 of sex. An aggrieved individual must
initially file a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis24
sion (EEOC) 23 or the appropriate state or local fair employment agency.
If the EEOC is unsuccessful in conciliating or settling the issue, the complainant may proceed de novo before the ordinary courts. 25 Administrative enforcement and review of both statutes is entrusted to the EEOC. 26
In the United Kingdom, there are two fairly specific analogues to the
American legislation, the Equal Pay Act of 19702" and the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975.28 The two Acts came into force on the same date,

22. Title VII also prohibits discrimination on the grounds of race, color, religion or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2) (1976). It is commonly thought that "sex" was added to
the grounds of discrimination as a careless afterthought, or even to "kill the Bill," but a
recent analysis of the legislative history concludes that Congress' extension of Title VII to
cover sex discrimination was deliberate and purposeful. See Gold, A Tale of Two Amendments: The Reasons Congress Added Sex to Title VII, and Their Implication for the Issue
of Comparable Worth, 19 DUQ. L. REV. 453 (1981).
23. Claims must be filed within 180 days of the unfair employment practice. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(5)(e)(1976). For EEOC practice and procedure in dealing with complaints, see Katz,
Investigation and Conciliation of Employment Discrimination Charges under Title VII:
Employment Rights in an Adversary Process, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 877 (1977).
24. In which case, the period of limitation to file a complaint with the EEOC under
Title VII is extended to 300 days, or to within 30 days of notification that the State or local
agency has terminated proceedings under State or local law, whichever is the earlier. 42
U.S.C. Sec. 2000e(5)(e) (1976).
25. Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 (1976)(federal employees have same right to
trial de novo as private employees); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36
(1974)(federal courts not bound to refer to arbitrator's decision but should consider employee's claim de novo; doctrines of election of remedies and waiver, and federal policy respecting arbitration do not limit independent access under Title VII); McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (charging party is not limited to EEOC determination of
"reasonable cause" in instituting court action).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(5) (1976). For a topical survey of the work of the EEOC, see
LEACH & OWENS, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY TODAY: A TIME OF SCRUTINY AND EvALUATION (1981). Enforcement was originally the responsibility of the Wages and Hour Division
of the United States Department of Labor. Jurisdiction was transferred to the EEOC under
Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, effective July 1, 1979. Enforcement had been divided for
many years because the EEOC was seen as primarily concerned with racial discrimination
under Title VII. Therefore, it was thought that a separate enforcement body to focus on sex
discrimination in pay would be appropriate. In the United Kingdom, there are still separate
enforcement agencies for race discrimination, the Commission of Racial Equality (Part VII,
Race Relations Act 1976), and sex discrimination, the Equal Employment Opportunities
Commission (Part VI, Sex Discrimination Act 1975). The British provisions and agencies are
not limited to employment discrimination but also cover education and the provision of
goods and services.
27. Equal Pay Act, 1970, ch. 41 (as amended by Sex Discrimination Act 1975).
28. Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, ch. 65 [hereinafter cited Sex Discrimination Act].
Part II of the Sex Discrimination Act, entitled "Discrimination in the Employment Field,
amended the Equal Pay Act 1970. In the main, coverage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e(17) and the Sex Discrimination Act, Part II, relating to
employment is very similar. Both protect "employees," those working or seeking work (42
U.S.C. § 2000e(f); Sex Discrimination Act §§ 6(1), (2)) from discrimination by "employers"
(42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b); Sex Discrimination Act § 6) "labor organizations" (42 U.S.C. §
2000e(e)) or "trade unions" (Sex Discrimination Act § 12) and "employment agencies" (42
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December 29, 1975, and together form a more or less harmonious code
against sex discrimination. Both statutes are administered by the Equal
Opportunities Commission (EOC), a statutory body created for this purpose by the Sex Discrimination Act. 9 Aggrieved individuals may present
a complaint under either Act directly to the local statutory labor court
known as the "Industrial Tribunal." s
In 1971, the United Kingdom signed the Treaty of Accession and
subjected United Kingdom law to Community law.3 1 In the area of gender

U.S.C. 2000e(c); Sex Discrimination Act § 15). There is a minimum qualifying number of
employees (15 under Title VII 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) and 6 under the Sex Discrimination Act
§ 6(3)(b), which also exempts private households Sex Discrimination Act § 6(3)(a)). On July
25, 1980, the European Commission decided to commence infringement proceedings under
article 169 of the Treaty of Rome (note 1 supra) against the United Kingdom on the basis
that the Sec. 6(3) exclusion of private households and small businesses is contrary to article
2 of the Equal Treatment Directive, 76/207/EEC. Europe, July 26, 1980 (magazine) at 8.
One major difference is the protection against "marriage bar" discrimination under Sec. 3 of
the Sex Discrimination Act, see infra Part IV of text.
29. See Sex Discrimination Act, supra note 28, Part VI (regarding composition and
duties of the Equal Opportunities Commission) Part VII (enforcement) and sched. 3 (incorporation, personnel and finance). See Byrne and Lovenduski, Sex Equality and the Law in
Britain, 5 BRIT. J.L. & Soc'Y 148 (1978).
30. Equal Pay Act, 1970, ch. 41 § 2; Sex Discrimination Act, supra note 28, § 63. See
also Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1978, ch. 44 § 128, sched. 9. The Industrial Tribunal has jurisdiction over all statutory individual employment rights. It comprises
a panel intended to be an "industrial jury" consisting of a legally qualified chairman supported by two "wing" persons representing either side of industry. Appeals on law are to the
Employment Appeal Tribunal [hereinafter EAT], a superior court of record, in London for
England and Wales, and Edinburgh for Scotland. See Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1978, ch. 44, §§ 135, 136 and sched. 11. See Phillips, Some Notes on the EAT, 7
INDUs. L.J. 137 (1978). Appeals thence are in the normal way to the Court of Appeal and the
House of Lords. At any stage, a Tribunal or Court may refer a question on Community Law
to the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg under article 177 of the Treaty of Rome
(note 1 supra). See infra note 35.
31. The actual date of subordination is January 1st, 1973, but for totally different reasons under British constitutional law and Community law. Under the former, treatymaking
falls under the Royal Prerogative, and international obligations incurred by the Crown have
no internal effect unless and until transformed by Act of Parliament into municipal law:
Within the British Empire there is a wellestablished rule that the making of a
treaty is an executive act, while the performance of its obligations, if they entail alteration of the existing domestic law, requires legislative action. Unlike
some other countries, the stipulations of a treaty duly ratified do not within
the Empire, by virtue of the treaty alone, have the force of law.
Per Lord Atkin, Attorney-Genera"
...
r Cana,. v.Attorney-General for Ontario, f 1937] A.C.
326, 347.
Thus, for example, the European Convention of Human Rights has no internal legal
effect. Ahmad v. I.L.E.A., [1978] 1 All E.R. 574. Community law is only part of British law
insofar as it has been incorporated by the European Communities Act, 1972 ch. 68, which
came into force on January 1st, 1973. For the modes of transformation adopted by the Act
see Mitchell, Kuipers & Gall, ConstitutionalAspects of the Treaty and Legislation Relating to British Membership, 9 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 134 (1972). The situation is different in
the other member states. See K. LIPSTmN, THE LAw OF THE EUROPEAN EcONOMIC COMMUNITY Ch. 2, pt. X (1974).
In contrast, the critical date under Community law is the ratification and entry into
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discrimination, there are two levels of enforcement under Community
law: by individuals under Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome, and by the
European Commission under the Equal Pay and Equal Treatment
Directives.
First, article 119 obliges member states to: "[E]nsure and subsequently maintain the application of the principle that men and women
should receive equal pay for equal work. ' '3 2 Article 119 has been held to
be "directly effective,""3 that is, it is a provision of Community law which
confers rights on individuals which they may enforce before their national
courts. 4 Individuals may thus plead article 119 before United Kingdom

force of the Treaty of Accession of January 22nd, 1972, which was, coincidentally, January
1st, 1973. Like ratification of the Treaty of Rome by the original Six this constituted a
definitive extraconstitutional political act constituting a new legal order. See submissions of
Procureur-General Touffait in Administration des Douanes v. Soc. Cafas Jacques Vabre, 16
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 336, 364 (French Cour de Cassation) (1975), discussed in Simon and
Dowrick, Effect of EEC Directives in France: The Views of the of the Conseil d'Etat, 95
L.Q. REV. 376 (1979). See also L. COLLINS, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM Ch. 1 (2d ed. 1980); Dagtoglou, European Communities and Constitutional Law, 32
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 256 (1973); Trinidade, ParliamentarySovereignty and the Primacy of European Community Law, 35 MOD. L. REv 375 (1972).
32. The full text of article 119 is as follows:
Each Member State shall during the first stage ensure and subsequently maintain the application of the principle that men and women should receive equal
pay for equal work.
For the purpose of this Article, 'pay' means the ordinary basic or minimum wage or salary and any other consideration which the worker receives,
directly or indirectly, whether in cash or in kind, from his employer in respect
of his employment.
Equal pay without discrimination based on sex means: (a) that pay for the
same work at piece-rates shall be calculated on the basis of the same unit of
measurement; (b) that pay for work at time-rates shall be the same for the
same job.
Article 119 is perhaps the most dynamic provision of social law in the Treaty of Rome,
but was included in the Treaty at the insistence of France for reasons of national selfinterest. The Preamble to the French Constitution of 1946, confirmed by the 1958 Constitution,
requires equal rights for women men "in all spheres." This was particularized into a duty to
pay equally for work of equal value by the Act of 22nd December 1972 (Code du travail, art.
L. 1402). See F. SCHMIDT, DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT: A STUDY OF SIX COUNTRIES BY
THE COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW GROUP 142 (1978). France was concerned lest her textile industry, heavily serviced by women, would be at a competitive disadvantage as against textile
producers in other Common Market nations. See Szyszczak, Problems of Equal Pay Within
the EEC Perspective, 131 New L.J. 39 (1981).
See also submission of Belgium to the Court of Justice in the first Defrenne case: "The
Belgian State, represented by the Minister of Social Security, states that Article 119 of the
Treaty has only an economic objective, since its aim is to avoid discrepancies in cost prices
due to the employment of female labour less well paid for the same work than male labour."
Defrenne v. Belgium, 1972 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 445, 449.
33. Defrenne v. Sabena, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. Rep. 455, 18 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 98.
34. N.V. Algemene Transport en Expeditie Onderneming Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1. See Bebr, Directly Applicable Provisions of Community Law: The Development of a Community Concept, 19
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 257 (1970); Steiner, The Application of European Community law in
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courts3" in addition to the Equal Pay Act and the Sex Discrimination Act,
or in preference to the national legislation where such is inferior.3 6
Second, pursuant to the European Social Action Programme of
1974, s" there are two binding directives on sexual equality in the work
place. 8 The Equal Pay Directive amplifies article 119 and, inter alia, radically extends the scope of the principle of "equal pay."3 9 The Equal

National Courts Problems, Pitfalls and Percepts, 96 L.Q. REV 126 (1980); Warner, The
Relationship between European Community law and the National Laws of Member States,
93 L.Q. REV. 349 (1977); Winter, Direct Applicability and Direct Effect, 9 COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 425 (1972).
35. There is no system of "federal" courts to enforce Community Law. National courts
interpret and apply their own national law, and as "common law" (i.e., Community) courts
apply Community law where the law is clear. Where there is a question of interpretation of
Community law, any court or tribunal may, and every court of final jurisdiction must, refer
the question to the Court of Justice for an advisory opinion, or "prelim inary ruling" under
art. 177 of the Treaty of Rome. Art. 177 establishes the Court of Justice as the final and
authoritative arbiter of Community law under the Treaty System of "organic cooperation
between the two orders of jurisdiction." Per Advocate General Lagrange, Flaminio Costa v.
E.N.E.L., 3 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 438, 443-44 (1964). See generally, Barav, Some Aspects of the
PreliminaryRulings Procedurein EEC Law, 2 EUR. L. REv. 3 (1977); BRIDGE, Community
Law and English Courts and Tribunals: General Principles and Preliminary Rulings, 1
EUR. L. REV. 13 (1976); GRAY, Advisory Opinions and the European Court of Justice, 8
EUR. L. REv. 24 (1983). An attempt by the British Court of Appeal to restrict the privilege

of the lower courts to ask for a preliminary ruling was found to be inconsistent with art. 177
and may not necessarily be authoritative. H.P. BULMER LTD. v. J. BOLLINGER S.A., [1974]
Ch. 401, 420-426. See, e.g., Pigs Marketing Board v. Redmond, 22 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 697,
706-07 (1978).
36. Note 14 supra.
37. Council Resolution on a Social Action Programme of 21 Jan. 1974, 17 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. C13) 1 (1974). The Council of the Communities expressed the political will to
achieve certain objectives, including the attainment of full and better employment in the
Community, during a first stage over the period 1974-1976. Specific priorities include: (1)
action to ensure equality between men and women regarding access to employment, to vocational guidance and training, and in respect of work conditions and pay; (2) the reconciliation of family responsibilities with the professional aspirations of the people concerned. On
Dec. 9, 1981 the Commission submitted a memorandum to the Council proposing a New
Community Action Programme on the Promotion of Equal Opportunities for Women 19821985, Com(81) 758 final. The Commission proposed specific action to (1) strengthen the
rights of the individual as a way of achieving equal treatment, involving closer monitoring of
the Directives, new legal measures, and specific guidelines with regard to unfamiliar concepts, such as indirect discrimination, and (2) achieve equal opportunities in practice, involving vocational and educational initiatives.
Towards these ends, the Commission has set up an Advisory Committee on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men to advise the Commission and coordinate activities of national bodies (such as the EOC). Decision of Dec. 9, 1981, 37 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 20) 35
(1982).
38. A third, on social security, Directive 79/7/EEC, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 6) 24
(1979), gives the member States until 1985 to implement its requirements. This is an unusually long implementation period, and was castigated by Parliamentarians as excessively long
and "astonishingly smug." Remarks of Mrs. Dunwoody, O.J.EuR. COMM. (No. 237) 135 (Dec.
13, 1978) (Debates of European Parliament).
39. Council Directive 75/117/EEC, 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 45) 19 (1975), art. 1(1).
"The principle of equal pay for men and women ... means, for the same work or for work
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Treatment Directive"' is an independent and novel provision4 1 which requires equal opportunities to be provided to men and women in vocational training4 2 and employment4 . The Court of Jusice has stressed that
only article 119 is directly effective and enforceable by individuals. The
Directives are detailed guidelines for member States, setting out objectives which must be implemented by national legislation in each State.
Individuals must bring suit under their own national law, rather than the
Directives. National legislation is monitored by the European Commission in Brussels. Recourse to the Court of Justice ensures, if necessary,
that the legislation adequately fulfills the requirements of the
Directives.""

III.

"SEx" DISCRIMINATION

An employer discriminates on the grounds of sex when it treats a
woman less favorably' 3 than a man". Three basic problems of definition

to which equal value is attributed, the elimination of all discrimination on grounds of sex
with regard to all aspects and conditions of remuneration." See Part V of text, infra.
40. Council Directive 76/207/EEC, 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 39) 40 (1976).
41. The Equal Treatment Directive was made under the general legislative authority of
art. 235 of the Treaty of Rome, implementing arts. 117 and 118. Also, the Social Action
Programme is a good example of the openended nature, traite cadre, of the Treaty of Rome.
42. Art. 4 of the Directive, note 40 supra, includes "all types and ... all levels of vocational guidance, vocational training, advanced vocational training and retraining." The European Commission has informed the U.K. Government that Sec.20 of the Sex Discrimination Act, which excludes the training and employment of midwives from the scope of the
Act, is contrary to the Directive. See London Times, Apr. 24, 1981, at 3, col. 6 (Discriminatory to compel male nurse in Sunderland to travel to Scotland or London to study because
only two nursing schools in U.K. admit male midwifery students). The Commission rejected
the frequently offered justification of privacy as applicable to midwifery, stating that it is
not one of the occupations excluded by art. 2(2) of the Directive in which "by reason of their
nature or the context in which they are carried out, the sex of the worker constitutes a
determining factor." See London Times, July 26, 1980, at 4, col. 1.
A contrary view was taken by an Arkansas District Court, which held that a male nurse
could lawfully be excluded under the BFOQ exception to Title VII from a hospital's labor
and delivery rooms in order to protect patients' "privacy and personal dignity." Backus v.
Baptist Medical Center, 510 F.Supp. 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1981), vacated as moot, 671 F.2d 1100
(8th Cir. 1982). Personal privacy of patients justified a BFOQ exception in Fesel v. Masonic
Home of Delaware, Inc., 447 F.Supp. 1346 (D.Del. 1978), afl'd mem., 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir.
1979). See Comment, Sex Discrimination Justified under Title VII: Privacy Rights in
Nursing Homes, 14 VAL. U.L. REv. 577 (1980).
43. Art. 3 requires equality of treatment with regard to hiring and promotion, and art. 5
requires equality of working conditions, including conditions governing dismissal. See Part
IV of text, infra.
44. The Commission enforces Directives under art. 169 of the Treaty of Rome. The
Commission first writes to the member State concerned and sets out its views on the alleged
infringement of the Directive. If the member State does not provide an answer satisfactory
to the Commission and refuses to amend its legislation in line with the Commission's views,
the Commission may initiate suit before the Court of Justice. The decision of the Court is
final, and its terms must be implemented by a member State found to be in default.
45. "'Disparate Treatment' . . . is the most easily understood type of discrimination.
The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race,
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arise: what is a "woman"; does discrimination on the grounds of sexual
preference constitute "gender" discrimination; and, is sexual harassment
(a phenomenon falling within the same cultural spectrum as rape4") an
evil which may properly be remedied by anti-discrimination legislation.
All three involve prejudice and cultural conditioning at the deepest level;
none were contemplated by the legislature when it considered the
legislation.
The woman who claims to be a man, or vice-versa, can present
problems to an employer in the context of affirmative action programmes
or protective legislation. At one level, the absurdity of cultural stereotyping is exposed when the same individual can step from one sex to the
other, and presumably be no better or worse a car mechanic or secretary
than before. At a deeper level, the transsexual will ask, who has the major
say on gender identity, the individual or the State? In one case, a person
was lawfully discharged under protective legislation because s/he was biologically female, i.e., had the ability to bear a child, notwithstanding a
personal decision at the age of seven to be a male.4 8 In Britain, so far,
Freud's maxim still holds true- "anatomy is destiny." Elsewhere, a contrary approach is gaining favor, that the right to determine one's physical
and psychological identity is a fundamental personal right which must be
recognized by the State. Authorities to this effect in California, 49 the Fed-

color, religion, sex or national origin." International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. U.S., 431
U.S. 324, 335 n. 15 (1977)(Stewart, J.). cf. Sex Discrimination Act, supra note 28, § 1(1)(1):
"A person discriminates against a woman. . . if on the ground of her sex he treats her less
favourably than he treats or would treat a man."
46. Or vice versa. Sex Discrimination Act, supra note 28, § 2. "Equality is the order of
the day. In both directions. For both sexes." Ministry of Defence v. Jeremiah, [1979] 3 All
E.R. 833, 836 (Lord Denning M.R.).
47. Sexual harassment and rape both involve invasion of the woman's personal privacy
and human dignity, the employment of superior power, economic or physical, and feelings of
shame and humiliation. See Montgomery, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, 10
GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 879, 880 (1980). Both tend to be underreported. See S. BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 175 (1975). See generally C.A. MAcKINNAN,
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979).
48. White v. British Sugar Corp., [1977] Indus. Rel. L. R. 121. See also Corbett v. Corbett, 1971 P. 83. The issue was the validity of an alleged marriage involving a male transsexual who had undergone surgery to become a female. The court held that sexual identity is
determined conclusively at birth and consists not only of the genital but also of the chromosomal and gonadal attributes of that person. This approach has been strongly criticised, see
Walton, When is a Woman Not a Woman?, 124 NEW L.J. 501 (1974); Pannick, Homosexuals, Transsexuals and the Sex DiscriminationAct, 1983 PUBLIC LAW 279.
49. M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (1976). A male transsexual had a sex change operation,
married and lived with her husband for two years. The court held she was a woman because
she had changed her genital anatomy to accord with her sense of self-identity as a female
and had brought about the necessary congruence between her psyche and genital features.
"Sex (is) one's selfimage, the deep psychological or emotional sense of sexual identity and
character." Id. at 209. See also Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir.
1977)(Goodwin, J., dissenting). "When a transsexual completes his or her transition from
one sexual identity to another, that person will have a sexual classification. Assuming that
this plaintiff has now undergone her planned surgery, she is ... female ...." Id. at 664.
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eral Republic of Germany, 50 and under the European Convention of
Human Rights5", are a powerful influence on the United Kingdom and
American jurisdictions to allow transsexuals to require the law to recognize their new sexual identity.
It is interesting to contrast this progressive definitional response to
transsexuality with the legal response to the second problem, sexual preference. Discrimination against homosexuals, the so-called "third sex,"
consistently provides clear examples of cultural stereotyping and
prejudice, 2 but such discrimination is not characterised in any jurisdiction as "sex" discrimination." None the less, certain individuals are particularly prone to suffer arbitrary discharge simply because of their sexual
preferences, unlike other individuals whose sexual preferences are socially
acceptable. In America and the United Kingdom, homosexuals are forced
to resort to alternative, less specific, legal remedies, 4 where they must
rebut what is effectively a presumption of wrongful behavior inferred
from their homosexuality by demonstrating that their sexual preferences
have no impact upon their jobs.5 5 Homosexuals are likely to remain rela-

50. Decision of Bundesverfassungsgericht of October 11, 1978, Juris tenzeitung 34, 64
(1979). German Basic Law arts. 1.1 (dignity of man) and 2.1 (free development of personality) require sex of person to be determined according to his/her psychical and physical constitution; a transsexual is therefore able to require correction of sex on birth register.
51. D. Van Oosterwijck v. Belgium, 1978 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 476 (Eur.
Comm'n on Human Rights). The Commission ruled that the refusal of transsexual's request
to amend his sex entry on the Belgian civil status register from female to male was a violation of arts. 8 (respect for life) and 12 (right to marry) of the Convention. See Note, 6 Eur.
L. Rev. 67 (1981).
52. See generally Rivera, On Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799 (1979); Warner, Homophobia,
"Manifest Homosexuals" and Political Activity: A New Approach to Gay Rights and the
'Issue' of Homosexuality, 11 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 635 (1981).
53. A Title VII disparate treatment argument was firmly rejected in DeSantis v. Pacific
Telephone & Telegraph Co., Inc., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979). Title VII is limited strictly to
the traditional meaning of "sex" discrimination. Interestingly, the case followed an earlier
decision that discrimination against a transsexual as such, rather than as a female or a male,
is not protected by Title VII. Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir.
1977)(colleagues unable to cope with transsexual during and after transition). Similarly, a
disparate impact argument was rejected in DeSantis as an attempt to "bootstrap" Title VII
protection for homosexuals, cf. Sneed, J. dissenting, who would have been willing to admit
evidence that a disproportionate number of males were homosexual to establish disparate
impact against males. DeSantis, 608 F.2d at 333-4.
54. Gay Law Students Association v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph, Co., 24 Cal. 3d
458, 595 P.2d 592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979)(Regulated public utility could not dismiss employees merely for being homosexual; protected under State Constitution, State Public Utilities Code and State Labor Code).
55. In Britain, there is a general statutory protection against Unfair Dismissal (wrongful discharge) in Part V of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1978 ch. 44, but
homosexuals do not in practice receive the same level of protection against arbitrary discharge as heterosexuals. Job-related heterosexual misbehavior has to be proven to justify a
dismissal. See Treganowan v. Robert Knee Ltd. & Co., [1975] Indus. Cas. R. 405
(Q.B.)(Dismissal justified because employee's unwelcome revelations about personal life and
sexual activities made workplace intolerable for fellow employees). In contrast, employee
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tively unprotected by the law as long as present prejudices endure.
However, a third definitional problem has been resolved in the face
of similarly strong cultural traditions, that is, the characterization of sexual harassment as discrimination under Title VII. Sexual harassment was
almost certainly never contemplated as a form of discrimination by any of
the framers of anti-discrimination legislation, but it is a strong example
of adverse treatment analysis. Harassment clearly demonstrates elements
of less favorable treatment (detriment, malignant motivation and lack of
justification). Even the narrowest "sex only ' 5' approach would have to
characterize it as "sex" discrimination. Harassment of women in employment is a serious social problem both in the United States5 7 and in Europe, 58 and the ongoing development of a broad definition of harassment
by the EEOC and some American jurisdictions 9 provides a lead which

misconduct or employer detriment is likely to be inferred from the mere fact of homosexuality. See Saunders v. Scottish National Camps Association Ltd., [19801 Indus. Rel. L. R. 174
(EAT), aff'd [1981] Indus. Rel. L. R. 277 (Ct. of Session). (Only police and employer knew
employee was homosexual, but dismissal justified on grounds of effect on employer's business of possible adverse customer reaction). Only the most innocuously placed homosexuals
are likely to succeed, Bell v. The Devon & Cornwall Police Authority, [1978] Indus. Rel. L.
R. 283 (homosexuality of canteen cook not an acceptable reason for dismissal). See C. BEER,
R. JEFFERY AND T. MUNYARD, GAY WORKERS: TRADE UNIONS AND THE LAW (1981).
56. An approach which limits the scope of "sex" discrimination to cases where a woman
is treated less favorably than a man would be treated in identical circumstances on the sole
ground that she is a woman. There is no discrimination if the circumstances are perceived as
inapplicable to men, e.g., pregnancy requirements that women should wear skirts (Schmidt
v. Austicks Bookshops Ltd., [19771 Indus. Rel. L. R. 360 or possess large bosoms (State Div.
of Human Rights on the Complaint of Mary Chamberlain v. Indian Valley Realty Corp., 38
A.D.2d 89 (1970), aff'd per curiam case no. CS21209870, N.Y. State Human Rights Appeal
Bd.)
57. In 1975, 70% of women surveyed by the Working Women United Institute reported
sexual harassment experiences. See Note, Sexual Harassmentin the Workplace, 10 GOLDEN
GATE U.L. REV. 879, n. 2 (1980). In 1976, 90% of women who responded to a questionnaire
published in November edition of Redbook magazine claimed they had experienced sexual
harassment. See C.A. MAcKINNAN, supra note 47, at 2526.
58. See H. Riffault, European Women in Paid Employment, their perception of discrimination at work 5860 (Dec. 1980)(study conducted in the nine Community member
States at the request of the "Ad Hoc" Commission of the European Parliament for
Women's Rights). In the Community overall, 6% of women surveyed complained of "sexual
blackmail," 7% in Britain, and 8%, the highest proportion, in France. In Britain, sexual
harassment is coming to be recognised as a social and legal issue, see Rubenstein, The Law
of Sexual Harassment At Work, 12 I1nus. L.J. 1 (1983). A recent pamphlet points out that
there seems to be a serious problem although research in the U.K. is as yet "embryonic,"
and recommends that a test case be brought under the Sex Discrimination Act as soon as
possible. See A. SEDLEY AND M. BENN, SEXUAL HARASSMENT AT WORK (NCCL, 1982).
59. Guidelines on Sexual Harassment, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11, which define sexual harassment as "[ulnwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature." Id. at § 1604.11(a). Three criteria are set out:
(1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or
condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such
conduct by an individual is used as a basis for employment decisions affecting
such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating,
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Europe must follow.
IV.

"SEX-PLUS" DISCRIMINATION-WIVES AND MOTHERS

The most fundamental area of debate over the definition of "gender"
discrimination is undoubtedly that of family status. Working women suffer "sex-plus" discrimination which flows from the physical and cultural
consequences of gender. Wives, expectant mothers and mothers with dependent children often suffer dismissal or exclusion from employment
and employment opportunities. Indeed, cultural stereotyping of the
"proper" female role in the family is the cause of the employment segregation that limits both the pay and the career aspirations of most women.
The problems of family status and equal pay, to be considered below, are
two sides of the same coin. European law is specific: "[T]here shall be no
discrimination whatsoever on grounds of sex, either directly or indirectly
." 0 This proviby reference in particular to marital or family status .
sion goes further than either United States or United Kingdom law at
present.
Three overlapping issues arise under the rubric of family status: marriage, pregnancy, and parenthood. Pregnancy is the only condition of the
three unique to women, but all three entail the same consequences for
working women. Married men and fathers (other than single parents) do
not suffer from "sex-plus" discrimination, due to social stereotypes of the
family responsibilities of men and women.
Sexual stereotyping can clearly be seen in discrimination against
married women. In the United States, flight attendants have provided the
litigation which tests the boundaries of Title VII, but they have achieved
comparatively little. Disappointingly, the courts have held that where
only women were employed as flight attendants a no-marriage rule was

hostile or offensive working environment." Id.
Conduct has to be considered in the light of all the circumstances, including the nature and
context of the unwelcome behavior. Id. § 1604.11(b). The Guidelines go on to impose vicarious liability on the employer for harassment by agents or supervisors, Id. § 1604.11(c), and
direct liability on the employer for harassment by nonsupervisory coworkers where the employer knew, or should have known, of the harassment and does not take "immediate and
appropriate corrective action." Id. § 1604.11(d), (e). See Note, New EEOC Guidelines on
Discriminationbecause of Sex: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment under Title VII,
61 B.U.L. REV. 535 (1981), where the cases are discussed and compared to the Guidelines,
and the author concludes that the guidelines go further than current jurisprudence in that
they (i) do not require employer knowledge to impose vicarious liability for harassment by
supervisors and (ii) do not so far impose direct liability for the actions of coworkers. Id. at
546-47. The Guidelines have been cited with approval and applied in the leading case of
Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 947 (D.C. Cir. 1981), though the decision itself turned on
unremedied harassment by supervisors well known to the employer.
60. Art. 2.1 of Council of Directive 76/207/EEC, 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 39) 40
(1976). "[Tlhis term should be interpreted as referring to hidden discrimination which
might in practice affect workers of one sex as a result of marital or family status being taken
into account." (Answer given by Commissioner Richard to European Parliament Written
Question #2295180 by Mrs. Liziu, 30 April 1981).
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not discrimination because there were no male flight attendants who were
treated better.6 ' These decisions are unfortunate, because equal opportunity cases, unlike equal pay claims, do not require an actual comparison
between men and women (although males who have been treated more
favorably will be highly relevant to the plaintiff carrying the burden of
proof.) Equal opportunity cases merely require a consideration of whether
a man (such as a member of the flight crew) would have been treated
more favorably in the same circumstances. The decisions have lost much
of their impact due to the hiring of male flight attendants. This allows
the courts to rule that a no-marriage provision applied to the female staff
alone is discriminatory. 2 However, the major interpretative step that the
marriage bar itself reflects social stereotyping, impacts exclusively on
women, and therefore constitutes "sex" discrimination has not been
taken. The EEOC has decided that a "sex-neutral" marriage bar contravenes Title VII; the fact that it is facially neutral is "irrelevant". 3 American courts have not followed this administrative lead, so the law continues to allow marriage bars which are applied to both sexes.
The inadequacy of the American approach led the United Kingdom
to include a second ground of discrimination, marital status, in its Sex
Discrimination Act.6 This was a welcome statutory recognition of an important bar to equal opportunity, but judicial treatment of the provision
has shed an interesting light on the prejudices of British judges; it has
been narrowly construed to apply only to those actually married.6" In
Skyrail Oceanic v.Coleman,66 for example, the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) considered the case of a female travel agency clerk whose
fiance worked for a rival firm. Their competing employers privately
agreed that one of the two would have to be discharged after the marriage
and accordingly Mrs. Coleman was dismissed. The EAT, later supported
by Lord Justice Shaw's dissent in the Court of Appeal,6 7 took a "marriage
only" approach; the woman's dismissal was lawful because it was based
not on her sex or marital status, but on the fact that she had become a

61. EEOC v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 578 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1978); Stroud v. Delta Air
Lines, 544 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1977).
62. Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971).
63. Neal v. American Airlines, Inc., EEOC Dec., Case No. 665759, C.C.H. EEOC Dec.
(1973) 1 6002 at 4015 (June 20, 1968).
64. Supra note 28, § 3.
65. Bick v. Royal West of England Residential School foru

t -,-

[

, Tns. Rel.

L. R. 326 (Engaged woman lawfully dismissed immediately prior to marriage because she
had not yet acquired protected marital status). Cf. Gay Law Students Association v. Pacific
Telephone & Telegraph, Inc. 24 Cal. 3d 458, 487, n. 16. (Supreme Court of California refusing to exclude applicants for employment from Cal. Labor Code protection of "employees,"
§§ 1101, 1102):
Such an anomalous interpretation of these statutes would allow employers to
thwart the legislative purpose of protecting citizens by merely advancing their
discriminatory practices to an earlier stage in the employeremployee relations.
66. Skyrail Oceanic Ltd. v. Coleman, [1980] Indus. Cas. R. 596.
67. [1981] Indus. Cas. R. 864, 873-74.
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businesss risk to her employer.
This approach refuses to recognize that the two employers had
jointly decided to dismiss the woman, due to the "male breadwinner"
stereotype.6 8 If Mr. Coleman had been employed by Skyrail, he would not
have been dismissed, and, fortunately, the majority of the Court of Appeal felt this was a clear case of unlawful sex stereotyping.0 9 This is a
strong and welcome precedent to guide British tribunals in the treatment
of marital discrimination. American jurisdictions require legislation or
similar judicial analysis for Title VII to cover the same ground.
In contrast, American treatment of pregnancy discrimination exposes
the inadequacies of British law. In both jurisdictions, the courts have had
to deal with a conceptual problem, because pregnancy may be regarded as
so unique a female disability that pregnant women cannot be compared
with men: "When she is pregnant, a woman is no longer a woman. She is
a woman. . .with child, and there is no masculine equivalent."70
Unitl 1976 this was not seen as a problem in America. The EEOC
and all six circuit courts of appeal which considered the point found that
pregnancy discrimination violated Title VII. In General Electric v. Gilbert, however, the Supreme Court overturned this body of law and held
that pregnancy discrimination fell outside Title VII. An employer's benefit plan which excluded coverage for pregnancy disabilities was held not
to constitute gender discrimination because the plan was otherwise evenhanded and pregnancy-related disabilities were regarded as an additional

68. In evidence, respondents admitted that: "We came to that decision (that is, to dismiss Mrs. Coleman) on the assumption that the husband was the breadwinner." See also
Short v. Poole Corporation, [1926] 1 Ch. 66 (married women schoolteachers dismissed
before single women or men on grounds that they could rely on husbands for support).
69. "The courts, both in the United Kingdom and the United States, have adjudged
that general assumptions, or as they are called in the United States, "stereotyped assumptions," do amount to discrimination against women." Per Lawton L.J., [1981] Indus. Cas. R.
864, 870.
70. Turley v. Allders Departmentt Stores Ltd., [1980] Indus. Cas. R. 66, 70 (Bristow, J.)
(dismissal of pregnant women not unlawful because no male equivalent). See Pannick, Sex
Discriminationand Pregnancy:Anatomy is Not Destiny, 3 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 1
(1983). On the same lines, see also Geduldig v. Aiello 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (no violation of
Equal Protection clause of Fourteenth Amendment where California insurance program covered a substantial number of disabilities but specifically excluded coverage of pregnancy and
related ailments). "There is no risk from which men are protected and women are not." Id.
at 4967). Rafford v. Randle Eastern Ambulance Service, Inc., 348 F.Supp. 316 (S.D. Fla.
1972). Rationale applied to Title VII in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
71. Pointed out in the dissent of Justice Brennan in Gilbert. The federal courts distinguished as inapplicable to Title VII the inconsistent 14th Amendment decisions in Cleveland Bd. of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (mandatory maternity leave violated
due process) and Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (exclusion of pregnancy from disability program not in contravention of Equal Protection Clause). Justice Brennan summarized the exclusion of pregnancy from disability benefits as having "the intent and effect of
providing that only women [are subject] to a substantial risk of total loss of income because
of temporary medical disability!" General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 146-47.
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risk unique to women. 2 Gilbert was followed in Nashville Gas Co. v.
Satty,73 where the majority affirmed that it was lawful to deny sick pay
(or maternity benefits) to pregnant employees. However, in that case, seniority rights were also affected by maternity leave, and the court felt,
somewhat inconsistently, that this did constitute sex discrimination, because it imposed an unjustifiable and substantial burden on women which
adversely affected their employment opportunities."
The Senate Human Relations Committee paraphrased the Gilbert
decision as saying: "[E]ven though only women are affected by pregnancy,
and even though the ability to become pregnant is the fundamental difference between genders, discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is not
sex discrimination. ' 75 Unhappy with this interpretation, Congress in 1978
reversed Gilbert and characterised pregnancy discrimination as sex discrimination in the Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment to Title VII:7 1
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are
not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or
related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all
employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under
fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in
their ability or inability to work ....
The question remains, why did the Supreme Court dedicate three major
decisions to a "distinction without a difference"? 77 The answer is: policy.
In all three major cases the Supreme Court was concerned with the enormous social cost to employers required to extend pregnancy coverage to
their employees. The Satty decision incorporated a benefit/burden test
whereby denial of seniority benefits fell within Title VII because it cost
women more, and employers less, than exclusion of pregnancy disability
coverage. Denial of seniority benefits imposed a burden on women that
men would never have to bear, and thus effectively reduced their salaries.
The benefit/burden test has been characterized as more semantic than
real." The action of Congress, which did no more79 than to restore the

72. General Electric v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 138-39.
73. Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
74. Id. at 14143. In terms of analysis of principle, it is impossible to distinguish between the two types of discrimination in this case. Women employees denied seniority after
matcrnity leave suffered only because thp.y had been pregnant: women who took ordinary
sick leave were not discriminated against. Justice Stevens, concurring, criticized the distinction as "mere semantics" because "[a]s a logical matter, the favored class is always benefitted and the disfavored class is equally burdened." Id. at 154, n. 4. In both types of discrimination, the favored class consisted of nonpregnant employees, men and women, and the
disfavored class of pregnant women only.
75. S.REP. No. 331 (to accompany Sec. 995), 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977).
76. Pub.L. No. 95555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978). § 701(k) of the Civil Rights Act 1964. See
Wald, Judicial Construction of the 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination Amendment to Title
VII: Ignoring CongressionalIntent, 31 AM. U.L. REv. 591 (1982).
77. Coyne v. Exports Credits Guarantee Department, [1981] Indus. Rel. L. R. 51, 54.
78. Note, The 1978 Amendment to Title VII: The Legislative Reaction to the
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intended scope of Title VII,

°

is welcome.

Policy also lurks behind the decision of the English Employment Appeal Tribunal in Turley v. Ailders Department Stores.8' The woman concerned had been continuously employed for less than 26 weeks, 2 and
hence she fell outside the specific statutory protection against "unfair dismissal" on the grounds of pregnancy. 3 The majority clearly felt she was
seeking an illicit "backdoor" remedy, 84 but was unable to see that the two
types of statutory protection, unfair dismissal and sex discrimination, are
separate remedies to separate types of problems.85 The American experience is persuasive evidence that pregnancy discrimination necessarily
falls within the proper scope of "sex" discrimination. It is time for the
Court of Appeal or the Employment Appeal Tribunal to bring the letter
of English law back within the spirit of the Sex Discrimination Act8" and

Geduldig-Gilbert-Satty Pregnancy Exclusion Problem in Disability Benefits Programs, 27
Loy. L. REV. 532, 569 (1981).
79. Supra note 76, § 701(k) does not require an employer to provide pregnancy benefits
as such; the employer may choose to provide no disability benefits at all. The Amendment
simply requires evenhanded treatment with regard to the provision or otherwise of benefits.
80. The dissent of Justice Brennan in Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 146-47, emphasized that
pregnancy discrimination properly fell within the spirit and ultimate objective of Title VII.
Gilbert flew in the face of decisions by 18 Federal District Courts, 7 Circuit Courts of Appeal, and nearly half of state courts interpreting state fair employment laws: Civil Rights
Act of 1964 Pregnancy Discrimination, Pub .L. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4749. Even after Gilbert, some state courts continued to
characterize pregnancy discrimination as contrary to their state laws. See Note, The 1978
Pregnancy Discrimination Act: A Problem of Interpretation, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 607, 617
(1980).
81. Turley v. Allders Department Stores Ltd., [1980] Indus. Cas. R. 66.
82. The then minimum qualification period (now one year) under the Trade Union and
Labour Relations Act 1974 for entitlement to the general statutory employment protection
right against "unfair dismissal," or statutory wrongful discharge, now contained in the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978, Part IV. The Act, as amended by the Employment Act 1980, creates a comprehensive code of rights to maternity leave, maternity
pay, the right to return to work, time off work during pregnancy, and protection against
unfair dismissal of the grounds of pregnancy. For a critical survey concluding the code is too
flawed to provide an adequate level of protection, see Upex and Morris, Maternity Rights
Illusion or Reality?, 10 INDUs. L.J. 218 (1981).
83. Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1978 ch. 44 § 60 (formerly Employment Protection Act, 1975, ch. 71 § 34).
84. "The situation of pregnant women in industry and commerce is dealt with by Sec.
34 . . . of the Employment Protection Act 1975. . . . The (Sex Discrimination) Act makes
no express provision for cases of discrimination against pregnant women because they are
pregnant ....
" Turley v. Allders Department Stores Ltd., [1980] Indus. Cas. R. 66, 69
(Bristow J.).
85. See dissent of Ms. Pat Smith:
This argument does not conflict with the Employment Protection Act . . .
[which gives rise to automatic rights]. The Sex Discrimination Act would not
give an automatic right; it would give a much more limited right, resting on a
comparison with other employees; a right not to be singled out for dismissal for
pregnancy a female condition as distinct from other medical conditions.
Id. at 71.
86. The disparate treatment analysis suggested by Ms. Smith is simple and convincing:
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within the requirements of European Community Law. 7
The third and most contentious aspect of family status is parenthood
and the problem of discrimination against mothers with dependent children. Child-bearing and child-rearing were described by the European
Parliament as inescapable facts for most working women.8 8 The Social
Action Programme included the objective "to insure [that] the family responsibilities of all concerned may be reconciled with their job aspirations."8 9 Two years later, this aim was embodied in the Equal Treatment
Directive, 76/207/EEC, 90 a legislative guideline in fairly specific terms,
which obliged member states to pass legislation implementing the principle of equal treatment. Article 2.1 specifically includes "marital or family
status" within the definition of "sex" discrimination. The issue is whether
the law in the United States or the United Kingdom measures up to this
"sex-plus" definitional standard. (The United Kingdom, unlike the
United States, is obligated to meet this standard, as are all EEC
members.)
As it happens, the only Supreme Court contribution to the first decade of Title VII was in this area of family status. In Phillips v.Martin
Marietta Corp.," the Fifth Circuit considered the automatic rejection of
plaintiff's application for employment as an assembly trainee on the
grounds that she had "pre-school age children." Men with dependent
children were allowed to continue their applications. The court took the
"sex-only" approach; that plaintiff had been rejected, not soley because
she was a woman, but because she was a woman with dependent children.
The legislative history shows that Congress had already rejected such an
approach in drafting Title VII on the grounds that it would "emasculate"
the statute,92 and the Supreme Court swiftly overturned the Fifth Circuit
in a brief per curiam decision.93 Comparing "like with like," men with
preschool age children were treated better than women in the same position. This constituted unlawful gender discrimination and it was irrele-

"1. Did the applicant's pregnancy incapacitate her in her job? [if not] 2. Would the employer have treated a man in similar circumstances differently that is, a man requiring time
off for a medical condition who is not incapacitated in his job." Id. at 71.
87. Under the Equal Treatment Directive, 76/207/EEC, 19 O.J. Eua. COMM. (No. L 39)
40 (1976). See supra note 60 and accompanying text and infra note 88 and accompanying
text.
88. "Childbearing and child care [are] inevitably the distinguishing features of the female employment pattern .... Dismissal because of pregnancy is an unacceptable practice." Opinion of European Parliament upon proposed Equal Treatment Directive, Comment No. 8, 1974-1975 Eur. Parl. Doc. (No. 39.856) 13 (1975). "[M]aternity, an essential
human function, should also be regarded as a vital social function, not as an automatic bar
to women's employment." Id. preamble, at 5.
89. Council Res. of 21 Jan. 1974, 17 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 13) 1 (1974). See note 37
supra.
90.
91.
92.
93.

19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 39) 40 (1976).
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 411 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1969).
110 CONG. REc. 13,825 (1964)(remarks of Sen. Case).
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
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vant that many other women were not discriminated against. The Supreme Court then went on, however, to assert that an employer might
legitimately exclude mothers with dependent children if the employer
could show there was a greater likelihood that a woman's work performance would suffer because of conflicting family obligations. This would be
a defense under the "bona fide occupational qualification" (BFOQ) exception to Title VII, whereby an employer may justify less favorable treatment of members of one sex as "reasonably necessary for the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise."9' 4 In his separate
opinion, Justice Marshall pointed out that this pronouncement was
plainly wrong. To demonstrate, he chose the most difficult cases, where
an employer could prove that most women with dependent children
would find it difficult to work efficiently in certain types of business operations (one obvious example might be night work). Even here, he said,
Title VII does not allow an employer to utilize a sex-based test based on
"ancient canards about the proper role of women. '95 Legitimate sex-neutral performance standards must be set, and an employee must be given
the chance to meet them. 96 The bona-fide occupational qualification ex-

94. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(2)(a) (1976). The EEOC regard the BFOQ as an extremely narrow exception, justified only "[w]here it is necessary for
the purpose of authenticity or genuineness, e.g. actor or actress." 29 C.F.R. §
1604.2.(a)(1977), but the analysis applied by the courts is wider. See Note, Dothardv. Rawlinson: A Method of Analysis for Future BFOQ Cases, 16 URB. L. ANN. 361 (1979)(two stage
analysis; employer must show (i) qualification or characteristic is necessary rather than tangentially related to the job; and (ii) all or substantially all members of one sex do not possess that qualification). The "all or substantially all" formulation has been criticized as
overbroad by depriving those persons who could do the job of the protection of Title VII.
See Developments in the Law: Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 84 HAnv. L. REV. 1109, 1179-80 (1971). Nonetheless, even under the
wider test enunciated in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), the majority in Phillips
seems to have gone too far, the Court commenting in the later case that "the BFOQ exception was in fact meant to be an extremely narrow exception .... " Id. at 334. The British
equivalent of the BFOQ is the "genuine occupational qualification," § 7, Sex Discrimination
Act, note 28 supra, which sets out in § 7(2) various criteria familiar to the American reader:
(a) reasons of physiology (excluding strength) or authenticity (in dramatic performances) relating to the "essential nature of the job"; (b) decency or privacy;
(c) jobs involving singlesex accommodation where it would be unreasonable to
expect the employer to change; (d) special establishments such as hospitals or
persons where the inmates are all of one sex and it would be reasonable to
limit employees to members of that sex having regard to the "essential character of the establishment"; (e) "personal services" most effectively provided by
members of one sex; (f) statutory regulations; (g) employment in foreign
maledominated countries; and (h) jobs of married couples.
The National Council for Civil Liberties has severely criticized the GOQ as being exceptionally overbroad, see J. Coussins, The Equality Report 61 (1976).
95. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971).
96. Compare the judgment of the Industrial Tribunal in Thorndyke v. Bell Fruit
(North Central) Ltd., [1979] Indus. Rel. L. R. 1, 5:
Many would share [the] view that a woman with or without a husband, with
three very young children is unlikely to be able to do justice to a demanding
fulltime job involving possibly abnormal hours, if she is to give her young chil-
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ception ought to be construed narrowly and, certainly, may not be predicated on "characterizations of the proper domestic roles of the sexes."
Justice Marshall concluded: "[w]hen performance characteristics of an individual are involved, even when parental roles are concerned, employment opportunity may be limited only by employment criteria that are
neutral as to the sex of the applicant."'9 "
But even Justice Marshall did not fully realize the extent of the
problem. If an employer raises a facially neutral employment bar against
persons with dependent children, is that the end of the matter? Community law would certainly regard this as unlawful discrimination on the
grounds of family status, contrary to Article 2.1 of directive 76/207/
EEC 98 . The question was considered by the EAT in Hurley v. Mustoe 9
The complainant was dismissed shortly after commencing work as a waitress for two to three nights a week from 6 to 11:30 in the evening when
her employer learned she had four children under the age of 11. The EAT
found, as in the Phillips case, that there was evidence of adverse treatment; comparing "like with like," the employer would not have treated
married men with children in the same way. 100
However, the EAT went further and subjected the case to an adverse
impact analysis, in the event that it was mistaken in holding that there
was a discriminatory "no women with dependent children" requirement.
Assuming that there was a facially neutral "no dependent children" condition of employment, the EAT concluded that there was a disproportionate impact upon married women, a de facto marriage bar, and was therefore unlawful. As has been seen, British legislators were careful to
embody marital status as a ground of sex discrimination. Hurley v. Mustoe is an effective illustration of the type of case where a requirement
which is aimed at women and exclusively affects women, but which is
expressed in facially neutral terms, may be struck down in terms of "sexplus" discrimination. 101 A meaningful and effective definition of discrimi-

dren all the material attention they may need, and which, if any conflict of
duties arises, many would still regard as the primary call on a woman who has
chosen to have children. Nevertheless ... it amounts in law to unlawful discrimination. A woman with young children can choose, and in some cases may
be obliged by circumstances, to take employment which may possibly create
difficulties for them, and for her and for her employer. Whether one likes it or
not, she is not to be denied that opportunity merely because she has young
children. It is up to the employer to make sure she does comply properly with
the job requirements and to dismiss her after due warnings if she does not.
97. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971).
98. 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 39) 40 (1976).
99. Hurley v. Mustoe, [1981] Indus. Cas. Rev. 490; see Docksey, Indirect Discrimination and the Protection of Mothers, 10 INDuS. L.J. 188 (1981).

100. The employer claimed his "no dependent children" requirement was facially neutral, on the basis of an alleged refusal to hire a deserted husband with three children, see
The Daily Telegraph, Feb. 24, 1981, at 3, but a male single parent is a "like" comparator
only for a female single parent, not a married person living with her spouse.
101. Especially since the Sex Discrimination Act, like Title VII, makes no mention of

1984

SEX DISCRIMINATION

nation must include all the physical and cultural disabilities flowing directly from sex. A definition which excludes the protection of married
women with children is inadequate, and dangerously close to the "sex
only" approach of the 5th Circuit in the Phillips case. A Supreme Court
concerned about job segregation and inadequate implementation of the
spirit of equal opportunity under the Civil Rights Act ought to reconsider
the definition of "sex" discrimination and include not only pregnancy but
also marital and parental status.
V.

EQUAL PAY

The council would, in my view, fail in their duty if, in administering
[public] funds . . they . . . allowed themselves to be guided in preference by some eccentric principles of socialistic philanthropy, or by a
feminist ambition to secure the equality of the sexes in the matter of
wages in the world of labour." 0 2

Times have changed since the above decision in 1925, and to modern
eyes it seems simple and unexceptional that working men and women
should be paid the same for doing the same. However, the potential for
debating the proper scope of the "equal pay for equal work" remedy is
enormous. There are three main possibilities: a woman's work may be
compared with that of a man which is (a) identical, (b) substantially
equal, or (c) merely comparable. 10 3 The American and British Equal Pay
Acts were deliberately worded quite narrowly 0 4 and are targeted at par-

family status. Justice Browne Wilkinson asserted that "Parliament has legislated that it is
up to each mother to decide whether or not she goes out to work and employers may not
discriminate against them just because they are mothers." Hurley v. Mustoe, [1981] Indus.
Cas. R. at 496. However, Parliament deliberately limited the wording of the Act to marital
status and the problem of the marriage bar (Jenkins, 889 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) col. 513
(1975); Harris, 362 PARL. DEa. H.C. (5th ser.) col. 98 (1975)); a proposed amendment in the
Lords to add the words "or parent" was blocked by the Government (363 PARL. DEB. H.L.
(5th ser.) col. 967-75 (1975)) as it was "a new issue of major importance" (per Lord Harris,
id. at col. 974,
1). The Equal Treatment Directive was treated very superficially: "[it]
would, I think ... have required us to introduce this kind of legislation" (per Lord Colville,
362 PARL. DEB. H.L. (5th ser.) col. 174 V 1 (1975)), and the Government clearly did not
consider that the rejected amendment was necessary to bring the Act within art. 2.1 of the
Directive. The judgment in Hurley, whilst purporting to implement the will of the legislature, has in fact overridden it and brought English law within the requirements of Community law. See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
102. Roberts v. Hopwood, [1925] A.C. 578, 594 (Lord Atkinson) (equal wages for women
paid by borough council set aside as excessive, ignoring market conditions; members of
council in breach of public duty, personally surcharged for amount of excess).
103. "While the standard of equality is clearly higher than mere comparability yet
lower than absolute identity, there remains an area of equality under the Act the metes and
bounds of which are still indefinite." Brennan v. City Stores, Inc., 479 F.2d 235, 238 (5th
Cir. 1973). See also Bowers and Clarke, Four Years of the Equal Pay Act, 130 NEW L.J. 304
(1980).
104. The American Bill as originally drafted provided an "equal wages for comparable
work" test, 108 CONG. REC. 14,767 (1962), which was felt to be too broad and was narrowed
by replacing "comparable" with "equal," 108 CONG. REc. 17,441 (1962).
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ticular pay injustices rather than general social or economic change. The
Acts draw a bright line for courts; equal pay claims may be addressed
when:
(a) women and men are working for the same employer in the same
establish ment;
(b) a woman does the same work as a man; 0 5
(c) the woman is paid less; and
(d) the employer cannot demonstrate a legitimate reason unconnected with gender to justify the pay differential."'
Within these constraints, the courts have developed a remarkably
creative parallel jurisprudence on both sides of the Atlantic. The "sexonly" problems of perception already discussed, which bedevil equal opportunity legislation, have not figured significantly in the area of equal
pay. The courts decided early on that the test of "equal work 10 7 or "like
work"108 used in comparing a man's work with that of a woman, is not
limited to identical work but to work which is "substantially" equal."0 '

105. Or, under the British Act, where the woman's work has been rated equivalent to
the man's following a job evaluation study: § 1(2)(b). Once the study has been completed a
woman may sue to have it applied notwithstanding the employer's refusal to implement.
O'Brien v. SimChem Ltd., [1980] Indus. Cas. R. 573. Because it is up to the employer, however, to initiate and complete the job evaluation, with no provision for evaluation by the
courts, the United Kingdom has been found to be in breach of the Equal Pay Directive.
Commission v. U.K., [1982] Indus. Cas. R. 578 (ECJ). British law is being changed to bring
it into line with the requirements of the Directive. See infra note 161 and accompanying
text.
106. The American Equal Pay Act authorizes pay differentials "made pursuant to (i) a
seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or
" 29 U.S.C. §
quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any factor than sex ....
206(d)(1) (1976). Exclusions from the British Equal Pay Act are differently drafted. Supra
note 30, § 1(3) of the Act authorizes pay differentials "genuinely due to a material difference
(other than sex)," the equivalent of the American exception (iv). See infra note 148. Sec.
6(1) excludes compliance with protective legislation, and Sec. 6 (2) excludes "terms related
to death or retirement, or to any provision made in connection with death or retirement."
Even this narrow formulation has proved broader than, and to that extent void as inconsistent with, art. 119 of the Treaty of Rome. See infra note 145.
107. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(1976).
108. Equal Pay Act 1970, supra note 30, § 1(2)(a).
109. "Congress in prescribing 'equal' work did not require that the jobs be identical,
ud.esro
:ytc
.....
equUl.
~
but oniy that they must be sAstnial
remedial purposes of the Act . . . (which) . . . sought to overcome the ageold belief in
women's inferiority and to eliminate the depressing effects on living standards of reduced
wages for female workers and the economic and social consequences which flow from it."
Schultz v. Wheaton Glass Co., 421 F.2d 259, 265. (3d Cir. 1970)(Freedman, J.). Compare the
explanation of "like work" in Sec. 1(4) of the British Act:
A woman is to be regarded as employed on like work with men if, but only if,
her work and theirs is of the same or a broadly similar nature, and the difference (if any) between the things she does and the things they do are not of
practical importance in relation to terms and conditions of employment; and
accordingly in comparing her work with theirs regard shall be had to the frequency or otherwise with which any such differences occur in practice as well
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The courts take a common sense approach and evaluate what actually
happens in practice, rather than compare conditions of employment"' or
job title classifications."' Moreover, it is the job taken as a whole, rather
than its individual segments, which forms the basis for comparison." 2
This has provided a relatively wide scope for equal pay remedies. In one
British company, a female cook dealing with an average of 10 to 20 meals
a day in the director's dining room was held to be doing "like work" with
a male cook in the company's canteen, who provided 350 less sophisticated meals per day. "1 3 In both countries, the courts seek to locate a functional core common to both jobs being compared, and then to consider
whether differences outside the core-function are such as to justify the
pay differential. It is often appropriate where there is an unavoidable external differential, such as night work, to take an intermediate approach.
The night work and day work are regarded as "equal work," but a shift
differential may be authorized over and above a common basic rate for
4
the job itself, regardless of time of performance."
The exceptions to the Equal Pay Acts," 5 which authorize otherwise
discriminatory pay differentials, have similarly caused little trouble for
the courts of either system. Problematic justifications such as "market
forces" have been firmly limited. For example, an employer may not pay
a new male employee more than existing women employees on the basis
of "market forces." The market is not a legitimate ground for discrimination in pay since it embodies and will perpetuate the discriminatory pay
differentials targeted by the legislation. The courts have developed a

as the nature and extent of the differences.
110. Redland Roof Tiles, Ltd. v. Harper, [1977] Indus. Cas. R. (E.A.T.) 349 (male clerktypist performing "like work" with women despite having to serve briefly as transport supervisor). Cf. Interpretative Bulletin , 29 C.F.R. § 800.130 (temporary supervisory duties
must be available equally to both sexes to justify pay differential). Where difference in duties is significant, differential will be justified. Brennan v. Victoria Bank & Trust Co, 493
F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1974)(male "exchange teller" found to have more complicated duties than
female "note tellers").
111. U.S. Department of Labor Wage and Hour Administrator's Regulations, 29 C.F.R.
Sections 800.121-123 (1979). See Wirtz v. Versail Mfg., Inc., 58 Lab. Cas. (CCH) V 32,047
(N.D. Ind. 1968)(men on "heavy work" pay schedule, women paid less on "light work"
schedule; classification irrelevant because women did same work as men); Wirtz v. Midwest
Mfg. Corp., 58 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 32,070 (S.D. Ill. 1968) (men paid more in Class I than
women in Class III but all performed substantially the same work).
112. Usery v. Richman, 558 F.2d 1318, 1321 (8th Cir. 1977). While a woman was able to
substitute for a man in terms of his individual work assignments, the overall work for which
he was responsible was not substantially the same as that of the women. The overall job and
not its individual segments must form basis of the comparison.
113. Capper Pass Ltd. v. Lawton, [1977] 2 W.L.R. 26.
114. Dugdale v. Kraft Foods Ltd., [1976] Indus. Rel. L.R. 368 (No. 2), [1977] Indus.
Rel. L. R. 160. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188 (1974). A higher basic rate for
night work may be justified in exceptional circumstances, such as difficulty in recruiting
night workers at day work basic rate. Kerr v. Lister & Co. Ltd., [1977] Indus. Rel. L. R. 259.
115. See note 106 supra.
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"personal equation" analysis " ' whereby individuals must be compared
with individuals in their particular circumstances, taking into consideration factors such as qualification, experience and seniority, rather than
17
comparing external circumstances, such as higher pay elsewhere.'
The personal equation approach may be seen in the judicial response
to "red circles."' 18 An employer may justify salary differentials in favor of
certain employees which have been preserved in "red circles," but only in
individual terms flowing neither directly nor indirectly from sex discrimination. Thus, it is acceptable to "red circle" the salary of an employee
who becomes ill and is moved to a less demanding and normally less wellpaid job. " His particular circumstances justify the salary differential between himself and female colleagues. Similarly, an employer may temporarily assign an employee to a less well paid job and "red circle" his normal wage during the assignment. 20 However, an employer cannot

116. "[T]he personal equation of the woman as compared to that of the man" per Lord
Denning M.R. in Fletcher v. Clay Cross (Quarry Service) Ltd., [1979] 1 All E.R. 474, 477,
applying dicta of Lord Denning M.R. in Shields v. E. Coomes (Holdings) Ltd. [1979] 1 All
E.R. 456, 464.
117. "[T]he courts in the United States had held that the Act was violated even though
the employer had no intention to discriminate . . . [and] . . .even though market forces
brought about the difference in pay." Fletcher v. Clay Cross (Quarry Service) Ltd. [1979] 1
All E.R. 474, 478. In fact, there are two meanings to "market forces," one lawful and one
unlawful. Unlawful market forces flow from stereotyped assumptions as to the pay expectations of women, prevailing wages, etc. See Fletcher note 116 supra, Pointon v. University of
Sussex, [1979] Indus. Rel. L. R. 119; Brennan v. City Stores, Inc., 479 F.2d 235 (5th Cir.
1973); Hodgson v. Brookhaven General Hospital, 436 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1970). Lawful market forces are economic factors acting upon the employer, such as a rundown in business,
Albion Shipping Agency v. Arnold, [1982] Indus. Cas. R. 22 (E.A.T.), or reduced profitability, Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes, Inc., 473 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1973); Jenkins v. Kingsgate
(Clothing Productions) Ltd., [1981] Indus. Cas. R. 592 (E.C.J.) and 715 (E.A.T.). In principle, the economic factors should be outside the employer's control and not a pretext for sex
discrimination, see infra notes 155 and 157. Where "comparable work" is concerned, however, market forces have been approved wholesale. Christensen v. State of Iowa, 563 F.2d
353 (8th Cir. 1977). "We do not interpret Title VII as requiring an employer to ignore the
market in setting wage rates for genuinely different work classifications." Id. at 356, cited
with approval in Lemmons v. City and County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228, 229, (10th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 244 (1980). The Title VII analysis of the Eighth and Tenth
Circuits is erroneous, in principle, and inferior to preexisting equal pay anaylsis.
118. "Unusual, higher than normal, wage rates" (29 C.F.R. § 800.146) which reflect
sme factor peronal tn pqrticular employees which are not based on sex. "Red circle" is
not a term of art or proposition of law but simply a "shorthand description of a particular
state of affairs." Methven v. Cow Industrial Polymers Ltd., [1980] Indus. Cas. R. 463, 469
(C.A.) (Dunn L.J.).
119. The example cited in the Interpretative Bulletin, 29 C.F.R. § 800.146. See also
Methven v. Cow Industrial Polymers Ltd., [1980] Indus. Cas. R. 463, 469; Outlook Supplies
Ltd. v. Parry, [1978] Indus. Cas. R. 388 (look at all circumstances, including length of time
elapsed since the "protection" was introduced) (E.A.T.); Charles Early & Marriott (Witney)
Ltd. v. Smith and Ball, [1977] 3 W.L.R. 189 (E.A.T.) (9 year period of "protection" not
necessarily suspect).
120. See Interpretative Bulletin, Temporary Reassignments, 29 C.F.R. § 800.147 (1976),
which specifies one month as the normal maximum period of "temporary" reassignment.
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permanently "red circle" the pay of long serving employees to preserve
differentials existing before the employment protection legislation came
into full force as this would simply perpetuate sex discrimination. 2 '
In general, therefore, the courts seem to have interpreted equal pay
legislation satisfactorily, and it is a surprise to find that women's pay has
actually declined, relative to men's, over the last five years.12 2 The reason
is that the Equal Pay Acts are inadequately drafted in three major respects. 123 First, they do not allow a person claiming equal pay to compare
herself with a hypothetical member of the opposite sex in similar circumstances, the famous "hypothetical male" or "notional man." Because a
woman must be able to compare herself with an actual male colleague, it
is impossible for most women, segregated into traditional areas of female
employment, 24 to make a successful claim for equal pay. Second, it is not
possible to claim equal pay for work of equal value. 2 5 And third, com-

121. Snoxell and Davies v. Vauxhall Motors Ltd., [1977] Indus. Rel. L. R. 123 (EAT),
following Corning Glass Works v. Brennan 417 U.S. 188 (1974). See also United Biscuits
Ltd. v. Young, [1978] Indus. Rel. L. R. 15 (E.A.T.)("Red circle" must be perfect, must not
have a discriminatory origin, and all persons within it must be employed at time anomaly
creating "red circle" existed). In both jurisdictions there have been unexpected results
where an employer has raised the pay of women employees to bring them into line with
their male colleagues, only to suffer litigation at the hands of males paid less than the upgraded women's salaries. See opposite results in Board of Regents of University of Nebraska v. Dawes, 522 F.2d 380 (8th Cir. 1975) (differential solely because were women) and
Ministry of Defense v. Farthing, [1980] Indus. Cas. R. 705 (C.A.) (differential on personal
basis).
122. The average salary of fulltime working women in the United States has dropped
from 63% of the salaries of fulltime male workers in 1956 to 59% in 1977, comparing median earnings for women and men in 1956 ($2,827 v. $4,466) and 1977 ($8,618 v. $14,626).
Women's Bureau, U.S. Dept. of Labor, The Earnings Gap Between Women and Men 6
(1979). See also Khan, The British Equal Pay Act - Some Developments, 11 ANGLO-AM.
L.R. 89, 108-10 (1982). In the United Kingdom, womens's average gross earnings dropped
from a peak equivalent of 75.5% of men's earnings in 1977 (L 1.77.4 v. L 1.33.9) to 73.9% in
1982 (L3.54.8 v. L2.62.1). See EOC: Seventh Annual Report (1982).
123. In January, 1981, the EOC wrote to the Secretaries of State for Employment and
the Home Office proposing 25 amendments to the Sex Discrimination Act and the Equal
Pay Act, including the amendments to the Equal Pay Act suggested in this text. See EOC
News, February/March, 1981 at 1, 4-5.
124. Women remain clustered in low status, poorly paid, and relatively unskilled occupations. Two thirds of American female workers hold sales, service or clerical jobs. L. HOWE,
PINK COLLAR WORKERS, INSIDE THE WORLD OF WOMEN'S WORK 16 (1977). Comparatively few
women hold "professional" jobs, Levy, 'Comparable Worth' May Be Rights Issue of '80s,
Washington Post, Oct. 13, 1980 at 20, col.3. British women are similarly situated, see EOC:
Fourth Annual Report (1979), most women remained clustered in "women's jobs." A significant element of both low pay and job segregation is parttime work, which tends to impact
upon women and to be grossly underpaid; three-quarters of all female British part-time
workers earned less than $150 per week in 1982. See Williams, The Low Paid in Britain,
London Times, Nov. 20, 1982, at p. 3, col. 7, and see infra notes 152 and 156.
125. The examination of "fair comparisons and fair differentials, the basic issues which
the courts have by and large avoided," can only be achieved by allowing job evaluation. "It
is time to put away the restrictive notion of 'like work' in favour of equal value." Bowers
and Clarke, supra note 103, at 305-306. British law is being changed to this effect, see infra
note 165 and accompanying text.
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plainants are confined to disparate treatment analysis in pleading equal
pay claims. This has allowed employers to defend pay differentials on
grounds such as mobility or full-time work, which do not directly discriminate on the sex of the complainant. Such reasons or requirements, however, often have a demonstrable impact upon a disproportionate number
of women, particularly married women with families or single parents,
and would constitute a prima facie case of adverse impact discrimination,
requiring the employer to demonstrate a legitimate justification related to
the requirements of the enterprise.'
It is not surprising, therefore, that

126. The burden of proof will differ depending on whether plaintiff pleads disparate
treatment or disparate impact, but three factors are common to the U.S. and the U.K.:
(1) Direct evidence of discrimination is usually difficult or impossible to provide, so that
it is necessary to allow circumstantial evidence to create inferences. Gates v. GeorgiaPacific
Corp., 326 F.Supp. 397, 399 (D.Ore. 1970), aff'd, 492 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1974); Wallace v.
South Eastern Education and Library Board, [1980] Indus. Rel. L. R. 193, 195. See Note,
The Prima Facie Case Approach to Employment Discrimination,33 MAINE L. REv. 195,
204 (1981).
(2) Substantive law deals with this problem by dividing the "burden of proof" into the
burden of persuasion, which remains with plaintiff (Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v.
Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093 (1981); Oxford v. Department of Health and
Social Services, [1977] Indus. Cas. R. 884, 886 (E.A.T.)), and the evidential burden, which
may shift to defendant (IX Wigmore on Evidence § 2485 (3d. ed. 1940); Oxford v. D.H.S.S.,
[1977] Indus. Cas. R. 884).
(3) A three-part, shifting burden analysis is common to disparate treatment and impact
cases. First, a "prima facie case" must be shown by plaintiff. This is simply a set of facts
which establish that plaintiff was treated differently than members of the opposite sex (McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Moberley v. Commonwealth Hall
(University of London), [19771 Indus. Cas. R. 791, 79394 (E.A.T.)), or that facially neutral
practices fall more heavily on women than on men, (Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
431 (1971); Steel v. U.P.O.W., [1978] Indus. Cas. R. 181, 187-88). The evidential burden
then shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption raised by the prima facie case that
there was unlawful discrimination. Defendant must "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the adverse treatment or justify the requirement on the ground of business necessity (McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Wallace, [1980] Indus. Rel. L. R. at
195). In both jurisdictions, "business necessity" may be applied strictly (Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Steel, [1978] Indus. Cas. R. at 18788) or more loosely,
especially, where health and safety is concerned (Woods v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 420 F.Supp.
35, 42 (E.D. Va. 1976), aff'd 579 F. 2d 43 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 930 (1979);
Panesar v. Nestle Co., Ltd., [19801 Indus. Cas. R. 144 (C.A.)). If the employer discharges
this burden, it returns to plaintiff, who must then prove that defendant's reasons are pretextual. In disparate treatment cases, plaintiff must prove unlawful intent (Texas v. Burdine,
450 U.S. at 253; Bindman, Pruving Diurnimrm
...
,. I TLe
-A-,en TT.
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Gazette, Dec. 17, 1980 at 1270). In disparate impact cases, where specific intent is not a
factor, plaintiff must rebut defendant's evidence or demonstrate some viable alternative (Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 425; Steel, [1978] Indus. Cas. R. at 188). The EAT
has tried to simplify the evidential process for industrial tribunals coping with the "rather
nebulous" concept of shift in the evidential burden period. The tribunal should concentrate
on whether the employer has given a clear and specific explanation of the conduct in the
questioned period, and if the employee has not, then discrimination may simply be inferred
from the primary facts. See Khanna v. Ministry of Defence, [1981] Indus. Cas. R. 653, 65859. Comparing the two systems, two conclusions emerge:
(i) English cases impose a heavier burden on plaintiff in disparate treatment cases, for
example, where plaintiff in practice needs to show she is better qualified than the successful
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the current debate in the United States, the United Kingdom and the
EEC centers on the availability of an equal pay remedy alternative to the
equal pay legislation.
In the United States, individuals and the EEOC have turned to Title
VII to provide a broader area of comparison of equal pay. The first hurdle, which has taken several years to surmount, is the problem of whether
Title VII may be pleaded in pay cases at all. The courts had to decide the
impact of a floor amendment.. 7 to Title VII known as the Bennett
Amendment:
It shall not be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining the amount of wages or compensation paid or to be paid to
employees of such employer if such differentiation is authorized by
provisions of Section 206(d) of Title 29.128
The courts were divided on whether to apply a narrow or broad interpretation to the Bennett Amendment. Under the broad view, equal
pay cases could be pleaded under Title VII subject to the four exceptions
set out in the Equal Pay Act. 129 Under the narrow view, the Bennett
Amendment reserved equal pay cases totally to the Equal Pay Act, so
that Title VII is limited to the scope of the provisions of the earlier
0
Act. 13
male applicant. Commentators recommend a shift in the legal burden once a prima facie
case has been established, see Pannick, The Burden of Proof In DiscriminationCases, 131
NEW L.J. 895, 896 (1981).

(ii) In disparate impact cases arising out of layoffs, English law ought to provide better
protection for women, who tend to lack seniority due to past discrimination, because there
is no "seniority" exception equivalent to § 703(h), and the only issue before the Tribunal is
whether the requirement of seniority in a particular case is justifiable, see Steel, [1978] Indus. Cas. R. at 187-88. But cf. Clarke and Powell v. Eley (IMI Kynoch Ltd.), [1983] Indus.
Cas. R. 165 (EAT held selection of parttime workers for redundancy was unlawful because
of disparate impact upon women but approved obiter the practice of "last in, first out"); see
also Docksey, Part-Time Workers, Indirect Discriminationand Redundancy, 46 MOD. L.R.
504 (1983). In the U.S., however, the seniority exception has been applied to require proof of
discriminatory intent even in adverse impact cases, regardless of whether the act of discrimination allocating seniority took place before or after Title VII became effective. See American Tobacco Company v. Patterson, 50 U.S.L.W. 4364, 4366-7 (1982).
127. 110 CONG. REC. 13,647(1964)(remarks of Sen. Bennett).
128. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e2(h)(1976). Pub. L. No. 88352, tit. VII, § 703, 78 Stat. 255
(1964).
129. City of Los Angeles, Department of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702
(1978). The "broad" view would have two consequences: (1) complainants could claim equal
pay under Title VII against any fellow employees rather than being limited to colleagues in
the same "establishment"; and, (2) complainants may argue that their work, although different, is of equal value, or "comparable worth," to that of a man.
130. Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975)(en
banc)(stronger evidence of Congressional intent required to justify "questionable" extensions of the scope of Title VII). The cases leading up to the Supreme Court decision in
Gunther are analyzed in the Note, Sex-Based Wage Discrimination Under Title VII: Equal
Pay for Equal Work or Equal Pay for Comparable Work? 22 WM. & MARY L. REV.. 421,
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The question was finally addressed by the Supreme Court in County
of Washington v. Gunther.' Four women formerly employed as guards
in the female section of a county jail claimed back pay under Title VII.
Their work was not substantially equal to that of male colleagues in the
men's section, so that no Equal Pay Act remedy was available, but it had
been assessed by the employer as being of equal value.. 2 and had been
intentionally depressed on the grounds of sex.
The Supreme Court took a broad view of the Bennett Amendment,
and held that Title VII wage claims are not limited to the Equal Pay
Act's equal work test. 3 3 Otherwise, the Court noted, "a woman who is
discriminatorily underpaid could obtain no relief-no matter how egregious the discrimination might be-unless her employer also employed a
man in an equal job at the same establishment at a higher rate of pay."'3
The Court concluded that "Congress surely did not intend the Bennett
Amendment to insulate such blatantly discriminatory practices from judicial redress under Title VII."' 3'
Gunther was the first 3 6 of a series of cases planned by the EEOC,
which regards it as a significant victory but stresses that Gunther is only
a gateway to further litigation.1 3 7 It is now up to American courts to work
out the scope of "equal value" or "comparable work" claims under Title
VII.'
Two recent developments in the European Community may provide some helpful ideas as to the potential scope of remedies under the

470-482 (1981).

131. County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
132. The employer had evaluated the women's jobs as worth 95% as much as the men's
jobs, but only paid the women 70% as much. Id at 162.
133. At this stage, one cannot say more about Gunther because the Court's decision is
so narrow. It remains that Title VII may be pleaded where there is evidence of intentional
suppression of a woman's salary on account of her sex. In practice it would provide no more
latitude than the pre-amendment scope of British law. Where an employer has conducted
but refuses to implement a job evaluation under the EPA § 1(5), it may nonetheless be
enforced by the employee under § 1(2)(b) of the Act. O'Brien v. SimChem Ltd., [1980] 1
W.L.R. 1011 (H.L.), noted in Thompson 97 LAW Q. REV. 5 (1981). The dissent in Gunther
felt that the Court's "narrow holding is perhaps its saving feature" (per Rehnquist J; Burger
C.J., Stewart and Powell JJ concurring, at 203), but that in principle the majority were
wrong, that "the legislative history of both the Equal Pay Act and Title VII clearly establish
that there can be no Title VII claim of sex-based wage discrimination without proof of
'equal work.'" Gunther, 452 U.S. at 204.
13.

Gunthe,
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135. Id. at 179.
136. In fact, the first case of "comparable worth" to reach the Supreme Court was Lemons v. City and County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S.Ct. 244
(1980), a relief to advocates of comparable worth, who had tried to discourage plaintiffs in
Lemons from filing for certiorari because the case, unlike Gunther, did not involve intentional discrimination. It was felt more appropriate that the Supreme Court's first exposure
to comparable worth under Title VII should involve intentional discrimination. See Legal
Times of Washington, June 30, 1980, at 8, col.2.
137. See LEACH AND OWENS, supra note 26, at 39.
138. See Newman and Vonhof, Separate but Equal Job Segregation and Pay Equity in
the Wake of Gunther, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 269.
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Equal Pay Act and Title VII in the future.
A.

Equal Pay

In the United Kingdom, the narrow scope of the Equal Pay Act has
caused dissatisfied equal pay litigants, supported by the EOC, to resort to
the European Court of Justice for redress under article 119 of the Treaty
of Rome. Indeed, in one case, counsel deliberately conceded the argument
in English law, notwithstanding an express invitation from the Bench to
argue the point, in order to compel a reference to the Court of Justice on
the scope of article 119.'31 Counsel's tactics proved successful; the subsequent decision of the Court of Justice has become one of the leading au140
thorities in this area.
The "founding father" of equal pay law under article 119 is a woman,
Gabrielle Defrenne, a Belgian flight attendant employed by Sabena Belgian Airlines. Ms. Defrenne's conditions of employment were inferior to
those of her male colleagues in several ways. Women were paid less, were
obliged to retire earlier (at age 40) and received inferior pension provisions. Three times she fought her way through the Belgian courts to the
European Court of Justice, losing twice and succeeding once, and her persistence has established a corpus of Defrenne jurisprudence which governs the scope of article 119.141 This has been refined through a series of
recent cases challenging the narrow scope of the British legislation,"42 but
significantly extended only once, in the Jenkins case.
The Defrenne analysis of article 119 is as follows:
(1) Article 119 is limited to "pay" discrimination on the basis of sex.
Broader remedies must be looked for in further legislation at the Commu14 3
nity level or national level.
(2) A woman may compare her pay to that of a man working1 44 for the

139. Oral argument in Jenkins v. Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Ltd., [19801 Indus.
Rel. L. R. 6, (exchange between Sir Gordon Slynn and Anthony Lester, Q.C.)(unreported).
140. In holding art. 119 is capable of a disparate impact analysis.
141. Defrenne v. Sabena (No. 3), 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1365; Defrenne v. Sabena
(No. 2), 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 455; Defrenne v. Belgium, 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
445. See Burrows, The Promotion of Women's Rights by the European Economic Community, 17 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 191, 192-200 (1980).
142. See generally Bridge, National and TransnationalRegulation of Equal Pay for
Equal Work in England and the European Community, 5 J. EuR. INTEGRATION 117 (1982);
Crisham, The Equal Pay Principle: Some Recent Decisions of the European Court of Justice, 18 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 601 (1981); Thomson and Wooldridge, Equal Pay, Sex Discrimination and European Community Law, LEGAL ISSUES EUR. INTEGRATION 1 (1980).
143. Defrenne v. Sabena (No. 2), 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 473,
18; Macarthys
Ltd. v. Smith, [19811 1 All E.R. 111, 119, 15.
144. Or who has previously worked for that employer. Macarthys Ltd. v. Smith, [1979]
3 All E.R. 325 (C.A.), [1981] 1 All E.R. 111 (E.C.J.), 120 (C.A.). See Schofield, Requirements
of Community Law, 9 INDUS. L.J. 173 (1980). The EAT held that the wording of the Equal
Pay Act would allow a comparison with a male predecessor. See Macarthys Ltd. v. Smith,
[1978] 2 All E.R. 746. But the majority of the Court of Appeal construed the statute narrowly as requiring a coterminous male comparator, necessitating a reference to the Court of
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same employer. 45
(3) "Pay" is broadly defined to include any consideration, whether in cash
or in kind, which the worker receives, directly or indirectly, in respect of
his employment.1 46 Such consideration may be noncontractual and inci147
dental to employment so long as it is linked to the employment.

Justice on the scope of art. 119. In the U.S., the broader interpretation favored by the EAT
and the Court of Justice is likely to be applied to the Equal Pay Act. See 1 A. Larson,
Employment Discrimination in Sex, § 29.70 "Sequent Inequality" (1979), citing Murphy,
Female Wage Discrimination:A Study of the Equal Pay Act of 1963-70, 39 U. CINN. L.
REv. 615, 633 (1970); Wirtz v. Koller Craft Plastic Products, Inc., 296 F.Supp. 1195 (E.D.
Mo. 1968); Wirtz v. Versail Mfg., Co., 58 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 32,047 (N.D. Ind. 1968).
145. Macarthys Ltd. v. Smith, [1981] 1 All E.R. 111. The requirement of present or
prior common employment represents an important policy decision by the Court of Justice.
Advocate-General Capotorti urged the Court to decide that art. 119 did not require the
existence of an actual male comparator employed or formerly employed by that employer.
Id. at 117. This "notional" or "hypothetical male" analysis was rejected by the Court, which
limited art. 119 firmly to the "equal work" approach and left the equal value remedy unequivocally to national legislation implementing the Equal Pay Directive. Id. at 119 14 &
15.
146. Art. 119(2). See Worringhan v. Lloyds Bank Ltd., 31 Common Mkt. L.R. 1
(1981)(discrimination in contributions to employer's pension fund by men and women under
age 25 affected determination of salary and entitlement to benefits, and was therefore sex
discrimination contrary to art. 119). Any private pension arrangements provided directly or
indirectly by the employer which discriminate against women in what they pay or receive
may be regarded, after the decisions in Worringham and Garland, infra note 147, as likely
to be contrary to art. 119. Community law now offers a similarly flawed protection to that
presently afforded under Title VII. See generally Henderson v. Oregon, 405 F.Supp. 1271
(D. Ore. 1975)(payment of inferior monthly retirement benefits to women violative of Title
VII); City of Los Angeles, Department of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 98
S.Ct. 1370 (1978)(higher contributions paid by women to pension fund violative of Title VII;
implication that unequal benefits would also be unlawful); EEOC v. Colby College, 589 F.2d
1139 (1st Cir. 1978)(employer indirectly responsible for provision of inferior pension benefits
to women by independent insurer); Spirt v. Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association
475 F.Supp. 1298 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)(independent variable annuity company held liable under
Title VII as an "employer," construed functionally, for providing unequal benefits based on
sex-segregated mortality tables). See Bernstein and Williams, Sex Discriminationin Pensions: Manhart's Holding v. Manhart's Dictum, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1241 (1978); Gold, Of
Giving and Taking: Applications and Implications of City of Los Angeles, Department of
Water and Power v. Manhart, 65 VA. L. REv. 663 (1979); Kistler and Healy, Sex Discrimination In Pension Plans Since Manhart, 32 LAB. L.J. 229 (1981). See also Ellis and Morrell,
Sex Discriminationin Pension Schemes: Has Community Law Changed the Rules? 11 INDUS. L.J. 16 (1982); McCullum and Smith, EEC Law and United Kingdom Occupational
tuu
ocunfes, 2 Eurc. L.R. 2oo (197); iludr, Eu
Puy fur Men und vumen: Two
Recent Decisions of the European Court," 30 AM. J. Comp. L. 627 (1982).
147. Eileen Garland v. British Rail Engineering Ltd., [19821 Indus. Cas. R. 420 (E.C.J.
and H.L.). The Court of Justice held that special travel facilities extended to spouses of
retired male employees constituted discrimination contrary to art. 119, against retired female employees whose spouses do not enjoy the same facilities. "The argument that the
facilities are not related to a contractual obligation is immaterial. The legal nature of the
facilities is not important for the purposes of art. 119 provided they are granted in respect
of the employment." Id. at 434, 10. The Employment Appeal Tribunal and the Court of
Appeal disagreed on the interpretation of § 6(4) of the Sex Discrimination Act (exempting
"provision in relation to death or retirement"). The EAT took a "narrow" view (exemption
did not apply to employment privileges allowed to continue after retirement), see [1978]
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(4) "Pay" does not include, however, contractual provisions which are the
1 48
result of statutory policy, such as public pension schemes.
(5) A facially neutral requirement which results in a differential in pay
and which has a disproportionate impact upon members of one sex must
be objectively justified on grounds other than gender.
Part (5) of the Defrenne analysis flows from the recent case of Jenkins v. Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Ltd. " 9, decided on 31st March
1981, two months before Gunther. In that case, part-time and full-time
workers performed the same work but were paid different rates for the
job. There were both men and women full-time workers but only women
part-time workers.'5 0 Two questions arose: (i) is part-time work comparable to full-time work, is it the same "job" and, if so, (ii) is the pay differential justified? Mrs. Jenkins had a strong case under the British Equal
Pay Act, since the work was identical, and there was arguably no "genuine material difference"'' between the two jobs. Instead, counsel conceded the point and requested the court to refer the issue to the Court of
Justice to consider the scope of article 119.
The response of the Court of Justice has broad implications; it did
not content itself with considering "equal work" under standard disparate
treatment equal pay analysis-i.e., is this woman paid less than a male
colleague? Instead, it declared that article 119 is capable of the disparate
impact analysis formulated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.' 52 and applied to gender discrimination in Dothard v. Rawlin-

Indus. Cas. R. 495. The Court of Appeal reversed, comprehensively interpreting § 6(4) to
cover any provision about retirement, see Eileen Garland v. British Rail Engineering Ltd.,
[19791 Indus. Cas. R. 558. Having received the opinion of the Court of Justice, the House of
Lords sidestepped the problem of the clash between article 119 and the subsequently enacted British statute by construing § 6(4) in the light of article 119 and adopting the "narrow" interpretation advanced by the EAT. For the noncontractual coverage of art. 119, see
also the Submission of Advocate-General Warner in Worringham v. Lloyds Bank Ltd., 31
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 1, 14 (1981) (covering Christmas bonuses).
148. Defrenne v. Belgium (80/70), 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 445. See also Burton v.
British Railways Board [1982] Indus. Cas. R. 329 (E.C.J.)(male employees unable to take
voluntary early retirement as early as female employees because eligibility for voluntary
redundancy (lay-off) benefits scheme linked to statutory retirement ages for men and
women. Held that Community Law under Directives 76/207/EEC and 79/7/EEC does not
prohibit discrimination in affording access to retirement benefits linked to minimum pensionable age fixed by national social security legislation).
149. Jenkins v. Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Ltd., 31 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 24 (1981).
See Barrett, Part-Time Workers and Equal Pay: The Case of Jenkins v. Kingsgate, 6 HuM.

RTs.

REV. 174 (1981).
150. There was one male parttime worker; a former fulltime worker rehired after retirement for a trial period as an exceptional case. The facts do not disclose if he remained, but
suggest his salary would have been "red circled."
151. § 1(3) of the Equal Pay Act exempts pay differentials, regardless of "like work,"
which the employer can prove are "genuinely due to a material difference (other than the
difference of sex)." The defense was successful in Handley v. H. Mono. Ltd., [1979] Indus.
Cas. R. 147, see infra note 153. The equivalent exception appears in 29 U.S.C. §
206(d)(1)(iv), see note 106 supra.
152. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849 (1971)(unnecessary employ-
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son.'5 s The disparate impact analysis considers whether these persons are
paid less than other persons because of an unjustifiable requirement or
condition that has a disproportionate impact upon women. Full-time
work may be characterized as a facially neutral requirement for higher
pay. However, if the complainant can demonstrate a disproportionate impact of the requirement upon women workers,154 it is presumed that there
is pay discrimination contrary to article 119 unless the employer can
demonstrate an economic justification for the requirement."" When the
Employment Appeal Tribunal received the preliminary ruling of the
Court of Justice, it was able to apply, for the first time and contrary to
precedent,156 disparate impact analysis to the Equal Pay Act, thereby

ment tests constituted unlawful race discrimination because of disproportionately large impact on black workers).
153. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 97 S.Ct. 2720 (1977)(statutory height and
weight requirements which could not be shown to be necessarily job-related were unlawful
sex discrimination because excluded disproportionate amount of women).
154. "Ample material has been placed before us to show that in the Community as a
whole, about 90 percent of parttime workers are women, mostly married women with family
responsibilities." Submission of Advocate-General Warner, Jenkins v. Kingsgate (Clothing
Productions) Ltd. 31 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 24, 29 (1981). The AdvocateGeneral cited a Communication from the Commission to the Standing Committee on Employment of 17 July 1980,
entitled "Voluntary Part-Time Work," Coin (80) 405 final, to show that in 1977, 93 percent
of parttime workers in the United Kingdom were women, the highest proportion in the
Community, including Germany. The Commission submitted a Draft Directive on Voluntary
PartTime Work to the Council on January 4, 1982, 25 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. C62) 7 (1982).
Member States will be obliged to pass legislation by January 1, 1984 to create a new head of
disparate treatment protection (pursuant to art. 10). Disparate treatment of parttime workers is prohibited under art. 2, and their pay is required to be "in proportion" to that of
equivalent fulltime workers (art. 4). Employers will no longer be able to argue a business
justification defense under disparate impact analysis.
155. As in the disparate treatment case of Handley v. H. Mono Ltd., [19791 Indus. Cas.
R. 147, where the employer paid parttime workers less than fulltime workers and successfully argued economic grounds as a "genuine material difference" defense under Sec. 1(3) of
the Equal Pay Act. The EAT accepted the fact that the economic return from parttime
workers was less than from fulltime workers because each worker had a machine allocated to
her and the employer obtained proportionately less output from the part-timers. However,
the decision was strongly criticized in principle, for allowing the employer to pay less for the
same work because it has less economic value, and in practice, for allowing this in a context
where the employer is responsible for the lower return on capital by choosing to underutilize
machinery. See Wallington, Position of Part-Time Workers, 8 INDUs. L.J. 237 (1979). The
same conflict of opinion can be seen in Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes, Inc., 473 F.2d 589
(3d Cir. 1973). The majority therein held that economic benefits to the employer flowing
from greater profits earned by salesmen in the men's department were a "factor other than
sex" justifying the wage differential, under 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(iv). Judge Van Dusen, dissenting, felt that the employer was responsible for the segregation of women in the less
profitable women's department and had not shown that the reason for the segregation was
other than sex. As in Handley, the economic justification flowed from a decision by the
employer which was not based on business necessity.
156. Meeks v. N.U.A.A.W., [1976] Indus. Rel. L. R. 198 (complainant able to demonstrate disparate impact on women due to fulltime work requirement for higher pay, but case
dismissed on ground that Equal Pay Act limited to disparate treatment).
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harmonizing that statute with the Sex Discrimination Act. 157
The application of the Defrenne/Jenkins approach to the Equal Pay
Act could be a powerful weapon against "women's jobs" in the United
States, where 69.5% of part-time workers are women aged between 25
and 65.'5 It is surprising that disparate impact analysis, which was formulated in the United States, has not been applied to the Equal Pay Act,
and that government guidelines specifically state that facially neutral pay
discrimination against part-time " or temporary'"s workers is not
unlawful.
B.

Equal Value

The impact of the Defrenne/Jenkins analysis is limited to claims involving the same kind of work performed within a common employment.
The wider concept of "equal value" was placed firmly by Defrenne
outside the scope of article 119, requiring further measures at the Com-

157. Jenkins v. Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Ltd., [1981] Indus. Cas. R. 715
(E.A.T.), wherein BrowneWilliamson, J., commented that the "Equal Pay Act was an integral part of one code against sex discrimination, and the rest of the code plainly rendered
unlawful indirect discrimination even if unintentional." The EAT was unsure whether art.
119 had been interpreted as applying to cases of disparate impact discrimination, and therefore simply expanded the scope of English law. This is a welcome decision, since the Commission had already noted unfavorably the absence of a disparate impact analysis from the
Equal Pay Act in its Report to the Council of Feb. 11, 1981. That report assessed the situation as of Aug. 12, 1980 with regard to the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women, Corn (80) 832 at 17 final. The case was remitted to an industrial
tribunal to determine whether the pay differential was in fact "objectively justified," i.e,
necessary to enable the employers to reduce absenteeism and to obtain the maximum utilization of their plant.
158. Employment and Training Report of the President: 1981, Appendix A (Persons on
voluntary parttime schedules). The 1980 figures show that 30.5% of parttime workers were
male, 69.5% female. In the critical age group of 25-44 years, only 7.2% of parttime workers
were men, but 42.7% were women.
159. "No violation of the equal pay standards would result if the difference in working
time is the basis for the pay differential, and the pay practice is applied uniformly to both
men and women." Interpretative Bulletin, 29 C.F.R. § 800.150 (1976). Interestingly, although the Bulletin only applies a disparate treatment analysis to parttime work, it goes on
to qualify the nature of genuine parttime work, which should normally be for working weeks
of 20 hours or less. Where parttimers are composed of workers of one sex and work 30-35
hours a week, as opposed to fulltime work of 40-45 hours a week, its nature as part time
work will be in doubt and there may well be sex discrimination, Id. In Jenkins, part-timers
worked 30 hours per week, fulltimers 40 hours, and sex discrimination could have been
found on a disparate treatment analysis, applying the Bulletin's interpretation.
160. The payment of different wages to temporary workers, such as seasonal help, is
"not necessarily" illegal "where payment of such differential conforms with the nature and
duration of the job and with the customary practice in the industry and the establishment,
and the pay practice is applied uniformly to both men and women." Interpretative Bulletin,
29 C.F.R. § 800.150 (1976). As with temporary reassignment, see note 120 supra, employment over one month may be suspect, though it has been suggested that temporary employment is not generally regarded as a camouflage of sex discrimination. See Sullivan, The
Equal Pay Act of 1963: Making and Breaking A Prima Facie Case, 31 ARK. L. Rv. 545,
603-604 (1978).
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munity or national level for provision of redress.' These measures now
exist.
6
At the Community level, the Equal Pay Directive, 75/117/EEC,"'
requires member states to enact national legislation on equal pay, including
the concept of equal value. At the national level, relevant legislation now
exists in all the member states. 68 In member States such as Germany and
Eire, the legislation is based exclusively upon the Equal Pay Directive,
and there is an unfettered right to claim equal pay for work of equal
value. National courts have been obliged from the outset to evaluate different jobs sought to be compared for the purposes of claiming equal pay.
In the United Kingdom, however, the Equal Pay Act does not provide
complainants such an unfettered right to allege a "comparable work" test
before the courts. Instead, Section 1(5) of the Act requires a prior job
evaluation by the employer, which establishes in effect an inquiry by the
employer as constitutive of the right to an equal value claim. The European Commission obtained a decision from the Court of Justice that this
condition is contrary to the Directive, which requires that it must be possible to initiate the assessment of allegedly comparable work, if necessary
in adversary proceedings, notwithstanding the wishes of the employer. 1'
The United Kingdom is thus in breach of the Treaty of Rome until it
alters the Equal Pay Act to provide an effective right to claim "comparable work." The Government has accordingly submitted a draft amendment to the Act to Parliament,'65 but it is widely regarded as inadequate
in several important respects and thereby in breach of the Directive.' 66

161. See note 143 supra. The Court of Justice has implicitly recognized the clear intention of the member States that progress in social law reform should be by way of harmonization of national action rather than direct Community action. See Treaty of Rome, supra
note 1, arts. 117 and 118, and the European Social Action Programme, note 37 supra. These
provisions all contemplate action by the member States, with each State's mode of reform
reflecting its own peculiar legal and cultural background. Hence three of the four Directives
and Draft Directives in this area have been made under the authority of art. 100 (approximation of laws). Only one, the Equal Treatment Directive, was made under art. 235 (new
Community legislative activity).
162. 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (L 45) 19 (1975).

163. See Report of the Commission to the Council on the Application of 12 February
1978 of the principle of equal pay for men and women, Coin (78) 711 final. The scope of the
report was criticized as inadequate by the European Parliament Committee on Social Affairs, Employment and Education, 1979-1980 EUR. PARL. Doc. (No. 56.361) 98 (1979)(Report of 2 May 1979).
164 Commission v. United Kingdom, [19821 Indus. Cas. R. 578 (ECJ). See supra note
105. For the art. 169 enforcement procedure, see note 44 supra.
165. Equal Pay (Amendment) Regulations 1983, draft debated in House of Commons
July 20, 1983, 46 PARL. DaB. H.C. (5th Ser.) col. 479-98 (1983).

166. Some problems are, inter alia, that the amendments do not come into force until
one year after the Regulations come into effect, cases are excluded where there are job evaluation or other studies, burden of proof is shifted to the claimant and criteria for assessing
work of equal value are inadequate. See Leading Counsel's Opinion on the Proposed
Amendments to the Equal Pay Act 1970 (Anthony Lester Q.C.), 24 February 1983 (EOC,
1983).
See also Young, Alas, He Was Sober, Times, Jul. 24, 1983, at 13: "The weaseling mode
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Further litigation supported by the Equal Opportunities Commission is
16 7
likely in the near future.
In the United States, of course, no such direct statutory or Community right to an equal value remedy exists, and the question arises
whether and how far equal value is likely to develop in American jurisdictions in the foreseeable future. The author would argue that developments in Europe will be paralleled in the United States, and that American courts are likely to develop an equal value remedy under Title VII for
employees working for the same employer.
There is a groundswell of public opinion, reflected in the actions of

public employers such as the City of San Jose'" and the State of
Idaho,'" in favour of equal pay for jobs of equal value as a necessary
aspect of achieving social justice in the workplace. Various schemes of job
evaluation exist which may be helpful to the courts; 70 the courts are
themselves already familiar with complex evaluative process under the
rubric of "substantial equality." Recent decisions of the Third and Ninth
Circuits have been favorable to a broader remedy against wage discrimination under Title VII,' 7' and one may assume that the necessary further
litigation invited by Gunther will be forthcoming, in part because the
structural nature of pay discrimination in traditional women's jobs lends

itself to class actions172 and "quasi-class" claims by the EEOC.178
of compliance the government has selected stands an excellent chance of leaving us in further breach, with another long round of litigation to come."
167. See Miles v. Shakespeare Tavern Playhouse, noted in London Times, Aug. 3, 1983,
at 3, col. 1, and Aug. 4, 1983 at 2, col. 4 (Aug. 2, 1983) (Industrial Tribunal held women
could claim equal pay for work of equal value). This case is suitable for referral to the
European Court of Justice for an Opinion upon the direct effect of the equal value provision
of the Equal Pay Directive, art. 1(1).
168. In 1979, the city requested an outside survey of wage comparability. The report in
1981 revealed gross disparities, e.g. nurses paid $9,210 less a year than assistant mechanics,
though jobs were comparable in requirements and responsibilities. The city will spend $1.5
million as a start to correcting such disparities, by raising the salaries of some women's jobs,
such as senior librarians, up to 15%. See The Economist, Aug. 1 1981, at 32, col. 2.
169. Idaho has implemented a comparable worth job evaluation system for state employees (Idaho Code Sec. 675309B), which has resulted in an average 16% increase for female workers. See also Gasaway, Comparable Worth: A Post-Gunther Overview, 69 GEo.
L.J. 1123, 1159 (1981)(use of Hay evaluation system resulted in salary increases of 10-20%
for clerical workers, who are predominantly female).
170. Gasaway, supra note 169, at 1155-60. See also National Academy of Sciences,
Women, Work Wages: Equal Pay for Jobs of Equal Value 70-82 (1981); Schwab, Job Eval-

uation and Pay Setting: Concepts and Practices,printed in E.

LivERNACH, COMPARABLE

WORTH: IssuEs AND ALTERNATIVES 49, 52-70 (1980); Fisher, Multiple Regression in Legal
Proceedings,80 COLUM. L. REV. 702, 721-25 (1980); Nelson, Opton & Wilson, Wage Discrimination and the 'Comparable Worth' Theory in Perspective, 13 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 231, 27887 (1980).
171. For the contrary view, that the courts are unable to evaluate job content, see
I.U.E. v. Westinghouse, 631 F.2d 1094, 1110 (3d Cir. 1980), (Van Dusen, J., dissenting) cert.
denied 101 S.Ct. 312 (1981).
172. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). The class action device is a vital means of providing effective
redress to individuals under Title VII, removing the prohibitive economic burden of litiga-
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It is interesting how parallel social conditions and economic exigencies have produced the development of a concept of equal value at the
same time in both the United States and the European Community. As
developed, equal value will almost certainly be limited to common employment and will not, therefore, strike directly at market forces and job
segregation. 17 4 It should, however, undermine the economic roots of job
segregation, and remove the financial consequences of "women's work,"
simply by striking effectively, for the first time, at sexist pay differentials
between fellow employees.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Women are entering the workforce in greater numbers than ever
before and families increasingly depend on their "second" incomes, but
the situation of women with regard to job segregation and inferior pay
has actually deteriorated since the 1960s. The recession must take a share
of the blame, 176 but a comparative perspective shows that there are significant loopholes in the protective legislation, and that, in its present state,
it has often been both insensitively and inadequately applied. The Jenkins case demonstrates the value of an awareness of developments in
other jurisdictions:
[T]he Supreme Court of the United States and this court often find
themselves confronted with similar problems. Although of course the
provisions of the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964 ... were
worded differently from art. 119 of the Treaty, their essential purpose
was the same . .. I draw considerable comfort from finding that my

conclusion accords with the conclusions of that court.

.

.

.

76

Surprisingly, there seems to be a growing acceptance of the concept
of comparable worth, without which pay equity is impossible. In the area
of equal pay, more than any other, there are grounds for cautious optimism that injustice may be significantly mitigated by law over the next
few years.
Perhaps the most important grounds for optimism are social rather
than legal. Women have become a significant part of the workforce, and

tion which otherwise deters many litigants from pursuing small claims. Deposit Guaranty
National Bank of Jackson v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980). The introduction of this device
into United Kingdom Discrimination law has been strongly advocated. See The Economist,
Feb. 20, 1982, at 13, col. 2. See generally Rutherglen, Title VII Class Actions, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 688 (1980).
173. General Telephone Co. of the Northwest, Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318 (1980) (Commission executing public policy may obtain class-wide relief without being subject to requirements of Rule 23 governing private class action complaints). See LEACH AND OWENS,
supra note 26, at 6-9.
174. See Lemons v. City and County of Denver, 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir. 1980); Christensen v. State of Iowa, 563 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1977).
175. See The Economist, Sept. 25, 1982, at 76-79.
176. Jenkins, 31 Comm. Mkt. L.R. at 35-36 (1981)(Advocate-General Warner).
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they are entering higher status occupations and professions in numbers
only dreamed of twenty years ago. 77 Every working woman, and every
successful woman, is both a practical and psychological boost to the
women that follow. For these women, at last, the legislation that now exists has the potential to play a supporting role.

177. See C.F. EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW (1981). Ms. Epstein discusses the dramatic rise
in numbers of women entering the legal profession since the passage of Title VII, and points
out, notwithstanding the "primary importance" of the legislation, the level of individual and
collective effort required of women lawyers to succeed.

The Right To Communicate
HOWARD C. ANAWALT*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Toward the end of the 1970s, international attention began to focus
on the creation of communication rights for individuals and groups who
neither own nor control portions of the large mass media of today. Communication was recognized as an enormously important political instrument and as a means of self-expression. It was argued that communication rights are inadequate if they protect only those who already possess
communication power. The power to initiate contact with important audiences must be spread among large segments of the population, if communication is to serve democracy. Thus, the movement for a "right to communicate" was born.'
The right to communicate seems to have emerged as a proposed legal
concept in an article concerning direct broadcast satellites written by
Jean d'Arcy in 1969. "The time will come that the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights will have to encompass a more extensive right than
man's right to information, first laid down twenty one years ago in Article
19. This is the right of man to communicate." ' In the ensuing years the
right to communicate has been explored with some intensity in the
United Nations Economic, Social and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).
Its chief proponents readily acknowledge that is remains today "an idea
and an ideal", a possibility that may come into being.3
The concept received a strong boost in 1980, when the MacBribe
Commission issued its final report. The Commission recommended:
Communication needs in a democratic society should be met by the
extension of specific rights such as the right to be informed, the right
to participate in public communication-all elements of a new con* American member of the UNESCO Constitution on The Right to Communicate, 1982;
Professor of Law, University of Santa Clara School of Law. The author wishes to thank
Kathryn Meier, for her assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. Similar concerns have become apparent within the United States during the past

decade and a half. Access to American media has been much debated. See Barron, Access-The Only Choice For the Media- Government Obligationto Enforce First Amendment, 48 TEXAS L.REv. 783 (1970); ARCHIBALD Cox, FREDoM OF EXPRESSION 56 (1981).
2. d'Arcy, The Right to Communicate, in J. RiCHSTEAD AND M. ANDERSON, CRISES IN
INTERNATIONAL NEWS 121 (1981).
3. "The Right to Communicate is an idea and an ideal...It is an idea inasmuch as it
exists as yet only in the conceptual stage... it is an ideal in that its supporters are working
to have it drawn up, defined and promulgated as a basic human right." Desmond Fisher,
The Right to Communicate: A Status Report, UNESCO, Reports and Papers on Mass Communication, 94, p. 5.
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cept, the right to communicate.4

The Commission explained that the right to communicate is to be in large
part a remedy for modern mass communications which have characteristics of monologue, that is, one way communication from an authoritative
source to a passive audience. "The demands for a two-way flow, for free
exchange, for access and participation, make a qualitatively new addition
to the freedom successively attained in the past."5
One of the immediate difficulties facing the right to communicate
movement is the problem of definition. The literature that has emerged
so far indicates that the right is intended to operate in two very different
domains. First of all, the right is seen as a means of establishing a legal
claim of individuals and groups to participate in the communication institutions of their respective societies. In this case, the right would create
some form of legal claim against national governments and probably certain private institutions as well.' Secondly, the right has been understood
as one which protects cultural diversity in a world which is increasingly
subject to the homogenizing influences of technology. In this second aspect the right to communicate is linked to some of the broader concepts
of a "new world information order" endorsed by many developing nations. 7 For example, one UNESCO consultation concluded that "the exercise of the right to communicate presupposes the availability of adequate
facilities and their equitable distribution within and between societies." 8

4. MAcBRIDE COMMISSION, MANY VOICES, ONE WORLD 265 n. 17 (1980). The International Commission for the Study of Communications Problems, popularly known as the
MacBride Commission, was composed of individuals prominent in the field of communications from sixteen different countries.
5. Id. at 172.
6. A UNESCO right to communicate working group gathered in Ottawa, Canada in
September 1980 and agreed to a formulation of the right to communicate including the
following: "Everyone has the right to communicate. Communication is a fundamental social
process which enables individuals and communities to exchange information and opinions."
Desmond Fisher, The Right to Communicate: A Status Report, op. cit., Appendix D, p. 54.
The UNESCO Consultation on the Right to Communicate: Legal Aspects held in Bucharest,
Romania in February of 1982 concluded: "Active participation in the communication process is regarded as the core of the right to communicate ....
The public at large should be
enabled to make their opinions known through adequate channels of communication (press,
broadcasting and the like) even if through their representatives only, i.e., their spokesmen
(as different from media professionals). UNESCO, draft final report, Right to Communicate:
LeVg-5

Aspt.s,

Ap.i

l982,

p.

3

7. The MacBride Commission report addresses the question of creation of a new world
information order primarily on the basis of the need for eliminating inequality in the communication resources available to the various different national cultures in the world. "Inequalities in communication facilities, which exist everywhere, are due to economic discrepancies or to political and economic design; still others to cultural imposition or neglect... it
is for the international community to take the appropriate steps to replace dependence,
dominance and inequality by more fruitful and more open relations of inter dependence and
complimentarity, based on mutual interest and the equal dignity of nations and peoples."
MANY VOICES, ONE WORD, supra note 4, at 268.
8. UNESCO, Report of a consultation organized by the International Institute of Communications and UNESCO, "The Relationship Between the Right to Communicate and a
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In order to preserve cultural independence, it would be necessary to recognize the right of each of the many different cultures to a fair share of
communication capacity.
The scope of the right to communicate must be scaled down if the
concept is to have utility. The statement that there is a right to communicate suggests that there is a legally supportable claim against someone.
The definition of the right needs to be refined so that it reflects only
those elements which can be stated in terms of legal rights and obligations. For example, when speaking of an individual's right to communicate to his or her fellow citizens, one can designate a legal right of access
to certain media, such as radio. The correlative duty would be the obligation of those in control of radio broadcasting to yield some portion of the
broadcast day to communications by individuals. The fact that such a
right of access is conditioned or limited does not undermine the notion
that it is a claim of legal right.
Let us pursue the matter of conditional access rights in more detail.
Assume that Mr. Jones, a citizen somewhere, wants to communicate to
his fellows concerning "desperate needs for changes in early childhood
education." Mr. Jones seeks a platform for projecting his particular suggestions. He goes to the newspapers, but they will not publish. Perhaps
the editor is not interested, thinks Mr. Jones is simply eccentric, or believes the public has had enough of that subject just now. As a result of
the editorial decision, Jones gets no forum in the newspaper.
It may be, however, that in Mr. Jones' country there is a right to gain
access to radio at certain times to broadcast citizens' views. This might
require that the individual show that he or she express the views of a
certain size group, that the spokesperson pay for the broadcast, that the
broadcast is restricted to certain times and that time is available on a
first come first served basis. Even when so conditioned the opportunity is
a claim of right. When the conditions are met-size of group, tender of
payment, and place in line-then a competent tribunal can decree that
the opportunity to speak must be accorded. 9
Legally defined and enforceable rights must be contrasted with other
kinds of stated expectations. In the communications field, a right of access to some existing public media can be posited as a legal right. However, the hope or expectation that given nations or groups of people shall
have a complete opportunity of cultural or individual expression cannot
be stated as such a right. The latter notion is admirable, and it is probably supported by the nations at large. Nevertheless, it cannot be shaped
into a legally supportable claim against someone or some things. This is
particularly true of the general claims of lesser developed nations to more

New World Information and Communication Bridge" Strasbourg Sept. 3, 1981.
9. It is critical that the person claiming access have some independent forum which will
hear and judge his or her claim. Without such a forum the right cannot be assured any
practical effect.
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equitable representation in the world communications order. Assume that
the claim is stated in the form of a right, for example, "the right to communicate is a right of individuals, groups, peoples, and states to participate fully in and benefit from communication on a basis of full equality
with all other."' The primary defect in this definition is that it does not
state a claim of right that can be asserted against any particular nation or
international body. No single entity is responsible for denying this general proposition of communication equality. Unlike the case of the radio
station, an aggrieved nation or people cannot find anyone or anything
that is obliged to fulfill the expectation. The addition of the phrase "right
to communicate" does not aid what is essentially an economic claim. This
difficulty is compounded by the lack of definition of essential terms. The
terms "equality" and "full participation" do not indicate sufficiently the
conditions, which once fulfilled, give rise to the perfected claim.
Some of those working for elaboration of a right to communicate
have acknowledged that it should not be burdened with such claims in
favor of economic equality.
The right to communicate is not a panacea for the world's ills. It is
not going to solve the problems of development, of a more balanced
communications flow, of fairer distribution of communication resources nationally or internationally.",
Indeed, if the right is to be meaningful, such concepts should be eliminated from the definition. The claims of economic equality relative to
communications are important internationally, but they should be pursued in economic arrangements or in specific legal forums which can accommodate them."
What then can the right to communicate be defined to include? In
general, it can be defined to include attributes of communication which
are not presently covered by international declarations. For example, Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights already declares
certain undoubted components of such a right. 3 These include the right

10. That phrasing of a "right to communicate" is based on the language of a "right to
development" submitted by the International Commission of Jurists to the Commission of
Human Rights, Working Group of Governmental Experts on the Right to Development,
Third Session, Geneva, Jan. 1822, 1982. E/CN.4/AC.34/WP.23, 12 Jan. 1982. The Draft Declaration of the Right to Development aimed at realizing the full potentialities of each person
in harmony with the community.
11. Fisher, supra note 3, at 21.
12. Such legal forums dealing with communication include the International Telecommunications Union and the World Administrative Radio Conferences. Each of these is competent to deal with certain claims to allocation of communication resources, for example,
appropriate allocations of the use of the radio spectrum.
13. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 19, G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N. Doc. A/
810 at 71 (1948). Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
contains a similar declaration or right and entered into force among its signatories on March
23, 1976. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967),
reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967).
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to freedom of opinion and expression and the rights to receive and to
impart ideas through any media. What appears to be lacking in this formulation is clear assurance of rights to participate in the editorial functions of media and rights of access to the media themselves. Article 19
does not spell out a right of even conditional access as in the radio access
example which has been discussed.' 4
At a meeting of legal and communications professionals in 1982 astatement of the right to communication was considered which was limited
to stating obligations concerning provision of access and participation.
The text of the statement affirmed that the right to communicate is a
fundamental human right which includes the rights set forth in Article
19. The text then stated that in order to be effectively exercised it is essential that adequate channels exist and "that individual groups who wish
to use those channels should have fair and equitable access to them, and
opportunities for participation in them, without discrimination of any
kind. . ." The draft further specified that restrictions on the exercise of
right to communicate, including exercise of access and participation
"should be strictly confined to those authorized by international
l a w . . . ,, ,5

II.

DIFFERENCES IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES

Even when the right to communicate is scaled down to manageable
concepts such as access and participation, there remain definite divisions
among the points of view expressed by various nations and cultures.
Initially, there is the problem of domestic effect of international legal
norms. Basically, the existing international law system focusesprimarily,
and nearly exclusively, on relationships between states. Generally, international legal norms do not displace domestic legal institutions, nor do
they create rights which the citizens of a particular state may claim
against their own national government.'" There are exceptions to this

14. The author, as a participant in the UNESCO Roundtable on the Right to Communicate in Bucharest, Romania in February 1982 argued that Article 19 itself creates a claim
of legal right to some form of access: "In fact, it is the recognition of the inequality of
modern communication resources and development which has stimulated greater concern
with rights of access and participation. Article 19 speaks to these needs as well, when it
states that individuals have a right to 'seek, receive and impart information and ideas
through any media. . .' While it is doubtful that Article 19 intends to require that each
particular medium yield a portion of its communication space to all comers, it is equally
unlikely that the provision was intended to underwrite monopoly of effective communication means. It is more likely that Article 19 calls upon member states of the world community of nations to provide at least some adequate forum for the interchange of ideas which
come from individuals or groups of people." UNESCO, "Right to Communicate: Legal Aspects, a Consultation" Draft Final Report April 1982, Annex III, p. 45.
15. Id. at 6.
16. Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter recognizes this basic approach. It specifies that "nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or
shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present char-
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general approach, as when a treaty is determined to have domestic effect.
Since World War II, a new role of international law, namely, the protection of individual rights against government power, including the power
of one's own government, has begun to emerge. This movement challenges some of the basic propositions of the existing international order.
In particular, it may make it possible to perfect claims of human rights
against one's own government. The status of international law protecting
human rights can be described as one of flux at the present time. Generally, protection of human rights through internationally recognized rules
17
or enforceable norms appears to be growing and strengthening.
The Soviet Union is resistant to claims that international law may
supplant domestic law in the area of human rights. The Soviet view is
that the rights and duties of citizens of a given state are determined exclusively by the national law of that state. Speaking specifically in reference to problems of communication rights, Iuri Kolossov, a Soviet legal
scholar and communications negotiator, stated: "International law cannot
regulate legal relationships within a particular state if only for the reason
that it has a coordinating and not subordinating character as distinct
from national law."18 Thus, at the international level, communication
rights and responsibilities must be viewed simply as a part of a general
system of international law, a system which imposes obligations which are
owed only by one national state to another. Furthermore, communication
rights do not exist in isolation from communication obligations. Since individuals are not truly the subjects of international law, according to the
Soviet view, individuals should not be permitted to make any authoritative claim concerning communication rights based on international law.
Their sole basis of a claim is dependent on national legislation."
In addition to differences of opinion concerning the individual's capacity to enforce human rights guarantees, there exist basic differences in

ter ..

" U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
17. International law can protect human rights in two ways. First it can create standards which are recognized by the individual nations and applied, in effect, as elements of
domestic law. Secondly, international law can posit norms and procedures which protect
human rights directly and which provide for mechanisms of enforcement of those rights
against one's own state. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5, is probably the most straightforhas~..,,
Ic ~o
,.
,..,.,r....,.,.-a. ti-a
.v whcha.
ward exVamlel of art. aangmef, ntunder
over human rights violations claimed by individuals against their own state. As to those
countries which have specifically acknowledged the competence of the Human Rights Commission to hear individual complaints, the Commission has authority to act. See O'Boyle,
Practice and Procedure Under the European Convention on Human Rights, 20 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 697, 700 (1980). Also see the procedure of the Economic and Social Council
of the United Nations pursuant to ECOSOC Resolution 1503, 20 REV. OF INT'L COMM'N OF
JURISTS 33 (1978).
18. UNESCO, Meeting of Experts on the International Issues of the Right to Communicate, Manila, Philippines, October 1979, "The Right to Communicate in International
Law" a position paper prepared by Iuri Kolossov, p. 4.
19. Id. at n. 50.
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philosophy concerning the function of communication in society. At the
risk of oversimplification, it is possible to identify three basic approaches
to communication which predominate in the world today. One of these is
what may be called the western point of view, which emphasizes communication freedom as a lively political process, as a set of journalistic freedoms, and as an important commercial activity. This point of view is
"western" because it has grown up in the European societies which have
experienced the decline of feudalism and monarchy and the replacement
of these systems by some form of representative government. Freedom of
communication is valued as a means of exchanging ideas and a public
examination of competing political programs. Since the economies of
these countries have grown rapidly, both in their colonial and post-colonial periods, communication resources have become intertwined in commercial activity itself.
A second approach to communication, which may be called the development of point of view, emphasizes that communication is an essential
process in the creation and preservation of national identity and national
economic and social strength. This view emphasizes the use of communication to serve the needs of lesser developed countries, countries which
for the most part have only recently emerged from the status of colonies
to full independence. The economic structures of these countries are relatively weak by twentieth century standards.Communication is seen as a
means for building the economy, helping to improve health and literacy
standards and enhancing the self-image of these cultures. The developing
nations are particularly concerned with preserving the independence of
their cultures.20
A third view of communication may be called the Soviet view. This
appears to give little recognition to the need for legal protection of communication voices which are independent of the party or the government.
The Communist party is seen as an organ which fully represents the people. The party supervises ands coordinates the various activities of the
people, including the various aspects of mass media communication. This
view is called the Soviet view simply because it reflects communication
practices which have developed in the Soviet Union and which appear to
predominate in eastern European countries as well.
Present day application of principles of press freedom and pressresponsibility requires reference to Western doctrines, to Soviet doctrines, and to doctrines emanating from the lesser developed nations of
the Third World.
A.

The Western-American View

Western doctrines are fairly well exemplified in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration and Article 19 of the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. That is, the national law and traditions of most western nations

20. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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and the practices in those nations reflect the proposition that the press
should be free to communicate, absent war or some other condition of
stress, and that this communication should be generally free of censorship. The Soviet tradition, on the other hand, emphasizes Communist
Party control of the content of mass media, and thus rather explicitly
accepts censorship. The developing nations have, over the past fifteen
years, begun to inject a third voice into this worldwide debate over control of the content of mass media.It is too early to generalize effectively
what the position of the Third World is, especially since it is such a diverse phenomenon. However, many Third World nations appear to be expressing a philosophy that mass communications should be affirmatively
guided for the purposes of achieving national self-development and cultural independence, but that they should not necessarily be subject to
negative censorship.
In international discussions of legal institutions to regulate media activities, the Soviet and American views invariable square offagainst each
other. The United States view distills and emphasizes the freedom to
communicate element of international legal tradition, while the Soviet
view is a severe application of the doctrine of preservation of public
order.
On the issue of censorship, the United States position is a full and
unequivocal condemnation of government control of content. An enormous variety of governmental interferences with freedom of inquiry and
freedom of communication have been struck down in the United States.
The Supreme Court has declared unconstitutional government restriction
of Communist propaganda, criminal penalties for general advocacy of violence, enforcement of flag misuse statutes and injunctions against splinter
group political rallies including those by the Nazis.2 ' Freedom of communication, especially with respect to public demonstrations, was an important element in the movements for civil rights and for termination of the
Vietnam War in the 1960's." The civil rights movement also resulted in a
virtual reformation of American defamation law, for it created a broad
new privilege to comment on public officials and public figures without
the monetary dissuasion of successful defamation actions. 3 Government
censorship in the United States is at a minimum largely because of the
role of active litigants and the pronouncements of the Supreme Court.
Censorship in the United States is therefore imposed principally through

21. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. (1978)) stay denied 436 U.S. 953 (injunction against splinter groups unconstitutional); Spence V. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974)
(flag misuse statute unconstitutional); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (criminal
penalty for general advocacy unconstitutional); Yates v. U.S., 354 U.S 298 (1957) (restriction
of Communist propaganda unconstitutional).
22. See H. KALVEN, JR., THE NEGRO AND THE FiasT AMENDMENT (1965).
23. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323 (1974) (limitation placed on New York Times rule). The legal standard is that
one is privileged to defame a public figure or public official so long as statements are not
made with reckless disregard of the truth.
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private means such as editorial judgments, corporate policy pronouncements and advertising determinations.
The American position, a minimum censorship principle, is based on
interpretations of the First Amendment made by Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes shortly after the close of the First World War. Holmes' idea was
very similar to one expressed by John Milton three centuries earlier. 4
Holmes states that there is a market place of ideas where all communications are free to circulate.25 The best ideas will win attention and acceptance on their merits. For Holmes, and subsequent American thought and
practices, the marketplace is not a mindless sea of ideas, but is a constant
intellectual process. The press, therefore, is not aimlessly adrift, but is an
active part of society, presenting the ideas which hopefully will receive
thoughtful consideration and selection.
Justice Holmes' position is familiar. He believed that speech and
press could be free provided their activities did not pose any "clear and
present danger" to major government policies. As long as the state articulated its goals in legislation, it could protect those goals from substantial
interference fomented by intentional communication activity.
Ultimately, Justice Holmes and his colleague, Justice Brandeis, became very strict in their interpretation of what communication activity
could actually constitute substantial interference sufficient to punish the
speaker. A communicator could be punished only if his words or actions
posed a grave and intended threat to the public order, and if the threat
carried with it likely and immediate consequences."
But Holmes did not start out with a view which so strongly protected
speech and press. In fact, his "clear and present danger" test was first
articulated and applied when Holmes wrote several decisions of the Supreme Court which denied freedom of speech claims of individuals who

24. John Milton was the leading critic of the English 17th Century licensing system. He
observed that the censors' work was bound to be boring, "to be made the perpetual reader
of unchosen books and pamphlets, oftimes huge volumes." Milton readily admitted that the
power of the State must loom large in his life, but he argued, "the State shall be my
governours, but not my criticks; they may be mistak'n in the choice of a licencer, as easily as
this licencer may be mistak'n in an author ..
" The licensing system was a cowardly one
to Milton, for it denied the strength of truth. He concluded his argument stating, "For who
knows not that Truth is strong next to the Almighty; she needs no policies, nor stratagems,
nor licencings to make her victorious, those are the shifts and the defences that error uses
against her power: give her but room & do not bind her when she sleeps, for then she speaks
not true ..
"MILTON, AREOPAGrrMcA, reprinted in VERSIONS OF CENSORSHIP, 19, 21 3132 (J.
McCormick & M. Maclnnes ed. 1962).
25. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 670 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Abrams
v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). In the Abrams case, Holmes stated
that "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market...", 250 U.S. at 630.
26. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 670 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S.
616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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had protested against American involvment in the First World War.2"
The activity of these indivduals consisted merely of the publication of
leaflets, mailing of circulars, and delivery of speeches condemning the
American war effort and urging individuals not to support it. In Schenck
v. U.S.,28 the first of the WWI protest cases, defendants had mailed antiwar circulars to draftees. In that case, Holmes declared that the communication activity of these men, including the Socialist leader, Eugene
Debs, could be condemned and punished by heavy jail sentences because
they spoke during a time of war, and thus undermined an effort which
demanded ultimate cohesion within the nation. "The character of every
act," he said, "depends upon the circumstances in which it is done." 9
The circumstance at hand was war, and the audience included those
who might fight or otherwise support the war effort. This was enough for
Holmes. "When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time
of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be
endured so long as men fight, and that no court could regard them as
protected by any constitutional right."3 0 On this basis, Holmes led the
Court in affirming the convictions of the protestors.
On November 10, 1919, a scant eight months after the decision in the
Schenck case, Justice Holmes had a chance to reconsider his views. The
case, Abrams v. United States, 1 was strikingly similar to those cases decided earlier that year. Abrams stood convicted of having conspired during war-time to publish "disloyal, scurrilous and abusive language" about
the United States government and language "intended to incite, provoke,
and encourage resistance to the United States in said war." The leaflets
involved had been printed up at night in New York city and distributed
by being thrown from windows and handed out secretly in that city. One
of the leaflets denounced President Wilson as a hypocrite and a coward
and stated that his "shameful, cowardly silence about the intervention in
Russia reveals the hypocrisy of the Plutocratic gang in Washington and
vicinity." The circular concluded with an appeal to the workers of the
world to awake and arise and "put down your enemy and mine! Yes!
friends, there is only one enemy of the workers of the world and that is
CAPITALISM. 3 ' The majority of the United States Supreme Court found
the leaflets plainly urged and advocated resorting to a general strike
which might cripple the production of necessary munitions during time of
war. This activity was found by the majority to be sufficient to sustain
the convictions.
Justice Holmes, however, perceived something wrong in the affirmance of these convictions. In his analysis, the earlier cases had been

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Debs v. U.S., 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
249 U.S. 47 (1919).
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. at 52.
Id.
250 U.S. 616 (1919).
Id. at 620.

1984

RIGHT TO COMMUNICATE

rightly decided. But built into those cases was a point of resistance
against government suppression of ideas, even impassioned appeals during a crisis like war. In order for a danger to be clearly and presently
evinced by a mere communication, it would be necessary for the government to prove that criminal defendants had a specific intent "to produce
a clear and imminent danger that it (speech) will bring about forthwith
certain substantive evils that the United States constitutionally may seek
to prevent." 33 In effect, the defendant must be convicted of an attempt to
interfere with the war effort. Inflammatory phrases, including urging of a
general strike and the suggestion that workers use weapons, did not, in
Holmes' opinion, amount to an attempt to achieve results. These views
have matured in American jurisprudence and now form the core of a protection of political speech which permits no punishment of a speaker unless the speech "is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. '3 4 This protection of
political speech, coupled with firm protection against prior restraints or
censorship, is the foundation of current American doctrine concerning
governmental interference with speech and press.
B.

The Soviet View

The Soviet point of view on international communication freedom
and responsibility reflects a strong orientation toward preservation of
public order. The Soviet position bears the marks of pre-revolutionary
Russian history and of the intense activity of the revolution, as well as
the imprint of Lenin's philosophy concerning the Communist Party.When
compared with the Russian revolution, the American revolution appears
as a rather easy severance of ties with a mother country. By and large, the
political institutions, the social mores, and the economic basis of the society in the United States after the revolution resembled those of pre-revolutionary days. In Russia, however, nearly an entire century of social and
political rebellion and realignment preceded the 1917 pair of revolutions.
When the Revolution of March 1917 occurred, Russian society was being
bled white by the First World War, and after the October Revolution the
entire nation was in turmoil. The Bolshevik Party was determined to set
the country on an entirely new basis, including a new economic and social
system. In order to accomplish his revolution, Lenin conceived of and insisted upon a strict central control of political activity by the leadership
of the Bolshevik Party. The Bolsheviks would cooperate with other parties in efforts to seize power, but they would not drive political bargains
with them or compromise what they determined to be basic principles of
Marxist political and economic organization. After seizing power in a relatively bloodless and swift action in October 1917, the Bolsheviks intended
to carry forward a coherent policy based on Marxist interpretation of the

33. Id. at 627.
34. Brandeburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
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productive forces of history.
Lenin, like the American Holmes, was concerned with the conditions
of wartime. However, in most other respects, his experience was vastly
different. The Soviet Union had only been in existence for a matter of
days and months when he drafted some of his original premises on communication freedom and responsibility within the Soviet state. War and
internal political dissension (soon to be civil war) were occurring on Russian soil and threatened at any minute to engulf the fledgling Communist
state. Lenin was responsible for organizing his successful revolution at a
time when Justice Holmes was completing a long and distinguished career
as a judge. In the early years before the revolution, Lenin had emphasized
the essential role of the Communist party and of the media as a means of
planning and guiding the New Society. Lenin and the Bolshevik leadership put these ideas in force immediately after seizing power.8 5 Within
days of the Bolshevik's seizure of power, Lenin issued a decree governing
the use of the press and advertising in the Soviet Union. These measures
included closing down those elements of the press which urged open resistance or defiance to the new government, which sowed discord by distorting facts and obvious slander, and which called upon the people to
commit patently criminal acts.
A Revolutionary Press Tribunal was empowered to try crimes and
offenses committed by the press, including spreading a false rumor or distorting information. Paid advertising in periodicals was declared to be a
state monopoly, and advertisements were permitted to be published only
by ordinance of the Soviet government." The stiff pro-censorship regime
was created by these decrees.
However, even the initial decree indicated that strong party control
of the press should be regarded as the temporary measure, forced upon
the government and the party by the surrounding circumstances.
In the grave, crucial hour of the Revolution, and the days immediately
following it, the Provisional Revolutionary Committee has been forced
to undertake a series of measures directed against the counter-revolutionary press of all hues and shades . . . as soon as the new order is
consolidated, every administrative measure of restriction with regard

35. On the eve of the Bolshevik Revolution, September 28, 1917, Lenin set forth some
186 (1972). In this essay he stated, "The capitalists (followed either from
stupidity or from inertia, by many S.R.'s and Mensheviks) call freedom of the press a situation in which censorship has been abolished and all parties freely publish all kinds of papers. In reality it is not freedom of the press, but freedom for the rich, for the bourgeoisis, to
deceive the depressed and exploited mass of the people." The opposi tion or bourgeois press
was seen to be a forceful weapon which would be used to exterminate Lenin's revolution,
something that no revolutionary would tolerate.
36. Decrees issued by V.I. Lenin as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars:
the Decree on the Press, published November 10, 1917, On the Revolutionary Press TribuABOUT THE PRESS

nal published November 10, 1917, Decree on the Introduction of State Monopoly of Adver-

tising, published November 8, 1917. Id. at 205-09.

1984

RIGHT TO COMMUNICATE

to the press will be lifted; it will be granted a full freedom within the
limits of its responsibility before the courts, in conformity with the
3
broadest and most progressive press laws. 1
In addition, Lenin repeatedly urged that various independent groups
should be supplied with newsprint and printing presses in order to circulate their views."8 One such statement was contained in a draft resolution
prepared on November 17, 1917 and stated, "For the workers' and peasants' government freedom of the press means liberation of the press from
capitalist oppression, and public ownership of paper mills and printing
presses; equal rights for public groups of a certain size (say, numbering
ten thousand) to a fair share of newsprint stock and the corresponding
quantity of printers' labor."' 9
Thus, the pro-censorship regime engendered by Lenin and his party,
was tempered by the pronouncements of Lenin himself. The strict censoring position of the Communist party was to give way to a freedom of the
press for opposition points of view as soon as the regime's position was
stabilized. Taking these views seriously, it seems apparent that the Soviet
regime is obliged by the words of its founder to restore the opportunities
of individuals and groups to critique national and party actions through
editorially independent and multiple group presses."'
The press was viewed by Lenin as an organ of social control from the
time of his enforced exile in 1900 until his death in 1924. According to
him, Marxist analysis should not permit the underlying material realities
of society to be obscured by any superficial aspects, including heady discussions of ideas or theories. The press should not reflect just a spirit of
"freedom of criticism" but should represent an exposition of the actual
workings of society. In 1902 Lenin wrote:
"Freedom" is a grand word, but under the banner of Free Trade the
most predatory wars were conducted; under the banner of "free labor," the toilers were robbed. The term "freedom of criticism" contains the same inherent falsehood. Those who are really convinced
that they have advanced science, would demand, not freedom for the
new views to continue side by side with the old but the substitution of

37. V.I. LENIN, Decree on the Press, Id. at 205.
38. V.I. LENIN, On Freedom of the Press, Thesis and Report on Boureois Democracy
for the Dictatorshipof the Proletariat,Draft Resolution. Id. at 188, 195, 208.
39. V.I. LENIN, Draft Resolution, Id. at 208.
40. The Soviet Union and the Communist Party should also be obliged to live up to
this promise by the provisions of Chapter VII, Article 50, of the 1977 Constitution of the
U.S.S.R. and its predecessors. Article 50 provides: "In accordance with the interests of the
working people and with a view to strengthening the socialist system, citizens of the USSR
shall be granted the freedom of: speech, press, assembly, meetings, street processions, and
demonstrations.
The realization of these political freedoms shall be ensured by granting public buildings, streets and squares, extensive dissemination of information, and the possibility of using the press, television, and radio to the working people and their organizations." W. Butler, The Soviet Legal System 13 (1978).
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the old views by the new views. The cry "Long live freedome of criticism" that is heard today, too strongly calls to mind the fable of the
empty barrel."'
The Leninist approach embodies the use of the media as a means of planning and guiding first a revolution and later a new society.
C.

The Development-Third World View

There is no single approach to the problems of censorship which will
hold true for all of the developing countries or the Third World. These
countries are geographically dispersed and possess very different cultural
heritages. Furthermore, the historical development of most of these nations has been altered by periods of colonialism which have, in some
cases, only recently terminated. Therefore, the legal traditions with respect to the press embody elements from different traditions and have
not crystallized into a uniform or final pattern. Despite this, there is one
theme which is so prevalent that it can be called a general Third World
approach. This is the theme of development. Third World nations want
and need to channel their national energies into the political, social and
economic improvement of their cultures. Communication media are
viewed as a positive element in this development. These media are available to circulate public health data, to generate support for public projects,
to assist in educating people and to mobilize general support for the prevalent policies of development. A basic philosophy for Third World countries is that communication should serve development.
The political structures of the developing countries differ widely.
Some of these countries have single party states, while others have multiparty systems. The single party states present issues of freedom of expression which parallel those that are to be experienced within Communist systems. A basic issue presented in Third World nations with single
party regimes is the status of freedom of press. The International Commission of Jurists recently inquired into this and other related matters in
a conference on human rights in a one-party state, held in Dares Salaam,
Tanzania. This conference exhibited a theme that one-party African
states should be recognized as very different from those established in a
Communist setting. Professor Telford Georges, formerly a chief justice in
Tanzania, urged that one major difference is that in Tanzania "there has
been no explicit founding of the one-party state on any identifiable politithat thee ic nn pnattrn nf legal thinking tn which
c- thecr,. This methe judicial 4officer
is obliged to conform-no party line on
2
jurisprudence."
41. V.I. LENIN, What Is To Be Done?, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF LENIN, THE ISKRA
No. 2, 96-97 (1929). The reference to a barrel is to a fable by Krylov. When a full
barrel and an empty barrel are rolled down the street, the empty barrel will make much
more noise than the full one.
42. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN A ONE- PARTY STATE
(1978). Quoted statement is part of an address delivered by Professor Georges originally in
PERIOD,
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Participants in the one-party human rights conference appeared to
acknowledge that the range of freedom of expression and freedom of association in such a system is necessarily limited by restrictions on the right
of organizing political opposition and prohibitions on the right of organizing political parties. In order to assure meaningful opportunities for popular participation in the formation of government policy, it is of great
importance that the press be free to vent new ideas and considerations. A
workshop of leaders from the various participating countries concluded,
"Continued freedom of the press was probably the most important element of freedom of expression and workshop participants were fully
agreed on the need for its protection. ' 4 The workship pointed out that it
was difficult for the press in a one-party state to criticize fundamental
positions of the party, but nevertheless the freedom of the press to criticize was essential. The press should function as a principal check on errors or abuses of the party itself. Emphasizing the positive role of the
press, the workshop states that "it has also a powerful and valuable role
to play as an educator of the public in the important issues of the day, in
helping to form public opinion and in popularizing the significance of the
rule of law and fundamental human rights."' 4 4 The press is thus seen as
integral and essential to the process of achieving political freedoms in a
one-party state context.
In situations where the press is supported or sponsored by the government the protections should come in the form of legal or political
guarantees. For example, the small African country of Rwanda recently
set up its first national newspaper. The newspaper is small, comprising
eight pages. The front page will usually contain a picture, a major editorial, news items and a table of contents. The rest of the paper includes a
section regarding the nation, regions, the party, Africa at large, social and
home questions, news concerning the capital city, Kigali, and sports and
entertainment. A UNESCO advisor who assisted in setting up the paper,
Diomansi Bombote, was concerned about the need for popular expression
and criticism in such a newspaper. If it was absent from the newspaper,
there would be no significant national forum. Furthermore, the voice of
the government might well be heard to the exclusion of other points of
view.
Mr. Bombote resolved this problem by an implicit agreement with
the Minister of Information of the government. He asked the minister
whether he wanted a newspaper: "Of course," was the reply. "But do you
also want people to read the newspaper?" Again, the minister replied,
"Yes." "Then you must allow criticism of the ministers and the government within the newspaper," suggested Bombote. Thus, a bargain was

December 1965.
43. The Conference included 37 active participants from the following countries:
Zambia, Sudan, Uganda, Tanzania, Barbados, Swaziland, Switzerland, Botswana, United
Kingdom, Lesotho and Kenya.
44. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, supra note 42, at 85.
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struck - freedom of commentary would be allowed to the editors and a
section would be provided for letters from the readers to be published in
the newspaper. The result is fragile. Editorial freedom within this essential medium must be reaffirmed on a day to day basis.
Thus there is evidence that the developing countries are articulating
a philosophy of mass media which emphasizes media as an educator or
leader in public affairs. This may entail for example, a different attitude
to what constitutes news. A distinguished Indian journalist, Narinder Aggarwala, has commented on the positive function of news:
News, to my thinking, is what happens, and the most important thing
happening in the Third World, even more important than coups, famine and civil wars, is social and economic change, imperceptively slow
and miserable, invisible against the backdrop of enormous problems,
but nonetheless a reality. Efforts to control endemic diseases which
constitute a matter of life and death for millions of people of Africa,
the Middle East and Asia, or the introduction of animal traction for
farming in Paraguay will not sound impressive; to 300,000 farmers of
that country, it is comparable to the introduction of the steam engine
in the West. Bangladesh, once condemned as a perennial international
basket case by Henry Kissinger, is now on the verge of achieving selfsufficiency in food. India, not long ago considered synonymous with
hunger and famine, today has the world's second largest food binbuffer. All of these are instances of important changes happening in the
Third World which remain unreported in the international media. 4
Development news and media coverage emphasizes the positive-the possibilities of achievement and the methods of getting certain jobs done. A
developing country's philosophy on censorship may very well be to institute some form of "positive" censorship or an editorial function which
would insist on the reporting of events and methods which will genuinely
aid development. There is no reason to expect that this positive editorial
function will carry with it any kind of insistence on "negative" censorship
or the interference with the free expression of criticisms, comments and
divergent new ideas. Caution must be used, however, to avoid affirmative
requirements which become so burdensome that they undermine the freedom to communicate.
III.

CONCLUSION

The three approaches which have been described place different emphasis on the relative importance of freedom to initiate messages, on the
one hand, and the need to control content of messages in the name of
public order, on the other. These two concerns are present in the basic
norms of international law which are recognized today. Article 19 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights emphasizes freedom to communi-

45. Address by Narinder Aggarwala, News Values in InternationalReporting, delivered at Who Makes News, University of Santa Clara Conference, (April 1981), reprinted in
Peace Research.

1984

RIGHT TO COMMUNICATE

cate messages. This freedom is recognized as an essential component of
human rights. Article 29 of the same Declaration emphasizes the importance of public order and recognizes that communication rights, like other
individual rights and freedoms, may be limited by law in order to meet
"the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare
in a democratic society. '46 On a spectrum which emphasizes complete
communication freedom at one end and complete control in the name of
public order at the other, one would place the western view toward the
communication freedom end and the Soviet viewtoward the public order
end. The development point of view does not fit so comfortably on that
spectrum, although it probably fits between the western and Soviet positions. The development point of view emphasizes communication as a
freedom, but also as a source of change for the betterment of all of the
people in a given developing nation. Thus, it may be fair to say that the
development point of view emphasizes using communication initially to
improve the lot of the people, and secondarily, as a means of self-expression for individuals and groups.
It will no doubt be difficult to get further agreement on substantive
premises regarding rights to communicate, because of these divergent
views. However, it is possible to find support for conditional rights of access and participation in each of the three philosophies which have been
described. None of these philosophies presents a principled claim that individuals and groups should be denied effective participation in mass media communications. Therefore, there is some hope that further discussions on the right to communicate can achieve some meaningful
agreement on such rights.
Even if further discussion concerning the right to communicate leads
to description and general acceptance of rights such as access and participation, there will be the overriding problem of realization of these rights
in practice. Professor Louis Henkin has stated in the most recent edition
of his book, How Nations Behave:
The human rights norms set forth in the International Covenants,
particularly that on civil and political rights, compare with those enlightened libertarian national constitutions. Even the derogations and
exceptions, e.g., for national security or public order, are not on their
fact extravagant or unduly permissive. The weakness in the law is in
its enforcement, a weakness far greater here than in other interna47

tional law.

The primary problems facing the advocates of a right to communicate lie
in the areas of enforcement, voluntary compliance with the principles,

46. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 19 & 29, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N.
Doc. A/810, at (1948). See also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec.
19, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967),
reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967). Article 29 of the Covenant specifically recognizes limitation of communication freedoms by law in accordance with the requirements of public order.
47. Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 232 (2d ed. 1979).
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and provision of the basic necessities which make communication possible. In some countries, the problems will be primarily political and legal,
that is, existing communications institutions may rigidly resist claims of
access. In other countries, the problems may be economic and social, for
example, public media such as local newspapers or radio stations may not
exist, or a lack of education may make access to and use of media of
relatively small importance.
The existing international communication norms are impressive. The
greater difficulties are found in the area of enforcement or realization of
those guarantees, rather than in the elaboration of new international
norms. However, this observation should not detract from the utility of
the efforts to articulate further communication rights. The very process of
trying to hammer out the content of a right to communicate or a right of
access creates a necessary conversation among these different world
views. If communication rights are to flourish on a worldwide scale, there
needs to be a continuous exchange between nations of views concerning
the appropriate role and the legal rights of communicators. At the end of
such discussions, one can hope that some common minimum of participation rights can be agreed to, and that, perhaps, some means for realizing
these communication rights can be established as well.
In conclusion, the consultations on the right to communicate have
contributed to the development of international communications institutions. The consultations have evidenced a desire to enhance individual
and group participation in communications. If this is to be accomplished,
the statements of the right must be relatively clear and should stand in a
form that can be enforceable against some responsible party. More importantly, the proponents of access and participation rights should turn to
the difficult problems of implementation and enforcement. The world
stands much to gain from enhanced participation in communication, but
no principle, no matter how grand, can be effective without concrete
means of realizing its goals in practice.

Influencing U.S. Foreign Policy on Human

Rights
OTWIN MARENIN*

The pursuit of human rights has not been a major preoccupation of
the Reagan administration, in contrast, at the very least rhetorically, to
the Carter administration which made human rights a central pillar of its
foreign policy. Human rights goals are now pursued quietly, through diplomatic back channels, with little public knowledge of either effort or effects. Meanwhile, human rights abuses continue unabated almost everywhere, among allies and opponents of the United States. In short, there is
no shortage of situations, abuses and incidents in which the U.S. could
intercede, and in which the powers, resources and leverage of the US
could be used more frequently, precisely and with more telling effect.
What can be done by members of the public to encourage the salience of human rights as a foreign policy goal?' I will argue two points:
that personal revulsion, indignation, hope, or fervor are not enough if the
goal is to influence foreign policy (though they do provide the motivation
for individuals to become involved in human rights activities); and that
one must understand the general constraints under which foreign policies
in the human rights area are made. Influencing foreign policy is a political
process and one needs to understand the political process to influence
effectively. Such work is difficult, time-consuming, incremental at best,
frequently frustrating and often ends in failure. Yet it can and should to
be done.
Two general conditions make shaping and influencing foreign policy
difficult: namely, human rights are a foreign policy and they are a policy.
Additionally, foreign policy decisions reflect ideological preferences and
perceptual images, and in the Reagan administration such preferences
limit the visibility and importance of human rights as a goal for US foreign policy. These three conditions make working for human rights quite
difficult, for they provide the Reagan administration (as they would all

* Visiting Professor, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver;
Department of Political Science, University of Colorado at Bolder.
1. An excellent discussion of human rights policy in the U.S. is found in L. Schoultz,
HUMAN RIGHTS AND UNITED STATES POLICY TowARD LATIN AMERICA (1981). The Office of

Public Safety Program has been little studies; the best available analysis is T. Lobe, U.S.
POLICE ASSISTANCE FOR THE THIRD WORLD (Ph.D. dissertation; University of Michigan,

1975). Kissinger's dissent is found in United States Government, The National Bipartisan
Commission on Central America, Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America (January 1984). Jeanne Kirkpatrick argues the distinction between totalitarian
and authoritarian repression in her article, Human Rights and American Foreign Policy: A
Symposium, in COMMENTARY 42-45 (November 1981).
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others) with legitimating reasons for deemphasizing human rights.
By the statement that human rights is a foreign policy, I mean that
human rights legislation and efforts develop within three contexts: the
context of other policy goals, of domestic politics, and of disagreements
about definitions of human rights.
All countries have a human rights policy. All profess, in their rhetoric, a commitment to people's welfare, to social justice, to the abolition of
barbaric practises, to the elimination of discrimination and abuses of
power which harm the right of individuals and of communities to develop
freely and autonomously. Such rights are universally 'accepted' in international charters and in the common vocabulary employed by states. Yet
countries also pursue two other major foreign policy goals-national security, and the power and alliances to ensure its protection, and the economic well being of its citizenry and the stability of international trade,
finance and investment which guarantees a style of living countries have
become accustomed or aspire to.
The promotion of universal values and moral standards (of which
human rights are part) is caught in a matrix of trade-offs, a need to balance contradictory demands (so decision-makers see them) which cannot
be met at the same time or with equal emphasis. Human rights abuses by
an ally, whose support is seen as essential for the protection of some strategic security goal, may have to be 'tolerated' in the 'national interest',
though with a heavy heart and dismay. To argue, then, that human rights
ought to be primary, simply because they are human rights, will not convince decision-makers as their occupational environment looks more complicated, 'requires' them to look at trade-offs, changes the emphasis to be
attached to various goals. Decision-makers can say that though violations
of human rights are personally abhorent and against the spirit of free and
unfettered expression and protection of the individual enshrined in
American Constitutional life, circumstances are such that were one to
pursue human rights the country's security and well-being might well be
jeopardized. This is not an articifical dilemma, created merely to justify
neglect or excuse inaction. Such choices do exist, must be made, and have
to be justified. We are all familiar with the rhetoric; they are the staple of
news coverage.
A second context is domestic politics. The priorities and emphases
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makers, their 'best' judgment and ideological preferences, yet also are
structured by the influence and activities of interested groups, lobbyists
and elected representatives-directly through appeals, pressure, public
exhortation and indirectly through the electoral process. Domestic politics influences not only the salience of human rights but its specific foci as
well. For example, a strongly organized lobby keeps the plight of Soviet
Jewry in the public limelight and the decision-memoranda of officials; the
equally dismal state of the Bahais in Iran or the Indians of Guatemala
finds no voice to speak for them consistently and powerfully.
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The third context is the absence of agreement on the meaning of
human rights. There exist voluminous dissertations on first, second and
third generation human rights, on the priorities to be assigned various
conceptions, or the necessary trade-offs when policies are carried out. No
consensus exists. The absence of agreement on what is meant or should
be meant by human rights is no mere semantic matter. It has practical,
political consequences. Most fundamentally, the lack of consensus leads
to arguments about trade-offs among rights. The variety of conceptions
and the practical, policy priorities among them 'pushed' by different
groups complicates advocacy of human rights in general. First of all, it
makes human rights an easy rhetoric for officials to use-to uphold one's
own actions and challenge those of opponents, for officials can always find
some conceptions which can be bent to that purpose. Second, by stressing
a particular conception practically any foreign policy can be labelled a
human rights policy-if not in the immediate future then in the long run
or as the best possible outcome within given constraints. Support for a
military government which represses its people is nonetheless better for
local people, in the long run, for it will lead to stability, the capacity for
economic development, the potential for transformation into more democratic forms of politics. Third, particular emphases have come to be associated with ideological stances, e.g., political and individual rights with
'democratic' cultures and systems, economic and community rights with
'socialists' orientations. Such associations integrate the vocabulay of
human rights into ideological conflict and make consensus even more difficult to achieve. The temptation is great to label the actions of opponents violations of human rights, for that is a powerful term to legitimize
one's critique.
In sum, human rights as foreign policies are part of the general foreign policy process, caught up in long-term considerations of national and
economic interests and ideological conflict which structure the perceptions, field of action and specific decisions of officials. That one may disagree with how the officials perceive the world, the priorities they attach to
different goals, or their calculations of long and short term interests and
effects, that is fairly irrelevant for trying to understand and influence the
process. The need to choose among policies exists and must be taken account of when lobbying for human rights. Within the constraints of that
process, decision-makers apply human rights pragmatically (as tradeoffs), inconsistently (in response to the pressure of demands) and rhetorically (by choice of definition and emphasis).
A second general condition is that human rights policies are policies,
which have three characteristics. First, policies are not accidents; they are
outcomes of a political process; and they are not policies until implemented. To change the neglect of human rights into positive actions requires being able to use the political process which creates and implements policies.
Policies are normally defined as sets of decisions which pursue a general goal. Policies are thought through by rational decision-makers; they
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are not decisions made by accident or on the spur of the moment. Most
likely, and one has to assume that policy-makers act the way most other
people do, they have thought about morality and values and human
rights when deciding on a choice; human rights have been weighed and
found wanting when balanced against other goals and means. To come to
a policy-maker, then, with the cry and the proof that human rights have
been violated and that US foreign policy ought to take account of such
violations in itself means little for that is not news to officials (though
specific data may be). In short, when human rights are neglected they are
neglected on purpose and sometimes after what policy makers like to call
an 'agonizing choice'. A choice made that way has a strong hold.
Second, policies are the outcome of a political process, meaning simply that groups and individuals have worked hard and long to influence
particular decisions or shape general themes in foreign policy. To change
a policy means influencing these groups and not merely gain the ear of a
powerful politician, for politicians listen to the 'heavenly choir'
(Shattschneider's felicitous phrase) interest groups perform.
Third, policies are mere rhetoric until implemented, until bureaucracies are organized, resources committed, committment encouraged and
progress evaluated to check that rhetoric has become the motive and
agency for change, both in the US and abroad. There are many potential
slippages in the transmission of intent as laws pass from Congress and the
Presidency to the field office in Brazil or Thailand. Implementation itself
is a political process as different agencies fight for control of territory,
resources, images and personal advancement. Working for human rights
should not stop in the halls of Congress.
Existing human rights legislation, such as the abolition of the Office
of Public Safety program in 1973 and 1974, the Harkin amendment to the
foreign aid bill of 1975, or the creation of the Office of Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs in the State Department in 1976 is on the books
because interest groups, and individual legislators worked hard to place
them there. Attempts to pass similar legislation had been introduced in
prior Congresses, but it was not until enough information, organization
and pressure could be brought to bear that the majority of votes needed
for passage could be collected. Human rights advocates during the Carter
Administration were successful partially because high level officials in the
executive, including the President, were favorably inclined to listen to
their arguments. yet more so because they knew how to lobby effectively,
what arguments would be persuasive with which legislator, what information convincing to another; they knew how to husband their resources-what legislator to write off and who wavered on a given vote. In
short, human rights legislation and implementation, as is the denial of
their importance, are the result of conscious political effort.
A third constraint on the promotion of human rights as a major foreign policy goal lies in the ideological beliefs of the current Administration. Three beliefs seem especially pertinent to this analysis: distrust of
human rights rhetoric; the perception of the world as primarily divided
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into East and West, free versus totalitarian camps; and a focus on systematic change.
Human rights rhetoric is suspect ideologically to Reagan and his advisors. An emphasis on human rights is seen as a kind of weak-kneed
liberalism, an undue concern for moral standards in a world which knows
and fears power and lives by strength. For real mean and strong women
do not worry about human rights when the bully is loose on the block.
Sometimes, human rights advocacy is seen as a revolutionary plot, an attempt at subversion internally and internationally. For who yells most
violently about violations of human rights-leaders of revolutionary
movements, demagogues from Third World countries and socialist
stooges, who hide their real intents behind the legitimating rhetoric of
human rights as they try to shame and degrade the US. Indeed, the issue
of human rights is seen to give opponents of the US an additional tool in
their rhetorical arsenal. For example, why sign the genocide convention
sponsored by the UN, for it might lead to calls for interference in the
sovereign domestic conditions of the US (unjustified though they would
be), is might be embarassing and, most galling, the embarassment would
be caused by countries who themselves are major violators, who lack a
genuine commitment to the cause which they espouse outside their
borders.
A second factor which deflects human rights concern is the basic image of the world held by members of the administration, namely that the
central problem and crucial dividing line in the world is the conflict between freedom and repression, between democracy and totalitarianism in
its communist disguise, between East and West, and that specific
problems, therefore, need to be case in terms of this conflict rather than
other terms. Violations of human rights, revolutionary movements, or
moral arguments are best understood in their relations to this basic struggle, rather than as local or autonomous standards and processes. For example, violations of human rights by a government (e.g., brutal repression
of dissent, economic corruption, or outright murders) are not seen as the
basic cause of why people revolt against their government and join revolutionary movements. It is external interference which inflames local
grievances; it is the presence and influence of outside agitators which convert situations that could and would have been handled by existing procedures, peacefully and effectively, into direct challenges to the
government.
In the struggle between freedom and totalitarianism, allies of the US
are friends first and ought to be supported if they understand the basic
conflict and are on the right side (ours)-even though their domestic
politics may not be totally in accord with what would be expected and
demanded in the US. Ambassador Kirkpatrick's well known distinction
between totalitarian repressions (theirs) and authoritarian repression
(ours) draws a specious line-a line between East and West rather than
between violations of human rights and no violations. For the best of reasons-the struggle against totalitarianism-the US may have to condone
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human rights violations committed by our allies, that is anti-communist
states. Human rights rhetoric and policy are consciously devalued since
they may detract from the fight against the larger evil-the spectre of
communist .world domination. To the 'realist' men and women of the
Reagan administration, nothing could be worse than the loss of any country to a socialist movement. As Henry Kissinger argued, in a dissent to
the recommendations of his commission on Central America, the conditionality clause (that aid to the Salvadoran military ought to be contingent on progress in controlling the activities of death squads) should not
be used to deny military aid to the Salvadoran army if that denial were to
lead to the victory of the insurgent rebel forces.
Lastly, the Reagan administration believes in what might charitably
be called a trickle down theory of human rights. Human rights are not
something which is most effectively achieved by harsh denunciations, by
direct appeals to morality and conscience or by ostentatiouslyh publicized
efforts to correct a perceived wrong, but by quiet diplomacy and the creation of stable, anti-communist, free market and private enterprise oriented politics. Human rights will automatically come into existence if
states are democratic and capitalist. Efforts and attention ought, therefore, be directed into these channels, rather than spent fruitlessly, in trying to achieve immediate and visible human rights results which are unlikely to persist unless the system evolves into an imitation of what the
US depicts itself to be.
General constraints which arise from the foreign policy process and
the ideological perspectives of the Reagan administration make working
for human rights difficult. Yet the work must be done. Since the administration places no high value on human rights as a foreign policy goal,
others must take up the slack. Groups and individuals who work for
human rights, e.g., Amnesty International or writers who argue the cause
of human rights, provide other lobbies and elected officials with the information, the arguments, the support network which enables them to keep
human rights violations anywhere in the public eye and on the political
agenda.
It would be a tactical mistake, though, to argue the case for human
rights by other criteria, for example that human rights are really national
interest concerns. Human rights are rights because of their moral value
and unless argued on those terms will be devalued into the coin of interes. Ins cmNarison of ;r t ~are
hurnan rightQ will aiwuauQ 1,Q nil+ to
national security, that is, they will be given last place in the ranking of
what the US ought to stand for. Human rights, then, would be a convenience, a luxury rather than the essential attribute of the foreign policy of
a free society.
My argument deals with attempts to influence foreign policy and
does not intend to deemphasize or devalue individual indignation or effort in behalf of human rights. Individuals can work quite effectively, at
the local levels, in a variety of ways to help the cause of rights-and such
commitment and efforts are the bedrock upon which organizations de-
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pend. I have tried to show, mainly, that influencing human rights at the
level of foreign policy is a different and more complex task (though not
one more worthy) than working for human rights at local levels.
Working for human rights may be unglamorous, slow and incremental yet it works best when based on a clear understanding of how the
complex foreign policy process works, what its limitations are and when
advocacy is fuelled by the indignation which all violations of human
rights deserve.

Advisory Opinions of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights
BERT
I.

B. LOCKWOOD, JR.*
INTRODUCTION

The regional arrangement for the protection of human rights in the
western hemisphere took an important step forward in 1978, with the entry into force of the American Convention on Human Rights and the subsequent creation of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights." The
Court offers a means not only of adjudicating disputes arising under the
Convention itself,2 but of generating advisory decisions on the Conven-

* Director, Urban Morgan Institute for Human Rights, University of Cincinnati College
of Law.
1. The American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature; San Jose, Costa
Rica, on Nov. 22, 1969, entered into force, July 18, 1978 [hereinafter cited as Human Rights
Convention]. For the official text, see ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES,
HANDBOOK OF EXISTING RULES PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS [hereinafter
cited as HAND-BOOK] 27, OEA/Ser.L/V/11.50 doc. 6 (1980). The text as it appears in OAS
Official Records, OEA/Ser.K/XVI/1.1, doc. 65, Rev. 1, Corr. 2 (1970), is reprinted in 9
I.L.M. 673 (1970).
The following OAS member states have ratified the Convention: Barbados, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala,
Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. The United
States has signed but not ratified the Convention, consistent with its egregious record on the
ratification of human rights instruments. See generally U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN
RIGHTS TREATIES: WITH OR WITHOUT RESERVATIONS? (Lillich ed. 1981).
Art. 33 of the Convention provides for the competence of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and reads in part as follows: "The following organs shall have competence with respect to matters relating to the fulfillment of the commitments made by the
States Parties to this Convention: ... The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, referred
to as 'the Court.'"
2. Human Rights Convention, supra note 1, art. 62. Art. 62 sets out the adjudicatory or
contentious jurisdiction of the Court and reads as follows:
1. A State Party may, upon depositing its instrument of ratification or adherence to this Convention, or at any subsequent time, declare that it recognizes
as binding, ipso facto, and not requiring special agreement, the jurisdiction of
the Court on all matters relating to the interpretation or application of this
Convention. 2. Such declaration may be made unconditionally, on the condition of reciprocity, for a specified period, or for specific cases. It shall be
presented to the Secretary General of the Organization, who shall transmit
copies thereof to the other member states of the Organization and to the Secretary of the Court. 3. The jurisdiction of the Court shall comprise all cases
concerning the interpretation and application of the provisions of this Convention that are submitted to it, provided that the States Party to the case recognize or have recognized such jurisdiction, whether by special declaration pursuant to the preceding paragraphs, or by a special agreement.
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tion and other human rights instruments of inter-American concern. 3
While 17 of the 29 member states of the Organization of American States
have ratified the Convention, to date only four have recognized the jurisdiction of the Court in contentious cases pursuant to article 62.' Costa
Rica is the only state to have submitted an article 62 case.5 Recently the
Court decided the first two cases submitted to it under its advisory jurisdiction." This article will analyze those decisions and their importance to
the future development of procedures for the protection of human rights
in this hemis-phere.
While the European experience is encouraging with 19 of the 21
member states of the Council of Europe now recognizing the compulsory
jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights7 -it is important for
the Inter-American Court to gain stature and acceptance within the community so that states will shed their reluctance to submit themselves to
its compulsory jurisdiction. The advisory jurisdiction established by article 64 of the Convention may offer the most effective means of demonstrating the Court's usefulness and providing the Court with an opportunity to develop a consistent and influential body of human rights
jurisprudence. With the decisions in its first two advisory cases the Court
is off to a good start. Both cases involved the interpretation of provisions
of the Convention, and the Court, acting unanimously in both, presented
articulate, well-reasoned opinions.

3. Human Rights Convention, supra, note 1, art. 64, set out in text accompanying note
12. Note also that individuals are not empowered to bring a case directly to the Court;
"[oinly the States Parties and the Commission shall have the right to submit a case to the
Court." Human Rights Convention, supra, note 1, art. 61.
4. The four states are Costa Rica, Honduras, Peru, and Venezuela. Note that a state is
not deemed to have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court merely by ratifying the Convention. Acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction is optional and requires a separate declaration or
a special agreement. Nevertheless, all state parties to the Convention may permit the Court
on an ad hoc basis to adjudicate a specific dispute relating to the application of the Convention. For an excellent introduction to the Court see Buergenthal, The Inter-American Court
of Human Rights, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 231 (1982). See also Dunshee de Abranches, The InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, 30 AM. U.L. REv. 79 (1981). On the topic of the interAmerican system for protecting human rights, see generally T. GUERGENTHAL, R. NORRIS, &
D. SHELTON, PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS: SELECTED PROBLEMS (1982).
5. Government of~ Ccost-ia
(i
the, M.atter o.f Vivi.,,fl,.,.,It.
a!), N.
GlOI/88
Decision of Nov. 13, 1981, Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
1982, OEA/Ser.L/III.5, doc. 13 at 13 (Sept. 23, 1982), reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 1424 (1981).
6. Other Treaties Subject to the Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 64 American Convention on Human Rights), No. OC-1/82, Decision of Sept. 24, 1982, reprinted in 22
I.L.M. 51 (1083) [hereinafter cited as Consultative Jurisdiction; The Effect of Reservations
On the Entry Into Force of the American Convention (Arts. 74 and 75), No. OC-2/82, Decision of Sept. 24, 1982, reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 37 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Effect of
Reservation].
7. Activities of the Council of Europe in the Field of Human Rights in 1982, H(83)1,
Strasbourg, Jan. 25, 1983, Council of Europe at 2.
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II.

THE FIRST ADVISORY OPINION

Pursuant to article 52 of the Court's Rules of Procedure,' the Court
had before it written observations from a number of states and OAS organs. 9 In addition, the Court accepted amicus briefs from several nongovernmental organizations.10 In so doing, the Court set an important
precedent, implicitly recognizing the significant role played by non-governmental organizations (NGO's) in the development of human rights
law." The Court's first advisory opinion related to a request of the government of Peru' 2 concerning the interpretation of article 64 of the American Convention granting advisory jurisdiction to the Court. Article 64
reads as follows:
1. The member states of the Organization may consult the Court

8. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Rules of Procedure, 44, O.A.S. Doc.
OEA/Ser. LiV/III.3/doc. 13, corr. 1 (1981) (corrected version reprinted in 20 I.L.M. (1289)
(1981).
9. In response to the Peruvian request for an advisory opinion, the following states and
OAS organs submitted written observations: Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic,

Ecuador, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Uruguay; the General Secretariat, the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights, the Inter-American Juridical Committee, the Pan
American Institute of Geography and History, and the Permanent Council. See, Annual
Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 1982, 25. OEA/Ser. L/113.F, doc.
13(1982) [hereinafter cited as Annual Report].
10. With respect to the Peruvian request for an advisory opinion, the following nongovernmental organizations submitted amicus briefs: Inter-American Institute on Human
Rights; The International Human Rights Law Group; The International League for Human
Rights; The Lawyer's Committee for International Human Rights; and the Urban Morgan
Institute for Human Rights at the University of Cincinnati College of Law. See, Annual
Report, supra note 9.
11. Since human rights law by definition erects limits on governmental actions, either
by establishing prohibitions on certain actions (such as arbitrary detention) or by creating
new obligations (such as education), it should not be surprising that few governments are
found in the forefront of promoting human rights.
For an analysis of the role played by NGO's, see Cassese, Progressive Transnational
Promotion of Human Right, in HUMAN RIGHTS: THIRTY YEARS AFrER THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION 249 (B. Ramcharen ed. 1979); Forsythe and Wiseberg, Human Rights Protection: A

Research Agenda, UNIvERsAL HUMAN RIGHTS, (Oct.-Dec. 1979); Scoble and Wiseberg,
Human Rights NGO's: Notes towards Comparative Analysis, 9 REvUE DES DRorrs DE

L'HOMME 611 (1976); Scoble and Wiseberg, The InternationalLeague for Human Rights:
The Strategy of a Human Rights NGO, GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L 289 (1977); Scoble and
Wiseberg, Monitoring Human Rights Violations: The Role of Human Rights NGO's, in
HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (Rubin and Spiro eds.); Shestack, Sisyphus En-

dures: The InternationalHuman Rights NGO, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 89 (1978); Weissbrodt, The Role of InternationalNon-Governmental Organizations in the Implementation
of Human Rights, 12 TEx. INr'L L.J. 293 (1977); Weissbrodt and McCarthy, Fact-Finding
by International Nongovernmental Human Rights Organizations, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 1
(1981). For current information on human rights activities of NGO's, see The Human
Rights Internet Reporter, a periodical published 5 times per year by the Human Rights
Internet.
12. Request for an Advisory Opinion Presented by the Government of Peru, reprinted
in Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 1982, 25. OEA/Ser. L/11.7,
doc. 13 (1982).
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regarding the interpretation of this Convention or of other treaties
concerning the protection of human rights in the American states.
Within their spheres of competence, the organs listed in Chapter X of
the Charter of the Organization of American States, as amended by
the Protocol of Buenos Aires, may in like manner consult the Court.
2. The Court, at the request of a member state of the Organization, may provide that state with opinions regarding the compatibility
of any of its domestic laws with the aforesaid international
instruments.
The Peruvian request was concerned with the meaning of the phrase "or
of other treaties concerning the protection of human rights in the American states." Peru offered, in the alternative, three possible interpretations
of "other treaties": (a) only those treaties adopted within the framework
or under the auspices of the inter-American system; (b) treaties included
solely among the American states, that is, those treaties in which only
American states are parties; (c) all treaties in which one or more American states are parties.13
Before deciding the question, the Court found it necessary to ascertain the extent of its advisory jurisdiction, noting that limits to that jurisdiction are not clearly spelled out in article 64.' The Court found that
article 64 confers on it the most extensive advisory jurisdiction of any
international tribuna in existence today. 5 All organs of the OAS listed in
Chapter X of the Charter of the Organization and every OAS member
state, whether a party to the Convention or not, are empowered to seek
advisory opinions." Additionally, the Court's advisory jurisdiction is not
limited to the Convention but extends to other treaties concerning the
protection of human rights in the American states.17 All OAS member
states have the right to request advisory opinions on the compatibility of
any of their domestic laws with the aforementioned international
instruments. 8
In contrast, the Court noted, the International Court of Justice may
not receive requests for advisory opinions from member states of the
United Nations. Rather, only the General Assembly and the Security
Council, and under certain conditions other organs and specialized agencies of the United Nations, are authorized to request advisory opinions
from that body.'" The European Court of Human Rights may receive a

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Consultative Jurisdiction,supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. at 53.
Id. at 54.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
19. U.N. CHARTER, art. 96, paras. 1 & 2 reading as follows:
1. The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.
2. Other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which may
at any time be so authorized by the General Assembly, may also request advi-
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request for an advisory opinion only from the Committee of Ministers
and that opinion may deal only with legal questions concerning the interpretation of the Convention and its protocols.2 0 Furthermore, the protocol
excludes from the advisory jurisdiction of that tribunal the interpretation
of any question relating to the content or scope of the rights or freedoms
defined in these instruments, or any other question which the European
Commission on Human Rights, the European Court, or the Committee of
Ministers might have to consider in consequence of any2 1 proceeding that
could be instituted in accordance with the Convention.
The Court next attempted to delineate the precise limits of its advisory jurisdiction. Looking to the preparatory work of the American Convention, the Court determined that the drafters' intention was to cast the
Court's advisory jurisdiction "in the broadest terms possible. '22 Nonetheless, certain restrictions flowed from the Court's status as an inter-American juridical institution. The Court held that is advisory jurisdiction did
not extend to international agreements concluded by non-member states
of the inter-American system nor to legal provisions governing the structure or operation of international organs or institutions not belonging to
the inter-American system.2 s These limitations, however, did not necessarily restrict the power of the Court to interpret a treaty that is directly
related to the protection of human rights in a member state of the inter24
American system.
To illustrate the Court's view of the scope of its advisory powers,

sory opinions of the Court on legal questions arising within the scope of their
activities
See L. Goodrich, E. Hambro & A. Simons, Charter of the U.N.: Commentary and Documents (1969) at 560: "Thus, a state can obtain an advisory opinion from the Court only if its
proposal is adopted by one of the organizations or agencies authorized to make such a
request."
20. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, done at Rome, Nov. 4, 1950, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, Europ. T.S. No. 5, 213
U.N.T.S. 221, reprinted in COUNCIL OF EUROPE, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
COLLECTED TEXTS (11th ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as European Convention]. Protocol No.

2 (Sept. 21, 1970) Article (1) of this Convention reads: "The Court may, at the request of
the Committee of Ministers, give advisory opinions on legal questions concerning the interpretation of the Convention and the Protocols thereto." For a comparison of the European
and American Conventions, see, Buergenthal, The American and European Conventions on

Human Rights: Similarities and Differences, 30 AM. U.L. REv. 155 (1981).
21. European Convention, supra note 20, Protocol No. 2, Article 1(2) Sept. 21, 1970.
See L. Sohn and T. Buergenthal, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OP HUMAN RIGHTS at 1106
(1973): "[T]he limitations which Article 1(2) of the Protocol imposes on the Court's power

to render advisory opinions taken together with the fact that only the Committee of Ministers may request them, greatly diminishes the significance of the Court's advisory
functions."
For an excellent study, see A.H. Robertson, Advisory Opinions of the Court of Human
Rights, reprinted in 1 RENE CASSIN AMICORUM DISCIPULORUMQUE LIBER 224-46 (Paris, 1969).
22 Consultative Jurisdiction, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. at 55.
23. Id. at 56.

24. Id.
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suppose Uruguay were to request an advisory opinion on its obligations
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 25 Under
the Court's analysis, the Court would not be empowered to pass upon the
appropriateness of procedures used by the Human Rights Committee set
up under the International Covenant, but it could adjudicate the question
of whether or not Uruguay was meeting its obligations under that instrument. As the matrix of ratifications of human rights treaties included below points out, 14 of the 26 OAS member states have ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and 11 have ratified the
Optional Protocol permitting individual petitions.
A second source of limitations on the Court's advisory jurisdiction
derives from the unique role envisioned for the Court by the drafters of
the Convention. This role was to include "assist[ing] the American States
in fulfilling their international human rights obligations and . . . assist[ing] the different organs of the inter-American system to carry out
the functions assigned to them in this field. ' '2 6 The Court was concerned
with the possibility that a state might invoke the advisory jurisdiction of
the Court out of a desire to avoid the contentious jurisdiction mandated
by the Convention. For example, if the Commission were investigating a
state action, the state might seek an advisory opinion upon the matter
under investigation. This would prevent the Commission from bringing
the matter up under the Court's contentious jurisdiction, thus enabling
the state to avoid a binding determination. To sanction this sort of "race
to the courthouse" strategy would clearly defeat the purposes of the Convention. Unlike most treaties, human rights treaties do not involve reciprocal interests of states; rather, they provide for individual rights and limitations upon the actions of states. If a state were permitted to
circumvent the binding nature of a judgment simply by invoking the
Court's advisory jurisdiction, the Court would impede those individual
rights it was set up to protect.27
Although article 64 and the rest of the Convention are silent as to the
question, the Court concluded that its advisory jurisdiction is not

25. In 1970 Uruguay ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16), 49,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967). For a thorough review of Uruguay's poor record of compliance
with the Covenant, see THE INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, URUGUAY'S HUMAN
RIGHTS RECORD: COMMENTS, ANALYSIS AND BACKGROUND INI'OUKMA7ION ON THE Co.mT
oF URUGUAY'S 1982 REPORT TO THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE (1982).
26. Consultative Jurisdiction,supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. at 57-58.
27. Human Rights Convention, supra note 1, art. 63(1), does, however, provide a
remedy:
If the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or freedom protected by this Convention, the Court shall rule that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated. It shall also rule,
if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party.
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mandatory but permissive. 8 This holding is consistent with the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice." Thus the Court may decide
on a case-by-case basis whether to accept or reject a request for an advisory opinion. The Court's broad discretionary powers are not, however,
to be viewed as totally unlimited.3 0 Before it may refrain from honoring a
request for an opinion, "[t]he Court must have compelling reasons
founded in the conviction that the request exceeds the limits of its advisory jurisdiction under the Convention .. .Moreover, every decision by
the Court declining to render an advisory opinion must conform to the
provisions of Article 66 of the Convention,3 1 which require that reasons be
'2
given for the decision.
It is interesting to note that the Court's concern with bogus requests
for advisory opinions was anticipated in a "Model American Convention
on Terrorism," drafted by the Standing Committee on World Order
Under Law of the American Bar Association. 3 One of the unique features
of the Draft Convention is that it provides a built-in procedure for utilizing the advisory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court. 34 When a state
receives a request for extradition of a person under the terms of the
treaty, and the state believes that the person may be subjected to persecution in the requesting state, it may request an advisory opinion from
the Court. 5 The drafters of the Draft Convention, realizing that an extradition request might be referred by a state which sought in reality not to
prosecute the alleged offender but rather to avoid his prosecution by returning him to a safe haven, included a provision defeating such fraudu-

28. Consultative Jurisdiction,supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. at 58.
29. See, Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, (1950)
I.C.J. 65, 271-72, distinguishing Statute of Eastern Carelia, (1923) P.C.I.J. Ser. B, No. 5 and
recognizing the ICJ's discretionary jurisdiction in advisory cases wherein the question
presented is directly related to an actual dispute between states.
'30. Consultative Jurisdiction,supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. at 58.
31. Human Rights Convention, supra note 1, art. 66 reads:
1. Reasons shall be given for the judgment of the Court. 2. If the judgment
does not represent in whole or in part the unanimous opinion of the judges,
any judge shall be entitled to have his dissenting or separate opinion attached
to the judgment.
32. Consultative Jurisdiction,supra, note 6, 22 I.L.M. at 58.
33. Lockwood, The Model American Convention On the Prevention and Punishment
of Certain Serious Forms of Violence Jeopardizing FundamentalRights and Freedoms 13
RUTGERS L.J. 579 (1982).
34. Id. at 596. Article 9 of the Model Convention reads:
Upon receipt of a request for extradition for an offense included in Article 1, a
Contracting State may refer the matter to the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights pursuant to Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights
for an advisory opinion as to whether granting the request for extradition
would violate the provisions of this Convention. In like manner, a Contracting
Party, which has made a request for extradition for an offense included in Article 1, may refer the matter to the Inter-American Court for an advisory
opinion.
35. Model Convention, supra note 34, art. 9.
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lent requests. 6 They were particularly concerned with the problem of a
state making an extradition request in favor of a "secret agent" who may
have committed acts of terrorism in another state.37 If such a case were to
reach the Inter-American Court, the Court-under the authority of its
38
present decision-could refuse to grant an advisory opinion.
Although the Court did not specifically raise the issue, its decision
regarding the permissive nature of its advisory jurisdiction implicitly addresses another potentially troublesome situation. Cases may arise in
which the Court is called upon to interpret a treaty which establishes a
separate tribunal for the adjudication of conflicts arising under the treaty.
For example, note again that eleven member states of the OAS have ratified the optional protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and and
Political Rights. 9 Under the provisions of the protocol, an individual may
lodge a complaint against a ratifying state with the Human Rights Committee.' 0 If the advisory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court were
mandatory, the state could avoid an unfavorable binding decision in the
Human Rights Committee by raising the matter before the Inter-American Court pursuant to article 64. Under the authority of the present decision, the Court could refrain from complying with the request.,1 Clearly,
this is sound judicial policy. Just as the Court seeks to avoid institutional
conflict within the inter-American system,"2 so should it respect those
parallel world bodies set up for the protection of human rights. By recognizing the permissive nature of its advisory jurisdiction, the Court ac-

36. Lockwood, supra note 33 at 595-6. Article 6 of the Model Convention states:
Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as imposing an obligation to
extradite if the requested State has substantial grounds for believing that the
request for extradition for an offense included in Article 1 has been maintained
for the purpose of obstructing or preventing the prosecution or punishment of
a person alleged to have committed an offense included within Article 1.
37. Lockwood, supra note 33 at 587.
38. Consultative Jurisdiction,supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. at 58.
39. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 25, and accompanying text.
40. Id. Art. 1 of the optional protocol provides in part:
A State Party to the Covenenat that becomes a party to the present Protocol
recognizes the competence of the [Human Rights Committee] to receive and
consider communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim
to be victims of a violation by that State Party of any of the rights set forth in
the Covennt.
The Human Rights Committee is provided for by art. 28 of the Inter-national Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights.
41. The hypothetical request would probably fall within the conclusions set forth in
Consultative Jurisdiction,supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. 59: "Finally the Court has to consider the
circumstances of each individual case and if, for compelling reasons, it declines to render an
opinion lest it exceed the aforementioned limitations and distort its advisory jurisdiction, it
must do so by means of an opinion, containing the reasons for its refusal to comply with the
request." Compare the comment of Fitzmaurice, infra, note 43, regarding the similar problem of the Inter-national Court of Justice facing a case falling within the concurrent jurisdiction of a treaty tribunal.
42. Consultative Jurisdiction,supra note 6, I.L.M. 56.
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knowledged that as a regional institution it is complementary to other
tribunals at the global level.4"
The Court next turned to the specific question presented by the Peruvian request, i.e., which of the three alternatives44 offered the correct
interpretation of the phrase "or of other treaties concerning the protection of human rights in the American states."'48 The Court settled upon
the broadest of the three alternatives, concluding that the Court may
properly interpret any human rights treaty to which one or more American states are parties."' In reaching its decision, the Court relied on traditional international law methods of interpretation, particularly those
codified in articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of
Treaties. 47 The nub of the problem as the Court saw it was determining

43. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice has addressed this problem with reference to the International Court of Justice. Fitzmaurice maintains that where an advisory case may conflict with
the jurisdiction of a treaty tribunal, the issuance of an advisory opinion runs the risk of
frustrating the expectation interests of the parties to the treaty. The problem cannot be
disposed of by simply citing the non-binding character of an advisory opinion, since an
opinion would surely affect future interpretations by the treaty tribunal and might be
deemed conclusive as to some questions. "The difficulty," he concludes, "is one which, like
others in the field, cannot be solved by any general formula, and its solution must depend
on the individual circumstances of each case." Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the
InternationalCourt of Justice 1951-4, 34 BRIT.Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 147 (1958). Even though the
particular state requesting an advisory opinion of the Court would not be frustrated by the
rendering of an opinion, it is clear in the hypothetical that the expectations of the parties to
the human rights instrument would be frustrated if the protections could be circumvented.
For an indepth examination of the scope of the International Court of Justice's advisory
jurisdiction, see K. KErrH, THE ExTENT OF THE ADvIsORY JURISDICTION OF THE INTrRNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (1971); D. Pratap, THE ADvisony JURISDICriON OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT (1972); I. Shihata, THE POWER OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT TO DETERMINE
ITS OWN JURISDICTION (1968).
44. Supra, at text accompanying note 13.

45. Human Rights Convention, supra note 1, art. 64.
46. Consultative Jurisdiction,supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. at 65.
47. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, UN
Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969), UN Doc. A/CONF. 39/27/Corr.1 (1969), reprinted in 8 I.L.M.
679 (1969) and 63 Am. J. Int'l L. 875 (1969). [hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention]. Art.
31 provides:
General Rule of Interpretation 1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith
in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 2. The context for
the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise in addition to the
text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all

the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;,
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in conne-xion
with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other
parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a)any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpre-tation of the
treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) any subsequent practice in the
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in
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what international obligations the American states intended to make subject to interpretation by advisory opinion. 48 In making this determination,
the Court found, it was not useful to distinguish between multilateral and
bilateral treaties, nor to look to the main purpose of the treaty which is
the source of the obligation. 49 Rather, the ordinary meaning of the terms
of article 64 itself, viewed in light of the object and purpose of the Convention, provided the appropriate guide to construction."
Applying the ordinary meaning rule, the Court held that the phrase
"American States" in article 6411 embraces all states which may ratify or
adhere to the Convention in accordance with article 74, i.e., all member
states of the OAS. 2" Further, the Court could find no compelling reason
why human rights obligations incurred by American states under treaties
concluded outside the inter-American system, or with non-American
states as parties, should be excluded from its advisory jurisdiction. 53 In
reaching this result the Court looked to the text of article 64,51 the object
and purpose of the Convention,5 5 the rules of interpretation set forth in
article 29 of the Convention, 56 the practice of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,5 7 and the preparatory work of the American
58
Convention.
The ordinary meaning of the text of article 64 was held not to compel
a narrow interpretation.5 9 "Since a restrictive purpose was not expressly

the relations between the parties. 4. A special meaning shall be given to a term
if it is established that the parties so intended.
Article 32 provides:
Supplementary means of interpretationRecourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and
the circumstances of its conclu-sion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting
from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure;
or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
48. Consultative Jurisdiction,supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. at 59.
49. Id. Under this reasoning it does not matter that the protection of human rights is
not the principal object of the treaty from which the obligation stems. Objections arising
under the UN Charter or the Charter of the OAS-instruments which are not primary
targeted at human rights-would therefore be subject to interpretation by advisory opinion
in the Inter-American Court.
50. Id. at 59-60. Here the Court applies a customary rule of interpretation of international agreements as codified in art. 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
supra note 47.
51. Human Rights Convention, supra note 1, art. 64 set out at text accompanying note
12.
52. Consultative Jurisdiction,supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. 60.
53. Id. at 64.
54. Id. at 60-61.
55. Id. at 61.
56. Id. at 61-62.
57. Id. at 62-63.
58. Id. at 63.
59. Id. at 60.
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articulated, it cannot be presumed to exist."60 In further support of a
broad interpretation, the Court noted that the Convention itself urged an
integrated view of the regional and universal systems.6' For example, the
Convention makes repeated references to instruments that are not interAmerican in character.6 2 Article 29, which contains rules governing the
interpretation of the Convention "clearly indicates an intention not to
restrict the protection of human rights to determinations that depend on
the source of the obligations,""3 the Court found. Not only does the article make express reference to the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man "and other international acts of the same nature, 6 4 it further provides that nothing in the Convention may be interpreted as "restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom recognized by
virtue of the laws of any State Party or by virtue of another convention to
which one of the said states is a party."" It is difficult to imagine any
stronger textual language in support of the proposition that the Court, in
its role as the authorized interpreter of the Convention, is empowered to
look beyond the Convention to any human rights treaty entered into by
one or more American State.6

60. Id. Moreover, as the Court might have noted, nothing in the Rules of Procedure of
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, supra note 8, indicates that the judges should
propound a restrictive interpretation of article 64. To the contrary, article 50 of the Rules
repeats the language of article 64: "1. If an interpretation is requested of other treaties
concerning the protection of human rights in the American States, as provided for in Article
64.1 .. " Article 51 of the Rules also parallels the wording of article 64(2) which it implements, giving no indication that the "international instruments" mentioned are exclusively
regional and not universal.
61. Consultative Jurisdiction,supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. 61.
62. See inter alia the Convention's Preamble, noting that "these principles have been
set forth in the Charter of the Organization of American States in the American Declaration
of the Rights and Duties of Man, and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and
. . .have been reaffirmed and refined in other international instruments, worldwide as well
as regional in scope" (emphasis added); art. 22(7), establishing the right to receive political
asylum "in accordance with the legislation of the state international conventions. . ."; art.
26, adopting the economic, social and cultural standards set forth in the Charter of the OAS
as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires; art. 27(1), providing for emergency supervision
of the Convention's guarantees when "such measures are not inconsistent with . . . [a
Party's] other obligations under international law ... "
63. Consultative Jurisdiction, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. 61.
64. Human Rights Convention, supra note 1, art. 29(d).
65. Human Rights Convention, supra note 1, art. 29(b).
66. Article 29 may be said to explain the reference in article 64(1) to "other treaties"
and to clarify the content of article 64(2). The expression employed in article 29, "another
convention to which one of the said states is a party," is not by its terms limited to American instruments, nor does it contain any qualifying or limiting modifier other than the logically implied requirement that one of the parties to the instrument be an American state.
This is apparently the only limit that was intended on the Court's advisory jurisdiction, and
explains why the second paragraph of article 64 which authorizes member states of the OAS
to request advisory opinions was included.
It is also worth noting that standing to request advisory opinions concerning "other
treaties" was originally reserved to the principal organs of the OAS and was later extended
to the member states, whereas the member states had from the first draft on the right to
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The Court went on to note the practice of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. 67 In particular the Court found that the Commission, it its reports and resolutions, had made repeated reference to
treaties concluded outside the inter-American system which entailed obligations of American states.6" Since the Court could not always review an
interpretation made by the Commission of a country's treaty obligation
unless its advisory jurisdiction was held to encompass at least as broad a
field as that assumed by the Commission, it was found to be in the best
interests of the states themselves for the Court to construe its article 64
powers broadly. 9
In the preparatory work on the American Convention the Court
found two facts in support of its conclusion. First, by the time the drafters of the Convention delineated the Court's advisory jurisdiction, the
more narrowly drawn provisions of article 1 of Protocol No. 2 of the European Convention7 0 had already been adopted. 1 Thus in shaping the expansive terms of article 64, the drafters purposefully eschewed the narrow
boundaries of the European system.7 2 Second, the Court noted that after
the drafting of the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights73 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political

request an advisory opinion with respect to the compatibility between those "other treaties"
and their domestic law. See Conferencia Especializada Interamericana Sobre Derechos
Humanos: Actas Y Documentos, OEA/Ser. K/XVI/1.2 (1969) at 377. Article 19 itself underwent only minor stylistic modifications and paragraphs (b) and (d) came through the process practically unchanged. Since article 29 makes such a forceful call for a broad interpretation of the Court's advisory jurisdiction, it is indeed significant that it underwent virtually
no change; article 64, by contrast, would seem to have been modified to comport with article
29.
67. Consultative Jurisdiction,supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. 62.
68. Id. 62-63. The Court specifically cited the following country reports and resolution
of the Inter-American Commission: El Salvador (OAS/Ser. L/V/II.46, doc. 23, rev.1, November 17, 1979) at 37-38; Cuba (OAS/Ser. L/V/II.48, doc. 24, December 14, 1979) at 9; Argentina (OAS/Ser. L./V/II.49, doc. 19, April 11, 1980) 24-25; Nicaragua (OAS/Ser. L/V/II.53,
doc. 25, June 30, 1981) 31; Colombia (OAS/Ser. L/V/II.53, doc. 22, June 30, 1981) 56-57;
Guatemala (OAS/Ser. L/V/II.53, doc. 21, rev. 2, October 13, 1981) 16-17; Bolivia (OAS/Ser.
L/V/II.53, doc. 6, rev. 2, October 31, 1981) 20-21; Case 7481 - Acts which occurred in Caracoles (Bolivia), Resolution No. 30/82 (OAS/Ser. L/V/II.55, doc. 54, March 8, 1982).
The Commission's status was raised to that of a consultative organ of the OAS by the
Amended Protocol of OAS Charter, signed Feb. 27, 1970, 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. No. 6847,
721 U.N.T.S. 324. For a thorough discussion of the Commission's on-site observations see
Norris, Observations in Loco: Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights, TEx. INT'L L.J. 46 (1980), see also Research Note, Synopsis of the 198081 Country Reports of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 4 HUMAN RTS. Q.
406 (1982).
69. Consultative Jurisdiction,supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. 63.
70. European Convention, supra notes 20 and 21.
71. Consultative Jurisdiction,supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. 63.
72. Id.
73. International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
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Rights and its optional protocol,"' the OAS Council consulted member
states of the organization in June of 1967 regarding the advisability of
continuing the work on an American Convention. 75 Ten of the twelve
states responding to the inquiry favored continuing the work on the Convention, with the understanding that an effort would be made to draw
upon the provisions of the UN Covenants.7 Thus the history of the Convention demonstrated a tendency to conform the regional system to the
a tendency which was reflected in the text of the Conuniversal system,
7
vention itself.
A number of the submissions addressed to the Court by member
states and OAS organs under article 52 of the Court's Rules of Procedure 78 urged a more restrictive interpretation of article 64 . s The concern
was evinced in these submissions that conflicting interpretations might
result from having more than one international body pass upon particular
instruments."0 Noting that the possibility of conflicting interpretations is
a fairly common phenomenon in all legal systems that are not strictly
hierarchical in character, the Court was not persuaded."' It further noted
that the broad jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice even
made it possible for the ICJ to pass upon instruments framed within the
inter-American system. 2 Another concern expressed in some of the submissions was that decisions regarding non-inter-American treaties could
affect states which had little to do with the Convention or the Court and

74. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
75. Consultative Jurisdiction,supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. 63.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Supra notes 8 and 9 and accompanying text.
79. Consultative Jurisdiction,supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. 64.
80. Id. For a discussion of the problems that may arise from conflicting interpretations
by international human rights tribunals, see Meron, Norm Making and Supervision in International Human Rights: Reflections on Institutional Order, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 754
(1982). Meron notes a concern that, given the growing number of U.N. and regional bodies
interpreting human rights instruments, it may be necessary to achieve a greater degree of
coordination among these bodies in order to prevent conflicting interpretations of human
rights norms. While this concern has merit, there is also merit in allowing diverse bodies to
address common issues arising under the respective instruments. There has been too little
rather than too much chalking out of the substantive meaning of the human rights norms;
as with the development of the common law, the product of diverse bodies may yield greater
insight into the appropriate rule of law than would complete judicial harmony. One of the
chief merits of the Inter-American Court's decision is that it permits the Court to examine a
wide complement of human rights instruments when considering a particular case. For one
approach to coordinating the procedural and normatic human rights mechanisms established by the American Convention with those of the U.N., see Piza, Coordination of the
Mechanisms for the Protectionof Human Rights in the American Convention with Those
Established by the United Nations, 30 Am. L. REV. 167 (1981).
81. Consultative Jurisdiction,supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. 64.
82. Id., See sources listed supra at note 43 on the scope of the ICJ's advisory
jurisdiction.
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which could not even be represented before the Court. 3 This matter, the
Court found, was disposed of by its decision to proceed on an ad hoc basis
and to view its advisory jurisdiction as permissive.8 4 A final safeguard
with respect to these concerns was the fact that the Court's advisory jurisdiction by definition involved non-binding decisions."
Although the Court did not directly confront the issue, it seems fair
to conclude that it would define the term "treaties" in article 64 to be
generic in character, encompassing a broad range of international instruments bearing upon human rights. 86 Supporting this conclusion is the
text of the Vienna Convention" 7-cited by the Court as a key guide to
interpretations-which defines a "treaty" as "an international agreement
concluded between States in written form and governed by international
law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related
instruments whatever its particular-designation.' 9 (Emphasis added.)
The full breadth of the term "treaty" as used in the Vienna Convention is
indicated by the International Law Commission in its report to the UN
General Assembly: "[I]n addition to 'treaty,' 'convention,' and 'protocol,'
one not infrequently finds titles such as 'declaration,' 'charter,' 'covenant,'
'pact,' 'act,' 'statute,' 'agreement,' 'concordat,' whilst names like 'declaration,' 'agreement,' and modus vivendi may well be found given both to
formal and less formal types of agreements."'"
The International Law Commission concluded that "treaty" is used
throughout the Vienna Convention, then in draft form, "as a generic term
covering all forms of international agreement in writing concluded between States,"'91 and that a majority of jurists accept this usage.2 The
Court itself attached heavy importance to article 29 of the Convention,
which prohibits any interpretation which would exclude or limit "the effect that the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and
other international acts of the same nature may have."' 93 Thus the plain
international meaning of "treaty" should be deemed to encompass such
instruments as, inter alia, the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man, 94 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,"' the OAS

83. Consultative Jurisdiction,supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. 64.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 65.
86. The question of whether instruments such as the American Declaration on the
Rights anrd Dtie nf Man, which are not treaties per se, fall within the scope of article 64,
was raised in Buergenthal, supra note 4 at 243.
87. Supra note 47.
88. Id. and accompanyint text.
89. Vienna Convention, supra note 47, art. 2, para. 1(a).
90. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc.
A/6309/Rev. 1 (1966), reprintedin 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 169, 188; U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.
A/1966/Add. 1.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Supra, note 63 and accompanying text.
94. The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 1948, reprinted in
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Charter,96 and the two UN Human Rights Covenants;9 7 the Court's advisory jurisdiction would seem to extend to such instruments.
III.

THE SECOND ADVISORY OPINION

In the second case, the Court again had before it the written observations of several American states and OAS organs,9 s and the amicus briefs
of two nongovernmental organizations. 9 The Inter-American Commission's request for an advisory opinion presented the following question:
At what point in time does a state become a party to the American Convention on Human Rights, where the state has deposited an instrument
of ratification or adherence, containing one or more reservations to the
Convention, with the General Secretariat of the OAS? 100 The request was
necessitated by an ambiguity in the American Convention's provisions
pertaining to ratifications and reservations.10' On the other hand, article
74(2) provides, in pertinent part, that with respect to a state depositing
an instrument of ratification or adherence after the Convention's entry
into force "the Convention shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification or adherence."' 0 2 On the other hand,
article 75 provides that "[t]his Convention shall be subject to reservations
only in conformity with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties signed on May 23, 1969. "13 In order to understand the
source of confusion it will be necessary to set forth the relevant provisions
of the Vienna Convention. Articles 19 and 20 provide:
Article 19
Formulation of reservations
A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding
to a treaty, formulate a reservation unless:
(a)the reservation is prohibited by the treaty;
(b)the treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do not

HANDBOOK, supra note 1, 17, OEA/Ser. L/V/11.50 doc. 6 (1980).
95. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217, U.N.
Doc. A/810 (1948).
96. Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30 1948, 2 U.S.T.S. 2394;
T.I.A.S. No. 2361; 119 U.N.T.S. 48.
97. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, G.A.
Res. 2200 A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 9(1966); International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200
A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16), 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
98. The following states and OAS organs submitted written observations; Costa Rica,
Mexico, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, the United States, the Permanent Council, the
Inter-American Juridical Committee and the General Secretariat.
99. Amicus briefs were submitted by the International Human Rights Law Group and
the Urban Morgan Institute for Human Rights of the University of Cincinnati College of

Law.
100. Effect of Reservations, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. 38-39.
101. Human Rights Convention, supra note 1, arts. 74, 75.

102. Id. art. 74(2).
103. Id. art. 75.

DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 13:2-3

include the reservation in question, may be made; or
(c)in cases not falling under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.
Article 20
Acceptance of an objection to reservations
1. A reservation expressly authorized by a treaty does not require any
subsequent acceptance by the other contracting States unless the
treaty so provides.
2. When it appears from the limited number of the negotiating
States and the object and purpose of a treaty that the application of
the treaty in its entirety between all the parties is an essential condition of the consent of each one to be bound by the treaty, a reservation requires acceptance by all the parties.
3. When a treaty is a constituent instrument of an international organization and unless it otherwise provides, a reservation requires the
acceptance of the competent organ of that organization.
4. In cases not falling under the preceding paragraphs and unless the
treaty otherwise provides:
(a) acceptance of another contracting State of a reservation constitutes the reserving State a party to the treaty in relation to that other
State if or when the treaty is in force for those States;
(b) an objection of another contracting State to a reservation does not
preclude the entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting
and reserving States unless a contrary intention is definitely expressed
by the objecting State;
(c) an act expressing a State's consent to be bound by the treaty and
containing a reservation is effective as soon as at least one other contracting State has accepted the reservation.
5. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 4 and unless the treaty
otherwise provides, a reservation is considered to have been accepted
by a State if it shall have raised no objection to the reservation by the
end of a period of twelve months after it was notified of the reservation or by the date on which it expressed its consent to be bound by
the treaty, whichever is later.'"
The Court began its discussion by noting that article 74(2) of the
Convention is silent as to whether it applies exclusively to ratifications
and adherences which contain no reservations or whether it also applies
to those with reservations. 10 5 The General Secretariat of the OAS, as depositary of the Convention, read the relevant provisions of the Vienna
......
t o ean that a reerving tate is not a party to the Convention until the expiration of one year from the date on which other state
parties received notification of the reservations or expressed their consent
to be bound by the treaty with respect to their reservations. 10 6 This view

104. Vienna Convention, supra note 47, arts. 19, 20.
105. Effect of Reservations, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. 42.
106. Request for an Advisory Opinion Presented by the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, reprinted in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 1982, 28. OEA/Ser. L/III.7, doc. 13 (1982). [hereinafter cited as Request for an Advi-
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was further advanced in the written observations submitted to the Court
by the United States.1 0 7 In its observations, the United States argued that
paragraphs 4(c) and 5 of article 20 were incorporated into the American
Convention by reference in article 75.'0 8 Paragraph 4(c) of that article
provides that an act expressing a state's consent to be bound by the
treaty and containing a reservation is effective when at least one other
state party has accepted the reservation. Paragraph 5 presumes such an
acceptance by another state if the latter has raised no objection to the
reservation in twelve months after notification of the reservation." 9 Thus,
reading article 20, the United States concluded that the Secretariat General may not deposit an instrument of ratification containing a reservation until a state party accepts the reservation, such acceptance being
presumed of any state that fails to object within a twelve-month
period. 10
This question is of great importance to the Inter-American Commission because its powers are different respecting states that are parties to
the Convention and those that are not. Article 33 of the Convention
grants the Commission competence with respect to matters relating to the
fulfillment by state parties of their commitments thereunder."' Article
41(f) authorizes the Commission to take actions -on petitions and other
communications pursuant to its authority under articles 44 through 51."1
The effect of petitions and communications to the Commission is different, depending upon whether the state concerned is a party to the Convention."13 It is necessary for the Commission to know when a particular
state is a party to the Convention in order to apply the correct procedures
to petitions and communications, as well as to apply the relevant norms.
4
The provisions of the Vienna Convention dealing with reservations"
provide for the application of different rules to different categories of
treaties, the Court found."' Thus it was necessary for the Court to determine how the American Convention was to be classified for purposes of
the relevant provisions of the Vienna Convention."' In so doing, the
Court was to look for guidance to the language of article 75 and the pur-

sory Opinion.]
107. Observations of the Government of the United States of American Concerning the
Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (Sept. 3, 1982).
108. Id. at 6-7.
109. Vienna Convention, supra note 47, arts. 20(4)(c), 20(5).
110. Observations of the Government of the United States of American Concerning the
Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights (Sept. 3, 1982) 9.
111. Human Rights Convention, supra note 1, art. 33.
112. Id. at arts. 41(f), 44-51.
113. Request for an Advisory Opinion, supra note 106.
114. Vienna Convention, supra note 47, arts. 19-23.
115. Effect of Reservations, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. at 42.
116. Id.
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pose for which it was designed." 7 Turning to article 19, the Court determined that the reference to the Vienna Convention in article 75 was a
reference to paragraph (c) of Article 19.1' Paragraph (a) was inapplicable
in that the Convention does not prohibit reservations; likewise, paragraph
(b) was inapplicable since the Convention does not specify permissible
reservations.1 9 It thus followed that paragraph (c), permitting reservations which are not "incompatible with the object and purpose of the
treaty, '120 was the governing provision. 12 ' The Court's interpretation was
buttressed by reference to the preparatory work of the Convention, which
indicated that the drafters wished to provide for a flexible reservations
policy.122
The Court applied a similar analysis to article 20 of the Vienna Convention. The chief question with respect to article 20 was whether reservations to the Convention required acceptance by the other state parties.
If not, then a ratifying state would be deemed a party to the Convention
upon the deposit of the instrument of ratification, regardless of whether
the ratification was accompanied by a reservation. On the other hand, if
acceptance of reservations by other state parties was a prerequisite under
the Convention, a reserving state would not be deemed a party until at
least one other state party had accepted the reservation. As mentioned
earlier,12 3 the latter view was adopted by the General Secretariat of the
OAS and advanced in the written observations submitted to the Court by
the United States. The Court, however, concluded differently. Noting
that the Convention did not involve a limited number of negotiating
states exchanging reciprocal rights, nor did the application of the treaty
in its entirety to all of the parties appear to be an essential condition of
the consent of each to be bound, the Court found that paragraph 2 of
article 20 was inapplicable. 2 4 Likewise, paragraph 3 could be eliminated
since the Convention was not a constituent instrument of an international
organization. 2 The Court's determination thus came down to a choice
between paragraph 1 and paragraph 4 of article 20. In selecting the approach codified in paragraph 1, the Court held that reservations to the
Convention do not require acceptance by any other contracting states. 2 6
Thus it followed that a reserving state is bound from the date of the de-

117. Id.

118. Id. at 44.
119. Id.
120. Vienna Convention, supra note 47, art. 19, para. (c).
121. Effect of Reservations, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. 44.
122. Id. at 44-46. The Court cited to the proceedings and documents of the Specialized
Inter-American Conference on Human Rights, which met in San Jose, Costa Rica from Nov.
7 to 22, 1969, to adopt the Convention. These materials are reprinted in Conferencia Especializada Interamericana Sobre Derechos Humanos, OEA/Ser. K/XVI.2 (1973).
123. Supra notes 106 and 107 and accompanying text.
124. Effect of Reservations, supra note 6, 22 LL.M. 46.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 49.
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posit of its instrument of ratification." 7 It should be noted that the
Court's view reflected the interpretation put forward by the Urban Morgan Institute for Human Rights of the College of Law at the University of
Cincinnati in its amicus brief.
The Court's views were strongly guided by the unique nature of
human rights treaties. In most treaties, the Court noted, reciprocal rights
are exchanged for the mutual benefit of the state parties.' 28 Article 20(4)
of the Vienna Convention is geared to the demands of this traditional
system. 12 9 While it liberalizes the ratification process insofar as it permits
reservations, article 20(4) still requires that at least one state party accept
the reservation before the treaty is operative as to the reserving party.
Further, it enables the other contracting states to accept or reject the
reservations to determine whether they wish to enter into treaty relationss with the reserving state. By contrast, modern human rights treaties
do not have as their object the reciprocal exchange of rights for the mutual benefit of contracting states; rather, they aim to protect the basic
rights of individuals from encroachments by the state of their nationality
or any other contracting state.130 "In concluding these human rights treaties," the Court found, "the States can be deemed to submit themselves
to a legal order within which they, for the common good, assume various
obligations not in relation to other States, but towards all individuals
within their jurisdiction.' 31 The Court buttressed its conclusions by ref3 2
erence to statements of the European Commission on Human Rights1
and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in the Genocide Convention Case.133
The Court's general views concerning the nature of human rights
treaties were found to apply with particular force to the American Convention.' 3" Unlike other treaties, including the European Convention, the
American Convention confers on individuals the right to file a petition

127. Id.

128. Id. at 46-47.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 47. D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in InternationalLaw, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 1110 (1982); Imbert, Reservations and Human Rights Conventions, 6 HUM.
RTS. REV.

28 (1981).

131. Effect of Reservations, supra, note 6, I.L.M. 47. Cf. Imbert, supra note 130 at 33:
In a human rights treaty, "one Party's obligations cannot be modified by another Party's
attitude; to allow a State to set aside its obligations simply because another State has conferred this right upon itself by making a reservation would be to detract from the goal that
conventions of this kind pursue, if only because the victim of this reciprocal arrangement
would not be the reserving State but individuals, the persons whom the convention is
designed to protect."

132. Effect of Reservations, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. 47-48. See also Application No.
788/60 (Austria v. Italy), 4 Y.B. EUR. CoNV. HUM. RTS. 138, 140 (1961).
133. Effect of Reservations, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. 47-48. See also, Reservations to the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15,

22-23.
134. Effect of Reservations, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. 48.
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with the Inter-American Commission against any state that has ratified
the Convention.13 3 States, however, may not institute proceedings against
another state until each has ratified the Convention.' 36 This structure, the
Court found, "indicates the overriding importance the Convention attaches to the commitments of the States Parties vis-a-vis individuals...
"137

Article 20(4) of the Vienna Convention, providing for the entry into
force of a ratification with a reservation only upon its acceptance by another state, was thus determined to have been intended to apply to a
more traditional treaty arrangement.1 3 8 By contrast, the American Convention was "a multilateral legal instrument or framework enabling
States to make binding unilateral commitments not to violate the human
rights of individuals within their jurisdiction.' 3 9 In this context, the
Court found, article 75 of the Convention must be held to refer to paragraph 1 of article 20, which addresses those cases in which no subsequent
acceptance of a reservation is required. 4 ° The fact that article 20(1) refers to reservations "expressly authorized by a treaty" was no obstacle;
while the Convention authorizes no specific reservations, the Court concluded, it sanctions in general those reservations that are consistent with
the object and purpose of the Convention.''
In closing, the Court emphasized that its holding was restricted to
42
reservations compatible with the object and purpose of the Convention.
As the ultimate arbiter of the meaning of the Convention, the Court has
the power to determine what reservations are incompatible and thus void
ab initio.'14 While the Court refused to consider in the abstract what sort

135. Id. at 48. See, Human Rights Convention, supra note 1, art. 44.
136. Effect of Reservations, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. 48. See also, Human Rights Convention, supra note 6, art. 45.
137. Effect of Reservations, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. 48.
138. Id at 46.
139. Id. at 48.
140. Id. at 49.
141. Id.
142. Id. See also, Koh, Reservations to Multilateral Treaties, 23 HARV. INT'L L.J. 71,

97 (1982).
143. Mr. Golsong has forcefully argued that this is the appropriate result where a tribunal is empowered to interpret and apply a human rights treaty. In such a case, "[flormal
acceptance or formal objection on the part of other Contracting States of one, or several
reservations formulated by another Contracting State can have no juridical validity." Golsong, Contribution to the Rome Colloquy, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 4TH INTER-NATIONAL COLLOQUY ABOUT THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 271-72 (1975). Imbert; supra
note 130 at 35, noted prior to the question arising before the Inter-American Court that "[a]
solution of this kind would.. .be suited to.. .the American Convention on Human Rights..

. ." Indeed, it would appear to be the case that the view that only organs responsible for
ensuring enforcement of a human rights treaty are qualified to judge the compatibility of
reservations is widely held. Imbert, id. at 36; Cohen-Jonathan, Les Rapports entre la Convention Europeenne des Droits de l'Homme et le Pacte des Nations Unies sur les Droits
Civils et Politiques,in REGIONALISME ET UNIVERSALISME DANS LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL CONTEMPORAIN 334-35 (1977).
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of reservation might be deemed to conflict with the object and purpose of
the Convention, it clearly perceived the safeguarding of contracting states
from improper reservations to be an important function of the Court.'44
The opinion of the Court was also important with respect to two preliminary matters relating to competence. First there was the question of
the Court's own competence to hear the case. Since the Secretary General
of the OAS was assigned depositary functions under the Convention,' 4 5
and, furthermore, since the past practice of the OAS had been to have the
Secretary General handle disputes concerning ratifications,'4 6 the argument could be made that the Secretary General rather than the Court
was authorized to settle the main question in the case. The Court had no
hesitancy in declaring that the article 64 explicit grant of power to the
Court to render advisory opinions interpreting the Convention encompassed the question posed by the Commission.' 7 The Court distinguished
those treaties with respect to which the Secretary General established its
past practice of dispute resolution, noting that the Convention set up a
formal supervisory mechanism-the Court-for the adjudication of questions arising under the Convention. 48 The Court's competence in this regard was expressed in article 33(b)' 4 9 and reinforced by article 1 of the
Court's Statute, which declares that the Court "is an autonomous judicial
institution whose purpose is the application and interpretation of the
American Convention on Human Rights."' 50

144. Effect of Reservations, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. 49. It is also important to note that
any interest other states parties to the Convention have as to reciprocity is protected by art.
21 of the Vienna Convention governing the legal effects of reservations and also incorporated by reference in the American Convention. Under art. 21, a reservation operates reciprocally between the reserving state and any other party, so that it modifies the treaty for
both of them in their mutual relations to the extent of the reserved provisions. The International Law Commission was of the opinion that this rule in large measure safeguarded the
interests of states. International Law Commission, Report of the InternationalLaw Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of its 18th Session, [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 207. Under the American Convention, therefore, it would not be possible for a state
to enter a complaint against another state before the Commission if the complaining state
had reserved on the gravamen of the complaint.
145. Human Rights Convention, supra note 1, arts. 74, 76, 78, 79, 81.
146. Effect of Reservations, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. at 40. See also Standards on Reservations of Inter-American Multilateral Treaties, OAS G.A. Res. 102 (111-0/73) (April 14,
1973), AG/doc. 375/73 rev. 1, reprinted in OEA/Ser. P/II-0.2, Vol. I (1973).
147. Effect of Reservations, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. at 40.
148. Id.
149. Human Rights Convention, supra note 1, art. 33(b).
150. Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. For the official text, see
Handbook, supra note 1, at 105, and Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights to the General Assembly, 1980, 16, OEA/Ser. L/V/III.3, doc. 13, Corr. 1 (1981). The
Statute is reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 635 (1980).
Thus the Court rejected the view that the Secretary General is empowered to determine
whether and at what time a ratification is to take effect. While the Secretary General's position on the main question in the case was contrary to the Court's holding, (supra note 106
and accompanying text), there is no indication that the Secretary General asserted a primary power to decide the question.
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Similarly, the Court found that the Inter-American Commission was
competent to request the advisory opinion under article 64 of the Convention.1"' The Court noted that, under article 64, member states of the
OAS enjoy an absolute right to seek advisory opinions. 1 52 By contrast,
OAS organs can request advisory opinions only "[w]ithin their spheres of
competence."' 1 3 The Commission is one of the organs listed in Chapter X
of the OAS Charter'84 , which is incorporated by reference in article 64.
Since the Commission has different powers with respect to those member
states that are parties to the Convention and those that are not, 58 it was
imperative for the Commission to know precisely when a reserving state
became a party. The Commission's request was therefore within its
sphere of competence.1 56 Furthermore, the Court observed that, given the
57
broad powers conferred upon the Commission by the OAS Charter,
"the Commission enjoys, as a practical matter, an absolute right to request an advisory opinion within the framework of article 64(1) of the
Convention." ' Thus, for the purposes of article 64, the Commission
stands on precisely the same footing as a member state of the OAS.
IV.

CONCLUSION

With the advent of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, an
additional body has been added to the regional apparatus for the promotion and protection of human rights. Serious and wide-ranging violations
are occurring on a quotidian basis in this hemisphere and one would rival
Dr. Pangloss for optimism if one thought that the establishment of the
court would lead to immediate and dramatic improvements in the observance of human rights by governments. Nevertheless, our best hope remains in the rule of law and in the institutions dedicated to ensuring its
even-handed, objective enforcement.
The two advisory opinions of the Court should demonstrate to states
the confidence they may place in this new institution. The opinions are
Note also that the Court's position on the scope of the Secretary General's duties as
depositary is supported by the Vienna Convention, art. 77. In its draft form, this article
required that the depositary "examine whether.., an instrument or a reservation is in conformity with the provisions of the treaty." Report of the International Law Commission to
the General Assembly, supra note 90, at 269. Despite this apparent command to inspect
reservations, the International Law Commission made it clear that this draft provision was
not ;ntended to make the depositary njudgp of the validity of the reservation. Id. In its final
form, however, art. 77 excludes the examining of reservations from the depositary's functions. It is thus safe to conclude that under the Vienna Convention a depositary is not to
make legal judgments as to the validity of treaties.
151. Effect of Reservations, supra note 6, 22 I.L.M. at 41.
152. The text of art. 64 can be found supra at text of accompanying note 12.
153. Human Rights Convention, supra note 1, art. 64(1).
154. See The Charter of the Organization of American States, supra note 96.
155. Supra notes 111-113 and accompanying text.
156. Effect of Reservations, supra note 6, 22 at I.L.M. 41.
157. See The Charter of the Organization of American States, supra note 96, art. 112.
158. Effect of Reservations, supra note 6, I.L.M. 41.
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well-reasoned, lawyer-like products, and correct in their conclusions. We
can only hope that states, with increasing frequency, will resort to the
Court both in its advisory and contentious capacities.

Trade Union Rights in the Workers' State:
Poland and the ILO
DAVID
I.

A.

WIRTH*

INTRODUCTION**

Poland recently gave notice of its intent to withdraw from the International Labor Organization ("ILO") as a result of the ILO's treatment of
the Polish trade union situation.' The Polish government had previously
warned of this action by characterizing the ILO's establishment of a Commission of Inquiry to investigate alleged violations of trade union rights
in Poland as "[i]nterference in Poland's internal affairs" and "an artificial, politically motivated resolve to keep by every means the so-called
Polish case on ILO's agenda."' One implication of this statement is that
the Organization has attempted to hold Poland-a state in which "[t]he
working people . . . wield state authority" 3-to

standards inconsistent

with the theoretical equivalence of the workers' and the state's interests.
Although the Commission's report' rejected these arguments, Poland's assertions continue to have significance for the overall work of the ILO. A
particularly important question in this context is whether the existence of
trade unions free of state and Communist Party influence is consistent
* Office of the Legal Adviser, United States Department of State. The views presented
in this article are those of the author and do not represent positions of the Department of
State. The author would like to acknowledge Professor Leon S. Lipson, who suggested the
subject of this article.
**Due to publication delays, the editors regret that diacritical marks have been deleted
from the text and footnotes. Complete copies of various sources are available by contacting
the Journal office.
1. Letter from Ambassador Stanislaw Turbanski, Permanent Representative of the Polish People's Republic to the United Nations Office in Geneva, to Francis Blanchard, Director-General of the ILO (Nov. 17, 1984). The withdrawal will not take effect for two years
and does not alter the obligations undertaken by Poland pursuant to ILO conventions. ILO
CONsT. art. 1, para. 5. The Belorussian SSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, Mongolia, the Ukranian SSR, and the USSR have formally supported Poland's action. Letter to Francis Blanchard, Director-General of the ILO (Nov. 23,
1984).
2. Letter from Stanislaw Turbanski, Permanent Representative of the Polish People's
Republic in Geneva, to Francis Blanchard, Director-General of the ILO (June 24, 1983),
reprinted in 67 Off. Bull., Ser. B, Spec. Supp. Annex 1 (1984) (Commission of Inquiry report
on Poland).
3. KONSTrrUCJA (Constitution) art. 2, para. 1 (Pol.). Cf. KoNsTrruTrsIA (Constitution)
art. 1 (USSR) (The state "express[es] the will and interests of the workers.")
4. 67 Off. Bull., Ser. B, Spec. Supp. (1984) (Commission of Inquiry report on Poland).
See infra text accompanying notes 66 & 68.
5. The Communist Party does not have a formal role in the government or the state,
but is "the guiding political force of society in building socialism." KONSTYTUCJA (Constitution) art. 3, para. 1 (Pol.). Cf. KoNsTrrrrTsiA (Constitution) art. 6 (USSR) (The Communist
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with the fundamental political principles on which a workers' state such
as Poland is based.'

II.

TRADE UNION THEORY AND PRACTICE IN POLAND

Lenin's statements about the role of trade unions in the postrevolutionary workers' state were ambiguous. Lenin rejected the proposition
that the state should assert total control over the unions as well as the
thesis that the unions should be completely autonomous. Instead he
adopted a compromise view that identified the unions primarily as links
between the state and the masses. The unions were not to be instruments
of the state, although their goals would be consistent with those of the
state and the Party. Likewise the unions would act as a vehicle for resolving workers' grievances, although they would also participate in supervising production norms and enforcing labor discipline.'
In practice the behavior of the official trade unions in Poland and
other Soviet bloc states has been remote from this intermediate doctrinal
position. The tension inherent in the unions' dual role is usually resolved
in favor of the concerns of the state and the Party. The unions' function
of transmitting directives to workers from the state and the Party has

Party is "[t]he leading and guiding force of Soviet society.") Conceptual distinctions between the Party and the state, however, are often unproductive, as the Party's influence
permeates virtually all governmental organs. See, e.g., W. BRUS, SOCIALIST OWNERSHIP AND
POLITICAL SYSTEMS 51-57 (1975) (etatist model of Party). See also de Weydenthal, Workers
and Party in Poland,PROBS. COMMUNISM, Nov.-Dec. 1980, at 1, 16 ("[T]he Polish sociopolitical environment has long been characterized by the party's dominance over all aspects of
organized social activity, especially by the official insistence that no form of public activity
can develop independently of the party's direct control and supervision.")
6. For a discussion of events leading to the establishment of independent trade unions
in Poland, see generally N. ASCHERSON, THE POLISH AUGUST (1982); R. ERINGER, STRIKE FOR
FREEDOM! (1982); D. MACSHANE, SOLIDARITY (1981); A. TOURAINE, F. DUBET, M. WIEVIORKA
& J. STRZELECKI, SOLIDARITY (1983) [hereinafter cited as TOURAINE, ET AL.]; L. WESCHLER,
SOLIDARITY (1982).
7. See S. COHEN, BUKHARIN AND THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION 102-03 (1974); M. FAINSOD,
How RUSSIA Is RULED 143 (rev. ed. 1963). Lenin's view was founded primarily on Marx's
conception of trade unions as "schools of communism." See S. COHEN, supra, at 102; F.
KAPLAN, BOLSHEVIK IDEOLOGY AND THE ETHICS OF SOVIET LABOR 295 (1968); A. LOZOVSKY,
MARX AND THE TRADE UNIONS 175 (1942). See generally Lenin, The Trade Unions, the Pre-

sent Situation and Trotsky's Mistakes, in ON TRADE UNIONS 375, 376-77 (B. Koval ed.
nl(~
€tKNeWPI
Constitution) art. 85
o ..
+l .. ~ , ro,}o
r.8
1970)1 (specch delivered on December 30, 1920)- (-f. KONa-v'rI1rIA (osiuin
(Pol.) ("Trade unions . . . shall be the school of civic activeness and involvement in the
building of socialist society.") Lenin had previously adhered to Trotsky's position requiring
total "statification" of the unions, but underwent an ideological shift in 1920. See S. COHEN,
supra, at 102; J. SORENSON, THE LIFE AND DEATH OF SOVIET TRADE UNIONISM 85-86 (1969).

Lenin's ultimate position can be seen as a practical compromise intended to resolve the
conflict between the unions and the state. See L. SCHAPIRO, THE ORIGIN OF THE COMMUNIST
AUTOCRACY 283 (2d ed. 1977); J. SORENSON, supra, at 85-86. See also N. ASCHERSON, supra
note 6, at 248 (Lenin's statements on trade unions were "responses to crises.") Although he
viewed trade unions as focal points for the political organization of the working class in
capitalist countries, Marx provided little guidance on the role of trade unions in the postrevolutionary state. See A. LoZOVSKY, supra, at 16-25, 174-75.
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consequently expanded at the expense of activities directed toward the
defense of workers' interests. As a result, the official Polish trade unions
have supported wage reductions, longer working hours, and productivity
increases.8 As a matter of principle, however, the bloc states have adopted
a contradictory position by committing themselves, as discussed in the
following section, to certain international standards established by the
ILO. 9
III.

POLAND AND THE ILO

The ILO was founded for the improvement of conditions of labor,' ° a

8. See N. ASCHERSON, supra note 6, at 249; A. KARATNYCKY, A. MOTvL & A. STURMTHAL,
69-71 (1980) [hereinafter cited as KARATNYCKY, ET AL.];
Stefanowsky & Hudson, Two Conflicting Concepts of Unions in Poland, in AUGUST 1980:
THE STRIKES IN POLAND 62 (W. Robinson ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as AUGUST 1980]. See
WORKERS' RIGHTS, EAST AND WEST

also J.

DE WEYDENTHAL, THE COMMUNISTS OF POLAND 62 (1978); M. DZIEWANOWSKI, THE
COMMUNIST PARTY OF POLAND 201 (2d ed. 1976); R. LESLIE, A. POLONSKY, J. CIECHANOWSKI &

Z. PELCZYNSKI, THE HISTORY OP POLAND SINCE 1863, at 301 (1980); P. WANDYCZ, THE UNITED
STATES AND POLAND 344 (1980). Cf. M. FAINSOD, supra note 7, at 518-22 (trade union practice in USSR); KARATNYCKY, ET AL., supra, at 53-64, 78-93 (trade union practice in USSR,
Rumania, and Czechoslovakia). Strikes are not prohibited by legislation in Poland and other
bloc states, but are theoretically impossible because the state's and the workers' interests
supposedly coincide. See C. JENKS, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF TRADE UNION FREEDOM 368 (1957). Termination without notice, however, is authorized in Poland for "a serious
violation of... basic obligations as a worker and, more particularly, ... [for] absen[ce] from
...work without a valid reason." LAB. CODE § 52(1)(1) (1974)(Pol.), translated in 1974 ILO
LEGIS. SER. This provision has been used to punish striking workers. See KARATNYCKY, ET
AL., supra, at 71-73. See also LAB. CODE §§ 64 & 65 (1974) (Pol.) (providing for cancellation
of contract of employment for absence from workplace).
9. Various provisions of Polish domestic legislation in principle protect trade union
rights. The Polish constitution provides that "[t]rade unions shall play an important part in
the Polish People's Republic ... [and] shall represent the interests and rights of the working people." KONSTYTUCJA (Constitution) art. 85 (Pol.). The constitution also provides that
"trade unions ... shall unite citizens for their active participation in political, social, economic, and cultural life." Id. art. 84, para. 2. See also id. art. 83, para. 1 & art. 84, para. 1
(guaranteeing freedom of meetings and assembly and right of association). Article 1, paragraph 1 of the Trade Union Act of 1982 states that "[w]orkers shall have the right to establish and associate together in trade unions." 1982 Dziennik Ustaw 581 (Pol.), translatedin
1982 ILO LEGIS. SER. The Act also provides that "[t]rade unions represent occupational
interests of their members." Id. art. 5. In addition, "[tirade unions represent and defend the
workers' rights and interests in connection with working conditions, wages, social and living
conditions and welfare." Id. art. 6, para. 1. The Polish labor code specifies that "[w]orkers
shall have the right to associate in trade unions." LAB. CODE § 19(1) (1974) (Pol.), translated
in 1974 ILO LEGIS. SER. But see id. § 19(2) (Trade unions "shall . .. co-operate with the
competent organs of government in issuing and applying the provisions of labour law and
shall take action to reinforce the rule of law in connection with the observance of the workers' rights and obligations.")
10. See ILO CONST. preamble para. 2 & annex art. III. The ILO is now a specialized
agency of the United Nations. See Protocol Concerning the Entry into Force of the Agreement Between the United Nations and the International Labour Organization, Dec. 19,
1946, 1 U.N.T.S. 183, 29 Off. Bull. 383 (1946). All UN members are eligible to become ILO
members. ILO CONST. art. 1, para. 3. This accounts for the presence in the ILO of the
Belorussian and Ukranian SSRs, both of which are UN members. See supra note 1 & infra
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mandate which is furthered through the adoption of conventions" and
recommendations.' 2 The annual International Labor Conference 3 is the
plenary body of the Organization and the Governing Body 4 its executive
council. The International Labor Office,' 5 headed by the Director-General, is the Organization's secretariat. The most distinctive feature of the
ILO's institutional structure is the principle of tripartism, under which
not only government officials, but also representatives of workers and employers, are participating delegates to the Conference and the Governing
Body."

notes 16, 21 & 22.
11. Only ratification by a member state creates binding obligations under a convention.
ILO CONST. art. 20. But see infra text accompanying note 43 (freedom of association principles apply to member states regardless of ratification of Nos. 87 and 98).
12. Recommendations are guidelines for-national action. See N. VALTICOS, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR LAW 44 (1979); Landy, The Implementation Proceduresof the International
Labor Organization, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 633, 634 (1980).
13. See ILO CONST. arts. 3 & 4. See generally G. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION 25-46 (1970); N. VALTicos, supra note 12, at 34-36.
14. See ILO CONST. art. 7. See generally G. JOHNSTON, supra note 13, at 47-53; N.
VALTICOS, supra note 12, at 36-37.
15. See ILO CONST. arts. 8-10. See generally G. JOHNSTON, supra note 13, at 54-63; N.
VALTICOS, supra note 12, at 37-38.
16. At the Conference each member state is entitled to two government delegates and
one delegate each representing workers and employers. ILO CONST. art. 3, para. 1. Each
delegate to the Conference has one vote. Id. art. 4, para. 1. The Governing Body has the
same 2:1:1 ratio of representation. Id. art. 7, para. 1. See generally W. GALENSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION 11 (1981) ("[I]t is not at all unusual, especially among
democratic countries, for delegates from one nation to vote differently on various issues.");
N. VATICOS, supra note 12, at 29. When the Soviet Union first joined the ILO in 1934, a
long conflict between the principles of tripartism and universal membership began. See generally A. ALCOCK, HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION 290-317 (1971); W.
GALENSON, supra, at 35-47; G. JOHNSTON, supra note 13, at 16-17 (principle of universality).
There were numerous objections to the participation of Soviet workers' and employers' delegates on the ground that they represented institutions and interests that were not distinct
from those of the state. See A. ALCOCK, supra, at 131-33. See generally N. VALTICOS, supra
note 12, at 32-34 (summarizing problems with credentials of nongovernmental delegates
from bloc states). Cf. infra note 60 (criteria for selection of nongovernmental delegates).
Dispute over the role of workers' and employers' delegates to the ILO from Soviet bloc
states continues to the present. See, e.g., Letter from Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
of the United States, to Francis Blanchard, Director-General of the ILO (Nov. 5, 1975),
U.N. Doc. A/C.5/1704 Annex (1975), reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1582 (1975)
(letter transmit.g
of Ut-et-at..
..,.-t
to _-ithaw .ru IL., ciLing erosion of tripartite representation). The bloc states for their part have complained of a capitalist bias in the
ILO. At the time of the Organization's founding, the USSR denounced it as "a capitalist
device to oppress working people." W. GALENSON, supra, at 4. See also A. ALCOCK, supra, at
128 (Soviet criticisms of ILO); V. SHKUNAEV, MEZHDUNARODNAIA ORGANIZATSIIA TRUDA
VCHERA I SEGODNIA 7-17 (1968) (ILO founded by ruling classes as instrument of reform
designed to subdue class struggle); V. VLADIMIROV, MEZHDUNARODNAIA ORGANIZATSIIA TRUDA
10-11 (1959) (same); Letter to Francis Blanchard, Director-General of the ILO (Mar. 29,
1985), ILO Doc. GB.230/19/4 Appendix I (declaration of Bulgaria, Belorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Ukranian SSR, and USSR asserting that "the ILO in effect serves the interests of only one socio-political system, that of
capitalism, in an attempt to impose its will and ways on other States"). The bloc has also
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The ILO Freedom of Association Conventions

Conventions Nos. 87'" and 98 ' 8 ("freedom of association conventions") are among the principal human rights instruments of the ILO. No.
87, "the basic instrument for the international protection of freedom of
association,"" provides that workers and employers, without distinction,
shall have the right to establish and join organizations of their own choosing without previous authorization. These organizations are to have the
rights, free from interference by public authorities, to draw up constitutions and rules, to elect representatives freely, and to direct their activities. Workers' and employers' organizations are not to be dissolved by
administrative authority. The acquisition of legal personality by workers'
and employers' organizations is not to be made subject to conditions that
would restrict these rights. Workers' and employers' organizations are to
have the right to establish and join federations and confederations, which
in turn may affiliate with international organizations of workers and
employers.
No. 98 elaborates No. 87's guarantees with special concern for workers and workers' organizations. Workers are to enjoy adequate protection
against acts of antiunion discrimination, which include conditions that a
worker not join a union and dismissal by reason of union membership.
Workers' organizations are protected from interference by employers and
from acts designed to subject workers' organizations to the domination of
employers. Procedures for guaranteeing these rights are to be
20
established.
Each of the Soviet bloc states has ratified Nos. 87 and 98.2' Although
the Soviet Union was not an active member of the ILO when Nos. 87 and

complained of socialist underrepresentation in the ILO. See, e.g., V. SHKUNAEV, supra, at
155-79 (bloc states' efforts to increase socialist representation in ILO organs); Letter to
Francis Blanchard, supra. Among nongovernmental delegates from bloc states, only workers' delegates have ever been elected to the Governing Body. Even that has been an infrequent occurrence. See W. GALENSON, supra, at 96.
17. Convention (No. 87) Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the
Right to Organize, adopted July 9, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 17, 31 Rec. Proc. 547 (1948).
18. Convention (No. 98) Concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to
Organise and to Bargain Collectively, adopted July 1, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 257, 32 Rec. Proc.
850 (1949).
19. N. VALTICOS, supra note 12, at 81.

20. Neither convention mentions the right to strike. Fundamental principles of freedom
of association, however, have been construed to protect the right to strike under many circumstances and to prohibit, in particular, an absolute prohibition on strikes. See N. VALTicos, supra note 12, at 85-86. See generally INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, FREEDOM OF
AssOCIATION 109-30 (2d ed. 1976) (digest of Committee on Freedom of Association
decisions).
21. 253 U.N.T.S. 387, 394 (Belorussian SSR); 337 U.N.T.S. 392, 405 (Bulgaria); 131

U.N.T.S.
U.N.T.S.
U.N.T.S.
U.N.T.S.
(USSR).

344, 134 U.N.T.S. 378 (Cuba); 488 U.N.T.S. 363, 365 (Czechoslovakia);
425 (German Democratic Republic); 272 U.N.T.S. 254, 258 (Hungary);
328, 332 (Mongolia); 264 U.N.T.S. 332, 348 (Poland); 272 U.N.T.S. 254,
420 (Rumania); 253 U.N.T.S. 387, 394 (Ukranian SSR); 249 U.N.T.S. 453,

972
682
318
459
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98 were adopted,2 2 the USSR was a principal contributor to the initiative
which led to the two conventions.2 s Both at the time the conventions were
drafted24 and later,2 the Soviet Union objected that they were insufficient, in part because they did not guarantee the right to strike. The Polish government delegation abstained from voting for No. 87 because the
text was inadequate to protect trade union rights.2s A Czechoslovak gov28
ernment delegate 7 and Polish and Czechoslovak workers' delegates
even proposed an amendment to the draft of No. 98 that would have
codified the right to strike.
B.

Supervision Under the Freedom of Association Conventions

The ILO not only adopts conventions, but also employs measures to
encourage and monitor implementation of ratified conventions by member states. There are two paths by which the ILO may facilitate adherence to the principles contained in Nos. 87 and 98: so-called "ordinary
supervision," applicable to any ratified convention; and specialized adjudicatory procedures applicable only to the freedom of association conventions. Results of proceedings commenced through both routes demonstrate that Poland has persistently failed to uphold the trade union rights
it voluntarily undertook to protect.
1.

Ordinary Supervision

Ordinary reporting and supervisory procedures come into effect upon
ratification of a convention. Member states must prepare reports on progress in the implementation of ratified conventions.2" These reports are

22. When the USSR was expelled from the League of Nations in 1939, its status in the
ILO became unclear. See A. ALCOCK, supra note 16, at 157-58; V. SHKUNAEV, supra note 16,
at 135-36. The USSR, along with the Belorussian and Ukranian SSRs, formally rejoined in
1954. 200 U.N.T.S. 338. Poland has been an ILO member continuously since the Organization's founding.
23. See, e.g., V. VLADIMmOV, supra note 16, at 62-63. See generally A. ALCOCK, supra
note 16, at 252-54 (Soviet initiative on trade union rights, undertaken through World Federation of Trade Unions, diverted from UN to ILO by American Federation of Labor); S.
IVANOV,

MEZHDUNARODNAIA

ORGANIZATSIIA TRUDA I PROFSOIUZNYE PRAVA V KAPrrALISTICHES-

KIKH STRANAKH 16-27 (1959) (same).
24. See U.N. Doc. E/AC.7/SR.111, at 14 (1949) (Soviet criticisms of Nos. 87 and 98).
See generally A. ALCOCK, supra note 16, at 254-60 (drafting history of Nos. 87 and 98); S.
IVANOV, supra note 23, at 27-49 (same).
-fO
i
10
Ct101-U
ken
I
"
IL
25. See S. IVANov, supru note 23, at 45, 1084-o, .We"
ILU......
,_
failure to address right to strike, No. 87 for not prohibiting dissolution of trade unions by
judicial authority, and No. 98 for excluding civil servants); V. SHKUNAEV, supra note 16, at
91-93 (objecting to the inclusion of protections for employers in both conventions and criticizing No. 87 for failure to treat dissolution by legislative or judicial authority and No. 98
for excluding civil servants and not addressing right to strike); V. VLADImIROV, supra note
16, at 63-64 (objecting to the inclusion of protections for employers in both conventions and
suggesting that No. 98 might even be used to justify actions against striking workers).
26. 31 Rec. Proc. 233 (1948).
27. 32 Rec. Proc. 470 (1949).
28. 32 Rec. Proc. 468 (1949).
29. ILO CONST. art. 22. Article 22 specifies annual reports. There are, however, over
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transmitted to the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations ("COE"),30 whose members are appointed in
their individual capacities by the Governing Body on the recommendation of the Director-General. The COE bases its report on information
supplied by governments and on other evidence, including comments
from workers' and employers' organizations. The COE's report goes to the
tripartite Conference Committee on the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations ("CACR").3 ' The CACR produces its own report,
which includes special mention of particular cases, for discussion in the
plenary.
The COE has noted Poland's failure to implement the freedom of
association conventions in the vast majority of its annual reports since
Nos. 87 and 98 entered into force for that state."2 In its first report on
Poland in 1959, the COE made observations about the trade union situation that became typical of its later comments. The Committee noted
that the Trade Union Act of 194911 required registration with a Central
Council of Trade Unions, which had the power to impose conditions on
the grant of legal personality to an applicant organization. The COE

5000 ratifications of ILO conventions. See ILO Press Release (Aug. 11, 1982). Because of the
workload, detailed reports are now required only every two years in the case of the freedom
of association conventions. See W. GALENSON, supra note 16, at 203; Landy, supra note 12,
at 638.
30. See generally E. LANDY, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION 19-34
(1966); N. VALTICOS, supra note 12, at 240-42; Landy, supra note 12, at 643-45. The COE
has enjoyed a reputation for impartiality and independence for many years, partly because
members are appointed in their individual capacities. See W. GALENSON, supra note 16, at
203-04; Landy, supra note 12, at 641-42. But see infra note 32 (bloc states question COE's
objectivity). The COE's report includes "observations" in the most important cases of
nonimplementation. The COE also communicates "direct requests" to governments in anticipation of its next report. See N. VALTicos, supra note 12, at 241; Landy, supra note 12, at
643.
31. See STAND. ORD. INT'L LAB. CONF. art. 7. See generally W. GALENSON, supra note 16,

at 205-06; E.

HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION-STATE

252-58 (1964); E.

LANDY,

supra note 30, at

36-51; N. VALTICOS, supra note 12, at 242; Landy, supra note 12, at 643-45.
32. 1985 COE Rep. 182-84, 236 (Nos. 87 & 98); 1983 COE Rep. 147-48, 181 (Nos. 87 &
98); 1982 COE Rep. 125-26 (No. 87); 1981 COE Rep. 121 (No. 87); 1979 COE Rep. 140-41
(No. 87); 1977 COE Rep. 161 (No. 87); 1975 COE Rep. 113-14 (No. 87); 1973 COE Rep. 12728 (No. 87); 1972 COE Rep. 161, 187 (Nos. 87 & 98); 1971 COE Rep. 129, 146 (Nos. 87 &
98); 1970 COE Rep. 121 (No. 87); 1969 COE Rep. 92, 105 (Nos. 87 & 98); 1968 COE Rep. 94
(No. 87); 1967 COE Rep. 90, 102 (Nos. 87 & 98); 1966 COE Rep. 101 (No. 87); 1965 COE
Rep. 98, 109) Nos. 87 & 98); 1964 COE Rep. 131, 149 (Nos. 87 & 98); 1963 COE Rep. 99-100,
112 (Nos. 87 & 98); 1962 COE Rep. 96-99, 128 (Nos. 87 & 98); 1961 COE Rep. 75-77 (No.
87); 1960 COE Rep. 44-46 (No. 87); 1959 COE Rep. 49 (No. 87). See infra note 47 (Nos. 87
and 98 entered into force for Poland in 1958). Poland and the other bloc states have questioned the validity of the approach taken by the COE in evaluating their implementation of
the freedom of association conventions. See, e.g., 1977 COE Rep. 134-35 (dissenting remarks
of Polish and Soviet COE members); 1963 COE Rep. 85 (COE response to criticisms from
Polish and Soviet COE members). See generally 71 Rec. Proc. 38/7 (1985) (Soviet government adviser's questioning of status of COE under ILO Constitution); E. LANDY, supra note
30, at 193-96.
33. 1949 Dziennik Ustaw 853 (Pol.), translated in 1949 ILO LEGIS. SEa.
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characterized these provisions as a legislative mandate for a monopolistic
trade union movement. The Committee then observed that this statutory
scheme was inconsistent with No. 87's provisions guaranteeing workers
the right to establish and join organizations of their own choosing without
previous authorization and assuring workers' organizations the right to
direct their own activities. In its next report, the Committee more forcefully characterized the Central Council's requirements for registration as
government regulations and concluded that the legislative framework as a
whole constituted impermissible interference by the state in protected
trade union activity.3 The CACR has also publicized Poland's violations
of trade union rights. The CACR included Poland in a "special paragraph" in its 1982 report to draw attention to the inconsistencies between
No. 87 and the declaration of martial law in December 1981.35
The ILO's Constitution provides another procedure for evaluation of
the adequacy of implementation of obligations assumed pursuant to a
convention. Under article 26 a member state may file a complaint against
another member alleging nonobservance of a convention both have ratified. The Governing Body may also initiate a complaint on its own motion or upon the request of a delegate to the Conference. The Constitution provides for subsequent consideration of complaints in appropriate
cases by a Commission of Inquiry established by the Governing Body.3 e
Until 1983 only five full-scale Commissions of Inquiry had been established in the ILO's history.3 7 The Governing Body constituted the
sixth as a result of an article 26 proceeding initiated against Poland under
Nos. 87 and 98 by the French and Norwegian workers' delegates to the
1982 Conference.3 8 The Polish government became the first in the history

34. Cf. S. IVANOV, supra note 23, at 100-06 (distinguishing requirements for registration
with governmental authorities from requirements for registration with trade union organs).
35. 68 Rec. Proc. 31/11 (1982) (noting that "the general suspension of trade union activities" as a result of the declaration of martial law "constituted a serious infringement of
the principles of Convention No. 87"). See infra text accompanying notes 58-60. As a result
of Poland's inclusion in a special paragraph, the CACR's report was not adopted in Conference's plenary session. 68 Rec. Proc. 36/1 (1982). This was only the third time the Conference failed to adopt the CACR's report. See W. GALENSON, supra note 16, at 206; Landy,
supra note 12, at 644 n.26.
36. ILO CONST.arts. 26-29. Complaints may ultimately be referred to the International
Court of Justice. ILO CONST. arts. 29, 31-34. A similar type of adjudicatory procedure, a
"representation," may be initiated by workers' or employers' organizations. ILO CoNsT. arts.
24-25. Representations are considered first by a three-member committee of the Governing
Body and then by the Governing Body as a whole. See N. VALTrcos, supra note 12, at 248;
Landy, supra note 12, at 640.
37. See 66 Off. Bull., Ser. B, Spec. Supp. (1983) (Commission of Inquiry report on Dominican Republic and Haiti); ILO Doc. GB.196/4/10 (1975) (Commission of Inquiry report
on Chile); 54 Off. Bull., No. 2, Spec. Supp. (1971) (Commission of Inquiry report on Greece);
46 Off. Bull., Supp. 11 (1963) (Commission of Inquiry report on Liberia); 45 Off. Bull., Supp.
11 (1962) (Commission of Inquiry report on Portugal). See generally N. VALTICOS, supra
note 12, at 245-47; Landy, supra note 12, at 649-51.
38. See 223 G.B. Min.V/6 (1983) (appointment of members of Commission of Inquiry).
See also id. at IV/10 (preliminary decision to establish Commission of Inquiry). Until the
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of the ILO to refuse to cooperate at all with a Commission of Inquiry3 e
and even threatened to 4withdraw
from the ILO in response to the Com0
mission's establishment.
2.

Freedom of Association Machinery
In addition to ordinary supervisory procedures which apply to any
convention, the ILO encourages implementation of the freedom of association conventions through adjudicatory mechanisms unique to those instruments. The primary body responsible for receiving complaints is the
tripartite Governing Body Committee on Freedom of Association
("CFA").4 ' Because of the importance of the principles of freedom of association to the ILO's Constitutional aims and purposes, 42 governments
and workers' and employers' organizations may present a complaint
against a member state whether or not that state has ratified the freedom
of association conventions. 43 The freedom of association machinery also
includes a Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission4 4 composed of in-

Governing Body's action, the article 26 complaint had been considered in the Committee on
Freedom of Association together with Case No. 1097 concerning Poland. See infra notes 6163.
39. See 67 Off. Bull., Ser. B, Spec. Supp. 123 (1984) (Commission of Inquiry report on
Poland). Member states are obliged to "place at the disposal of the Commission all the
information in their possession which bears upon the subject-matter of the complaint." ILO
CONST. art. 27.

40. See supra text accompanying note 2.
41. See 117 G.B. Min. 88 (1951) (establishing CFA procedures). See generally E. HAAS,
supra note 31, at 383-423; E. HAAS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL AcrON (1970); N.
VALTIcOs, supra note 12, at 249-50; Landy, supra note 12, at 654-55.
42. See ILO CONST. preamble para. 2 & annex art. I, para. b. See generally 57 Off. Bull.

152 (1974) (resolution on freedom of association and industrial relations in Europe).
43. See W. GALENSON, supra note 16, at 206; E. HAAS, supra note 31, at 381; N. VALTICOS,

supra note 12, at 248; Landy, supra note 12, at 640, 653-54. Complaints are presented

to the CFA primarily by trade union organizations. See N. VALTICOS, supra note 12, at 248;

Landy, supra note 12, at 654. The CFA's reports are transmitted to the Governing Body,
which ordinarily approves them. See N. VALTIcos, supra note 12, at 249. The Soviet Union
and other bloc states have questioned the CFA's objectivity. See, e.g., 139 G.B. Min. 27
(1958) (statement by USSR government delegate). See also S. IVANOV, supra note 23, at
230-36 (criticisms of composition and work of CFA); V. SHKUNAEV, supra note 16, at 95
(CFA as instrument of cold war and political propaganda against socialist countries); V.
VLADIMmOV, supra note 16, at 65, 89; Letter to Francis Blanchard, supra note 16 (declaration of socialist countries noting that "[rlepresentatives of socialist countries are not admitted to such important bodies of the so-called ILO supervisory machinery as, for example,
the Governing Body Committee on Freedom of Association"). Cf. supra note 32 (bloc states
question impartiality of COE). Partially as a result of the ILO's consideration of the Polish
labor situation, the bloc states have recently renewed their efforts to modify the supervisory
machinery. See, e.g., 69 Rec. Proc. 7/17-7/19 (1983) (statement by government delegate from
German Democratic Republic calling for working group to examine supervisory machinery);
Letter to Francis Blanchard, supra note 16 (declaration of socialist countries arguing that
"[tihere is a striking contrast between approaches towards representations and complaints
lodged against socialist States and those concerning imperalist States"). But cf. S. IVANOV,
supra note 23, at 218-20 (necessity for strengthening ordinary supervisory apparatus).
44. See E.S.C. Res. 277, 10 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 1) at 9 (1950) (approving establishment of Fact-Finding and Conciliation Commission). See generally N. VALTicos, supra
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dependent experts to which complaints may be referred only with the
consent of the government concerned. The Commission was originally intended to be the primary body in the freedom of association machinery.
In actuality, however, few cases have been considered through this route.
The CFA, which at first was intended as a body for conducting preliminary investigations, consequently has emerged as the principal organ in
the freedom of association machinery for publicizing violations of trade
5
union rights.4
Cases in the CFA have demonstrated that Poland has persistently
failed to observe the principles embodied in the freedom of association
conventions. Poland has been the subject of four complaints lodged with
the CFA, each of which has resulted in adverse findings.
The first complaint against Poland"s was presented to the CFA in
1953.'1 The CFA examined Poland's trade union scheme 4 8 and noted that
trade unions were required by the constitution and rules of the Central
Council of Trade Unions to recognize the guiding role of the Polish
United Workers' Party ("PUWP"), Poland's Communist Party. The CFA
suggested that the registration requirement, the necessity for recognition
of the guiding role of the PUWP by registered unions, and the imposition
of trade union unity were inconsistent with the right of workers to establish and join organizations of their own choosing without previous authorization.' The second case 51 was commenced in 1956 as a result of a strike
and demonstration in Poznan. After noting that strikes, although not illegal, were officially discouraged and disapproved in Poland, the CFA emphasized that the right to strike and the right to demonstrate peacefully
in support of occupational demands were critical rights of workers and
workers' organizations. 1
In 1978 another complaint" was presented to the CFA alleging that
Poland's trade union legislation still did not meet the standards of No.
87. In mid-1980, however, the Polish government concluded historic
agreements" with striking workers providing in part for the full imple-

note 12, at 250-52; Landy, supra note 12, at 656-57.
45. See E. HAAs, supra note 31, at 383; W. GALENSON, supra note 16, at 207; Landy,
supra note 12, at 656. See generally A. ALCOCK, supra note 16, at 260-69 (establishment of
freedom of association machinery by ILO in consultation with UN); S. IVANOV, supra note
23, at 222-30 (same).
46. CFA Cae N. .58 (Poland).

47. Nos. 87 and 98 did not enter into force for Poland until February 25, 1958. 264
U.N.T.S. 332, 348. But see supra text accompanying note 43 (complaints against ILO member states may be presented to CFA regardless of ratification of Nos. 87 and 98).
48. See supra text accompanying note 33.
49. 39 Off. Bull. 191-93 (1956) (CFA Case No. 58).
50. CFA Case No. 148 (Poland).
51. 39 Off. Bull. 207-09 (1956) (CFA Case No. 148). See generally E. HAAs, supra note
31, at 386-87 (analyzing CFA Cases Nos. 58 and 148).
52. CFA Case No. 909 (Poland).
53. The first agreement, which included a provision specifying implementation of No.
87, was concluded in Szczecin on August 30, 1980. Glos Pracy, Sept. 2, 1980, at 2, col. 4;
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mentation of Nos. 87 and 98. The government also agreed to alter the
registration requirement and to guarantee the right to strike. In October
the Polish parliament (Sejm) adopted an amendment" to the Trade
Union Act of 1949 permitting registration with the Warsaw provincial
court instead of the Central Council of Trade Unions. That court, however, modified the charter of the confederation of independent trade unions Solidarity (Solidarnosc) by inserting a reference to the leading role
of the PUWP and altering the provisions dealing with strikes."5 On appeal the Polish Supreme Court concluded that the lower court had exceeded its power in modifying Solidarity's charter. The Supreme Court
then approved without alteration a version of the charter submitted by
the union which included the principal provisions of Nos. 87 and 98 as an
annex.5s As a result of these developments, the CFA concluded in November 1980 that the complaint had "lost its basis.""7

Zycie Warszawy, Sept. 2, 1980, at 2, col. 1, translatedin N. ASCHMESON, supra note 6, at 284;
AUGUST 1980, supra note 8, at 416. The second, which provided in addition for implementation of No. 98, was concluded in Gdansk on August 31, 1980. Glos Pracy, Sept. 2, 1980, at 2,
col. 1; Zycie Warszawy, Sept. 2, 1980, at 2, col. 1, translatedin N. AscHERSON, supra note 6,

at 288;

AUGUST

1980, supra note 8, at 423;

KARATNYCKY, ET AL.,

supra note 8, at 123; D.

supra note 6, at 151 [hereinafter cited as Gdansk Agreement]. In the Gdansk
Agreement the government consented to "the establishment of new, independent and selfgoverning trade unions" that would not be under the control of the state or the PUWP. The
new unions "[r]ecogniz[ed] that the PUWP plays the leading role in the state" and stated
further that they did not intend to be a political party, would observe the Polish constitution, would not attempt to disrupt Poland's international alliances, and approved of the
principle of social ownership of the means of production. The Polish government subsequently extended the Gdansk Agreement to the entire country. See TouRaMN, Er AL., supra
note 6, at 197; L. WESCHLER, supra note 6, at 176; de Weydenthal, supra note 5, at 12. A
third agreement was concluded in Jastrzebie on September 3. See N. ASCHERSON, supra note
6, at 177.
54. 1980 Dziennik Ustaw 241 (Pol.), translatedin 1980 ILO LEGIS. SER. 34 (Supp.). The
government stated that the amendment was designed to allow registration of the new independent unions, as specified in the Gdansk Agreement, with a body other than the Central
Council of Trade Unions. The government also communicated to the ILO that it was undertaking to draft new trade union legislation consistent with Poland's international obligations. See 63 Off. Bull., Ser. B, No. 3, at 101-04 (CFA Case No. 909).
55. See PRAWO I ZyciE, Nov. 23, 1980, at 12 (report on hearing in Supreme Court
describing actions taken by provincial court) (English summary and text of charter submitted by Solidarity to provincial court on file with Denver Journal of InternationalLaw and
Policy).
56. See id. (reporting text of judgment) (translation on file with Denver Journal of
International Law and Policy). The Supreme Court's decision is thought to represent a
behind-the-scenes compromise between the government and Solidarity. See generally N.
ASCHERSON, supra note 6, at 195-99; de Weydenthal, supra note 5, at 17-19; Court Backs
Union in Poland's Dispute over Role of Party, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1980, at Al, col. 5. The
reference to the leading role of the PUWP was relegated to an annex quoting portions of the
Gdansk Agreement. See de Weydenthal, supra note 5, at 18-19.
57. 63 Off. Bull., Ser. B, No. 3, at 108 (1980) (CFA Case No. 909). The COE's next
report noted the statutory amendment "with satisfaction." 1981 COE Rep. 121. In connection with Case No. 909, Poland received the first "direct contact" mission ever accepted by a
Soviet bloc state. See 63 Off. Bull., Ser. B, No. 3, at 98 (1980) (CFA Case No. 909); ILO
Press Release (Nov. 27, 1981). See generally N. VALTicos, supra note 12, at 242-43; Landy,
MACSHANE,
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In December 1981 the Polish Council of State adopted a martial law
decree and resolution s that curtailed all trade union activity and prohibited strikes. Two new complaints"9 were immediately presented to the
CFA alleging that the arrest and detention of trade unionists and the prohibition of trade union activity as a result of the declaration of martial
law violated Nos. 87 and 98, the 1980 agreements, and the charters of the
independent unions. The CFA found that the internment of trade union
activists and the suppression of trade union functions were inconsistent
with the principles of freedom of association. 0 In October 1982 the Sejm
adopted new trade union legislation" that purported to guarantee the independence of self-governing trade unions. The CFA found numerous defects in the law, among which were the dissolution of all existing trade
unions, restrictions on the right to strike, and a statutory timetable
prohibiting resumption of trade union activity before specified dates."2 At
the CFA's recommendation," the Governing Body referred this case and
the article 26 complaint filed by delegates to the 1982 Conference to a
Commission of Inquiry."
In the conclusions to its report,6 5 the Commission noted that the Po-

supra note 12, at 646-47. Lech Walesa, President of the National Committee of Solidarity,
was the Polish workers' delegate to the 1981 Conference. See 67 Rec. Proc. 10/9-10/10
(1981), reprinted in D. MAcSHAx, supra note 6, at 160 (Walesa's address to Conference).
58. 1981 Dziennik Ustaw 309, 317 (Pol.), translated in JPRS E. EUR. REP., Feb. 26,
1982, at 21. Martial law was suspended by the Council of State's resolution of December 19,
1982. 1982 Dziennik Ustaw 737 (Pol.) (translation on file with Denver Journal of International Law and Policy). See also id. at 730 (law on special legal regulations during the
suspension of martial law) (translation on file with Denver Journal of International Law
and Policy), The Council of State lifted martial law by its resolution of July 20, 1983. 1983
Dziennik Ustaw 536 (Pol.) (translation on file with Denver Journal of InternationalLaw
and Policy).
59. CFA Case No. 1097 (Poland).
60. 65 Off. Bull., Ser. B, No. 1, at 186-87 (1982) (CFA Case No. 1097). The COE's next
report contained similar observations. 1982 COE Rep. 125-26. Poland sent a delegation to
the 1982 Conference consisting only of government representatives. Nongovernmental delegates must be "chosen in agreement with the industrial organisations, if such organisations
exist, which are most representative of employers or workpeople, as the case may be, in their
respective countries." ILO CONST. art. 3, para. 5. See also id. art. 3, para. 9 (Conference may
exclude delegates not nominated in accordance with this principle). Because of this requirement, the Polish government probably anticipated a credentials challenge if a workers' delegate other than from Solidarity were part of the Polish delegation.
61 1.9 lR iefflnik Ust-w 581 (Pol.), translated in 1982 ILO LEGIS. SER. The Polish
government submitted a draft of the legislation to the ILO for review three days before
enactment. Although the government made some changes based on the ILO's comments, it
did not alter the basic provisions of the legislation. See 65 Off. Bull., Ser. B, No. 3, at 28889, 298-99 (1982) (CFA Case No. 1097).
62. 65 Off. Bull., Ser. B, No. 3, at 299-301 (1982) (CFA Case No. 1097). The COE's next
report also noted inconsistencies between the new trade union legislation and Nos. 87 and
98. 1983 COE Rep. 147-48, 181.
63. 66 Off. Bull., Ser. B, No. 2, at 144 (1983) (CFA Case No. 1097).
64. See supra note 38. Poland boycotted the 1983, 1984, and 1985 Conferences.
65. 67 Off. Bull., Ser. B, Spec. Supp. 120-46 (1984) (Commission of Inquiry report on
Poland).
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lish government had not appeared before it and had totally failed to cooperate with the Commission's investigation. In particular, the government had refused to permit members of the Commission to visit Poland
to communicate firsthand with those involved in the controversy and did
not allow witnesses in Poland to leave the country to testify before the
Commission in Geneva. The Commission nonetheless concluded that, because of Poland's voluntary ratification of the ILO's Constitution and the
freedom of association conventions, the Commission's examination of the
complaint did not constitute interference in Poland's internal affairs. The
Commission also rejected the assertion that the complaint's allegedly po6
litical character affected its validity.
On the merits of the complaint, the Commission concluded that the
situation in Poland before the declaration of martial law was not so grave
as to justify subsequent nonobservance of the freedom of association conventions. The suspension of trade union activity by the declaration of
martial law and the subsequent dissolution of all existing trade unions by
the new trade union legislation consequently were violations of No. 87.
The Commission found that the prohibition on strikes and the internment and detention of trade union leaders because of their trade union
activities likewise conflicted with the guarantees of No. 87. The Commission also considered the evidence to demonstrate that after the declaration of martial law many members of independent unions suffered antiunion discrimination in violation of No. 98.
After reviewing Poland's new trade union legislation, the Commission
found that a transitional prohibition on more than one trade union organization in an enterprise conflicted with No. 87, which anticipates trade
union plurality. The Commission observed that a requirement for approval of a strike by a majority of a union's members, as distinct from a
majority of its voting members, was an unreasonable restriction on the
right of trade unions to organize their activities. Restrictions on the establishment of federations and confederations were also criticized by the
Commission as violations of No. 87.67

66. See supra text accompanying note 2.
67. The Commission also noted that a requirement in the legislation that trade unions
be organized by occupation was acceptable to the extent that those unions could form regional associations. See 67 Off. Bull., Ser. B, Spec. Supp. 142 (1984) (Commission of Inquiry
report on Poland). See also id. at 143-44 (right to establish federations and confederations
guaranteed by No. 87 must be applied to permit regional associations). This had been a
particularly troublesome issue for the government because Solidarity, unlike the official
trade unions, had adopted a regional structure. The government often asserted that this was
evidence of Solidarity's intent to become not a trade union, but a political organization. See,
e.g., 65 Off. Bull., Ser. B, No. 2, at 155-56, 174 (1982) (CFA Case No. 1097); N. AsCHERSON,
supra note 6, at 178-79. Cf. S. IvANov, supra note 23, at 29-31 (interpreting No. 87 as protecting political activity by trade unions). Interestingly, the Commission of Inquiry found
that a provision in the new trade union legislation requiring reference in a trade union's
charter to the leading role of the PUWP in society was not of itself a violation of No. 87.
See 67 Off. Bull., Ser. B, Spec. Supp. 142-43 (1984) (Commission of Inquiry report on Poland). Cf. 1985 COE Rep. 182-83 (criticism of statutory timetable for resumption of trade
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Conclusion

In its recommendations, s" the Commission of Inquiry stated its belief
that freedom of association could exist in Poland without disruption of
fundamental principles on which the Polish state is based. Before the
declaration of martial law, the Polish government had produced draft
trade union legislation that the ILO approved as basically consistent with
the freedom of association conventions.69 Even after the declaration of
martial law, the Polish government admitted that there was room in its
socioeconomic system for self-managed and truly independent unions.70
This assertion is not contrary to Lenin's statements on trade unions.
Even more importantly, this attitude on the part of the government is
required by the universal principles of trade union freedom to which Poland has voluntarily adhered. Instead of withdrawing from the ILO, the

Polish government might more profitably invest its effort in working with
the Organization once again to begin to establish a trade union environ71
ment consistent with fundamental principles of freedom of association.

union activcity and conditions on right to strike).
68. 67 Off. Bull., Ser. B, Spec. Supp. 148 (1984) (Commission of Inquiry report on
Poland).
69. See 64 Off. Bull., Ser. B, No. 2, at 3 (1981) (CFA Case No. 909).
70. See 65 Off. Bull., Ser. B, No. 1, at 181 (1982) (CFA Case No. 1097).
71. Even if Poland withdraws from the iLO, it will still be buound by the obligatiors
assumed under Nos. 87 and 98. See supra note 1. In cases of persistent inability to observe a
convention, denunciation is a potential last resort. See E. LANDY, supra note 30, at 97 (Denunciation "is a solution of despair[,] .. . [y]et it may be precisely in the interest of the rule
of law to put an end to obligations when efforts to observe them encounter fundamental
obstacles and when there apparently exists no hope for gradual compliance."); Landy, supra
note 12, at 648. Cf. Note, The Polish Labor Crisis of 1980: An Assessment of the Role of the
InternationalLabor Organization,8 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 177, 203 & n.163 (1982) (suggesting that implementation of freedom of association conventions in Poland could be facilitated by ratification of Convention No. 144 Concerning Tripartite Consultations to Promote
the Implementation of International Labour Standards).

The Marckx Case
The Impact on European Jurisprudence of
the European Court of Human Rights' 1979
Marckx Decision Declaring Belgian
Illegitimacy Statutes Violative of the
European Convention on Human Rights
MARC SALZBERG*

[W]bilst recognizing as legitimate or even praiseworthy the aim pursued by the Belgian legislation - namely, protection of the child and
traditional family -, the Court stated that in the achievement of this
end, recourse must not be had to measures whose object or result is,
as in the present case, to prejudice the "illegitimate" family.'

With the above-stated rationale, the European Court of Human
Rights, in its decision of June 13, 1979 in the Marckx case, called for the
final dismantling of the legal disabilities that had been imposed for centuries on "non-marital" 2 children throughout Europe. Notwithstanding
* Mr. Salzberg is now in private practice in Denver, Colorado and teaches law-related
courses at the University of Denver and Metropolitan State College, Denver.
1. Marckx Case, 1979, Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 414 (Eur. Comm'n on

Human Rights). For the full text of the Marckx decision, see: Eur. Court H.R., Marckx case,
judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A no. 31 [hereinafter cited as ECHR-Marckx]. Studies of
the Marckx case may be found in: E. Alkema, Verwandtschaft des nichtehelichen Kindes /
Einfluss der Marckx-Entscheidung des EGMR [Kinship of the non-marital child] / Influence of the Marckx decision of the ECHR-Court],EUROPAISCHE GRUNDRECHTE ZEITSCHRIFT
[EUROPEAN FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS REVIEW] 213-215 (1980); Bossuyt, L'arret Marckx de la

cour europeenne des droits de l'homme [The Marckx decision of the European Court of
Human Rights], 15 REVUE BELGE DE Dsorr INTERNATIONAL [BELGIAN INTERNATIONAL LAW
REVIEW] 322-325 (1980-82); A. HEYVAERT & H. WILLEKENS, BEGINSELEN VAN HEr GEZINS-EN
FAMILIERECHT NA HET MARCKXARREST. DE THEORIE VAN HET MARCKXARREST EN HAAR WEERSLAG OP HEr GELDEND RECHT [PRINCIPLES OF NUCLEAR AND EXTENDED FAMILY LAW AFTER THE
MARCKX DECISION. THE THEORY OF THE MARCKX DECISION AND ITS APPLICATION TO OPERATIVE

LAW.] 1-142 (1981); Rigaux, La loi condamn~e. A propos de l'arrt europ~enne du 13 juin
1979 de la cour europkenne des droits de l'homme [The Condemned Law: Concerning the
June 13, 1979 decision of the ECHR-Court] 1979 JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX [COURT RE-

PORTER] 513-24; Van Hove, Het Marckx-arrest en de notariele praktijk [The Marckx decision and notarial practice], 4 TmSCHRIFT VOOR NOTARISSEN [REVIEW FOR NOTARIES] 97

(1982).
2. In modern English legal terminology, the derogatory term of "bastard" has been replaced most frequently by "illegitimate" or, more recently, "born out of wedlock". The common law expression, however, was "bastard". The unlawful connotation of "illegitimate"

makes it hardly much more of an improvement over "bastard". "Child born out of wedlock"
is stiff and cumbersome. Some authors have used the more neutral expressions "ex-marital"
or "ex-nuptial"-two imprecise expressions which may be improperly taken to mean "for-

merly married" rather than "outside of marriage." The preference in this article is for "non-
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solemn church canons, the time-honored Napoleonic Code, and contrary
national legislation, the European Court of Human Rights proclaimed
throughout the 21 nations' of Europe which respect its decisions that
henceforth children-whether born inside or outside of marriage-should
be born free of any legal disability or discrimination resulting from their
parents' marital status.
This article will assess Marckx by first focusing on the illegitimacy
laws prior to Marckx. Then it will analyze and appraise the Marckx decision. Next it will focus on the aftermath of Marckx in European national
courts during the four subsequent years, 1979-1983.

I.

BACKGROUND ON ILLEGITIMACY IN EUROPEAN LAW AND CUSTOM

Over the centuries, European tradition had made into law the biblical notion that "the sins of the fathers shall be visited upon their children."' Adulterous, incenstuous or simply unmarried relationships were
designated as "illegitimate". By no semantic accident, the children of
such relationships were called "illegitimate" too. Since sexual relations
between unmarried persons were outside the law, the issue of those extralegal acts was "illegitimate", tainted with sin - in short, "bastards". 5
Embodying and codifying that set of beliefs, the Napoleonic Codeo
determined the law pertaining to illegitimacy for almost the last two centuries in much of Europe.7 To enforce the notion that the only rightful

marital". It is the direct translation of the German term nichtehelich. See Klette, Nichtehelich-Nicht 'unehelich' [Non-marital-not 'unmarried'],FAMILIEN RECHT ZEITUNG [FAMILY

206-07 (1967). Nevertheless, for lack of a better expression, the word "illegitimacy" shall be used in this article to describe the noun form of the condition, while "nonmarital" remains the choice for the adjective.
LAW JOURNAL]

3. These are the 21 countries which were Member States of the Council of Europe as of

January 1, 1984: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, France,
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. The European Court of Human Rights is affiliated with the Council of Europe. On the Council of
Europe, see, A.H. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE (1977).
4. This expression comes from the Second Commandment Exodus 20:4. The words are
ascribed to the Supreme Judge, whose full pronouncement was: "For I, the Lord, thy God,
am a jealous God, visiting the sins of the fathers upon the children unto the third and
fourth generation of them that hate me."
5. The word "bstqrd" derives from the French btztard, which means fits de bast, or,
literally, "pack-saddle child".
6. On the Napoleonic Code, see generally: ARTHUR TAYLOR VON MEHREN, THE CIVIL
LAW SYSTEM (1957); MAURICE SHELDOM AMOS AND FREDERICK PARKER WALTON, INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW (1967); RENE DAVID AND H.D. DE VRIES, THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM
(1957); FREDERICK HENRY LAWSON, A COMMON LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CIVIL LAW (1955).
7. The illegitimacy provisions of the Napoleonic Code, which so long determined the

law in France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Luxembourg, Italy, Spain and Portugal, have now been reformed or abandoned in most of these nations within the last 15 years.
On reforms in European illegitimacy laws, see generally Krause, Creation of Relations of
Kinship, 4 INT. ENCYC. Comp. L. 6:1 (1973). On illegitimacy in European legal tradition, see
also Stoljar, Children, Parents and Guardians,4 INT. ENCYC. CoMP. L. 7:1 (1973); SCHMIDT-
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place for children was as the issue of a lawful marriage, the Napoleonic
Code made a child not the result of such a bond suffer extraordinary disabilities. Thus, the encouragement to marry was often a manipulation of
the parents' desire not to have their children suffer because of the parents' improprieties. The result was unabashed discrimination.
Under the Code, parents could voluntarily recognize their non-marital children and thereby establish the legal relationship of parenthood,
unless the children were the fruit of an incestuous or adulterous relationship. The acknowledgment needed, however, to be voluntary on the parents' part. "La recherche de la paternit" ("hunting down the father")
was specifically proscribed. The relationship between the non-marital
child and its mother was not established by the fact of birth. 8 If the
mother did not voluntarily acknowledge the child, the child needed to
prove maternity in court by showing the confinement of his alleged
mother and by establishing that he is the child to whom she gave birth.
Moreover, the Napoleonic Code distinguished not only between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" children, but distinguished further between
"natural simple"', "adulterous"' and "incestuous"'" children. Unlike natural simple children, adulterous and incestuous children, according to the
old code, could not be acknowledged by their parents, and their paternity
or maternity could not be declared judicially, where this would show the
2
adulterous or incestuous nature of the parents' connection.
As to inheritance rights' s, the Napoleonic Code allowed an "illegitimate" child to inherit from his unmarried mother, but he was not allowed
to inherit from his mother's relatives as of right, for he had no intestacy
rights in the succession of his parents' relatives, even of his own grand-

HIDDING, DIE STELLUNG DES UNEHELICHEN KINDES IN DEN ROMANISCHEN RECHTSORDNUNGEN

EuROPE] (1967).
8. On the relations between the mother and her illegitimate child, in evolving French
EUROPAS [THE POSITION OF THE NON-MARrrAL CHILD UNDER ROMAN LEGAL SYSTEMS OF

law, see: Savatier, L'6volution de la condition juridique des enfants naturels en droit francais [The Evolution of the Legal Condition of Illegitimate Children in French law], in J.
DABIN, LE STATUT JURIDIQUE DE L'ENFANT NATUREL [THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE ILLEGITIMATE CHILD] 4:37 (1965).
9. Father and mother are not married at the time of the child's conception or birth, and
no legal impediment would have prevented their marriage.

10. Father and/or mother are married at the time of the child's conception, but not to
each other.
11. Father and mother are related by blood or affinity to a degree which legally impedes
marriage.
12. Specifically on voluntary acknowledgment of parenthood in European law, see
Lasok, Legitimation, Recognition and Affiliation Proceedings: A Study in Comparative
Law and Legal Reform, 10 INT'L & ComP. L.Q. 123 (1961); Meulders-Klein, Fondements
nouveaux du concept de filiation [New Foundations for the Concept of Affiliation], 1973
ANNALES DE DROIr (BELG.) [ANNALS OF LAW (BELG.)] 285.
13. On the inheritance rights of non-marital children in Europe, see generally Stone,
Illegitimacy and Claims to Money and Other Property: A Comparative Survey, 15 INT'L &
Coup. L.Q. 527 (1966).
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parents. 1 ' An "illegitimate" child was classified not as an heir, but as an
irregular successor.13 In all intestate successions, his share was reduced
according to the number and status of the heirs with whom he was in
competition, and he was not allowed to receive by gifts or bequest more
than his statutory share."6 Owing to the dominance in Belgium and other
civil law countries of intestate succession and to statutory limitations
there on testamentary freedom, the result was to discriminate severely
against non-marital children in their inheritance rights.17
II.

THE MARCKX CASE

In its Marckx opinion of June 13, 1979, the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR-Court)' s held that certain Belgian statutes discriminating against non-marital children, as these laws applied to the applicants, violated the right to respect for one's family life protected by
Article 819 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR-Convention), both by itself and when read with Article 1420 prohibiting discrimination based, inter alia, on birth.
A.

Marckx: The Facts

The facts of Marckx are relatively simple. On October 16, 1973, near
Antwerp, Belgium, an unmarried Belgian national named Paula Marckx
gave birth to a daughter, Alexandra Marckx. The father was neither identified nor even mentioned in the proceedings. In 1974, Paula Marckx introduced a complaint before the European Commission of Human Rights

14. Article 756 of the Napoleonic Code.
15. Id.
16. Articles 757, 760 and 908 of the Napoleonic Code.
17. On succession in common law systems as compared to succession in civil law systems, see generally: MAZEAUD, 4 LECONS DE DROIT CIVIL [LEssoNs IN CIVIL LAW] (1971).
18. The European Convention on Human Rights and its institutions, the European
Court of Human Rights and the European Commission on Human Rights, are abundantly
documented. For updated bibliographies of the most recent articles, see the bibliography
section in each volume of: Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON HUMAN RIGHTS (Eur. Comm'n on Human
Rights). See also LAURIDS MIKALSEN, EUROPEAN PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1980); A.H.
ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD (1982); A.Z. DRZEMCZEWSKI, EUROPEAN HUMAN
RIGHTS CONVENTION IN DOMESTIC LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1983).

19. The full text of Article 8 is:
1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence.
2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of
this right except such as is in accordance with law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others.
20. The full text of Article 14 is: "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth
in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race,
colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association
with a national minority, property, birth or other status."
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(ECHR-Commission) on behalf of her infant daughter and herself. She
complained of Belgian law with respect to: 1) the maternal affiliation (acknowledgment of parenthood) of a non-marital child, 2) the non-marital
child's family relationships, and 3) the non-marital child's inheritance
rights. The first two points need some explanation. First, under Belgian
law, a non-marital child is only regarded as the child of its mother if the
latter chooses to recognize her maternity. A marital child undergoes no
such delay; affiliation is proved simply by the legally obligatory entry of
the married mother's name on the birth certificate. Second, as regards
family relationships, a non-marital child remains, even after recognition,
in principle a stranger to his mother's family. Thus, for example, in the
absence of its mother, the state guardianship agency rather than its
grandparents has the power to consent to the child's marriage. The reverse is true of marital children.
B.

Marckx: The Opinion

The ECHR-Court gave complete satisfaction to Paula Marckx's
claim on each count. In the introduction of its opinion, the ECHR-Court
formulated two general and significant statements of law. First, it confirmed that Article 8 (protecting "family life") of the ECHR-Convention
made no distinction between a marital and a non-marital family. Second,
the ECHR-Court indicated that Article 8 had a positive as well as a negative side. The Court held that Article 8:
does not merely compel the State to abstain from such [arbitrary] interference; in addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there
may be positive obligations inherent in an effective "respect" for family life.
This means, amongst other things, that when the State determines in its domestic legal system the regime applicable to certain
family ties such as those between an unmarried mother and her child,
it must act in a manner calculated to allow those concerned to lead a
normal family life. As envisaged by Article 8, respect for family life
implies in particular, in the Court's view, the existence in domestic
law of legal safeguards that render possible as from the moment of
birth the child's integration in his family. In this connection, the State
has a choice of various means, but a law that fails to satisfy this requirement violates paragraph 1 of Article 8 without there being any
call to examine it under paragraph 2.21 [emphasis added]
C.

Marckx: Judicial Activism

Until Marckx, the ECHR-Court had always interpreted Article 8 of
the ECHR-Convention as including only a negative duty of non-interference in private family life. In Marckx, for the first time, the Court implied from Article 8 "positive obligations" on States Party to provide for
21. ECHR-Marckx, supra note 1, at 15, Section 31.
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"the existence in domestic law of legal safeguards", and thereby seemingly appealed to the legislature and tribunals of States Party to reform
their domestic illegitimacy laws. Marckx signalled the adoption by the
ECHR-Court of a judicial "activism" that transcends the immediate context of illegitimacy.
Just as the U.S. Supreme Court" under Chief Justice Warren came
under heavy fire from opponents of "judicial legislation", so has the
ECHR-Court been severely criticized in some circles for its "activist" approach-for law-making instead of law-interpreting. Two Belgian jurists
have stood out in their opposition. Both of them are law professors at
Belgian universities: Francois Rigaux of the Catholic University of Louvain and Marc Bossuyt of Antwerp University.
Professor Bossuyt argues strongly against the Court's implying of
positive obligations and for the adoption of a "strict constructionist"
approach:
The transformation of classical freedoms, which impose essentially
negative obligations (duties to abstain) into social rights, which demand a positive interpretation by the State, is difficult to justify simply by a court's interpretation. Except where the Convention contains
some indications allowing one to conclude that the States Parties were
ready to submit it to the positive obligations of control mechanisms of
the Convention, any interpretation transforming the negative contents
of a guaranteed right into a positive obligation is rebuttable. Such an
interpretation ends up in a considerable expansion-probably without
the States Parties having desired it-of the power of the Court. An
interpretation expanding the power of a court of international jurisdiction has no basis, however, in international law.23
Professor Rigaux objects even more strenuously to the "activism" in
the Marckx decision. He considers that "the Court has gone beyond its
mission by imposing on the States Parties the adoption of a specific sys'
tem for maternal legitimation. 24

22. With respect to illegitimacy, the U.S. Supreme Court has shown little of the judicial
activism of the ECHRCourt. The U.S. Supreme Court has been applying a balancing test
when deciding on the constitutionality of state statutes allegedly discriminating against nonmarital children. Thus a permissible legislative purpose of public policy is balanced with,
and may override, the goal of equal protection. Some state statutes have been condemned
while others have been -pheld; the Supreme Court has used an ad hoc approach rather than
articulating a clear standard of review. See Note, Protecting the Illegitimate's Right to Inherit, 6 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 469-91 (1981); Guerin, Illegitimates and Equal Protection:
Lalli v. Lalli-A Retreat from Trimble v. Gordon, 57 DEN. L.J. 453-65 (1980); Metz, Trimble v. Gordon and Lalli v. Lalli: Shall the Sins of the Fathers Be Visited Upon the Sons?,
48 CIN.L. REV. 578-88 (1979); Harris, "Legitimate Discriminationagainst Illegitimates" A
Look at Trimble v. Gordon and Fiallo v.Bell. 16 J. FAM. L. 57-75 (1977).
23. Bossuyt, L'arr~t Marckx de la Cour europ~enne des Droits de l'Homme [The
Marckx decision of the European Court of Human Rights], 15 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INT'L
[BELGIAN REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAw] 68, 68 (1980).
24. Rigaux, La loi condamn~e. A propos de l'arr&te du 13 juin 1979 de Ia Cour
europienne des droits de l'homme [The Condemned Law: Concerning the June 13, 1979
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The strongest articulation of the legal objections to the Marckx decision is contained in the dissenting opinion15 of the British judge sitting on
the ECHR-Court that tried the Marckx case. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice has
been noted for his judicial conservatism as judge both on the International Court of Justice and now on the ECHR-Court. 26 In Sir Gerald's
view, the Court's judgment in Marckx was "little else but a misguided
endeavour to read-or rather introduce-a whole code of family law into
Article 8 of the Convention, thus inflating it in a manner, and to an extent, wholly incommensurable with its true and intended proportions. ' 2
On the scope of Article 8, Fitzmaurice took the view that Article 8
dealt only with questions of state interference with family life and not
with state regulation of civil status by family law:
It is abundantly clear ... that the main, if not indeed the sole object
and intended sphere of application of Article 8 was that of what I will
call the "domiciliary protection" of the individual. He and his family
were no longer to be subjected to the four o'clock in the morning rata-tat on the door; to domestic intrusions, searches and questionings to
examinations, delayings and confiscation of correspondence; to the
planting of listening devices (buggings); to telephone tapping and disconnection; to measures of coercion such as cutting off the electricity
or water supply; to such abominations as children being required to
report upon the activities of their parents, and even sometimes the
same for one spouse against another-in short the whole gamut of fascist and communist inquisitorial practices such as had scarcely been
known, at least in Western Europe, since the eras of religious intolerance and oppression, until (ideology replacing religion) they became
prevalent again in many countries between the two world wars and
subsequently. Such, and not the internal, domestic regulation of family relationships, was the object of Article 8, and it was for the avoidance of these horrors, tyrannies and vexations that "private and family life..home and ... correspondence" were to be respected, and the
individual endowed with a right to enjoy that respect-not for the
regulation of the civil status of babies. 8
To understand why the Court chose to be so assertive in Marckx a
few factors need to be considered.
First, the illegitimacy issue was ripe, and the inequities were blatant.
The movement was already afoot in Europe to overhaul the system of
disabilities imposed by centuries-old statutes based on notions of shame
and transferred punishment not in tune with modern justice. There was
little organized opposition to reform, even in the most traditional circles.

decision of the ECHR-Court.] 1979 JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX [CouRT REPORTER] 513, 518.
25. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, dissenting opinion, ECHR-Marckx, supra note 1, 39-54.
26. About Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, see generally Merrills, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice's
Contribution to the Jurisprudenceof the InternationalCourt of Justice, 1976-7 BRrr. Y.B.
INT'L L.

183.

27. Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, dissenting opinion, ECHR-Marckx, supra note 1, No. 10-15."
28. Id., para. 7 at 41-42.
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Second, the Marckx decision may have also grown out of the Court's
desire to take a greater role in the movement toward European unity.
Such an ambition was never expressed in the opinion, but might still have
been very present in the judges' minds. By the late 1970s, despite Spain's
addition to the Council of Europe and ratification of the ECHR-Convention in 1979, the Council of Europe and its affiliated ECHR-Convention
institutions had seen their prestige eclipsed by the expanded European
Economic Community (EEC). By 1979, the first directly-elected deputies
sat in the EEC's European Parliament.
The EEC institution directly in "competition" with the ECHR-Court
is not the European Parliament but rather the Court of Justice of the
European Communities.2 It is often called the "Luxembourg Court", after the city and country where the court meets, as opposed to the "Strasbourg Court", i.e., the ECHR-Court. The Luxembourg Court first sat in
1955 and initially dealt only with economic matters. In contrast to the
judgments of the Strasbourg Court, those of the Luxembourg Court are
directly enforceable in the member states of the EEC, under Arts. 187
and 192 of the EEC Treaty. Moreover, the Luxembourg Court seeks directly to promote the unification or harmonization of the laws of the EEC
countries, while the ECHR institutions have not declared that as one of
their goals. Moreover, in recent years, the Luxembourg Court has ruled
on human rights issues as well as on economic issues.30 There is still no
specific declaration of human rights in the EEC Treaties- nothing like
the ECHR-Convention. The protection of fundamental rights has nevertheless been developed by the Luxembourg Court as an inherent part of
its duty to ensure that, in the interpretation and application of the EEC
Treaties, "the law is observed"."' So far, the Luxembourg Court has ruled
on issues like privacy, search and seizure, and speedy trial, but it has not
inquired into "respect for family life"."
The third factor needed to understand the Marckx court's judicial
activism is the applicability of ECHR-Court decisions to the domestic law
of States Party to the ECHR-Convention. This factor is discussed below.

29. On the Court of Justice of the European Communities, see MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO
(1980); SCHERMEIS, JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrrIES (1979); Schermers, Application of InternationalLaw by the Court of Justice of
the European Communities, in EssAYs ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LuAL
ORDER 169 (1980); Stein, Lawyers, Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1981); Special Issue on the European Court, 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 515 (1975), which includes an annotated bibliography by I.I. Kavass.
30. On the human rights cases tried by the Court of Justice of the European Communities, see Sorensen, The Enlargement of the European Communities and the Protection of
Human Rights, in 1971 EUR. Y.B. 3 (Council of Europe); Pescatore, The Protection of
Human Rights in the European Communities, 1972 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 73.
31. Art. 164 of the EEC Treaty.
32. See generally the index of each annual bound volume of COMMON MKT. L. REV. for
a survey of the cases decided by the Luxembourg Court.
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW
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D. Marckx: Enforceability of the Decision
The Marckx court could "afford" to be judicially active; it knew that
its decision would be respected. Though the decision was clear and forthright, it was not exactly bold and revolutionary. Nearly all of the States
Party had already committed themselves to reform at the time of
Marckx.3 3 The issue of non-marital children, like that of consenting homosexual behavior34 , is a relatively marginal one that does not threaten a
State's dignity.
The ECHR-Court wished to win over the trust of the States Party.
The member states, which accept the Court's jurisdiction to receive individual petitions against them, must, according to Article 25 of the ECHRConvention, annually renew their declarations of acceptance. Six member
states-Cyprus, France, Greece, Malta, Spain and Turkey-do not even
recognize the Court's competence. The human rights cases that come
before the Court are matters relating directly to the sovereignty of nations. The Court knows that it will not win this confidence by an adventurous brand of judicial activism.
The Court is acutely aware that it lacks an enforcement mechanism
and that compliance with its decisions is essentially discretionary. 5 It is
indeed quite remarkable that most member states have been willing to
waive formal objections to admissibility, accept applications against them
raised on their merits, cooperate with the ECHR Commission when trying
to settle out of court, and modify their legislation and administrative
practice. Member states often compensate individuals for the acts of their
own administrative authorities and courts of law. What the ECHR-Court
has achieved is precious and fragile. It has gained the cooperation of
many member states in allowing the ECHR-Court to point out deficiencies in their own systems of law. Against the backdrop of increased unwillingness of nations to submit disputes for international judicial settlement, the relative success of the ECHR-Court is indeed remarkable.

33. For the most up-to-date survey of.illegitimacy laws in Western Europe, especially as
regards inheritance rights, see Pauwels, De hervorming van het afstammingsrecht in WestEuropa [The reform of the law of descent in Western Europe], 3 TIJDSCHRFrr VOOR FAMILIE
EN JEUGDRECHT [REVIEW OF FAMILY AND JUVENILE LAw] 182 (1981). Countries with Napole-

onic Code legacies that had undergone major reforms in their illegitimacy laws were: France,
1972; Italy, 1975; Luxembourg, 1978; Netherlands, 1970; Portugal, 1966.
34. See also Dudgeon Case, Decisions on the European Convention on Human Rights
during 1981, 1981 BRIT. Y.B. INTr'L L., 343-7]. In the Dudgeon case [Eur. Court H.R., Dudgeon case, judgment of 22 October 1981, Series A no. 47], the ECHR-Court for the first time
declared a homosexuality law violative of the ECHRConvention. The case arose out of the
complaint of an adult homosexual resident of Northern Ireland that Northern Irish law
rendered criminal any homosexual acts between consenting adult males. The court found
that the relevant statute constituted an unjustified interference with the petitioner's right to

respect for his private life, in breach of Article 8.
35. On implementing the ECHR-Convention in the States Party, see Buergenthal, The
Domestic Status of the European Convention on Human Rights, 13 BUFFALo L. REV. 354
(1963-4).
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The ECHR-Court has been cautious. It is this caution which allows
Marckx to be enforced, because the member states have confidence in the
Court's decisions. Thus, once the Court made its decision in Marcx, it
could be reasonably sure of eventual compliance by the member states'
domestic courts.
III.

THE AFTERMATH OF MARCKX IN EUROPEAN NATIONAL COURTS

The domestic status of the ECHR-Convention as it relates to the national law of each member state varies widely. When the member states
ratified the ECHR-Convention, they agreed to Article 1 providing that:
"The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section 1 of this Convention." 6 In fact, the member states have chosen to implement these guarantees by different methods, according to their own constitutional
practice. The means of implementation are essentially of two kinds: 1)
complete integration of the Convention into domestic law, or 2) the integration of only specific provisions of the Convention into domestic law
through legislation.
The states that completely integrated the Convention into their own
domestic law include: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey and
West Germany. Under Belgian law, the Convention is directly applicable,
so that the Convention has the force of law in that country. Once the
national judge in Belgium determines that the relevant provision of the
ECHR-Convention is "self-sufficient"-that is, clear and complete-he
can enforce that provision of the Convention, which is understood as be37
ing "self-executing" under Beligan law.
The states that have not totally integrated the Convention into their
own domestic law include the Scandinavian countries, Ireland and the
U.K. In those countries, where specific legislation has not incorporated
the provisions of the Convention, the Convention has legal effect only in
interstate relations with other member states.
A.

Aftermath: Marckx As It Relates to Direct Applicability

The Marckx case raises peculiar problems as to the direct applicability of the ECHR-Convention, or, to be more precise, Article 8 of the

36. Article 1, The European Convention on Human Rights (Convention of November 4,
1950 for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms).
37. On the implementation of the ECHR-Convention in Belgium, see Bossuyt, The Direct Applicability of InternationalInstruments on Human Rights (with special reference
to Belgian and U.S. law), 15 REvuE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 317 (1980-2). For a
general survey of changes that have been introduced in Belgian law as a result of findings by
the ECHR-Court, see De Meyer, Belgie en het Europees Verdrag tot bescherming van de
rechten van de mens [Belgium and the ECHR- Convention], in BELGISCH BuITENLANDS
BELEID IN INTERNATIONALE BETREKKINGEN [BELGIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL RELA-

TIONS] (De Raeymaeker ed. 1978).
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ECHR-Convention. In Belgium, the ECHR-Convention is directly applicable and has been incorporated into Belgium law. Article 8 would then
be "self-executing" in Belgium if it were also self-sufficient-that is, clear
and complete. Many observers, however, say that the Article 8 guarantee
of protection of "family life" is extremely imprecise and therefore not
self-executing. In his comments on the Marckx judgment, Professor Francois Rigaux stated that Article 8 of the ECHR-Convention as interpreted
by the ECHR-Court in Marckx, was "not sufficiently precise to have direct effect in national law."' 8
Part of the problem of imprecision arises out of the "evolutive" interpretation by the Marckx court of the notion of "family life" in Article 8.
The Marckx court held that even if the signatories of the ECHR-Convention in 1950 considered non-marital families as falling outside under Article 8 protection, even if they considered it normal at that time to distinguish between marital and non-marital children, that, nevertheless, an
evolution in social thought had occurred by 1979, leading to a consensus
that such a distinction was now discriminatory.39 The determination of
the evolution of social consensus is of course an area fraught with
imprecision.
Even more disturbing-because even more imprecise-is the clause
in the Marckx decision referring to "positive obligations inherent in an
effective 'respect' for family life"."0 Without articulating exactly what this
clause meant, the Marckx court stated that, in their domestic laws, member states must "act in a manner calculated to allow those concerned
'
[non-marital families] to lead a normal family life."41
This aspect of Marckx has come under a great deal of fire from European jurists. Professor Fritz Sturm of the Law Faculty of the University
of Lausanne, Switzerland, refers to the ECHR-Court's action of broadening Article 8, through uncertain "positive obligations", as "uberstrapazierung", which can only be translated as "bootstrapping". 2 Pro-

38. Rigaux, supra note 24, at 523.
39. In the Marckx decision, the Court spelled out its commitment to make the Convention evolve with society:
Finally, in reply to an argument advanced by the [Belgian] Government,
the Court acknowledged that, at the time when the Convention was drafted, it
was regarded as permissible and normal in many European countries to draw a
distinction in this area between the "illegitimate" and the "legitimate" family.
The Court however recalled that the Convention is to be interpreted in the
light of present-day conditions; it could not but be struck, it stressed, by the
evolution in the domestic law of the great majority of the Member States of
the Council of Europe towards equality between "legitimate" and "illegitimate" children on the point under consideration.
Marckx Case, 1979 Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 414 (Eur. Comm'n on Human

Rights).
40. ECHR-Marckx, supra note 1, at 15, Section 31.

41. Id.
42. Sturm, Das StrassburgerMarckx-Urteil zum Recht des nichtehelichen Kindes und
seine Folgen [The Strasbourg Marckx Decision as to the Law of Non-marital Children and
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fessor Jacques Velu of the Law Faculty of the Free University of Brussels
stated his vehement objection to the direct applicability of the Marckx
decision:
Insofar as Article 8 has negative obligations, meaning a prohibition
against the State's arbitrarily meddling in the private and family life
of individuals, it [the Marckx decision] enunciates a sufficiently precise and complete rule that takes on a directly applicable character.
Insofar as Article 8 includes positive obligations. . .,this holding
does not take on a directly applicable character, because, as soon as
several alternative means are available for the State to adopt in order
to implement this court instruction, the holding is not sufficiently precise or complete. To this extent, Article 8 imposes, in our mind, only
an obligation for the legislator to act, an obligation which should only
be invoked in national courts as one element, for interpretation according to domestic law, but not as a principal source of controlling
43
law or obligation.
B.

Aftermath: The Three Dutch and Belgian Cases

The three cases infra purport to represent all reported cases in European national courts that have cited Marckx in their decisions. There are
several reasons why of all 21 States Party, only in Belgium and in the
Netherlands were cases reported that cited Marckx. One reason is that in
many countries, most notably in Scandinavia"", illegitimacy laws have
been reformed to eliminate any discrimination against non-marital children; no cases would be likely to arise. Among the other reasons for the
dearth of cases citing Marckx are: 1) the common practice throughout
Europe not to report any cases except the most important appellate
cases; 2) the non self-executing status of the ECHR-Convention in most
European countries, including France; and 3) the social context in many
European countries which prevents plaintiffs from bringing suits that
might attract public attention to their own non-marital status or to that
of their children. The three reported cases, two Belgian and one Dutch,
that did cite Marckx all involved statutes which were found to violate
Article 8 of the ECHR-Convention as interpreted by Marckx. Each case
sheds light on ramifications of the Marckx decision in specific and different areas.

its Aftermath], 12 ZErrsCHRIvr FUR DES GESAMTE FAMILIENRECHT [FAMILY LAW REVIEW]
1150, 1154 (1982).
43. Velu, Les effets directs des instruments internationaux en matiere de droits de
t'homme [The Direct Effects of InternationalInstruments Concerning Human Rights], 15
REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [BELGIAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW] 293, 314

(1980-2).
44. See supra note 7 and note 33. On illegitimacy statutes in the Scandinavian countries, see generally KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY (1971) at 179-93.
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B.1 Supreme Court of the Netherlands: The "Adoption by Aunt"
Case of Nijmegen-decided January 18, 19808
Facts: Petronella Janssen, a Dutch national living in Nijmegen
(Netherlands), filed a motion on November 24, 1978 with a local Nijmegen court asking that she be allowed to officially adopt Leyla Janssen, a
minor child under her care. Leyla Janssen was born on November 16,
1974, the non-marital daughter of Anna Maria Janssen, who died on November 6, 1978, and who was the sister of Petronella Janssen. The identity of Leyla's father was never made known by her mother, and was
never declared.
Holding: In effect, Petronella Janssen wanted to adopt her sister's
non-marital four-year-old daughter, after her sister died and the child became an orphan. Such an adoption procedure would have been quite normal under Article 959 of the Dutch Civil Code4 , which allows for adoption of orphans by the next blood relative. Such an adoption would have
proceeded without any opposition if the aunt, Petronella Janssen, were
recognized by law as her niece Leyla's next blood relative. However, because Leyla was illegitimate, she was considered by Dutch law, as under
the Napoleonic Code, to have no blood relative other than her mother.
Therefore, the trial court at Nijmegen, in February, 1979, followed Dutch
law and declared her "a ward of the state" because she was without a
blood relative. In April, 1979, two months before Marckx, the Arnhem
appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, stating that the child's
only relative was her unmarried mother. As the plaintiff was not a relative within the meaning of Article 959, the motion to adopt could not be
granted.4
The Dutch Supreme Court rendered its decision on January 18, 1980.
It reversed the decision of the Arnhem Appellate Court and remanded
the case to that court with instructions to proceed with the case in a manner that would make no distinction between marital and non-marital children. Basing its holding specifically on Marckx, the Dutch Supreme
Court gave this explanation for its decision:
The legal distinction made between marital and non-marital children
has of late undergone sizable change. This development found expression in the ECHR-Court's judgment in the Marckx case in an inter-

45. De Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Supreme Court of the Netherlands], Case No.
463 of January 18, 1980, NEDERLANDSE JURISPRUDENTIE [DUTCH JURISPRUDENCE] 1460 (1980);
REPRINTED IN SUMMARY FORM IN Rechtspraak [Law Talk], No. 21, 7 NEDERLANDS JURISTENBLAD [DUTCH LAWYERS' PAGE] 141 (1980); summarized and intepreted in German in: De
Hoge Raad der Nederland [Supreme Court of the Netherlands], Verwandtschaft des
nichtehelichen Kindes / Einfluss der Marckx-Entscheidung des EGMR [Kinship of the
non-marital child / Influence of the Marckx decision of the ECHR-Court],EUROPAISCHE
GRUNDRECHTE ZEITSCHRIFT [EUROPEAN FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS REVIEW] 213 (1980).
46. Article 959, Civil Code of the Netherlands.
47. De Hoge Raad, supra note 45, at 1460.
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pretation of Article 8 in conjunction with Article 14 of the ECHRConvention. The domestic judge must therefore take into account this
important evolution when examining matters which come before him
on this point.
With respect to the question whether in the instant case, Article
959 ought to be applied to the sister of the mother of a minor child,
even when the child is not a marital offspring of the mother, the need
for legal consistency does not oppose such an application. So then, for
all unadjudicated proceedings henceforth the applicable Dutch law is
that in this regard no distinction must be made between marital and
non-marital children."8
It appears that the Dutch Supreme Court gave the ECHR Convention, as interpreted in Marckx, the force of binding law that could overrule Dutch statutes. Without that binding force of the Convention, the
Dutch Supreme Court would have had, in the name of "legal consistency"
in a civil law jurisdiction, to rule against the aunt's motion, unless the
Dutch Parliament changed the law and gave it retroactive force.
B.2 Civil Tribunal of Ghent, Belgium: The "Granddaughter'sInheritance" Case-decided November 20, 19809
Facts: When Elza D. died in 1978, her estate was to be divided up among
her heirs according to Belgian law. A problem arose because Elza D. had
only one child, a non-marital daughter, Denise, who, for unstated reasons,
refused to accept any part of her mother's estate. This non-marital
daughter, Denise, had married and had a marital child, Antonia, who was
an adult at the time of her grandmother's death. Antonia wanted very
much to inherit her grandmother's entire estate. If Denise had been a
marital child, Antonia would have been a "conventional" granddaughter.
As the only grandchild, Antonia would have been the closest heir in line
for the estate, and, under Belgian law, would have received the entire
estate. Antonia's mother's illegitimacy had barred her from doing so.
Meanwhile, certain "legitimate" nieces and nephews of the decedent had
opposed Antonia's claim to any part of the estate, and had argued for
their exclusive rights to the estate.
Under the Belgian Civil Code, a non-marital child has a blood relationship only with its mother and thus has the right to inherit only from
its mother and not from any extended family beyond. Thus, by Beligan
statutes, Antonia had no relationship to her grandmother, Elza D.
Holding: The judge refused to apply the relevant Belgian statutes, which
he considered to be violative of the ECHR-Convention:
The Belgian Civil Code therefore makes a distinction between the inheritance rights of legal [marital] offspring and the inheritance rights

48. Id. at 1462.
49. Burgerlijke Rechtbank Te Gent [Civil Tribunal of Ghent], Decision of November
20, 1980,

RECHTSKUNDIG WEEKBLAD [WEEKLY LAW REPORTER SHEET]

2328 (1980-81).
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of natural [non-marital] offspring.

That discrimination is discriminatory and is in conflict with Articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR-Convention (signed in Rome on November
4, 1950) and with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (signed in Paris on
March 20, 1952), both ratified by Belgian and applicable in Belgian
law since June 14, 1955.
That is also the holding in the judgment of the ECHR-Court of
June 13, 1979 (Marckx case).60
B.3 Civil Tribunal of Turnhout, Belgium: The "Adulterous Child"
Case-decided April 29, 198251
Facts: Maria El. was married to Hans-Joachim K. for a number of years
until they separated in 1976. They continued to live apart, without divorcing. Also in 1976, Maria El. began to live with Anastassios K., and
continued to live with him during the six years that followed, even though
she was still legally married to Hans-Joachim. In March, 1980, Maria
gave birth to a daughter, Stella, whom Hans-Joachim refused to recognize
as his own. Hans-Joachim and Maria were officially divorced in October,
1980. After Maria's divorce, Anastassios, with Maria's consent, petitioned
the Turnhout Civil Tribunal to allow him to be recognized as the child's
father.
Articles 333 and 335 of the Belgian Civil Code forbade any official
recognition of Anastassios's paternity of Stella. According to Article 331,
a "natural" ("non-marital" but not "adulterous") child could become "legitimate" by its parents' marriage, but a non-marital child born of an
adulterous or incestuous relationship could not be so acknowledged. According to Article 335, the paternity or maternity of a non-marital child
could not be judicially declared where this would show the adulterous or
incestuous nature of the parents' connection.
Holding: The Belgian court held that Articles 331 and 335 violated the
ECHR-Convention and should not be applied, and that Anastassios's paternity should be officially acknowledged. The court's reasoning was as
follows:
Considering that in the given circumstances, the petition from Mr.
Eu. [Anastassios] concerning the child, Stella El., is not allowable
under Articles 331 and 335; that the petitioner, aware of the Marckx
decision of the ECHR-Court of June 13, 1979, contends that Articles 8
and 14 of the ECHR-Convention hold that a state which has ratified
the Convention must provide legal safeguards for the protection of
normal family life; that a non-marital child has as much right as the

50. Id. at 2329.
51. Burgerlijke Rechtbank Te Turnhout [Civil Tribuanl of Turnhout], Decision of April
29, 1982, RECHTSKUNDIG WEEKBLAD [WEEKLY LAW REPORTER SHEET] 1590 (1982-83). The
opinion is immediately followed by a comment: Pauwels, Noot: Overspelige kinderen en de
directe werking van het Marckxarrest[Note: Adulterous Children and the Direct Applicability of the Marckx decision], at 1592-5.
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marital child to the recognition of its paternity; that the existence of a
non-marital family is entitled to enjoy the same safeguards as the existence of a marital family;
Considering that the rules with regard to the rights recognized by
Articles 2 through 12 of the Convention are directly applicable in national courts and have precedence over internal law. . . . Considering
that in this case the discriminatory distinction made by Articles 331
and 335 has no objective and reasonable justification, in the light of
the case law of the Marckx decision . . . [tihis tribunal . . declares
the petition granted and authorizes the recognition by Mr. Anastassios Eu., . . . of his child, Stella El.. .5
C.

Aftermath: The Three Dutch and Belgian Cases As Illustrations
of the Direct Applicability of Marckx

In these three cases, Dutch and Belgian judges directly applied Article 8 of the ECHR-Convention as interpreted by Marckx, without concerning themselves with the "positive obligations" aspect of the Marckx
decision. The judges in the three cases did not base their opinions on the
"positive obligations" clause in the Marckx opinion. The "positive obligations" clause, because of its vagueness, is unlikely to be cited by a national court as controlling authority in any future case. The clause can be
thought of as the Marckx court's policy statement. It is obiter dictum
that is not directly self-executing. Despite this dictum; the Marckx
court's interpretation of Article 8 of the ECHR-Convention is directly applicable and self-executing in Belgium and the Netherlands.
Indeed, the direct applicability of the ECHR-Convention in the
Netherlands and Belgium is now a fait accompli that is newly, but firmly,
anchored in judicial tradition in those countries. Precisely in order to
strengthen the Convention's direct applicability, the ECHR-Court in the
Van Oosterwijck case 53 refused to try the case on the merits. Instead, it
decided that a Belgian court could best judge the applicant's claim, by
using the Marckx decision as a guideline. In Van Oosterwijck, the
ECHR-Court announced very clearly that violations of the ECHR-Convention need not be heard by the ECHR-Commission and the Court, but
could and indeed should be heard by domestic courts, applying the Convention directly, as did the courts in the Hague, Ghent and Turnhout.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Centuries ago, decisions in family law affecting all the European
states were often made at Vatican Councils". In this way, for example,
52. Id. at 1590-1.
53. Eur. Court H.R., Van Oosterwijck case, judgment of 6 November 1980, Series A no.
40.
54. On Vatican Councils and canon law, see generally A.G. CIGOGNANI, CANON LAW
(1934); R. METZ, WHAT IS CANON LAW? (1960); T.L. BOUSCAIIEN AND A.C. ELLIS, CANON LAW:
A TEXT AND COMMENTARY (1966); J.A. ABBO AND J.D. HANNAN, THE SACRED CANONS (1960).
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the Council of Trent in 1563 decided that informal marriage (cohabitation) would cease to be recognized as a valid union by canon law. Now at
last Europe possesses a lay institution-the European Court of Human
Rights-whose decisions are respected by the Member States of the
Council of Europe. The law is an evolutive process. If discriminatory illegitimacy statutes can trace their origin to the Council of Trent decision in
1563, they may also very well trace their demise to the Marckx decision
of 1979.

A Report on the University of Denver's
Institute for Human Rights
VED

P. NANDA* and
I.

MATTHEW LIPPMANN**

INTRODUCTION

During the summer of 1983, the University of Denver College of Law
offered a five-week Institute for Human Rights, which was taught by Ved
P. Nanda, Professor of Law and Director of the International Legal Studies Program at the University of Denver College of Law, and Matthew
Lippman of the Political Science Department at the University of Denver. The following report is designed not only to describe the Institute
but also to assist other law professors who plan to offer similar programs.
II.

GOALS

OF THE INSTITUTE

In planning for the Institute, the instructors had identified a primary
goal of providing the enrolled students a real opportunity to sharpen
their skills in the advocacy of international human rights. The instructors
hoped that the students' understanding of the application of international law and its machinery would be greatly enhanced by participation
in the program, taking international law out of the abstract and theoretical and into the practical. In fact, the students' ability to generate creative legal solutions to critical situations was tested and stimulated by the
urgency of the problems with which they dealt.
Above all, it was felt that by their entry into the field of advocacy of
international human rights, the students would be able to provide research assistance where it is sorely needed. Also, they would have a voice
in the domestic and international fora in which international human
rights instruments are interpreted, mechanisms refined, precedents and
customs established, and conflicts decided.
In short, the Institute was viewed as analagous to early legal service
programs in which law students were trained to litigate cases on behalf of
the poor, and which led to expanded legal protections for disadvantaged
groups within American society. Not surprisingly, the Institute attracted
a group of committed and idealistic students, most of whom expressed a
desire to continue their involvement in human rights litigation. For these
individuals, the Institute provided an important starting point for profes* Professor Law and Director, International Legal Studies Program, University of Denver College of Law.
** Associate Professor of Criminal Justice, Department of Criminal Justice, University
of Illinois, Chicago. Professor Lippman was then an Assistant Professor in the Department
of Political Science at the University of Denver.
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sional involvement with the advocacy of human rights.

III.

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE INSTITUTE

The Institute was structured primarily on the basis of a clinical program, with an advanced international human rights law course available
as a supplement. Each course was worth three hours of credit on a quarter basis. The clinical course was limited to 10 students from the University of Denver College of Law' and three students from law schools
outside Colorado2 ; in the substantive course, 17 students were enrolled.
Four students at the Graduate School of International Studies at the
University of Denver s and a few undergraduate political science students
in the honors program4 were also permitted to attend some classes and to
lend assistance in conducting research primarily in foreign languages.
The students enrolled in the clinical course were all required to participate in one or more projects or cases solicited from the attorneys involved in those cases and from several nongovernmental organizations.
The availability of faculty to supervise students-two full-time faculty
members with the assistance of several colleagues at the College of Law
and several attorneys in the community5 who are primarily engaged in
the practice of international law or immigration law-determined the
number of students who were permitted to enroll in the course. Students
were required to work on projects entailing a written product and an oral
presentation.
Two orientation sessions were held to enhance the students' appreciation of the challenges faced by human rights advocates. In many countries, advocacy on behalf of the victims of human rights violations might
lead to reprisals for assisting these persons. Also, without specialized experience, lawyers in the domestic fields lack the skills, time, resources and
financial support needed to litigate human rights cases.
Throughout both the clinical and substantive courses, the instructors
emphasized the practical side of human rights law through its established
machinery. Local attorneys working in such international law areas as immigration and political asylum spoke to the class and worked with the
students on their projects. The substantive and theoretical quality of the

1. Law students attending the Institute from the University of Denver were: David Castro, Mark Clark, Rnbrt Leichty, MArk Roberts. Marc Salzberg. Jocelyn Sedney, Mary
Sinton, David Stephenson, Jan Suzukawa, and Laurence Tobey.
2. Law students from other schools were: James Cooksey, Gonzaga University School of
Law; Jordon Sanger, Oklahoma City University School of Law; and Craig Zetley, University
of Wisconsin School of Law.
3. Students from the Graduate School of International Studies were: Aziz Beziou, Yung
Kee Kogh, Mouloud Meslem and Youcef Smail.
4. Undergraduate students included Jean Paul Prentice, Rachael Sibley and Amelia
Sang Venetti.
5. The faculty included James Branch, William Beaney and Francis Jamison. The attorneys included Jonathon Cox, Shelley Dodge, Walter Gerash, Gerald Padmore, Anne
Schmitt and Ken Stern.
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students' work was evaluated in several discussion sessions with local attorneys, members of the press and nongovernmental organizations such
as Amnesty International. This was a vehicle for active community participation in human rights advocacy.
At the conclusion of the five-week period, a moot court and a mock
United Nations Security Council debate were conducted. These practical
exercises required students to integrate their advocacy skills and the issues presented by the cases on which they had worked. The moot court
sessions were videotaped and critiqued by the instructors for style and
substance. Francis Jamison, Director of the Advocacy Skills Program at
the College of Law, graciously supervised this segment of the program.
What follows is a description and an appraisal of the clinical component
of the Institute.
IV.

CASES

Of course, the selection of cases and projects is of critical importance
to a successful program of this kind. The instructors solicited several
human rights law groups in the United States and Colorado attorneys to
select appropriate projects for students. Considerable time and attention
were devoted to screening cases, identifying specific issues on which students were to work, preparing and assembling the essential research material, and planning logistics so that the students' time and efforts would
be used effectively. Three criteria determined the selection: one, that the
case be current; two, that an intense five-week effort by a student, or by a
number of students jointly working on the project, would suffice for research and writing purposes to result in the completion of the project;
and finally, that the case or project would not only raise issues that were
of sufficient actual concern, gravity and urgency, but would also permit
students to enhance their appreciation of international law and international human rights law in a practical setting.
Nine projects were ultimately concluded during the 1983 session. The
Governments whose conduct and actions were challenged were of a wide
variety of political persuasions and the positions taken were based upon
established principles of international law.
As the request of the National Lawyers Committee for Soviet Jewry
a complaint was prepared pursuant to ECOSOC Resolution 1503 for filing
with the United Nations Commission on Human Rights on behalf of
Yosef Begun, a Jewish citizen of the Soviet Union and a mathematical
engineer.' Soviet authorities refused to permit Begun to emigrate to
Israel, and he was facing twelve years' confinement for "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda." The student argued that the failure of the Soviet

6. We are grateful to Ms. Bobbie Towbin for her assistance. Ms. Towbin is Coordinator,
Commission on International Jewish Affairs of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith,
and was our initial contact with the National Lawyers Committee for Soviet Jewry. Craig
Zeitlin prepared the petition.
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government to permit Begun and other Jews from emigrating, along-with
its refusal to allow these and other persons to select their own trial attorneys, violated both Soviet and international law, and demonstrated a consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested violations of human rights.
Two briefs prepared on behalf of six Haitian and Salvadoran refugees
argued against patent deportation.7 The students took the position, inter
alia, that § 1253(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which prohibits deportation of a refugee to a country where his "life or freedom
would be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group or political opinion," should be interpreted to
comply with provisions of the U.N. Handbook on Proceduresand Criteria for Determining Refugee Status. Under the Handbook, states would
be prohibited from deporting "economic refugees," or those who have fled
El Salvador or Haiti because of economic deprivation caused by government expropiation, or threatened expropiation, of their land and personal
goods.
In addition, the students argued that the Handbook requires that a
refugee show "good reason" to fear persecution if deported, and that this
standard should be adopted by U.S. courts in place of the current, narrower burden of proof of "clear probability" of persecution. The students'
briefs asserted that refugees from both Haiti and El Salvador fall within
the Handbook's definition of persecution based on "membership in a particular social group" because of evidence showing that refugees from
these countries have "good reason" to fear persecution if returned to their
homelands.
A legal opinion was prepared for the South African Project of the
Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law for submission to South
Africa's Rumpff Commission which was charged with evaluation of the
advisability of South Africa's planned cession of the black homeland
KaNgwane to Swaziland. 8 Such a move would strip South African citizenship from the people of KaNgwane. The student argued that cession
would violate the right to self-determination of KaNgwane's citizens and
that, under international law, any such cession must first be ratified by
the citizens of KaNgwane. The opinion concluded that denationalization
on the basis of the race of the KaNgwane citizens violates the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination.
Another brief written for the South African project of the Lawyers'
Committee for Civil Rights Under Law discussed the legal effect upon
United States multinational corporations of Decree No. 1 for the Protec-

7. We are grateful to Ms. Shelley Dodge and Ms. Anne Schmitt for their advice and
assistance. David Castro and Mary Sinton prepared the briefs.
8. We are grateful to Gay J. MacDougall, Director, Southern Africa Project for her advice and assistance. Marc Salzberg prepared the opinion.
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tion of the Natural Resources of Namibia9 The decree, adopted by the
U.N. Council for Namibia in September 1974 and approved by the U.N.
General Assembly in December 1974, vested complete control of
Namibian natural resources in the U.N. Council for Namibia. It prohibits
any corporate involvement in Namibian natural resources that is not authorized by the Council. Violators may be held liable for damages by the
future government of an independent Namibia, and the U.N. Commissioner for Namibia may take steps to enforce the decree.
The student brief contended that American corporations engaged in
extracting natural resources in Namibia without the consent of the Council are in violation of this decree as well as customary international law;
thus, stockholders have standing to sue the corporate directors in U.S.
courts for breach of a fiduciary duty of care.
Another project undertaken for the Institute was an opinion written
for the International Rights Law Group" ° on a law proposed by the military rulers of Argentina in 1983 granting amnesty to individuals who, between May 24, 1973 and the passage of the amnesty law, were responsible
for perpetrating murder, kidnapping, torture and disappearances among
Argentines for alleged "terrorist or subversive activities or purposes." It
was argued that Argentina's proposed law would excuse the violation of
fundamental human rights from which no derogation is permitted under
the American Convention on Human Rights. The students also asserted
that many of these human rights violations constitute international
crimes and are violation of customary international law, and that the enactment of the amnesty law would violate Argentina's international obligation to "extradite or prosecute" the perpetrators.
Another project for the International Human Rights Law Group was
an analysis of standards used by the United States Department of State
denying foreign assistance to a government on the grounds that it has
engaged in a "consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights."11 The analysis reviewed hearings conducted by
the House Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations in 1981 and 1982, and concluded that, although the Reagan Administration has generally ignored human rights standards for foreign assistance set forth by Congress, Congress has contributed to that policy by
permitting assistance to countries which violate human rights where there
is evidence of some improvement in conditions from time to time.
Another brief was written for a prominent Denver defense lawyer
representing anti-nuclear demonstrators arrested in Fort Collins, Colo-

9. Jocelyn Sedney and David Stephenson prepared the brief with the assistance of Jean
Paul Prentice.
10. We are grateful to Ms. Amy Young, Director, International Human Rights Lawyers'
Group for her guidance and assistance. James Cooksey and Mark Clark prepared the report
with the assistance of Amelia Sang Vinetti.
11. Laurence Tobey prepared the report.
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rado, who had blocked a train supposedly carrying nuclear material.' 2
The brief took the position that not only is the use of nuclear weapons
prohibited under international law, but that arguably their manufacture,
storage and transportation could be challenged as impermissible under
the evolving international law norms. The brief invoked applicable international agreements, principles of customary international law, and U.N.
resolutions and declarations in support of this position. The student argued that the demonstrators had sought to force compliance with the pertinent norms of international law.
An amicus brief was undertaken as a joint project with the Urban
Morgan Institute for Human Rights at the University of Cincinnati College of Law for submission to the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights. 3 It was contended that Guatemala's extension of the death penalty for common crimes relating to political offenses was a violation of
article 4(2) of the American Convention on Human Rights, which provides that "the obligation of such punishment shall not be extended to
crimes to which it does not presently apply." At the time Guatemala ratified the Convention, article 4(2) did not apply to common political offenses; thus, Guatemala was in violation of the Convention.
V.

APPRAISAL

The satisfactory completion of every project undertaken by the Institute was gratifying to the students as well as the instructors. Briefs prepared on behalf of the Haitian and Salvadoran refugees were used by Colorado attorneys in successfully challenging their deportation. The brief
written on behalf of the anti-nuclear demonstrators was used by the defense attorney. Although the court did not pass on the international law
issues raised in the brief, the case against the demonstrators was dismissed. The success of the 1503 petition is not to be measured by the
Soviet response to such petitions, which essentially remain negative to all
complaints regarding the violation of human rights of its citizens. It is
essential, however, that the world public opinion on the issue be continually and forcefully expressed.
The KaNgwane representation was made by the Lawyers' Committee
for Civil Rights Under Law, as suggested by the student, to the Rumpff
Commission. The Committee also used the student brief on Decree No. 1
in its ongoing efforts on the Namibian question. The brief was subsequently publisleUd ii-i
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12. The brief was written for Walter Gerash, Esq., to whom we owe a debt of gratitude.
Robert Leichty prepared the brief.
13. We are grateful to Tom Buergenthal, Dean, Washington College of Law, American
University, for bringing to our attention the project. Professor Bert Lockwood, Director of
the Urban Morgan Institute for Human Rights at the University of Cincinnati College of
Law was most generous with his advice and assistance in the preparation of the brief. Mark
Roberts, Jordon Sanger and Jan Suzukawa were primarily responsible for the amicus brief.
14. Stephenson, Sedney & Prentice, Enforcing Decree No. I in the Domestic Court of
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mocracy, the outcome sought by the project on the proposed Argentine
amnesty decree was accomplished. The other project undertaken for the
International Human Rights Law Group, an analysis of the human rights
standards used by the Department in its country reports, was followed by
a further study the next year in the human rights class at the College of
Law, where a student replicated the earlier results. Finally, the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights accepted the amicus brief on the question pertaining to the Guatemalan death penalty.
Several points in the structure of the course emerged by the end of
the Institute as needing improvement. The major complaints of students,
instructors and attorneys alike, focused on the compression of the Institute into only five weeks' time. Because of the depth of the work required, most students were compelled to put in long evening and weekend
hours of intensive work. Moreover, two students were forced to change
their projects in the second week of class because of the lack of sufficient
research material or too-extensive scope of intended studies. The abandoned cases were a study on human rights violations in Brazil and a complaint against the International Labor Organization.
Two cases available to the program were rejected by the instructors:
a New Mexico land rights case, for lack of ripeness, and a complaint concerning the treatment of Harijans in India, for non-exhaustion of remedies. From these experiences, valuable lessons were learned relating to the
need for the instructors to be thoroughly acquainted with the cases offered for such a program prior to the beginning of the Institute so that
only those will be undertaken to which the program can do justice in the
time allowed.
Another difficulty felt by both the students and the instructors arose
because there were only two full-time instructors to supervise the nine
research and writing projects. Most of all the projects required not only
our close supervision, but also our contributions of substantive assistance.
Assigning more than one student to a project increased rather than lightened our workload since we became involved in integrating and coordinating the students' work. We concluded that in the ideal structure for
such a program, an instructor should have to oversee no more than three
students' work.
Perhaps the greatest problem was faced by those students who had
inadequate background in international law and international human
rights law. In particular, they required substantial special assistance and
had enormous initial hurdles to cross before they could start working on
their projects in earnest. It was for their benefit that the substantive international human rights law course was taught. Although it must be said
to the great credit of the students that they were all able to complete
their projects quite satisfactorily, those who lacked training and experience in the use of the principles of international law and its resources

the United States, 30
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69 (1983).
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carried an extra burden. The need is apparent for law schools to include
instruction of international legal research materials in their first-year research and writing programs.
Two positive factors of the Institute were the accessibility of research
material and the high level of participation by many faculty and local
practitioners. 15 In addition to the essential international and comparative
law materials, U.S. government documents, and United Nations materials
being available to the students, they also had ready access to human
rights materials, including the official documents of the European Commission and the European Court of Human Rights and the American
Commission of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights. Official documents which were not available at the University of
Denver libraries were provided by the Denver Public Library which is a
U.S.government depository library and a depository library of the U.N.
materials since the establishment of the United Nations, the Organization
of American States, the Washington Office on Latin America, and several
other human rights groups in New York, Washington, D.C., San Francisco and Miami. 6
The Institute also benefited greatly from the attention and concern
of several faculty members at the College of Law and several distinguished members of the local bar. These persons brought to the program
their special expertise in advocacy skills, procedure and international law.
Any law school endeavoring to carry out a similar program would be
strongly encouraged to take advantage of this kind of invaluable resource.
The instructors were pleased with the outcome. The Institute was a
successful affair. Student evaluations of the Institute were uniformly positive. To ensure the greatest possible contribution of such future Institutes at the University of Denver or other law schools, we offer a few
suggestions. First, it is essential to prepare in advance written materials
and to conduct orientation sessions for the participating faculty and students. Second, sources of funding should be located to enable highly qualified students and faculty from all parts of the country to participate regardless of their capacity to pay expenses of the course and housing.
Third, only students with adequate background in international law, international human rights law, and some prior exposure to advocacy skills
should be enrolled in such an institute. Fourth, a minimum of 8 to 10
weeks' period is necessary for an institute of this kind to function properly. Ample time is critical, for the stakes are high when students are
assisting with actual litigation in progress or working on urgent projects
demanding thorough research, rigorous analysis and thoughtful
deliberation.

15. We are especially grateful to Mrs. Nancy Nones, Administrator, International Legal
Studies Program at the College of Law, who very ably and skillfully coordinated the various
segments of the Institute.
16. Ms. Sue Weinstein, associate librarian at the University of Denver College of Law,
and Mr. Robert Shaklee at the Denver Public Library were especially gracious and helpful.

The International Organization of Whales
PATRICIA BIRNIE*

I.

THE CHANGING PERSPECTIVE OF WHALE MANAGEMENT

The great whales are the largest living creatures on earth and their
preservation presents a major challenge to international law. For hundreds of years the exploitation of whales' remained unorganized at the
international level. Whales have been regarded as a common property resource of the high seas,2 subject to the prevailing doctrine of freedom of
fishing. This doctrine of open access to living resources led to overexploitation and the decline of serveral stocks of whales, s endangering even
those captured by Alaskan Eskimos. Whales, as warmblooded marine
mammals," have many characteristics which make them particularly vulnerable and atrractive to capture.
Until the twentieth century there were no management bodies for the
protection of whales from overexploitation. During the present century
the need for international conservation, at least to sustain the industry,
began to be appreciated by most whaling states. This was first evidenced
by the League of Nations activities in the 1930's and later by the establishment of the International Whaling Commission (IWC) in 1946). Uni* Patricia W. Birnie teaches Public International Law at the University of Edinburgh
in Scotland. B.A. Oxford; Ph.D. Edinburgh; Barrister-at-law.
1. Including blue, fin, sei, sperm, humpback, gray, Bryde's, minke, North Atlantic,
North Pacific, Greenland, and Southern Right whales. These cetaoceans in general are a
small group of 80-100 species of marine mammals with special characteristics rendering
them unique. There are two sub-orders: (1) Mysticetes - baleen whales feeding mainly on
the shrimp-like krill, and (2) Odontocetes - toothed whales feeding on fish, birds and other
cetaceans. For further details, see: INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION, THE LIVES OF
WHALES FACTSHEET; Gambel, Whale Conservation - Role of the International Whaling
Commission, 1 MARINE POLICY 301 (1977); T. VAUGHAN, MAMMALOGY (1972); J.N. TONNESSEN and A.O. JOHNSEN, THE HISTORY OF MODERN WHALING (1982); Scarff, The International
Management of Whales, Dolphins and Porpoises: An Interdisciplinary Assessment, 6
ECOLOGY L.Q. 323 (1978) [which includes comprehensive bibliographic references].
2. For a full account of the problems of common property resources, see F. CHRISTY &
A. Sco'r, THE COMMON WEALTH IN OCEAN FISHERIES (1965), especially Ch. 3, "The Characteristics of the Common Property Resources," and Ch. 6, "Common Property, Open Access
and the Common Heritage."
3. For the background to this problem, see Scarff, supra note 1, at 623-3. For a current
understanding of this problem, see, Preparationsfor the 34th International Whaling Commission Meeting: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and InternationalOrganization of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 343 (1982). See
also publications of the International Whaling Commission: U.S. Report on Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling of the Bowhead Whale by Alaskan Eskimos, IWC Doc. IWC/34/37 (June,
1982); Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission First Conference on the Biology of the Bowhead Whale Balaena Mysticetus, IWC Doc. IWC/34/11E (January, 1982).
4. For the special characteristics of marine mammals, see Vaughan, supra note 1.
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lateral action could not solve the problem because whales migrate
through the jurisdictional zones of may states and are found (though not
necessarily commercially exploited) in the waters of most coastal states.
International cooperation is essential to conservation. This cooperation is
especially imperative in view of factors such as pollution and harrassment
which affect recover of stocks.
The United National Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE, described infra)5 in 1972 focused public attention on the overexploitation of whale-related environmental problems. It laid down several
principles concerning the preservation of habitats, the need for states to
prevent activities under their control from causing damage to other
states' environments, coordinating efforts of international organizations
to protect the environment.
The UNCHE principles are not binding but have provided important
norms for the development of international environmental law and preservation of wildlife. An Action Plan of Recommendations' was adopted in
conjunction with the principles which directly commended to governments appropriate national action. The principles provide that Governments should enact international conventions: to protect species which
inhabit international waters or migrate from one territory to another, to
protect representative ecosystems of international significance; to
strengthen the IWC; to increase international research efforts on whales;
and to urgently call, under IWC auspices, for a ten year moratorium on
commercial whaling. The principles stressed the need for governments,
the UN and its organizations, especially the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), to support the recommendations of the various international fisheries organizations (e.g. the ICCAT' and ITTC). Participating
in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) was also considered crucial. 9
The UNCHE realized that the protection of marine resources requires collaboration among international regional and national fishery
bodies, and that the collecting and sharing of data on living aquatic resources are essential. The UNCHE therefore urged governments and U.N.
bodies to strengthen existing international and regional machinery for the
development and management of fisheries. It asked that a conference be
convened to adopt a convention on the export, import and transit of cer-

5. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm,
5-16 June, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1 [hereinafter cited as UNCHE Report], 35.
6. The Action Plan consisted of 109 recommendations. See UNCHE Report, supra note
5, at 6-27. Relevant recommendations are at 16-17.
7. International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna. See infra note 51.
8. International Tropical Tuna Commission. See infra note 52.
9. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Oct. 7, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.62/1982 and Draft Final Act of the U.N. Conf. on the Law of the Sea, Oct. 21, 1982,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/121 (1982).
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tain species of wild animals and plants. The strengthened IWC, and the
conventions in the fields of Trade in Endangered Special, 10 Conservation
of Migratory Special," Anartic Marine Living Resources, 2 and European
Habitats"3 all subsequently followed, yet both the IWC and the UNCHE
are popularly supposed to have failed. This article proposes that the UNCHE provided the impetus for new guidelines, conventions and institutions to protect whales. It also proposes that the IWC is but one International organization which is equipped to deal with whale-related
environmental problems. Conservationists should become aware of the
variety, breadth and interrelationship of measures now available in order
to achieve the UNCHE objectives. As part of a global strategy, the new
measures require wide adoption, application and enforcement.
The role of major existing organizations concerned with whale conservation will first be examined, including those with broad conservation
concerns, those concerned with regulating whaling for maintenance of
food supply, and those concerned with industrial or cultural potential.
After examining the organizations' approach and progress, new conventions contributing to the protection of cetaceans will be considered.
II.
A.

UN

ORGANIZATIONS

The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP)
A.1.

The Action Programme

The UNCHE established the United Nations Envrionmental Programme (UNEP) to further its objective of environmental protection. Its
component parts are: Governing Council of 58 states which promotes international cooperation, creates policy guidelines, and reviews implementation of environmental programs within the UN system; an Environment
Secretariat which puts forward environmental programs, and coordinates
within the UN system to ensure effective management; and lastly, a modest Environment Fund.
The work of the UNEP and other environmentrelated UN bodies is
coordinated by the UN's Administrative Co-ordinating Committee
(ACC). Althouth its Standing Sub-Committee on Marine Affairs has been
disbanded, it reconvenes if required.
The UNEP has established priority areas for its activities. One priority area is the oceans, monitoring the effects of pollutants upon acquatic

10. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and
Fauna, March 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249, reprinted in 12 I.L.M. 1085.
11. Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, June 3,
1979, 19 I.L.M. 11 (not in force).
12. Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, May, 1980,
19 I.L.M. 837.
13. Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats, Sept.
19, 1979, Council of Europe Treaty Series No. 104.
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living resources14 Another priority area is the problem of common resources. UNEP's first Executive Director, Maurice Strong, was quick to
point out that the "tragedy of the commons"'15 i.e., the lack of responsibility for common resources (such as whales) and the "what belongs to everyone belongs to no one" syndrome.' 6 A crucial link in the environmental strategy of UNEP is the development of international instruments,
including international environmental law. 17 UNEP has therefore taken
part in most of the conferences and organizations concerned with whale
conservation referred to in this article, and has gained observer status at
the IWC.
A.2.

UNEP's Guiding Principlesfor Shared Natural Resources

In 1978, UNEP adopted a set of 15 Guiding Principles for Natural
Resources Shared by States. 8 They are not binding per se. Rather, they
set forth guidelines for those states which want to encourage cooperating
in research, scientific information and management. A few states regard
the principles as part of customary international law, while others have
declared reservations.' The principles were expressed in disappointingly
general terms representing political compromises. Nonetheless, they are a
set forward since they stress the need for cooperation among states. Cooperation is encouraged in conserving shared natural resources, controlling adverse environmental effects, concluding bilateral and multilateral
agreements to apply the principles in a legally binding manner, and in
establishing institutional structures to enable consultation on resources.

14. United Nations Environmental Programme, 3rd Session, 1975, Proposed Programme, UNEP/GC/31, 11 February 1975 at 37. The UNEP Governing Council entrusts
surveying of marine living resources, however, to the U.N. Food and Agriculture
Organization.
15. See Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 2 SCIENCE 1243 (1968), No. 3859. Hardin concluded, id. at 1244, that "the inherent logic of the commons remorselessly generates
tragedy."
16. United Nations Environmental Programme, Proposed Programme, supra note 14.
17. Id. at 54.
18. Draft Principles of Conduct in the Field of the Environment for the Conduct of
States in the Conservation and Harmonious Utilization of Natural Resources Shared by
Two or More States, 31 (COM) UNEP/GC.6/17, 10 March 1978. The Principles were developed by an inter-governmental group of experts convened by UNEP pursuant to the UNCHE Principles and Recommendations. The Report was noted by the UN General Assembly, which recognized states' rights to provide specific solutions on a bilateral or regional
basis and was transmitted to governments for consideration, GAR 33/78, 19 January 1979
(XXXIII), adopted 15 December 1978. The Report does not define "shared natural
resources".
19. Report of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Natural Resources Shared by
Two or More States on the Working of its Fifth Session Held at Nairobi from 23 January to
7 February 1978, UNEP/IG.12/2, 8 February 1978. India, Poland, Rumania and the USSR
regarded the principles as recommendations only. These countries felt that bilateral and
multilateral agreements would be needed to translate them into binding obligations, and
that, until such agreements were signed, the sovereignty of states over national resources
would be unaffected.
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Other principles emphasize the need for environmental assessment,
exchange of information, advance notification of use of shared resources,
and execution of joint scientific studies. Principle 10 recommends that
"states sharing a natural resource should, when approproate, consider the
possibility of jointly seeking the services of any competent international
organization in clarifying the environmental problems relating to conservation or utilization of such natural resources."
A.3.

UNEP-FAO Draft Global Plan of Action for Marine Mammals

In 1981, the UNEP again took the initiative by preparing, in collaboration with the FAO, a Draft Global Plan of Action for Conservation,
Management and Utilization of Marine Mammals.20 This ambitious document identifies the main species of marine mammals, the values placed
upon them (including consumptive exploitation for human benefit), the
threats to them, and their interaction with fisheries. It points out the inadequacies of the present situation and outlines the basis for international action. It isolates certain objectives while recognizing that at present there is no widely accepted policy for marine mammals. A major
objective of the Plan is to formulate a policy for conservation of whales.
Primary objectives include prevention of further extinction of taxonomically identifiable forms or distinct populations; maintenance of populations which can be used and enjoyed by manking on optimal states;2 ensurance that high and low consumptive uses are conducted in a humane
and non-disruptive way; and consideration of the cultural and economic
needs of communities especially dependent upon marine mammals. Secondary objectives include promotion of research on marine mammals and
their ecosystems, and the creation of a broader understanding by the
public of their role in and the nature of marine ecosystems, so that governmental policy and practices will correspond at the national and international level.
The Plan also sets forth measures necessary to achieve these objectives and suggests various areas of concentration.2 2 These include a more

20. United Nations Environmental Programme/Food and Agriculture Organization
Draft Global Plan of Action [hereinafter cited as UNEP/FAO Action Plan], FAO/UNEP
Project No. 6502-78-02, FAO, Rome, 1981.
21. The concept of optimum population levels is a key factor of the plan. The optimum
level for each population is ideally regarded as that in which it contributes its part to maximizing the benefits from the ecosystem as a whole.
22. For a detailed list of the recommendations and suggestions, see UNEP/FAO Action
Plan, supra note 20, at Appendix 1, 74-84. Recommendations for actions to improve legal
protection are assigned for action to the U.N. and its specialized agencies generally, and to
UNEP, FAO and IUCN in particular. The latter include renegotiation of agreements, interim action pending entry into force of the Law of the Sea Convention, coordination between overlapping international organizations, stimulating new members of the IWC, producing an inventory of legislation sources, promoting measures concerning sanctuaries,
incidental take, live capture and harassment, and the holding of a legal workshop to study
conservation and management of marine animals.
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detailed formulation of objectives, regulatory and protective measures,
improvement of scientific knowledge, law and enforcement, and enhancement of public understanding. Actions the Plan address have been classified according to their priority. Classified first are urgent situations in
which species or populations are known to be in a critical state requiring
immediate action to alleviate the most serious threats. Second are situations potentially threatening resources where more information is required. Finally, in some situations there is a general need to improve conditions for conservation of marine mammals by increasing scientific
capability, improving legal and administrative machinery, or adding to
public awareness.
Problems to be considered include: organization of machinery to implement the Plan; study of important situations requiring information to
determine appropriate measures; execution of scientific recommendations;
and fund-raising for activities, possibly through UNEP or FAO, supplemented by non-governmental organization sources. After the Plan's first
draft,2 3 non-governmental organizations
convened to make several recom24
mendations for legal developments.
Institution of a Plan Group is proposed with a secretariat, and ad hoc
planning and coordinating committee, and a scientific committee. These
are ambitious proposals, but in the context of institutional progress, are
not unreaslistic. The organization of a Plan Group, perhaps assisted by
UNEP or FAO, would imporve coordination of the plethora of new treaties and principles. The UN's ACC does not seem suited to the role, and
the UN Law of the Sea Conference has provided no new machinery for
cetacean conservation.
B.

UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)

The FAO is a specialized agency of the UN, and therefore reports to
the UN. It is also a much larger body than the UNEP with more resources at its command. It is required by it consitution to promote and
recommend, national and international action with respect to the conservation of natural resources and the adoption of improved methods of fisheries production.2 5 The FAO Conference submits conventions to its members and approves arrangements placing other public international
organizations dealing with these questions under FAO's general authority.
It can provide for cooperation with related organizations and enter into
agreements with them for this purpose. Its Fisheries Department furthers

23. Report of the Group of Experts in Reviewing First Draft Plan of Action for Conservation of Marine Mammals, May 28-31, 1979, Karen, Nairobi.
24. Report of Workshop, Legal Aspects of Conservation of Marine Mammals, December
10-14, 1979, Quissac, France, Center for Environmental Education Monograph Series.
25. FAO Constitution, 1 A. PEASLEE, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, 489-511. For a full
description of sea-related current activities of the FAO, see World Fisheries and the Law of
the Sea: The Challenge to Fisheries Development and Management under the New Legal
Regime, FAO, Rome (1979).
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research and cooperation in fisheries matters (which include whale hunting and conservation of acquatic resources), by operating through a Committee on Fisheries (COFI) which is composed of member states. The
COFI annually reviews the state of world fisheries bodies, including the
IWC, the nine regional fisheries commissions and councils established by
FAOitself, and others.26
The FAO has also established a number of committees and working
groups on specifici issues which report to it on all aspects of fisheries. For
instance, the Advisory Committee on Marine Resource Research
(ACMRR) gives independent advice. Its scientist members are appointed
in their independent personal capacity. ACMRR established a working
group on marine mammals which initiated the unique Consultation on
Marine Mammals held in Bergen, Norway in 1976. It surveyed all species
2 7
and made numerous recommendations, especially concerning whales.
The ACMRR also advises UNESCO's Intergovernmental Oceanographic
Commission on appropriate matters and can thus relate research on pollution and other factors affecting whales' habitats to conservation
stategies.
The FAO takes the view that there is no scientific justification for a
global moratorium on whaling at present and that present catch levels
should be sustained indefinitely.29
III.

INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL

ORGANIZATIONS

A. International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural
0
Resources (IUCN)3
This organization, which is not part of the UN system, is unusual in
that its membership includes non-governmental conservation organiza-

26. For a summary of the activities of regional fisheries bodies, see UNEP/FAO Action,
supra note 20, App. 8, International Organizations, Agreements and Programmes Concerned with Marine Mammals and their Environment, 131-139.
27. Mammals in the Seas, Report of the FAO Advisory Committee on Marine Resources Research, Working Party on Marine Mammals, 1 FAO Fisheries Series No. 5
(1978); this work includes most of the papers submitted at the Bergen Consultation.
28. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
has responsibilities for scientific research in the ocean which it implements through a
marine science program in its Division of Oceanography and in the Secretariat of the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC). The IOC was established by UNESCO and
serves as a "joint specialized mechanism" for marine research for UN organizations participating in the Inter-Secretariat Committee on Scientific Programmes Relating to Oceanography (ICSPRO). UNESCO has also adopted a Convention Concerning the Protection of the
World Cultural and Natural Heritage (1972), which may have some relevance to habitat
preservation. For more information on this Convention, see UNEP/FAO Action Plan, supra
note 20, at 133-4.
29. Statement by FAO observer at IWC Special Meeting, March 1982, unnumbered
text circulated at 34th Meeting, 1982.
30. On the IUCN, see UNEP/FAO Action Plan, supra note 20, at 138.
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tions, such as the World Wildlife Fund."1 It has established various specialized coordinating groups which are concerned with marine mammals.
One notable group is the Survival Service Commission (SSC) which includes a specialist group on whales, one on trade in endangered species
and their products (TRAFFIC), and a Committee on Marine Mammals
which has members from other IUCN commissions such as Law, Ecology
and Parks. IUCN's Marine Steering Committee (MSC) 32 of specialists
and nominated members of IUCN Commissions advises on IUCN's and
the World Wildlife Fund's Marine Programmes. Following the advice of
these bodies the IUCN General Assembly has adopted policies for marine
mammals and has passed various resolutions on the preservation of great
whales in particular. These policies are presented to the IWC, where the
IUCN has observer status.33 IUCN also engages in several other activities
directly affecting marine mammal conservation 4 such as production of its
Red Data book listing endangered species, which includes some whale
species. Its World Conservation Stategy calls for a moratorium on all
commercial whaling until the full ecological consequences of whaling can
be predicted. 35

IV.
A.

REGIONAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

InternationalCouncil for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES)36

Although it is not the only regional body concerned with whales, 37
ICES has been one of the most historically important to their conservation and management, and is the oldest of the regional marine scientific

31. On the World Wildlife Fund, see UNEP/FAO Action Plan, supra note 20, at 138-9.
32. Now subsumed into a new "Programme and Policy Advisory Group" (PPAG).
33. On these policies, see Principles replacing maximum sustainable yield as a basis
for management of wildlife resources, IUCN Res. 8, 12th Session of the General Assembly
(1976); cited in Report of the IWC Scientific Committee (SC), IWC 28th Report, 43. These
policies include the principles that: (1) ecosystems should be maintained to permit survival
of the species even when maximum "yields" by fishermen or hunters are allowed, and (2)
management decisions should include a safety factor to allow for limitations on knowledge
and imperfections in management. Insofar as the points were within its competence, the
IWC's Scientific Committee thought the present IWC Convention and policies could adequately take account of those principles. See also IUCN Res. 15/19, 15th Session of the
General Assembly (1981).
34. On these activities, see UNEP/FAO Action Plan, supra note 20, at 138.
35. World Conservation Strategy - Priorities for International Action, IWC/34/34, Section 18. The Global Commons (1980).
36. For a historical account of ICES, see A.E.J. WENT, SEVENTY YEARS AGROWING: A
HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR THE EXPLORATION OF THE SEA, 1902-1972
(1972). For an account of ICE's modern role, see M. Tambs-Lych, ICES General Secretary,
General Information on the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, ICES (Jan.
1979). By 1979, ICES had 18 member states: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Federal Republic of Germany, German Democratic Republic, Iceland, Ireland, Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, U.K., U.S., U.S.S.R. For a critical assessment of
present changes at ICES, see J. Gulland, Long-term Political Effects from Management of
the Fish Resources of the North Atlantic, 40 J. CONS. INT. EXPLOR. MER 8 (1982).
37. On other such bodies, see UNEP/FAO Action Plan, supra note 20, at 132, 134-37.
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bodies. It was one of the first to raise the question of over-exploitation of
whales in the 1920's and drafted the League of Nations 1931 Convention
on Whaling.38 It now advises, on request, the Northeast Atlantic 9 Baltic
Sea Fisheries Commissions 40 the Oslo Commission for the Prevention of
Pollution by Dumping at Sea, 41 the Paris Commission for Prevention of
Pollution from Land-Based Sources 42 and the European Economic
Community.
ICES was founded informally in 1902 to further international cooperation in marine scientific research. Its scientific investigation was accompanied by a practical expose of the steps to be taken in order to bring
exploitation of fisheries more in accord with the natural conditions regulating the growth and increase in fish. It has remained faithful to these
objectives though it now investigates pollution and other exploitative activities and assesses their effects on living resources. The ICES plans research programs and publishes the results as reports. Its area covers the
Atlantic Ocean and its adjacent seas, primarily the North Atlantic, but
also the Baltic Sea and Arctic Ocean. However, the ICES field of interest
can best be delineated in scientific rather than geographical terms.
The ICES permanent staff is small, and it does most of its work
through Standing Committess and ad hoc Working Groups4" of scientists
from its member states. They meet separately from any other commission
or conference, and thus are free from political pressures. The scientific
advice given through ICES reports is widely respected because it comes
from experts who do not fear to criticize. At ICES's 69th Meeting in 1981,
its special topic was the interactions between fisheries and food requirements.4 It reports to an Advisory Committee on Fishery Management. 5

38. On that Convention, see Went, supra note 36, at 78-79; L. Leonard, Recent Negotiations towards the International Regulations of Whaling, 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 90 (1941);
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 1931, 102 L.N.T.S. 349.
39. Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Convention, January 29, 1959, No. 7078, 486 U.N.T.S.
157; now superseded by the Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in Northeast
Atlantic Fisheries, November 8, 1980, unpublished.
40. International Baltic Sea Fishery Commission, done at Gdansk, Sept. 13, 1973, entered into force July 28, 1974; Annotated Directory of Intergovernmental Organizations
Concerned with Ocean Affairs, at 108, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L.14 (1976) (distribution
limited).
41. Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and
Aircraft, Feb. 15, 1972, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 262 (1972).
42. Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Landbased Sources, Feb.
21, 1974, reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 352 (1974).
43. For details of these committees and working groups, see Tambs-Lych, supra note
36. There are 5 Standing Committees and 12 Area and Subject Committees.
44. See Observers' Report on the 69th Statutory Meeting of the International Council
for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), IWC/34/l1A (1982).
45. One of these reports, Reports of the ICES Advisory Committee on Fishery Management, 1979, ICES Cooperative Research Report No. 93 (1980), includes an assessment of
interactions between gray seal populations and fish species. It points out that the multispecies inter-relationships concerned were poorly understood, and that there was no satisfactory method of modelling them.
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There is thus ample time for matters to be fully and critically discussed
by a highly respected group of international scientists so that a wide
range of environmental factors can be considered.
ICES also has an excellent reputation for the collection, dissemination and assessment of date which presents a detailed picture of both
organizations, including the FOA, UNEP, the IWC (with which it exchanges observers), UNESCO, WMO (World Meterologista Organization), and SCOR (Scientific Committee for Oceanographic Research).
ICES could well be the model of a network of similar regional bodes as
part of a global strategy to advise on whale management. Regional fisheries commissions are more politicized and therefore less suitable.
B.

Regional Fisheries Organizations

There are a large number of regional bodies, the constitution and
work of which have been described elsewhere. 46 None is directly engaged
in conservation and management of whales, but some are concerned with
marine mammals which share the whales' habitate and food supplies, and
others are concerned wtih controlling the incidental catching of small
whales and dolphins which are frequently ensnared in tuna nets.
For example, the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization
(NAFO)4 7, which replaced ICNAF,4 s provides advice on the setting of seal
quotas for Canada and Denmark (for Greenland). Canada considers it a
more appropriate organization through which to cooperate, as required by
Article 65 of the Law of the Sea Convention, for the conservation of small
cretaceans in the region than the IWC (which has not yet been allowed to
regulate their catching). This Canadian proposal, circulated informally at
the UNCLOS III,"' remains controverisal.
50
The International North Pacific Fisheries Commission (INPFC),
though concerned with regulating high seas salmon fishing, provides for
cooperative research to ascertain the effects of the Japaneses salmon fishery upon marine mammals and to reduce the incidental catch of marine
mammals in the North Pacific and the Bering Sea. It has instituted an ad
hoc Committee on Marine Mammals which is investigating competition
between man and mammal for fish resources. The Inter-American Tropi-

supra noe 40: M. S vini. Report on International and Na4...
..
e. .. "
tional Legislation for the Conservation of Marine Mammals, Part 1. International Legislation, FIRD/C326, FAO Fisheries Circular No. 326 (1974) (distribution restricted); and M.
Savini, Report on International Agreements Related to the Conservation of Marine Mammals, FIPL/C (1982) (distribution restricted).
47. Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, Oct. 24, 1978, App. 1, text made available by the government of Canada.
48. International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, Feb. 8, 1949, 1
U.S.T. 477, T.I.A.S. No. 2089, 312.
49. Written statement by the Delegation of Canada, Apr. 2, 1980, A/CONF.62/WS/4.
50. International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific, Mar. 14,
1952, No. 2770, 205 U.N.T.S. 65.
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cal Tuna Commission (I-ATTC)P is particularly concerned with the incidental killing of dolphins in the purseseine nets used for tuna fisheries in
the eastern tropical Pacific, as is the 1967 International Commission for
the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna (ICCAT) 2 in its area. The Permanent
Commission for the South Pacific (PCSP) 53, of which Chile, Peru, Ecuador and Columbia are members, has, since its inception in 1952, regulated
whaling in that area. Peru and Chile have, since 1979, been parties to the
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) and are
therefore subject to its regulations as well. ICRW regulations are generally more stringent than those of the PCSP. There are a few regional
commissions directly concerned with regulation of seals only, but only the
PCSP is exclusively concerned with whales. Most whaling and many nonwhaling states are now members of the International Whaling
Commission.
V.

THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION

(IWC) 5

The over-exploitation of whales during the World War I-II period led
the industry itself to establish a permanent institution in 1946. Neither
private inter-company agreements to control whale oil production nor the
1931 League of Nations Convemtion on Whaling and subsequent Protocols,55 had been able to slow down the slaughter. In the absence of a permanent body, without flexible amendment procedures, and for lack of full
participation by all whaling states, little progress was made. The history
of this period and of the early years of the International Whaling Commission established by the International Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling (ICRW) 6 has been well documented elsewhere.

51. Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, Apr. 23, 1949, No. 1367, 99 U.N.T.S. 3. See also J. JOSEPH & J.W. GREENHOUGH, INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF TUNA, PORPOISE AND BILL FISH: BIOLOGICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL

ASPECTS (1979).

52. International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, Oct. 11, 1967, No.
9587, 673 U.N.T.S. 63, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 293 (1967). For current activities, see Observers' Report on the Seventh Regular Meeting of the ICCAT, IWC/34/11B (1981).
53. The Permanent Commission for the Conference on the Use and Conservation of the
Maritime Resources of the South Pacific, U.N. Leg. Ser. ST/LEG/SER.B/6 (1979).
54. For a history of whaling and of the Commission, see Tonnessen, supra note 1. For a
shorter history coupled with a highly critical analysis of the Commission's scientific and
economic work, see Scarff, supra note 1, and Gambel, supra note 1. For an economic and
political analysis of international whaling, see M'Gonigle, The "Economizing" Ecology: Why
Big Rare Whales Still Die, 9 Eco. L.Q. 120 (1980. See also INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON
WHALING, FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMISSION (1950) through THIRTY-SECOND REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION (1982).
55. A good account of these is given in P. BOCK, A STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL REGULATION: THE CASE OF WHALING (1966), at 84-99 (unpublished thesis, New York Univ.). See also
Leonard, supra note 38, at 96; and W. VAMPLEW, SALVESEN OF LEITH (1979), at 198.
56. INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE REGULATION OF WHALING, 1946 (1964); and INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION, PROTOCOL TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE REGULATION OF WHALING SIGNED AT WASHINGTON
UNDER DATE OF DEC. 2, (1956).
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Though the Preambular objective states that the Contracting Governments recognize the interest of the nations of the world in safeguarding for future generations the great natural resources represented by the
whale stocks, the ICRW was primarily established to provide a mechanism for maintaining the whale industry. It established a permanent institution with powers to make and amend regulations incorporated into a
flexible schedule which forms an integral part of the Convention. Regulations under Article V must be based on scientific findings, must provide
for conservation, development and optimum utilization of whale resources, and must take into consideration the interests of consumers of
whale products and the industry. The regulations cannot restrict the
number of nationality of factory ships or land stations, or allocate specific
quotas to them. The regulations can include: the usual fishery conservation techniques; the continued pre-war Protocol measures determining
protected and unprotected species; open and closed seasons and areas (including sanctuaries); size limits); specification of gear used; catch returns;
and biological methods. Regulations are binding once adopted by the required three-quarters majority but are subject to lengthy objections procedure under Article V(3). Parties can also withdraw after due notice
under Article XI and some have done so from time to time, most recently
Canada in 1981.
In addition, the IWC can make non-binding recommendations to its
members on any matters relating to whales or whaling which are within
the IRCW's aims. Article 1 of the ICRW, notably, applies not only to
"factory ships, land stations and whale catchers under the jurisdiction of
the Contracting Governments" but also "to all waters in which whaling is
prosecuted by them." Thus it applies in the high seas, in the territorial
sea, in the new fisheries, and in the exclusive economic zones (though
some states, including the Latin American states, France, Japan and the
USSR, have reserved their positions in the Commission on this last area
in light of the Law of the Sea Convention's provisions, described infra.
Whales are not defined in the Convention; thus it could apply to all
whales, large and small. Some states, however, now take the view that it
does not apply to small cetaceans. In fact, there appears to be no legal
reason why small cetaceans cannot be added to the Convention, if scientific findings support the need for regulation to prevent over exploitation.
At present a few small cetaceans are mentioned in the Convention, but
.. for purposes of colletinn of information on directed fisheries, not for
regulation.

57

57. At present the IWC collects information on certain small cetaceans under the
description of "small-type whaling" operations. INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE REGULATION OF WHALING, 1946, SCHEDULE, Part V, at 18
(1982). As defined in the Schedule at 4, Interpretation, C. Generally, only the minke and
bottlenose whales in the Southern Hemisphere are included in the substantive regulations,
where the latter is merely listed as an unclassified stock. The minke has for some years been
regarded as the smallest of the large whales, hunted mainly by Japan and the USSR under
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Despite the accelerating decline in stocks over which the IWC presided during its first 25 years, it almost always sets quotas on exploited
stocks too high, due to political and economic pressures. Nonetheless,
compared to other fisheries bodes, the IWC has remarkable powers and
scope. Now that efforts to bring its objectives more into line with the
aims and perspectives of conservationists have failed, its parties (which
over the years have swelled from 14 to 37 states, most of them non-whaling) have used the flexibility of the Convention the open-endedness of
recommendations, and the ambiguity of the ICRW's objective to bring
about remarkable changes in direction.
Article IX left enforcement to national means and inspection. The
IWC introduced an International Observer Scheme. Although belated and
limited to exchange of observers under bilateral agreements, observers are
appointed by and report to the Commission on infractions. Following the
UNCHE, in response but in resistance to the moratorium then pressed
upon it, the IWC adopted New Management Procedures5 (NMP). Instead of setting an overall figure for the Total Allowable Catch (TAC), it
began to classify stocks in particular areas on the basis of the advice of its
scientific committee, according to estimated stock levels. It began to discuss, regulate or make recommendations upon a large variety of topics.
The agenda at its most recent (34th) meeting59 in 1982 included: the ending of commercial whaling; revisions of the NMP; review of regulatory
measures other than catch limits; the concept and characteristics of whale
sanctuaries; infractions reports and the International Observer Scheme;
whale stocks and catch limits; aboriginal and subsistence whaling; small
cetaceans; measures to discourage "pirate" whaling; an International Decade of Cetacean Research; humane killing; a conference on non-consumptive uses of cetaceans; and cooperation with other organizations.
The 34th Meeting adopted a three year phase-out of commercial
whaling 0 by amending the Schedule to set zero catch limits for this pur-

quotas.
58. These procedures require the Scientific Committee to categorize stocks into: Protection Stocks (on which all catching is prohibited), Initial Management Stocks, and Sustained
Management Stocks - depending on the extent to which populations are estimated to be
below or at or above their maximum sustainable level. The Commission decides the quotas
on the basis of this scientific classification. However, because of the increasing uncertainty
of the information and of the models used to calculate populations, the Scientific Committee frequently finds either that it cannot agree on the classification or that it cannot advise
on any classification whatsoever - thus making the NMP unworkable.
59. 34th Annual Meeting of the International Whaling Commission, Provisionsal
Agenda, IWC/34/2 (July, 1982). For a summary of events, see XXI ECO Int'l Whaling
Comm., Nos. 1-7 (July 19-24, 1982).
60. The vote was 25 for and 7 against. Voting in favor were: Antigua, Argentina, Australia, Belize, Costa Rica, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, India, Kenya, Mexico, Monaco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Oman, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Senegal, Seychelles, Spain,
Sweden, U.K., U.S.A., Uruguay. There were 5 abstentions: Chile, China (People's Republic),
Phillipines, South Africa, and Switzerland. (Switzerland explained that it did not regard the
ban as justified by the scientific advice available.) Dominica and Jamaica were absent.
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pose on all stocks for the 1986 coastal and 1985-86 open sea seasons. This
decision is subject to review based on scientific advice, a comprehensive
assessment of its effects, consideration of any modifications, and imposition of further catch limits by 1990 at the latest. Several states, despite
voting in favor of the cessation, made formal statements that this was
without prejudice to their sovereign rights over marine resources of their
exclusive economic zone. 1 Some added "according to the Law of the Sea
Convention '62 to their vote.
This is not the end of the IWC's history. Many of the seven states
still whaling can either object to this amendment or withdraw from the
Convention. In any event, the status of stocks and observance of the zero
quotas will require continuous surveillance. Most other items now on the
IWC agenda will continue to be relevant. However, the Commission's role
will certainly be vastly changed and the relevant measures of protection
and enforcement under other Conventions will achieve increasing importance and prominence. There is now a considerable range of these conventions at both global and regional levels, as illustrated infra.

VI.

UNITED NATIONS

63

CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

The Law of the Sea Convention provides in Part V, Articles 55-75,
for the establishment of an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), extending to
200 nautical miles from the baselines of the territorial sea of coastal
states. Within the EEZ, Article 56 guarantees sovereign rights for the
purposes of exploring and exploiting conserving and managing the natural
resources of the sea-bed, subsoil and superjacent waters. States may enter
another's EEZ to exercise redidual freedoms of the sea under Article 8. It
is these zonal rights that some states formally reserved when voting for
the cessation of whaling from 1985/6.
In the EEZ the coastal state must promote optimum utilization and
can establish the Total Allowable Catch of fisheries, determining for itself
its own harvesting capacity. It is required to make available to other
states' TAC in its EEZ. However, in determining the TAC, the coastal
state must take into account environmental as well as other factors, including interdependence of stocks, effects on dependent speciaes, and
generally recommend international minimum standards. The coastal state
must consider the best scientific evidence avialable, to which it must contribute by regularly supplying information through competent international organizations."
Article 65 on Marine Mammals which under Article 120 also applies

61. E.g., Uruguay. Author's notes of the 34th Meeting, Plenary Session, Countdown to
Zero, 34th Meeting of International Whaling Commission, Brighton, U.K., July 19-24,
1982, MARINE POLicy 64, 65 (Jan. 1983).
62. E.g., Mexico. Id.
63. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. See supra note 9.
64. Id., Articles 61 & 62.
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to the conservation and management of marine mammals on the high
seas, eliminates the optimum use requirement and orders all states to
conserve whales on an international basis. It states:
Nothing in this Part restricts the right of a coastal state or the
competence of an international organization, as appropriate, to prohibit, limit or regulate the exploitation of marine mammals more
strictly than provided for in this Part. States shall cooperate with a
view to conservation of marine mammals and in the case of cetaceans
shall in particularwork through the appropriateinternationalorganizations for their conservation, management and study.65 (emphasis

added)
There are ambiguities in this article evidenced by use of such general
phrases as "work through" and "with a view to" and the plural reference
to organizations, However, the drafters' intention, clearly understood during the negotiation of this Article, was to recognize that the cetaceans'
special characteristics, which distinguish them from fish, necessitate full
international management through the International Whaling Commission, through other organizations might deal with the incidental catch
problem. Canada, as mentioned earlier, before withdrawing from the
IWC, circulated a different interpretation at UNCLOS which would allow
coastal states to work through only one organization of their own choice,
seeking its advice only.
VII.

WASHINGTON CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN
ENDANGERED SPECIES

(CITES) 6

This Convention, which by January, 1982 had 79 parties, is now a
powerful instrument for whale conservation. All large cetaceans are now
listed on one or other of its Appendices, therefore requiring measures to
be taken to prevent or control trade in whales and their products,
6 7
through reservations are permissible.
Appendix I covers the most endangered species; that is, all species
which are or may be threatened with extinction or may be so affected by
trade. Appendix I thus requires the most stringent protection. Appendix
65. Id., Article 65. Cetaceans are not defined in this Article, although most species are
included in Appendix I, which lists the Highly Migratory Species covered by Article 64.
Since Article 64 encourages utilization, and Article 65 removes marine mammals from Article 64, Appendix I has no legal, definitional significance for Article 65 with respect to marine
mammals. The confusion arises from the negotiating and drafting history of this part of the
UNCLOS text. Article 65 was inserted later than Article 64, in order to mitigate its effect on
whales.
66. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and
Fauna, supra note 10. For an excellent critical analysis of the approach adopted in this
Convention and in recent related developments in U.S. law, see Coggins, Legal Protection
for Marine Mammals: An Overview of Innovative Resource Conservation,6 ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 1 (1975).

67. Reservations have been entered for some stocks of fin and sei on Appendix I. Japan
and Norway have entered reservations for sperm whales on Appendix II.
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II covers two kinds of less endangered species: those which may become
threatened with extinction unless trade is not strictly regulated, and
other species which must be regulated so that trade in other more endangered species may be brought under effective control. Appendix III covers
species regulated by individual nations to control trade and exploitation.
"Trade" is broadly defined in Articel 1(c) to cover "export, re-export,
import and introduction from the sea." CITES does not specify any general area of application. "Introduction from the sea" is, however, limited
to transportation into a state of specimens taken in the marine environment not under the jurisdiction of any state. It seems likely that following
the provisions in Part V and VII 6s of UNCLOS, states will consider this
zone to be that commencing beyond the 200 mile EEZ, although the ambiguities concerning the zone's status remain. In practice this CITES provision has not been activitaed to date. If it is, the national Management
and Scientific Authorities, which are required to be established under the
CITES to operate the system of permits and certificates, will have the
same responsibilities for controlling such imports as for others. For such
specimens, however, the usual export/re-export/import permits required
by Articles III and IV, which certify that CITES criteria have been complied with, are not required. Only a certificate authorizing "introduction
from the sea" is required.
There is no CITES Commission. Continuing responsibilities are executed by the Secretariat and its Secretary-General. Because of its central
role in receiving parties' reports on measures taken under Article VIII (7)
and as disseminator of trading information (e.g. the country of origin of
specimens), the Secretariat has become an effective enforcement instrument. The European Economic Community has also aided in enforcement
by adopting a binding regulation controlling trade in whale products
which provides a uniform listing for its ten member-states.6 9
CITES parties must take appropriate national measures to enforce
the convention. Limited application to non-parties is permitted by Article
X. They can be required to produce "comparable documentation" for export, import or re-export to CITES parties as required. Trade exclusively
between non-parties is of course still possible.
Though CITES is an important component of the new strategy for
protecting cetaceans it must be remembered that cetaceans are only one
of hundreds of species listed needing regulation in trade. The growing
... tifi 'n wle..... oncerni
the Complevitie of whlp hehvior, their

68. Part VI, Article 86 of UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,
supra note 9), limits the high seas to all parts of the sea not included in the exclusive
economic zone, in the territorial sea, or in internal waters of a state, or in the archipelagic
waters of an archipelagic state, but it specifically does not affect the residual high seas freedoms enjoyed in the EEZ.
69. Regulation on Common Rules for Import of Whales and other Cetacean Products,
Council on Regulation (EEC) No. 348/81, Co. J. EUR. COMM. (No. L39/1) (1981), entered
into force Jan. 1, 1982.
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role in their ecosystems, and their importance to man all require a more
sophisticated approach to conservation and management. Other conventions are therefore being developed which partially cover these aspects.

VIII.

THE BONN CONVENTION ON CONSERVATION OF MIGRATORY SPECIES
OF WILD ANIMALS

197970

This Convention was concluded on June 23, 1979. It requires fifteen
ratifications for entry into force. At the time of writing it had been signed
by 30 states, but ratified by only eight. It covers all migratory species,
including marine mammals. It develops the UNCHE Principles and Action Plan and provides means for applying the UNEP Guildeine Principles for Shared Natural Resources. The Preamble recognizes the special
values of these species, the importance of conserving them, and the significance of "Range States" (states whose territory is within the range of
such species) agreeing to take action to avoid endangering them.
The Convention applies to all territories within the range of migratory species as defined in Article I. Appendix I lists those species which
require immediate protection or subsequent international action if their
status for conservation purposes does not require immediate action. Appendix II lists species whose conservation status is unfavorable or which
would benefit from conclusion of international agreements, and requires
states within whose jurisdiction those species are found to conclude the
necessary international agreements to protect them. Parties accept the
need to take action and cooperate in doing so.
Article IV of the Convention specifies the duties of range states for
species listed in Appendix I. They are to try to conserve and restore habitats, to prevent obstacles to migration, to control factors endangering
them, and to prohibit capture (subject to some exceptions). For those
species listed in Appendix II, range states must try to conclude agreements to benefit those with unfavorable conservation statues, taking necessary action for those which periodically cross national boundaries.
Guidelines for the relevant agreements are laid down in Article V. Special
provisions in Article V require that parties should, at a minimum, prohibit any capture of cetaceans that is not permitted for that migratory
species under any multilateral agreements. Thus, relevant ICRW regulations should be observed by Bonn Convention parties, whether or not
they are parties to the IWC. Article V provides that access to the relevant
agreement should be possible also for states that are not range states of
those migratory species. Article V encourages exchange of information
about speices and coordination of actions to suppress illegal capture.
Therefore, once the Convention enters into force, close relations with the
IWC will need to be established.
The Bonn Convention's organs do not include a Commission but consist of a triennial Conference of the Parties with broad review and
70. Convention on Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, supra note 11.
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amendment powers, a secretariat (with an Executive Director to be appointed by UNEP), and a Scientific Council of qualified experts. Each
party must also designate a specific national authority and any other machinery necessary to implement the agreements.
The Bonn Convention is a framework instrument expressed in broad,
open-ended terms. Article I defines some of them, but ambituities remain7 1 which will be removed only by state implementation. Parties to
the Convention can include range states, meaning those exercising jurisdiction (often by flag vessels) over any part of the species' range. Additionally, regional economic integration organizations, such as the European Economic Community (EEC), which have competence to conclude
agreements, can also be parties. States must enforce these agreements on
vessels within their jurisdiction by national means.
This Convention takes a broader approach to protection of cetaceans
than the ICRW. It introduces as a criterion of conservation the long-term
vaibility of the species within its ecosystem. The ecosystem approach has
now been related to the management of all marine living resources (including cetaceans) in Antarctica, though there are as yet no other regional
treaties requiring eco-system management of cetaceans.
IX.

CONVENTION ON THE CONSERVATION OF ANTARCTIC MARINE LIVING

RESOURCES

1980 (CCAMLR)

This Convention, the first to take an ecosystem approach to management, was concluded in May, 1980. It recently entered into force and has
been signed by fifteen states. Articles XVI and XIX limit the Convention
to such states which have conslutative status under the 1959 Antarctic
Treaty, 73 states which participated in the Conference negotiating that
treaty (only those with a demonstrated interest in the Antarctic were invited), and other states demonstrating an interest either by scientific research or by harvesting activities relating to the marine living resources to
which the Convention applies. The first meeting of its Commission took
place on April 7, 1982.74

71. An example of such ambiguities is that "migratory species" are defined as "the entire population or any geographically separate part of the population of any species or lower
taxon of wild animals a significant proportion of whose members cyclically and predictably
cross one or more national jurisdictional boundaries." Another example is that "favourable
conservation status" is described as the status which as species has which "maintains itself
on a long-term basis as a viable component of its eco-system." Moreover, the Convention
leaves undefined phrases such as "significant portion" of a range and "endangerment
throughout its range" and "normal migration".
72. Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, supra note
12.
73. The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, No. 5778, 402 U.N.T.S. 71. Fourteen states have
consultative status at present. 74. At this meeting, in Hobart, Australia, it was agreed that
all signatories of the Convention which are not yet members of the Commission (viz.,
Belgium, France, Norway, Poland) could participate in negotiations and discussions. Observers from FAO, IOC, IUCN and the IWC also attended.
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Article I applies to the CCAMLR to living resources found south of
600 south latitude and in the area between that line and the Antarctic
convergence which forms part of the Antarctic marine ecosystem. The
marine ecosystem is defined as "the complex of relationships of Antarctice marine living resources with each other and with their physical environment." The resources are defined to include populations of finf fish,
mollusks, crustaceans and all other living organisms. Though cetaceans
are not speicifically mentioned, they are covered as a component of the
area's ecosystem. Conservation of cetaceans is also inextricably linked to
the CCAMLR's main purpose-regulation of catches of kirll, the small
crustacea which form the staple diet of the baleen whales which formerly
existed in huge numbers in the area.
Article VI provides that nothing in the Convention shall derogate
from the rights and obligations of parties under the ICRW. However, Article 11(3) requires that any harvesting and associated activities in the
CCAMLR area shall be conducted in accordance with the provision of the
Convention and with specific conservation principles concerning prevention of decreasing populcations below levels enabling stable recruitment.
Article XXIII provides that the CCAMLR Commission and Scientific
Committee "shall seek to develop cooperative working relationships, as
appropriate" with the IWC. Al the large whales in Antarctica now have
protected status under the ICRW's New Management Procedures except
for minke whales, captured by Japan and the USSR. Tentative efforts at
cooperation were taken at the IWC's 34th Meeting as we have seen, by
exchange of observers and statements. 75 More will be required for effective coordination of the IWC with the Commission, Secretariat and Scientific Committee established by the CCAMLR.
The Commission consists of represented state parties and such regional economic organizations as have members which are qualified
CCAMLR parties, e.g. the EEC. It has wide powers to collect and analyze
information and to adopt any necessary conservation measure under Article XI(1), based on the best scientific advice. Questions of substance are
decided by consensus. It can also draw the attention of parties and nonparities to activities of their nationals which defeat CCAMLR's aims. Article XXV requires implementation of the international system of observation and inspection outlined therein.

75. See statement by Dr. J.A. Heap, Designated by the Commission [for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources] to act as the Commission's Observer at the 34th
Session of the Int'l Whaling Comm., IWC/34/OS CCAMLOR (1982); K.R. Allen & K.J.
McNamara, Observers' Report on the Antarctic Marine Living Resources Preparatory Meeting, IWC/34/11D (1981); and a written statement submitted by Professor J.D. Ovington to
this meeting on behalf of the IWC. This last written statement included, as Attachment A,
"Recommendations from the Working Group on the Implications for Whales of Management Regimes for Other Resources" and a "Resolution on Cooperation and Coordination
between the International Whaling Commission and the Proposed Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources."
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Regulation of whaling will be left primarily to the IWC. The first
CCAMLR Commission meeting instructed its Executive Secretary to discuss with the IWC Secretariat means of establishing a working relationship. ICRW objectives of achieving optimum levels of whale stocks may
be defeated if kirll is over-harvested. The IWC has suggested: that it
should have "appropriate status" to enable its contribution to CCMALR
activities; that account should be taken of its responsibilities for whale
stock management; that Scientific Committee (SC) representatives should
be exchanged and a joint SC Working Group established; that a workshop
on whale population dynamics sponsored by the IWC, CCMALR and
other concerned organizations should be held; that qualified whale spotters should be placed on vessels in the Southern Oceans; and that the
IWC's IDCR (International Decade of Cetacean Research) cruises should
be coordinated with the BIOMASS (Biological Investigation of Marine
Antarctic Species and Systems) project.7"
Closely regulated krill fisheries, conducted on an ecological basis
backed by international inspection, could be coordinated with restoration
of whale populations to stable levels if the CCAMLR can avoid becoming
as politicized as other fisheries commissions and can coordinate fully with
the IWC. Parties can, however, object to CCAMLR measures under Article XXIX procedures. The Convention can be amended, however, only by
unanimity. Withdrawal from the Convention is permitted under Article
XXXI.
X.

REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Space does not permit a detailed analysis of the effect of regional
conventions and the activities of regional organizations on cetaceans. Previously dormant regional conventions have bene reactivated by recent
events in the IWC and by growing pressures from non-governmental organizations. Relevant regional instruments and bodies include the
following.
A.

Convention on Nature Protectionand Wildlife Preservation in the

Western Hemisphere 19407
This Convention was negotiated between 21 American states and is
limited to North and South. Its Secretariat is provided by the Organization of American States (OAS). Its goal is to establish national sanctuaries to protect and preserve in their natural- habitat reprentatives of all
species of native fauna in numbers and areas sufficient to ensure that
they do not become extinct though any means controlled by man. An Annex lists species now regarded by the states concerned as of special importance and urgency for preservation. Argentina and the USA early

76. IWC Recommendations and Resolution supra note 75.
77. Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere, 1940, T.I.A.S. No. 485, 161 U.N.T.S. 193.
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listed the blue whale; and the USA, the right, bowhead and gray whales.
Recent OAS-sponsored workshops have reactivated the Convention and
further action may be forthcoming to update listings to correspond more
closely with the IWC and CITES actions.
B. The Permanent Commission of the Conference on the Use and Conservation of The Maritime Resources of the South Pacific (PCSP) 195278
This Commission was established following Chile, Ecuador and
Peru's assertion of jurisdiction over a 200 nautical mile Maritime Zone.
The PCSP's goals include conservation and protection of the marine
fauna of these waters, including cetaceans. The Commission has met regularly to adopt regulations for whaling. Its main role is to coordinate the
three states' laws for this purpose. A regulatory system similar to, but less
stringent than the IWC's was initially adopted. Since Chile and Peru
have now joined the IWC, however, IWC regulations must be applied.
Following the IWC zero quotas from 1985, the PCSP could provide a
mechanism for coordinated study of whales in its area. It could also serve
as a focal point for cooperation with relevant bodies through its Conference of the Representatives of the three Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The
Conference meets biennially to set out its policies and is backed by a Secretariat and standing committees, including one for Coordination of Scientific Investigations and Work Methods.
C. The African Convention on the Conservationof Nature and Natural
9
Resources 19687
The Organization of African States (OAU) initiated this Convention,
to protect water, flora and fauna resources threatened in various ways.
The OAU provides the Secretariat. Species are listed on an Annex, but
cetaceans are not listed. The Convention came into force on October 9,
1969 but remained dormant for many years. More interest has recently
been evinced following the new international treaties. Some cetaceans
may eventually be listed.
Article VII provides that for certain purposes parties shall "manage
acquatic environments." Article X provides for estalbishment of conservation areas (as deinfed in Article III) to protect representative ecosystems and conserve species listed, or likely to be listed, in the Annex. Protective zones must be established around such areas within which
activities detrimental to protected natural resources must be controlled.
A variety of measures which must be taken for these pruposes are pre-

78. On this Permanent Commission, see: U.N. Leg. Ser. ST/LEG/SER.B/1 (1951), at 6;
M. Savini, supra note 46, at 23-25.
79. African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, 1968,
Organization of African Unity, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS, publication of the Commission for Environmental Policy, Law and Administration, Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany, BzUBz/IX/75.
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scribed in Articles VII and VIII, including prohibition of some hunting
methods, protection of habitats, and adoption of "adequate" legislation.
Wildlife populations must be managed on the basis of scientific advise.
The protective measures required for species threatened with extinction
vary according to the degree ot threat. Measures include control of trade,
through permits, to prevent illegal takings.
Article XV requires that, if possible, a single national conservation
agency be established to deal with all Convention matters. Parties are
required to cooperate as necessary and to promote conservation education
nationally.
D. The Berne Convention on the Conservation of European of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats 197980
This Convention, negitiated through the Council of Europe, entered
into force on June 1, 1982. Its object, under Article 1(1), is to conserve
especially those species and habitats whose conservation requires the cooperation of several states. Endangered and vulnerable species, including
migratory ones, are singled out in Article 2. Although the Convention was
open initially only to member states of the Council of Europe, non-members participating in its development and other states invited by the
Committee of Ministers of Council can accede. It applies in the territory,
including the territorial sea, of state parties and can be extended to their
dependencies.
Under Article 6, species are listed on three Appendices according to
the degree of threat. The measures and also regulation of internal trade.
The general objective under Article 2 is to maintain a population or to
adapt it "to a level which corresponds in particular to ecological, scientific
and cultural requirements," while taking into account economic and recreational requirements and the needs of subspecies, varieties, or forms at
risk locally. This is a broad and open-ended goal. Article 4 requires parties to take measures to protect areas important to the listed migratory
species and areas appropriately located for migratory routes, breeding,
feeding, and other purposes, coordinating their efforts as appropraite. Article 10 elaborates special provision for this in relation to migratory
species.
A Standing Committee of all parties, meeting at least biennially at
the behest of the Council of Europe, is established by Article 13. NonParty states wh.ch are members of the Council of Europe can send ohservers. Specialist bodies may also attend ad hoc. The Standing Committee reviews the application of the Convention, recommends measures, reports to the Committee of Ministers, and can make any proposal for
improving the effectiveness of the Convention.

80. Berne Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitats,
Sept. 19, 1979, Council of Europe European Treaty Series No. 104. See Convention, supra
note 13.
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Most articles of the Convention can be amended by following procedures in Article 15 with approval by a three-quarter majority of the parties. Amendment of appendices is subject to a simpler procedure and requires only a two-thirds majority.
E.

The European Economic Community (EEC)8 '

By broad interpretation of the 1950 Treaty of Rome, the EEC has
developed an Action Programme on the Environment, 82 which includes
the marine environment. The Community can implement its goals by
adopting regulations which bind member states and individuals as part of
national law. The EEC's Commission can exercise its own initiative in
proposing and drafting community measures to put before the EEC
Council. The EEC can also become a party in its own right to conventions
of an economic character. It may join economic bodies, such as fisheries
commissions, in replacement of its individual member states, and may
join bodies of en environmental character.
Pursuant to these requirements and objectives, the EEC has become
a party to the CCAMLR and is seeking to become a party to CITES.
However, it has decided not to adhere to the ICRW, which preceded the
EEC and does not provide for adherence by any organizations (a Protocol
would be required to enable EEC membership). Moreover, EEC members' policies are not always harmonious in the IWC: Denmark (Greenland and the Faroe Islands) is still whaling; France, West Germany, the
Netherlands, and the UK are not; the other EEC members are not parties
to the ICRW. However, the EEC did agree in 1981 to protect cetaceans
by banning the import of whales and whale products into the territories
of Member States by means of a regulation" which became effective in
January, 1982. An Annex to the Regulation lists a comprehensive number
of banned products which includes main whale and other cetacean products. Once the EEC becomes a CITES party, it will probably adopt more
general measures concerning suspension of trade in other species of wild
flora and fauna. Until further Community action, member states will re-

81. The EEC was established by the Treaty of Rome, 1950, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
82. O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. C.112/3) Annex (1973); See also Declaration of the Council of
the European Communities and of Representatives of the Governments of the Member
States, Meeting in the Council of Nov. 22, 1973 on the Programme of Action of the European Communities on the Environment, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C112/1) SEC (74) 70014
(1973); Environment Programme 1977-81, Bull. E.C. Supp. 6/76.
83. See Regulation on Common Rules for Imports of Whales and other Cetacean Products, supra note 69. The Preamble to the Regulation also bases the Council's powers on
those derived from the Treaty of Rome generally and from Article 235 in particular, which
relates to powers implied by interpretation of the Treaty and its fundamental principles.
The Council also stated that it took into account the Commission's proposals and the opinion expressed on the subject by the European Parliament, which had stated that it recognized that conservation of cetaceans calls for measures restricting international trade and
that such measures should be taken at the Community level, in conformity with the Community's international obligations.
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tain the right to limit nationally more products than those listed in this
Annex.
The EEC has powers to enact binding measures. Its permanent institutions include a European Court of Justice and a democratically elected
Parliament with advisory and supervisory powers. The EEC offers a
model for future regional development of similar machinery to complete
the protective circle of measures necessary to conserve cetaceans.
XI.

CONCLUSION

World attention has concentrated on the International Whaling
Commission as the organization nominally concerned with conserving
whales. But as this article has illustrated, the Whaling Commission is
neither the only nor arguably the most important body which protects
our marine resources.
The IWC was established in order to preserve no whales but whaling.
It requires whales to be conserved so exploitation can continue. PreWorld War II over-catching was based on a patchwork of ad hoc regulations, unsupervised by any permanent body and not adhered to by all
whaling states. This brought the industry near economic collapse.
The policies first adopted by the IWC regulated the industry but still
permitted serious over-exploitation on ever declining stocks because they
were based on industrial greed and widespread ignorance of cetacean
ecology and behavior. Since 1972, when Stockholm UNCHE adopted fundamental principels and proposed a moratorium on commercial whaling,
IWC policies, regulatory techniques and membership have greatly
changed. This led to such annual decreases in remaining quotas that in
1982 the IWC achieved a sufficient majority of sympathetic whaling and
non-whaling state members to procure cessation of commercial whaling
by 1985, in the absence of objection or withdrawal.
These changes have been brought about by the activities of determinedly conservationist states and non-governmental organizations, by
declining returen in commercial activities and by the tightening circle of
international conventions. Global conventions, if widely ratified and applied, now offer virtually complete protection to at least the great whales.
The CITES could control trade in products which has heretofore had
damaging effects. The Bonn Convention affords the means for enabling
the international cooperation necessary to protect species that migrate
across frontiers. The CCAMLR can be used in conjunction with the
ICRW to preserve the Antarctic ecology which governs a major habitat of
great baleen whales.
This circle is reinforced by a band of regional conventions. The
Berne Convention reveals a model for international action to protect habitats against newly perceived threats from pollution and various forms of
human and industrial harassment. Other regions may apply and expand
the international conventions by developing suitable local measures. Gaps
remain, but an encouraging organizational start has been made, since all
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these treaties establish or designate permanent bodies to supervise their
operations.
There is, however, no cause for complacency. Some instruments are
not in force, some are poorly ratified, some are ambiguous and require
much interpretative practice, some are little used or ineffectively enforced. If commercial whaling ceases in 1985, this network of treaties will
become vitally important in ensuring that illicit operations do not occur.
Scientists have demonstrated that the continuing need for conservation of
whales on an ecological and integrated basis. It must be asked whether
the chronological pragmatic development that has occurred measures up
to the strategic approach of the UNEP/FAO Draft Action Plan. A need
surely exists for one or both of these organizations to use their powers to
take the leading role to ensure that, whether regionally or globally, these
new treaties and organizations work as part of a scientifically based strategy. Perhaps this can be done by convening periodic meetings of representatives of all bodies referred to in this article, serviced by a standing
Plan Group.
Following the adoption of the moratorium at the 34th IWC Meeting,
Dr. Gambell, the IWC Secretary, said that the moratorium tells us "not
'
to forget about the whales but to think harder about them."84
One problem to ponder is certainly how to weld this disparate series of treaties and
organizations into a strategic plan of action to restore and maintain the
whales and their environment.

84. NEW SCIENTIST, July 29, 1982, at 282.

Ocean Dumping
JOHN WARREN KINDT*
Man is both creature and molder of his environment, which gives him physical sustenance and affords him the opportunity for intellectual, moral, social
and spiritualgrowth. In the long and tortuous evolution of the human race on
this planet a stage has been reached when, through the rapid acceleration of
science and technology, man has acquired the power to transform his environment in countless ways and on an unprecedented scale. Both aspects of man's
environment, the natural and the man-made, are essential to his well-being
and to the enjoyment of basic human rights-even the right to life itself.
Declaration of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment (1972).'

I.

INTRODUCTION

The oceans are the earth's greatest single natural resource. Covering
71 percent of the earth's surface, they are crucial to maintaining the balance of the global ecosystem. "The importance of the oceans needs little
emphasis as this planet's last great economic frontier, the potential source
for enormous food supplies, the final buffer against ecological catastrophe,
and a recreational outlet for restoration of body and spirit of man."'
As important as the oceans are to mankind, it seems irrational that
human enterprise would abuse them.3 Man's dumping of wastes into the
ocean has always occurred. However, due to accelerating industrial development and population growth, the quantities and concentrations of
wastes dumped have begun to tax the assimilative capacity of the oceans.4
The reasons for the growing use of the ocean as a dump site are readily observable because mankind tends to "regard the oceans as a convenient, limitless receptacle for wastes."'5 "But as problems of waste disposal
on land multiply, pressures to use the oceans as a dumping ground become stronger." Ocean dumping often provides the least expensive
*Professor, University of Illinois; A.B. 1972, William & Mary; J.D. 1976, MBA 1977,
University of Georgia; LL.M. 1978, SJD 1981, University of Virginia.
1. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, art. I, proclamation 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, 3 (rev. ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Stockholm Report]. For a copy of the unrevised edition of the Stockholm Report, see UNITED
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT, THE RESULTS FROM STOCKHOLM 1, 70
(E. Verlag ed. 1973).
2. Waldichuk, Control of Marine Pollution:An Essay Review, 4 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.
269, 291 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Waldichuk].
3. Id. at 282.
4. Lumsdaine, Ocean Dumping Regulation: An Overview, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 753, 753
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Lumsdaine].
5. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, ENVTL. QuALrrY-1980 15 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
CEQ 1980 REPORT].

6. Id.
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method of disposal. Since the sites are far removed from land, the adverse
effects are less noticeable and therefore less objectionable.' However, experience and research have revealed that despite its vastness, the ocean's
natural ability to accept, decompose, and recycle wastes is limited." Once
saturation levels of waste assimilation develop, irreversible consequences
may result, for the "deep sea has a turnover rate measured in thousands
of years." 9
Of the pollutants entering the world's oceans, approximately 10 percent are due to direct ocean dumping.'0 In 1970 the U.S. Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) identified seven sources of ocean dumping."
The seven categories and their definitions are as follows:
a. "Dredge spoils-the solid materials removed from the bottom
of water bodies generally for the purpose of improving navigation:
sand, silt, clay, rock, and pollutants that have been deposited from
municipal and industrial discharges.""
b. "Industrial wastes-acids; refinery, pesticides, and paper mill
wastes; and assorted liquid wastes.""11
c. "Sewage sludge-the solid material remaining after municipal
waste treatment: residual human wastes and other organic and inorganic wastes.""
d. "Construction and demolition debris-masonry, tile, stone,

plastic, wiring, piping, shingles, glass, cinderblock, tar, tarpaper, plaster, vegetation, and excavation dirt.""'
e. "Solid waste-more commonly called refuse, garbage, or
trash-the material generated by residences; commercial, agricultural,
and industrial establishments; hospitals and other institutions; and
municipal operations: chiefly paper, food wastes, garden wastes, steel
and glass containers, and other miscellaneous materials. '"'6
f. Explosives and chemical munitions-no official definition but

includes "[u]nserviceable or obsolete shells, mines, solid rocket fuels,
and chemical warfare agents.""
g. "Radioactive wastes-the liquid and solid wastes that result

from processing of irradiated fuel elements, nuclear reactor opera-

7. Lumsdaine, supra note 4, at 754.
8. CEQ 1980 REPORT, supra note 5, at 15.
10. Note, The Ocean Dumping Dilemma, 10 LAW. AM. 868, 877 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Dumping Dilemma].
11. CouNcE

oN ENvTL. QuALrry, OCEAN DUMPING 18 (Report to the President, 1970)

[hereinafter cited as OCEAN DUMING REPORT]. These seven categories remain unchanged in
the CEQ 1980 REPORT, supra note 5, at 17.
12. OCEAN DUMPING REPORT, supra note 11, at iv.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 6.
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tions, medical use of radioactive isotopes, and research activities and
from equipment and containment vessels which become radioactive by
induction."' 8
These sources are listed in decreasing order of their deleterious impact on the marine environment.'" Of the 10 percent of ocean dumped
materials, dredged spoils constitute 80 percent of this total."0 Approximately 1 to 10 percent of the dredged sediment taken from waterways
and harbors has been contaminated to potentially unacceptable levels because of industrial, urban, and agricultural activities.2 ' Even non-toxic
dredged spoils can physically damage marine organisms in ways ranging
from inhibiting the penetration of light (due to suspended sediments) to
smothering organisms on the ocean floor when large quantities are
dumped. 2
The dumping of dredged material, sewage sludge, and other wastes
has had a measurable impact on ecosystems, such as the New York Bight,
and has led to cadmium and PCB concentrations that have approached
intolerable levels. 3 Toxic pollutants dumped into the ocean, either industrial wastes or municipal sewage sludge, enter into the tissue of marine
organisms. As larger forms feed on contaminated organisms, toxic substances accumulate and reach concentrations where immediate physical
harm can occur to marine mammals, birds, and man.2 4 For example, biomagnification 2 5 of PCB's in marine food chains has been reported, and
levels involving birds and mammals have been magnified "by a factor on
the order of 10 to 100 at each step.

'26

Pollutants may be highly biodegradable and have only a locally adverse effect, whereas less or non-biodegradable pollutants may have longterm effects on both local and global marine environments. Pollutants can
be classified into several scientific categories: (1) hydrocarbons (basically
oil and gas); (2) hydrocarbon compounds utilized as organic contaminants, inhibitors, and poisons; (3) heavy metals; (4) radioactive wastes;

18. Id. at iv.
19. Id. at 1-8. Contra Dumping Dilemma, supra note 10, at 869-79 n.1.
20. OCEAN DUMPING REPORT, supra note 11, at 3.
21. Ocean Dumping: Hearings on H.R. 6112, H.R. 6113, and H.R. 6324 Before the Subcomm. On Oceanographyand the Subcomm. On FisheriesAnd Wildlife Conservation And
The Environment of the House Comm. On Merchant Marine and Fisheries,97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 126 (1982) (statement of Brig. Gen. Forrest T. Gay III) [hereinafter cited as 1982
Ocean Dumping Hearings].
22. Lumsdaine, supra note 4, at 755.
23. COUNCIL ENVTL. QUALITY, ENvTL. QUALrry 1982 1, 46 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
CEQ 1982 REPORT].
24. Lumsdaine, supra note 4, at 755-56.
25. "Biomagnification refers to the increase in toxicant concentration which occurs in
successively higher trophic level organisms in an ecosystem." Dredge Spoil Disposal And
PCB Contamination:Hearings Before the House Comm. On Merchant Marine And Fisheries, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 512 (1980) (statement of Frank G. Wilkes) [hereinafter cited as
1980 Dredge Spoil Hearings].
26. Id.

DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 13:2-3

and (5) solid wastes (including particulate pollution). Of these, heavy
metals, poisons, and radioactive wastes are especially hazardous because
they tend to bioaccumulate" in marine organisms."
The adverse effects of these hazardous wastes are numerous. High
levels of pollutants which bioaccumulate have led to "bioconcentration"
that kills marine organisms or anything which feeds on them. This phenomenon has killed marine stocks and made surviving stocks inedible,
thus causing severe economic loss to the fishing industry. 9
More serious is the long-range impact of pollutants on the marine
environment. First, pollutants affect some species more than others. The
resulting diminution of species variety is known to upset the ecobalance.
Secondly, organic wastes, particularly sewage sludge, require oxygen for
decomposition. When organic wastes are dumped, they deplete the oxygen in adjacent waters to the extent that some organisms cannot survive.
The cycle is accelerated when deceased organisms decompose and further
deplete oxygen concentrations in that process. A vicious cycle of death,
decay and depletion ensues which threatens the hardiest marine organisms.3 0 The oxygen deficiency may continue for years-long after the
dumping has ceased.3"
Due to the volume and types of wastes dumped annually, particularly
toxic materials and radioactive wastes, the need to understand the impact
of these wastes and to expand international environmental cooperation
must receive priority."2
II.
A.

AN ANALYSIS OF OCEAN DUMPING

Delimitation of the Problem

There are three traditional problem areas involved in analyzing international ocean dumping and its ramifications. These problems, whether
dealt with either as international concerns or as national problems, are
eventually faced by the entire international community.3 " The first area
of concern deals with determining what constitutes pollution. The most
widely invoked definition of marine pollution is that agreed upon in 1970

27. "Bioaccumulation refers to those processes by means of which organisms take up
chemicals from the physico-chemical environment and incorporate them into some or all of
their tissues." 1982 Ocan Dumping Heariga ,,nr nntp. 21. .t 449 (submission of the

International Association of Ports and Harbors).
28. Waldichuk, supra note 2, at 280.
29. Lumsdaine, supra note 4, at 756.
30. See Comment, Ocean Dumping: Progress Toward A Rational Policy of Dredged
Waste Disposal, 12 ENvTL. L. 745, 751 nn.37-42 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Ocean Dumping
Progress].
31. Lumsdaine, supra note 4, at 757.
32. CEQ 1980 REPoRT, supra note 5, at 15.
33. As noted by Captain Cousteau, "[e]ach one of the cells of our bodies is a miniature

ocean. Poisoning the sea will inevitably poison us." 1982 Ocean Dumping Hearings, supra
note 21, at 188 (statement of Jacques-Yves Cousteau).
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by the United Nations Joint Group of Experts on the Scientific Aspects
of Marine Pollution (GESAMP):
Introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy
into the marine environment (including estuaries) resulting in such
deleterious effects as harm to living resources, hazard to human
health, hindrance to marine activities including fishing, impairment of
quality for use of sea water, and reduction of amenities.'
The Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention) 5 enumerates the preferred definition in article 1, paragraph 1(4), which incorporates the GESAMP wording.
(4) "pollution of the marine environment" means the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the
marine environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to
result in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and
marine life, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine activities,
including fishing and other legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of
quality for use of sea water and reduction of amenities; . .

.36

Similarly, in article 1, paragraph 1(5), the LOS Convention enumerates
the best definition for ocean dumping.
5. (a) "[D]umping" means:
(i) any deliberate disposal of wastes or other matter from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea;
(ii) any deliberate disposal of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other manmade structures at sea;
(b) "[D]umping" does not include:
(i) the disposal of wastes or other matter incidental to, or derived
from the normal operations of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other
man-made structures at sea and their equipment, other than wastes or
other matter transported by or to vessels, aircraft, platforms or other
man-made structures at sea, operating for the purpose of disposal of
such matter or derived from the treatment of such wastes or other
matter on such vessels, aircraft, platforms or structures;
(ii) placement of matter for a purpose other than the mere disposal
thereof, provided37 that such placement is not contrary to the aims of
this Convention.

34. See Kutner, The Control and Prevention of TransnationalPollution: A Case for
World Habeas Ecologicus, 9 LAw. AM. 257, 260 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Kutner].
35. Done Dec. 10, 1982, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as LOS Convention].
36. Id. art. 1, para. 1(4). This version of paragraph 4 is reprinted pursuant to the copy
of the LOS Convention in 21 I.L.M. 1261. The LOS Convention as reproduced by the U.S.
State Department has the words "(including estuaries)" in parentheses instead of being offset by commas.
37. LOS Convention, supra note 35, art. 1, para. 1(5). The margins in paragraph 5 differ between the version of the LOS Convention reproduced by the U.S. State Department
and the version reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261.
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Thus, the test of whether the disposal of unwanted materials constitutes
"ocean dumping" focuses on "intent" (i.e., deliberate disposal).
Any definition of ocean dumping necessarily involves many of the
problems inherent in defining "pollution." Five categories have been suggested for approaching definitional problems. Pollution can be viewed as:
a. any alteration of the existing environment,
b. the right of the territorial sovereign,
c. damage per se,
d. interference with other uses of the environment, and
38
e. any excess beyond the assimilation capacity of the environment.
The first two approaches define the boundaries or limits of pollution,
and therefore, they are not viewed as realistic alternatives. When referring to pollution as just "damage" per se, two factors must be determined. First, determinations must be made of which injured countries,
individuals, and properties may seek redress. The standards must be set
for those damages which are compensable. For example, the question
arises as to whether damages must be tangible injuries which can be recompensed monetarily or can intangible injuries also demand compensation? In addition, the level and magnitude of damages must also be delimited by reference to a high or low threshold.3 9 In other words, does
injury take place when a serious, proven action endangers the health or
property of another, or is it possible that the injury has occurred when
the action causes substantial inconvenience or discomfort? The major
fault with this definitional approach is that a high threshold approach is
generally adopted, ignoring gradual yet constant impairments.
Pollution as "interference" with other uses of the environment has an
anti-ecological basis, and it is the result of international agreements regulating busy waterways and ocean areas. "The environment is important
only to the degree that it is useful to man's immediate interests and environmental alteration is something to be halted only if the benefits of so
doing . ..outweigh the costs."4
Pollution as "exceeding the assimilative capacity of the environment"
is generally considered to be the best approach. Due to the growing realization of the frailty and interdependence of the components of the biosphere, it has been recognized that certain pollution, either in quantity or
kind, cannot hp decomDosed or rendered harmless by natural
processes-thus exceeding the ocean's assimilative capacity."1 Although
theoretically sound, this approach fails to resolve certain practical issues.
First, it is difficult to determine the assimilative limits of a given environ-

38. Springer, Towards a Meaningful Concept of Pollution in International Law, 26
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 531, 533 (1977).

39. Id. at 538.
40. Id. at 544.
41. Id. at 548.
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ment. It is equally difficult to ascertain when actual damage has been
done to the integrity of natural cycles. Second, there is a problem with
delimiting the point at which the quantity of the pollution exceeds the
"assimilative capacity" of the environment.42 Research has led the scientific community to conclude that marine systems can be safely used for
waste disposal if such disposal is carefully managed. 43 Furthermore, eliminating the oceans as an alternative disposal site would transfer all waste
management problems to land and air media." For wastes which are biodegradable and nonaccumulative in marine organisms, the ocean would
be a reasonable disposal site.4 5 Assimilative capacity models, which incorporate a number of factors considered by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) in establishing and revising ocean dumping criteria, suffer
from numerous weaknesses."' One of the most important limitations is
the absence of empirical data which has impeded efforts to estimate the
47
endpoints of contaminants for particular ocean areas.
Previously undiscovered dangers of PCB's and DDT in dredge spoils
and sewage sludge, for example, highlight the lack of scientific evidence
with respect to ocean dumping. 4" Short-term environmental analysis has
further compounded the problem situation and led to dangerously flawed
decisions for waste disposal via ocean dumping. Due to the lack of knowledge regarding the ocean's assimilative capacity, the tendency has been to
proceed with rapacious ocean dumping.49
There are numerous international conventions which impact upon

42. For a brief discussion of materials which the ocean can safely assimilate, see Waste
Dumping: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation And
The Environment of the House Comm. On Merchant Marine and Fisheries,97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 83-85 (1981) (statement of Kenneth S. Kamlet) [hereinafter cited as 1981 Waste
Dumping Hearings].
43. Swanson & Devine, Ocean Dumping Policy, ENV'T, June 1982, at 14, 16 [hereinafter
cited as Swanson & Devine]. "[W]aste disposal policies are changing to allow the cautious
and studied use of the oceans as a waste disposal medium." 1982 Ocean Dumping Hearings,
supra note 21, at 295 (statement of NACOA). Research results indicate that some wastes
can reasonably be dumped in the oceans, but research and monitoring measures must be
undertaken to protect the ocean. Id.
44. See Ocean Dumping Progress, supra note 30, at 748.
45. Id.
46. Note, Ocean Dumping of Sewage Sludge: The Tide Turns From Protection to
Management. 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 395, 429-30 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Dumping
Sludge].
47. Id. at 430.
48. "[T]he complex toxicological interactions of PCB's with other contaminants such as
petroleum hydrocarbons, pesticides, and heavy metals" are not fully understood. 1980
Dredge Spoil Hearings, supra note 25, at 142 (statement of Lynn A. Greenwalt).
It is known, however, that these materials do not act alone and that most, if
not all, test methods used do not adequately predict latent and chronic toxic
effects of individual contaminants, let alone the mixtures of materials that are
known to be present in some dredge materials.
Id.
49. 1982 Ocean Dumping Hearings, supra note 21, at 189 (statement of Rep. Norman
E. D'Amours).
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the problems of ocean dumping, but these conventions should generally
be categorized as dealing with vessel-source pollution or land-based pollution. The most comprehensive international convention is the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes
and Other Matter (Ocean Dumping Convention).5" Prior to this Convention, the United States enacted narrowly tailored legislation to control
specific pollutants or categories of pollutants that impacted upon ocean
dumping. Ocean dumping per se, however, was not regulated until the
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (MPRSA). 5'
Although the MPRSA was enacted on October 23, 1972,52 its primary
purpose was to implement the Ocean Dumping Convention, which entered into force for the United States on August 30, 1975. 53 In fact, the
MPRSA is frequently referred to as the "Ocean Dumping Act," 4 but
since it also encompasses important issues involving ocean research and
marine sanctuaries, "MPRSA" is probably a more appropriate short
form.
Both the Ocean Dumping Convention, and the MPRSA prohibit the
dumping of dangerous wastes and license the dumping of other wastes,5"
and both specify that some consideration must be given with regard to
the environmental effects of land disposal alternatives during the reviewing process for applications for ocean dumping permits." Each system
allowed an exception for trace amounts of contaminants from the prohibited lists. In dealing with the problem of how much is too much, the
Ocean Dumping Convention provided that parties shall prohibit dumping
of those wastes listed in Annex I (the "blacklist"). 57 Annex I listed organ-

50. Done Dec. 29, 1972, [19751 2 U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S. No. 8165 (entered into force Aug.
30, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Ocean Dumping Convention]. While this Convention is com-

monly termed the "London Convention," the "London Dumping Convention," or the
"London Ocean Dumping Convention," it is less confusing to use the terminology "Ocean
Dumping Convention" because there have been and probably will be more "London Conventions" (particularly since IMCO is largely based in London). Accordingly, this Convention should be referred to as the "Ocean Dumping Convention."
51. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1444 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
52. See Letter from Secretary of State William P. Rogers to President Richard M.
Nixon (Feb. 13, 1973), reprinted in G.P.O., CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION OF MARINE
POLLUTION, 93D CONG., 1ST SESS., v (Doc. No. 83-118).
53. Id. See also Amendments to the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act
nf 1972. in order to implement the provisions of the Convention on the Prevention of
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, Pub. L. No. 93-254, 88 Stat. 50
(codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1401-1444 (1976)), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 611 (1974).

54. See, e.g., Kuersteiner & Herbach, In Pursuit of Clean Oceans- A Review Of The
Marine Protection,Research, and Sanctuaries Act, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 157, 159 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Kuersteiner]; Dumping Dilemma, supra note 10, at 879.
55. See Dumping Dilemma, supra note 10, at 904.
56. Dumping Sludge, supra note 46, at 424.
57. Ocean Dumping Convention, supra note 50, art. 4; Dumping Dilemma, supra note
10, at 896-97. The lists of substances contained in Annexes I and II are not exhaustive. Any
country is free to prohibit the dumping of wastes and other materials not mentioned in
either Annex. Dumping Dilemma, supra note 10, at 897.
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ohalogens, mercury, cadmium, persistent materials (plastics), oil, highlevel radioactive wastes, and chemical and biological warfare (CBW)
materials, among other pollutants." Annex I, however, permitted disposal
of the proscribed materials which are:
"rapidly rendered harmless by physical, chemical or biological
processes in the sea provided they do not:
(i) make edible marine organisms unpalatable, or
(ii) endanger human health or that of domestic animals." 9
In addition, the incineration at sea of organohalogen compounds, crude
oil and petroleum products was exempted by amendment in October of
1978.60 The prohibitions of Annex I did not apply to wastes or other
containing the aforematerials (e.g., sewage sludges and dredged spoils)
'
mentioned pollutants as "trace contaminants."'
Marine scientists have generally agreed that a "trace" constitutes
concentrations which are commensurate with levels normally found in the
ocean (e.g., natural levels). However, the problem of definition has become complicated when directed toward certain organohalogens (such as
PCB's and DDT) which are man-made contaminants yet present in
Dumping Convendumped waste.6 2 Neither the MPRSA nor the Ocean
63
tion could define trace contaminants numerically.
Sewage sludge and dredged spoils, generally taken from commercial
harbors, contain concentrations of "blacklisted materials" which are far
in excess of those which naturally occur.6 4 In spite of this fact, ocean
dumping of hazardous sludge and spoils is allowed (in limited quantities)
due to the nature of these waters.6" This seems contrary to the spirit of
Annex I.
A related problem in this area deals with the economics of waste disposal and the degree to which alternative methods are available. Three

58. Ocean Dumping Convention, supra note 50, Annex. I.
59. Id.; see Dumping Dilemma, supra note 10, at 896.
60. Ocean Dumping Convention, supra note 50, Annex I (10). Incineration of these
wastes requires a special permit prior to disposal.
61. Id. Annex I. "Such wastes shall be subject to the provisions of Annexes II and III as
appropriate." Id.
62. Rogers, Ocean Dumping, 7 ENvTL. L. 1, 13 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Rogers].
63. Schenke, The Marine Protection,Research, and SanctuariesAct: The Conflict Between Marine Protection and Oil and Gas Development, 18 Hous. L. REv. 987, 1001 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Schenke].
64. Rogers, supra note 62, at 13; see 1982 Ocean Dumping Hearings,supra note 21, at
173 (statement of EPA); see also 1980 Dredge Spoil Hearings,supra note 25, at 331 (statement of Kenneth S. Kamlet). "[Much of the spoil material dredged from the New York
Harbor area is severely contaminated with highly toxic, persistent, and often carcinogenic
chemicals, many of which are subject to biological uptake (from water and sediments) at
levels which may have serious implications for health and the environment." Id.
65. Schenke, supra note 63, at 999. Dredged spoils received special consideration under
Annex I. Hazardous toxic materials found in dredge waters were automatically defined as
"trace" contaminants. Id.
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major land-based alternatives to the ocean disposal of sludge, for example, have become commercially feasible: (1) landfilling, (2) landspreading,
and (3) incineration. 6 Although these three alternative methods have
been used safely and effectively, each poses potential risks to human
health and the environment.6 7 Landfilling and landspreading of sludge
containing high concentrations of heavy metals and soluble materials contaminate groundwater.6 Sludge spread on agricultural fields threatens
human food supplies when crops absorb certain toxic contaminants.6 9 Incineration of sewage sludge, considered the most effective mode of disposal, presents environmental problems created by gaseous and particulate
emissions.70 In addition, disposal of ash residue produced through incineration endangers the environment because high concentrations
of heavy
7
metals found in sludge become residues in the ash. '
Incineration of wastes at sea, in specially designed tankers, offers
perhaps the best means of disposing of certain ultra-hazardous chemical
wastes.7 2 However, the high-temperature, high-efficiency, combustion

66. Dumping Sludge, supra note 46, at 411.
Landfilling involves placing the waste in landfills or impounding it in storage
lagoons or basins; it is the most common sludge disposal technique in the
United States, accounting for approximately forty-four percent of the sludge
generated. Landspreading involves using the waste as fertilizer or as soil conditioner and accounts for about twenty-four percent of the sludge. Approximately twenty-two percent of the sludge is incinerated.
Id. For a more detailed discussion of the various sludge management alternatives, see 1981
Waste Dumping Hearings, supra note 42, at 467-70 (statement of Christopher J. Capper).
67. Dumping Sludge, supra note 46, at 411.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 411-12.
70. See id. at 412.
71. Dumping Sludge, supra note 46, at 412.
72. Farrington, Capuzzo, Leschine, & Champ, Ocean Dumping, 25 OCEANuS 39, 45
(1982-83) [hereinafter cited as Farrington].
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has allowed several test burnings
of chlorinated organic chemical wastes at sea where the basic chemical nature
of seawater rapidly neutralizes the hydrochloric acid that is the main combustion product of concern. Burning such wastes on land requires difficult and
potentially expensive controls on the release of this acid to prevent adverse
effects on nearby structures, plants, animals, and people.
Id. Incineration of toxic wastes at sea has been used for more than a decade by European
counLries, w c are.......
,.".
+ - exp eriment than the U.S. in the utilization of
alternate disposal methods. EPA permission for the operation of the Vulcanus II, a commercial incineration vessel, has not come easily. In October of 1983, EPA tentatively approved a three-year permit for the Vulcanus II to burn hazardous wastes in U.S. waters.
Critics of the incineration process contended that the ship was not adequately tested. Lancaster, Waste Management Still Hits Snags In Bid To Operate Incinerator Ship, Wall St.
J., Nov. 17, 1983, Sec. 2, at 35, Cols. 4-6. In addition, land-based operators are required to
install costly pollution-cleansing scrubbers which are not mandated for sea operated incinerators. The installation of these devices on incinerator ships would reduce considerably the
ships' expected cost edge. See id. Failure to install such pollution-control equipment, however, may merely transform the ocean dumping pollution problem into a degradation of the
atmosphere.
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technology
including:

of

incineration

entails

several

adverse

characteristics

a. the difficulty of ensuring continued high efficiency of operations;
b. the risk of accidental spills of material during collection, storage,
loading, and transit at sea; and
c. the high cost of the
fuel necessary to achieve and maintain the re7
quired temperatures. 3
Pollution controls seldom reveal tangible benefits. The social utility
of a pollution-free environment is often quite difficult to ascertain. 74 Economic and political factors dominate the final decision on the methods
utilized to dispose of unwanted materials." Dumping pollutants into the
oceans is frequently the mode which is the most economically and politically expedient.70 Environmental regulations, increased energy costs, and
the dwindling availability of land have dramatically increased the cost
differential of non-ocean disposal methods. 77 The estimated costs of landbased alternatives may be 10 to 100 times greater than the costs of ocean
disposal.78 For example, composting sewage sludge generated by New
York City would entail a capital cost of $250 million and require an annual operating budget of $45 million. 79 In contrast, the total expense of
ocean disposal of the same sludge over the same period would cost approximately $3 million.80
Users of the ocean as a resource for waste disposal generate costs
external to themselves that are borne by others."1 These costs, called externalities or external diseconomics, are absorbed elsewhere by society.82
"[B]ecause ocean dumpers do not have to pay for ocean dumping and
disposal property, and because the ocean has no nearby constituency,
ocean dumping is economically and politically expedient." 3 If policymakers consider the full costs of ocean dumping and the impact of marine
pollution on the quality of human life, the cost differential of alternative
disposal media may prove less troublesome and ocean disposal less attractive. "[T]hose who would use the ocean to subsidize their enterprises

73. Farrington, supra note 72, at 45.
74. Waldichuk, supra note 2, at 283.
75. Id. at 277.
76. Dumping Sludge, supra note 46, at 415.
77. Id. "As sites for landfilling or landspreading become less available, the costs of
transporting the sewage sludge become significant." Id. at 415-16. "Large energy requirements have always made incineration a relatively expensive disposal technique, but the energy demands of air pollution control technology have recently increased these expenses."
Id. at 416.
78. Bleicher, The Battle Over Ocean Dumping, 12 ENvTL. L. R". 15,032, 15,033 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Dumping Battle].
79.Dumping Sludge, supra note 46, at 416.
80. Id.
81. Waldichuk, supra note 2, at 276.
82. Id.
83. Dumping Sludge, supra note 46, at 425.
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ought to bear the burden of proof that no irreversible damage will result
now, or in the future."" ' '
Thus, the problem is that "[olften, the economics of a particular disposal operation, rather than its ecological impact, will determine the final
disposal practice." 85 This situation is illustrated by the former practice in
the United States of disposing of low-level radioactive wastes by dumping
them into the coastal waters of California. From 1946 to 1970, these
wastes were dumped by the United States under regulations established
by the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), which were set prior to the
international controls on low-level waste disposal.86 Due to stricter dumping policies adopted by the AEC and due to the attractiveness of shallow
burial of wastes on land, U.S. ocean disposal of low-level radioactive
wastes declined in importance and was eventually terminated in 1970.8,
Thereafter, as a result of the high cost of sea disposal, these wastes were
buried inland at a lower cost. Although the termination of this ocean
dumping was a long-term benefit to life in coastal U.S. waters, the fact
remains that economics, rather than ecological impact, was the determining factor."
Due to a shortage of inexpensive land disposal sites, the pendulum
may swing toward greater use of ocean dumping for radioactive wastes.
Despite the dumping moratorium adopted by Congress, effective through
January 6, 1985,11 the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has conducted
feasibility research on using the seabed for disposal of high-level radioactive wastes."' In addition, the DOE has advanced a proposal to dump

84. 1982 Ocean Dumping Hearings, supra note 21, at 188 (statement of Jacques-Yves

Cousteau).
85. Waldichuk, supra note 2, at 277.
86. Finn, Ocean Disposal of Radioactive Wastes: The Obligation of International Cooperation to Protect the Marine Environment, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 621, 632 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Finn]. Following passage of the MPRSA, jurisdiction over radioactive waste

disposal by the United States shifted to the EPA. Id. at 633. Internationally, the Ocean
Dumping Convention vested regulatory authority over "rad-waste" dumping with IMCO
and technical oversight with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). See id. A
thorough analysis of radioactive waste dumping is beyond the scope of this article. For a
comprehensive examination of radioactive waste disposal issues, see id. at 621-90; 1981
Waste Dumping Hearings, supra note 42, at 381-464.
87. Finn, supra note 86, at 632-33.
00
IdT..1
,I
supra nte 9., at 277.

89. Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-424, § 424(a), 96
Stat. 2165 (1983) (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1414).
90. CEQ 1982 REPORT, supra note 23, at 97. The ocean disposal option is favored for
several reasons: (1) "developing marine technology may provide the means to design, imple-

ment, and monitor a disposal system": (2) deep-seabed sediments, "which would tend to
trap released radionuclides from high level waste, constitute one of the most geologically
stable environments in the world"; (3) the ocean provides "a medium of dilution for any
wastes released from a repository"; (4) ocean sites would provide "resistance to future
human intrusion"; and (5) ocean repositories would reduce domestic political pressures associated with selecting land-based sites. Finn, supra note 86, at 640-41. On the other hand,
ocean disposal of radiological wastes involves several troubling risks:
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thousands of cubic yards of radioactive soil generated by the 1950's Manhattan Project and other contaminated materials created in similar energy programs."' Similarly, the U.S. Navy has explored the possibility of
dumping irradiated decommissioned nuclear submarines at sea after
defueling their reactors. 92 These evolving U.S. interests in ocean dumping
indicate that the trend in balancing economic costs and ecological effect
will extend the pollution hazards of radiological wastes to the marine
environment.9 3
Other industrialized countries have also dumped low-level radioactive wastes into the ocean. 94 Pursuant to the Ocean Dumping Convention,
Western European disposal operations have dumped much larger
amounts of these wastes than the previous amounts dumped by the
United States. 95 During the period between 1967 and 1979, dumping by
European countries exceeded one-half million curies of radioactive waste,
whereas total U.S. dumping between 1946 and 1970 approximated 94,630

(1) Wastes are irretrievable once they have been placed in the ocean. What
may appear to be acceptable today may prove unacceptable tomorrow. It is
necessary to maintain the option of future remedial action because we do not
have a full understanding of the ecological consequences of ocean disposal of
radioactive materials.
(2) The bioaccumulation of radionuclides is poorly understood. Radioactive
materials may pose serious health threats to future generations.
(3) There has been no clear demonstration of the need or advantages of ocean
dumping of radioactive materials other than political or financial
considerations.
(4) Opening the ocean as a dumping ground for radioactive wastes encourages
the proliferation of such wastes, and discourages the minimization of waste
generation ...
1982 Ocean Dumping Hearings,supra note 21, at 551-52 (statement of Edmund G. Brown,

Jr.).
91. Disposal of Decommissioned Nuclear Submarines: Hearing Before the House
Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,97th Cong., 2d Sess. 125 (1982) (statement of
Clifton E. Curtis) [hereinafter cited as 1982 Submarine Hearing].
92. Id. at 2. The United States Navy has not identified a preferred alternative, and no
immediate plans have been made to dispose of nuclear powered vessels. No deep-ocean sites
have been selected. However, deep ocean disposal is being examined because it might produce negligible environmental harms at lower costs than land burial alternatives. Id. at 4
(testimony of Carl H. Schmitt).
93. Cf. U.S. ENvTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS JAN.-DEc. 1980, 18
(1981) [hereinafter cited as EPA 1980 REPORT] (based on environmental impact survey results, the EPA has concluded that past ocean dumping of radioactive wastes by the United
States has not caused harm to either man or the marine ecosystem).
94. Finn, supra note 86, at 633. However, these activities may be reversed following
passage of a Spanish resolution calling for the suspension of sea dumping of radioactive
waste. The resolution, enacted at a 1983 meeting of the parties to the Ocean Dumping Convention in London, would suspend dumping until 1985, while the IAEA assessed the environmental safety of ocean disposal. The resolution, as such, is non-binding but serves as
moral persuasion against ocean dumping. See Cruickshank, Disposing of intermediate and

low level waste in Britain, NUCLEAR
95. Finn, supra note 86, at 635.

ENGINEERING INT'L,

Aug. 1983, at 33, 35.
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curies.9 6 The vast magnitude of the European operations, when coupled
with the possibility of future dumping by the United States, highlights
the need for transnational cooperation.17 Without an internationally enforceable policy on radioactive waste dumping, "a mad dash toward using
the oceans as a less expensive, quick fix for waste disposal will occur without due consideration of the relative risks and benefits of all options for
waste management. "s
The MPRSA authorized the EPA to deny ocean disposal of wastes
containing any of several types of "prohibited materials" (organohalogens, mercury, cadmium, oil, and others) unless present only as trace
contaminants, in which case an application must be made for a special or
interim permit. The definitional problem with trace contaminants has
been previously discussed. 9
Interim permits require their holders to take effective action to develop alternatives to ocean dumping. However, sewage sludge, the waste
substance most often dumped under interim permits, was not originally
subject to this type of implementation plan."'0 Certain sludge wastes cannot be sufficiently modified to eliminate the accumulation of all hazardous substances.0 1 Even so, it has been proven that there are economically
feasible recycling alternatives for sewage sludge, particularly when external costs are considered. 0 2 Inclusion of sewage sludge in the implementation plan requirement has pressured municipalities to find recycling alternatives. 10 3 In addition, holders of "special permits," who were not
required to formulate implementation plans, were encouraged to search
for alternatives.
Another problem area deals with international uniformity and the
method of regulation. Under one international legal interpretation, the
ocean is res communes, i.e., the common possession of mankind.'0 4 According to the concept known as the "tragedy of the commons," property
which is the common heritage of humanity belongs to no one in particular
and therefore, gets no special attention for preservation. 0 5 Accordingly,
each country is motivated to maximize its short-term benefits in using
common property resources-in this instance, the utilization of the

96. Id. at 632-33.
97. Id. at 633.
98. Farrington, supra note 72, at 50.
99. See footnotes 62-63 supra and accompanying text.
100. Lumsdaine, supra note 4, at 775-76.
101. See 1982 Ocean Dumping Hearings,supra note 21, at 297 (statement of Dr. John
A. Knauss).
102. Lumsdaine, supra note 4, at 776.
103. Id.
104. Dumping Sludge, supra note 46, at 424-25. The other international legal interpretation is that the ocean is res nullius; i.e., the property of no one. It should be noted that res
communes is frequently misspelled res communis.
105. Ocean Dumping Progress, supra note 30, at 748; see Hardin, The Tragedy of the
Commons, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL HANDBOOK (G. DeBell ed. 1970).
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oceans for dumping.' Since each country is a sovereign, each can theoretically despoil the environment in any manner it desires.'0 7 The dumping of materials in deeper ocean waters, legally accessible to any country,
may be especially damaging because the site chosen may fall below the
"thermocline," where conditions on the ocean floor are generally unvarying and marine organisms are highly sensitive to change. '
Most ocean disposal takes place within the territorial waters or contiguous zone of a country due to considerations of convenience and due to
high transportation costs. It has been suggested that "90 percent or more
of the particles originating in rivers or discharged to the oceans settle out
at the discharge site or never leave the coastal zone."' 0 9 However, if the
settling rate is slow, a pollutant may be carried by currents from the coast
of one country to another. In either case, fish feeding in coastal zones can
be caught in international zones-possibly transferring one country's pollutants to the people of another. Waters washing ashore on the Antarctic
continent have already showed signs of pollution originating from other
parts of the world." This problem illustrates the internationality and
commonality of the marine pollution dilemma. Wastes discharged into
the oceans do not respect political boundaries."' Therefore, a need exists
for uniformity of standards for effluent discharges and water quality from
one country to another. "Both use and abuse of the seas are of consequence to all peoples; a GLOBAL OCEAN POLICY thus must be established to define a common set of principles and rules for activities of indi' 2
vidual nations and 'a fortiori' for states and cities."

106. See Waldichuk, supra note 2, at 276.
107. Dumping Dilemma, supra note 10, at 870 n.4. As noted by one commentator:
Developing nations are unimpressed by the dilatory environmental chivalry of
developed nations which while themselves industrializing polluted with impunity. These nations are not easily swayed by arguments favoring strong environmental protection measures, believing that if such stringent standards are
applied to them their development will be considerably more difficult, expensive, and inconvenient. England only recently began ocean dumping its sewage
sludge and is disturbed by the U.S. example of strictly controlling such
dumping.
Id.
108. Lumsdaine, supra note 4, at 755 n.13.
109. Rogers, supra note 62, at 21 n.86.
110. 1982 Ocean Dumping Hearings, supra note 21, at 188 (statement of Jacques-Yves
Cousteau).
111. Farrington, supra note 72, at 49.
112. 1982 Ocean Dumping Hearings, supra note 21, at 188 (statement of Jacques-Yves
Cousteau) (emphasis original).
The Pilatus syndrome-that is, dump it and wash your hands-is no longer an
expediency. It has now developed into an entirely new, fundamental moral issue. What we dump "out of sight" in the sea will not remain for long "out of
mind." The anonymous crime of conventional poison dumping is aimed at no
one in particular, but it may bring about agonies around the world. The ultimate conceivable escalation consists in threatening not just other nations who
are endangered by our recklessness, but whole generations to come.
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Goals

Both the Ocean Dumping Convention and the MPRSA clearly delineate which pollutants are prohibited from being dumped into the oceans.
However, if these contaminants are present as traces in dredged spoils or
sewage sludge, they may be readily dumped-often in very high concentrations. This dumping violates the spirit of both the Ocean Dumping
Convention and the MPRSA. In pure form, these contaminants are prohibited because they are dangerous, regardless of the particular type of
waste in which they are found.
An international organization, such as the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO)," 3 should establish standards
which resolve certain questions. For example, this international body
should resolve: (1) whether "trace" really means concentrations normally
found in the ocean (i.e., natural levels), (2) whether the phrase means
only that each nation should dump as little of the blacklisted substances
as possible, or (3) whether whole categories of common wastes such as
dredge spoil and sewage sludge are to be exempt from Annex ."4
The permissible concentrations of toxic materials in ocean dumped
wastes has received a good deal of discussion, but little attention has been
given to "the more difficult environmental and legal question of how
much total waste should be allowed to be dumped."'1' IMCO should determine the overall levels of waste mentioned herein and investigate their
potential ramifications. This gap in ecological understanding highlights
the vast need for further marine scientific investigation, and therefore, a
maximum amount of freedom of research should be encouraged"" to protect the "common heritage of mankind." The sine qua non7 of protecting
the marine environment is freedom of scientific research."1
Another major goal should be to encourage harmony between international and national laws. In the United States, "[tihe EPA ocean
dumping program [as defined by the MPRSA] is one of the few national
environmental regulatory programs significantly affected by international
law." 118 The Ocean Dumping Convention establishes international rules

113. In 1982, IMCO changed its official name to the International Maritime Organization, but it is still commonly referred to as IMCO. For a brief discussion on the formation of
IMCO, see Kindt, Special Claims Impacting Upon Marine Pollution issues At "The Third
U.N. Conference On The Law Of The Sea, 10 CAL. W. INr'L L.J. 397, 432 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Special Claims].
114. Rogers, supra note 62, at 20-21.
115. Id. at 21 (emphasis added).
116. See e.g., 1982 Submarine Hearing,supra note 91, at 123 (statement of Clifton E.
Curtis).
117. Kindt, The Effects of Claims by Developing Countries on LOS International
Marine Pollution Negotiations, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 313, 339 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Effects of Claims].
118. Rogers, supra note 62, at 6.
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of conduct. 1 9 However, incorporating the Convention into U.S. environmental law and regulatory policy created two problems. First, there was
confusion due to contradictions between the MPRSA and the Ocean
Dumping Convention. 20 Secondly, national laws of the participating
countries were not uniform, so that actions taken in one country would
often undermine the efforts of another country. An example of this international vis-a-vis national disharmony was the unilateral decision by
Canada in 1970 to exercise jurisdictional control over a 100-mile "pollution zone." At the time, creation of such a zone was criticized as a flagrant
violation of international law.' 2 ' Canada responded by asserting that the
Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act' 22 was enacted to remedy international legal weaknesses that failed to protect Canadian shores from pollution. 22 Such unilateral extensions of jurisdiction, for whatever reason,
need to be discouraged since the LOS Convention addresses this type of
24
problem.'
The final and perhaps most challenging goal pertains to the implementation of an international regulatory scheme. Defining what the law
should be has been less difficult than agreeing on how to enforce the law
and deciding who should carry out the enforcement. Regional arrangements appear to be the best means of approaching this particular
problem 2 "
C.

Historical Background
1.

U.S. Legislation
a.

General U.S. Legislation

Substantial international regulation of ocean dumping has taken
place only since the 1950's. For this reason, U.S. legislation and regulation policy as well as international regulations need to be reevaluated.
There are similarities between U.S. and international law, and these similarities will be analyzed after an examination of pertinent U.S. legislation.

119. See Dumping Dilemma, supra note 10, at 885-86; Dumping Sludge, supra note 46,

at 403. The MPRSA was amended in 1974 providing that "[t]o the extent that he may do so
without relaxing the requirements of this subchapter, the Administrator, in establishing or
revising such criteria, shall apply the standards and criteria binding upon the United States
under the Convention, including its Annexes." 33 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (1976).
120. See Kuersteiner, supra note 54, at 162-63.
121. Okidi, Toward Regional Arrangements for Regulation of Marine Pollution: An
Appraisal of Options, 40CEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 1, 1 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Okidi];
Special Claims, supra, note 113, at 438 & n.282.
122. CAN. REV. STAT. c.2 (1st Supp. 1970), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 543 (1970).

123. Okidi, supra note 121, at 2. Canadian authorities argued that Canada had a sovereign right and duty to enact and enforce protective measures because of the "uniqueness
and fragility of the Arctic ecology." Id.
124. See LOS Convention, supra note 35, art. 194; cf. id. art. 234. Canadian claims for
protecting the Arctic are now specifically covered in the LOS Convention. Id. art. 234.
125. Effects of Claims, supra note 117, at 332.
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Prior to the 1970's, statutory and regulatory control exercised over
ocean dumping by the U.S. government was minimal.12 Although several
federal agencies possessed authority over limited facets of dumping activities, no single agency was empowered to regulate ocean waste disposal on
a comprehensive scale.12 Under the Supervisory Harbors Act of 1888,1"'
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) was delegated jurisdiction over
the removal of materials from various ports. For activities transpiring
within the territorial sea, the River and Harbors Appropriations Act of
1899129 (Refuse Act) and the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1905130 provided
13 1
legal support for the exercise of regulatory control by the Corps.
Historically, the Corps failed to utilize these acts to impose stringent
pollution control regulations. The only major action taken by the Corps
was to designate sites for ocean dumping. The limited use of its regulatory power was explained by the Corps' interpretation of its responsibilities as being directed toward problems concerning navigation, not pollution.' 2 In addition, during the early twentieth century the assimilative
capacity of the oceans was widely believed to be limitless. Public opinion
and legislation were generally insensitive to ocean dumping pollution
problems. Even during the growth of environmental awareness and activism in the 1950s and 1960s, the oceans were relatively ignored.' 33 It was
not until 1966 that Congress first ordered a comprehensive investigation
of marine issues. 4
Public concern in the United States was eventually aroused by the
dumping of sewage sludge and dredge spoils in the New York Bight.'" In
response to public concern, the Governor of New Jersey recommended
that: (1) sewage sludge dumping be phased out; (2) present dumpsites be
immediately moved 100 miles out to sea; (3) future Corps' permits be
conditioned upon a pledge for the termination of dumping; and (4) con
currence with New York State be sought through agreement or congressional enactment. 3 6 Alarmed by the technological gap between increased
wastes and ecologically safe ocean disposal methods, President Nixon directed the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) to work with other

Ocean Dumping Progress, supra note 30, at 753-54.
Id. at 754.
33 U.S.C. §§ 441-454 (1976).
33 U.S.C. § 401 (1976).
33 U.S.C. § 417 (1976).
Rogers, supra note 62, at 3.
Spirer, The Ocean Dumping Deadline: Easing the Mandate Millstone, 11 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 8-9 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Spirer]. The enabling legislation was addressed to the navigational, as distinguished from the environmental, risks posed by ocean
dumping. Since the Congress was concerned that disposal of wastes at harbor entrances
would frustrate dredging operations, the Corps was vested with regulatory control over
dumping activities. Id.
133. Id. at 12.
134. Id.; see id. at 12 n.67.
135. See Spirer, supra note 132, at 13.
136. Id.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
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agencies and to recommend necessary research legislation and administrative actions.""7 In 1970, the report of the CEQ was transmitted to Congress along with President Nixon's endorsement of the conclusions and
legislative recommendations made by the CEQ.'38
b.

The Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of
1972

Prompted by the CEQ report, in 1972 the Congress passed the
MPRSA, 13 effective April 23, 1973. " 0 With enactment of Title I of the
MPRSA, Congress pursued two explicit objectives: (1) to regulate, as
much as possible, all disposal of wastes in ocean waters, and (2) to limit
strictly or prevent any such dumping that "would adversely affect human
health, welfare, or amenities, or the marine environment, ecological sys1 ' 41
tems, or economic potentialities.
The MPRSA attacks the problem of ocean dumping in two ways.
First, the MPRSA bans all dumping of materials (without a permit)
within the territorial sea (which can be 12 nautical miles) and the contiguous zone of the United States. Secondly, it prohibits all transportation
of materials from the United States for the purpose of ocean dumping,
unless authorized by a permit.1 42 The MPRSA provides control over both
the content and manner of dumping, without duplicating other environmental statutes, and it divides the power to issue permits between the
EPA and the Corps. Under the MPRSA, the EPA sets criteria for evaluation of all permit applications and issues permits for the dumping of all
materials except dredged spoils. The Corps issues permits for the dumping of dredged spoils using EPA's criteria. 43
In directing the EPA to establish criteria for the review of permit
applications, the MPRSA specified nine factors for EPA consideration. 4 4

137. Id. at 15.
138. See OCEAN DUMPING REPORT, supra note 11, at 1-11.
139. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1444 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
140. Rogers, supra note 62, at 4.
141. 33 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (1976).
142. Lumsdaine, supra note 4, at 760.
143. Id at 763.
144. 33 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (1976). The nine factors, which are not exclusive, include the
following:
(A) The need for the proposed dumping.
(B) The effect of such dumping on human health and welfare, including
economic, esthetic, and recreational values.
(C) The effect of such dumping on fisheries resources, plankton, fish, shellfish, wildlife, shore lines, and beaches.
(D) The effect of such dumping on marine ecosystems, particularly with
respect to(i) the transfer, concentration, and dispersion of such material and
its byproducts through biological, physical, and chemical processes, (ii)
potential changes in marine ecosystem diversity, productivity, and stability, and (iii) species and community population dynamics.
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For substances which are not prohibitied under Title I,"' the EPA's implementing guidelines 4" enumerated several categories of ocean dumping
permits.'
a. General permits may be issued for the dumping of small
amounts of those materials which cause minimal adverse environmental impacts (e.g., burial at sea involving human remains or ashes,
transport and sinking of vessels by the U.S. Navy during ordnance
testing, the sinking
of derelict vessels posing a threat to navigational
48
operations);
b. Special permits may be issued to dump materials which satisfy
the criteria"19 for reviewing and evaluating such applications, but they
may only be issued for a maximum of 3 years per permit; 50
c. Emergency permits may be issued to dump materials which
pose a danger to human health and which admit to no other feasible
solution;' 5'
d. Interim permits may be issued, not exceeding 1 year, for those
materials that do not comply with dumping criteria and for which no
feasible land-based alternatives exist. 5 This permit was scheduled
for phaseout on December 31, 1981;
e. Research permits may be issued to dump any materials into
the ocean when the scientific advantages outweigh the potential environmental damage. 15
f. Permits for incineration at sea are issued as research or in-

terim permits except where evaluations of the waste materials, incineration method, disposal location, and vessel have been conducted

(E) The persistence and permanence of the effects of the dumping.
(F) The effect of dumping particular volumes and concentrations of
such materials.
(G) Appropriate locations and methods of disposal or recycling, including land-based alternatives and the probable impact of requiring
use of such alternative locations or methods upon considerations affecting the public interest.
(H) The effect on alternate uses of oceans, such as scientific study,
fishing, and other living resource exploitation, and non-living resource
exploitation.
(I) In designating recommended sites, the Administrator shall utilize wherever feasible locations beyond the edge of the Continental Shelf.
Id.
145. See id. Radiological, chemical and biological warfare agents and high-level radioactive wastes are prohibited by the MPRSA from being dumped, and dredged material is
handled separately in section 1413.
146. 40 C.F.R. §§ 220-228 (1982).
147. Id. at § 220.3.
148. EPA 1980 REPORT, supra note 93, at 3.
149. 33 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (1976).
150. 40 C.F.R. § 220.3(b) (1982).
151. Id. at § 220.3(c).
152. EPA 1980 REPORT, supra note 93, at 3; see 40 C.F.R. § 220.3(d) (1982).
153. EPA 1980 REPORT, supra note 93, at 3; 40 C.F.R. §220.3(e) (1982).
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previously, and warrant a special permit."'
However, before permits are issued, the EPA must give notice and an
opportunity for public hearings. 55
Title I of the MPRSA empowers the Administrator of the EPA to
designate areas where ocean dumping will be permitted or prohibited. 5 6
For violations of permit conditions, the EPA has the authority to revoke
or suspend the permit 57 and to assess civil penalties. 5 In addition, criminal proceedings may be initiated by the U.S. Attorney General against
persons who knowingly violate the MPRSA. 5 9 Under Title I, the U.S.
Coast Guard is empowered to utilize surveillance and other appropriate
enforcement measures to prevent unlawful transportation of dumping
materials or unlawful dumping. 60
Title II of the MPRSA requires the Secretary of Commerce to initiate a comprehensive and continuing program to monitor and research the
impact of ocean dumping. 6 ' The research program is conducted under
the auspices of the Department of Commerce-the lead agency being the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The research is directed at: (1) the consequences of overfishing, (2) the longrange effects of pollution, and (3) the man-induced changes in ocean ecosystems. 6 2 Title III authorizes NOAA to establish marine sanctuaries. 6 3
Although the MPRSA originally set no deadline for the termination
of ocean dumping, Congress expected such activity to be reduced or eliminated expeditiously. 4 To this end, the final regulations and criteria
adopted by the EPA in 1973 to evaluate dumping applications virtually
ignored the mitigating factors enumerated under the MPRSA.' 5 The
EPA relied almost completely upon considerations involving the type of
material dumped; hence, a restrictive approach was taken towards applying the criteria embodied in the MPRSA.6 6 With little scientific understanding regarding the impact of particular dumping practices, the EPA
cautiously elected to ban virtually all ocean disposal which could conceiv-

154. 40 C.F.R. § 220.3(0 (1982).
155. 33 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (1976); see 40 C.F.R. § 222.3-222.4 (1982).
156. 33 U.S.C. § 1412(c) (1976).
157. Id. at § 1415(0.
158. Id. at § 1415(a).
159. Id. at § 1415(b). Criminal sanctions may also be assessed against a "person who
knowingly violates this subchapter, regulations promulgated under this subchapter, or a permit issued under this subchapter shall be fined not more than $50,000, or imprisoned for not
more than one year, or both." Id.
160. Id. at § 1417(c).
161. Id. at § 1441.
162. Id. at § 1442(a) (Supp. V 1981).
163. EPA 1980 REPORT, supra note 93, at 2.
164. Dumping Sludge, supra note 46, at 402.
165. Spirer, supra note 132, at 20.
166. Id. at 20-21.
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ably be harmful to the environment. 67
The EPA's regulatory program for sewage sludge, implemented pursuant to the MPRSA, was increasingly criticized as being overly protective of the ocean, especially when limited availability of alternate disposal
options was considered. 6 8 In 1976, revised regulations and criteria were
issued by the EPA.' 9 While reiterating the EPA's opposition to ocean
dumping, these measures followed a more pragmatic scheme for evaluating the environmental acceptability of dumping sludge.' 70 This scheme
did not rely on the simple presence of certain specific toxic materials;
instead, it relied on the impact of the material upon marine ecosystems as
measured by bioassay and bioaccumulation tests. The EPA would permit
municipal sludge producers to continue dumping under interim permits
even if their waste failed to meet the new criteria, as long as the municipality exercised its best efforts to meet the standards.'"' Even so, these
regulations provided that interim permits would not be extended past
December 31, 1981.171
In 1977, Congress amended the MPRSA to prohibit dumping of all
sludge after 1981 which would "unreasonably degrade or endanger human
health, welfare, or amenities, or the marine environment, ecological systems, and economic potentialities."' 73 The congressional validation of the
interim permit system and the congressional agreement with the EPA's
December 31, 1981 deadline acted as motivating forces for the legislation.' 7 4 Approximately 3 years later, in 1980, Congress again revised the
MPRSA to restrict industrial waste disposal in a manner similar to that
imposed on sewage sludge. 17 5 However, the amendment allowed narrow
76
exceptions for research purposes and emergency situations.'
As 1981 began, circumstances encouraged alteration of the sludge
dumping moratorium of December 31st.17 7 Continued inflation, increased
consumption of energy, and politicized public discontent with government spending and regulation tempered the movement to clean-up the
environment.' 78 Increased expenses of the ocean dumping regulatory sys-

167. Id. at 21.
168. Dumping Sludge, supra note 46, at 395.
169. Spirer, supra note 132, at 25.
170. See Dumping Sludge, supra note 46, at 407.
171. Spirer, supra note 132, at 25-26. The new criteria are set forth in 40 C.F.R. § 227.4
(1982).
172. Dumping Sludge, supra note 46, at 408.
173. 33 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(d) (1982). The term "sewage sludge" is defined to mean "any
solid, semisolid, or liquid waste generated by a municipal wastewater treatment plant the
ocean dumping of which may unreasonably degrade or endanger human health, welfare, or
amenities, or the maritime environment, ecological systems, and economic potentialities."

Id.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

See Dumping Battle, supra note 78, at 15,034.
Id.; 33 U.S.C. § 1412a(a) (Supp. V 1981).
33 U.S.C. § 1412a(b)-(c) (Supp. V 1981).
Spirer, supra note 132, at 38.
Id. at 36.
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tern generated considerable political debate.' 79 A report by the General
Accounting Office (GAO) recommended that the EPA consider the environmental effects of land-based alternatives to ocean dumping before
banning ocean disposal.180 This recommendation was followed by a report
from the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), advocating a "multimedium view" for sewage sludge disposal. 8 1 The National Advisory
Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere (NACOA) also endorsed the multimedia management of waste disposal.' 2 Finally, President Reagan initiated a policy for obviating environmental regulations and other federal
regulations in favor of greater state and local autonomy.' 83
In 1981, the City of New York successfully challenged the EPA's permit criteria in City of New York v. U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency.8 4 The Federal Court for the Southern District of New York
85
granted a motion for summary judgment in favor of New York City.1
Following this decision, the EPA could only enforce the 1981 dumping
moratorium with regard to materials which unreasonably degraded the
environment, and the EPA was ordered to revise its criteria to assess the
unreasonable degradative environmental impact of each application according to the statutory factors. 86 In addition, the Court prohibited any
action by the EPA which would force New York City to implement landbased alternatives "without evaluating and finding acceptable the actual
and potential environmental effects of land disposal.' 87 Accordingly, the

179. Id. at 37.
180. Dumping Sludge, supra note 46, at 418.

181. Id.
The NAS called for a comparison of the suitability for waste disposal of each
environmental medium: ocean, land, and air. Sewage sludge, the NAS argued,
should be disposed of in the medium in which it would pose the least serious
environmental and public health risks. The report recommended that EPA not
carry out its plan to end all ocean dumping of sewage sludge because this
would exclude wastes from one environmental medium at the expense of the
remaining media.
Id. at 418-19.
182. Id. at 419. "NACOA is convinced that part of the present problem is the mediumby-medium approach that follows from the statutory regimes enacted by Congress (Clean
Air Act, the Ocean Dumping Act, the Clean Water Act, etc.) and the conflicting goals of
many of the existing laws." 1981 Waste Dumping Hearings,supra note 42, at 78-79 (statement of Dr. John A. Knauss). NACOA's 1981 recommendations included: (1) "[i]ncreased
incentives for reuse, recycling, and reduction of waste products;" (2) "[a]n integrated approach to weighing different waste disposal options;" (3) "[m]ore consistent environmental
criteria for disposal in different media;" (4) "[clontinuation of ocean disposal 'under appropriate management conditions and with adequate monitoring safeguards';" and (5)
"[i]ncreased emphasis on ocean disposal research and monitoring." 1982 Ocean Dumping
Hearings, supra note 21, at 290 (statement of Dr. John A. Knauss).
183. Spirer, supra note 132, at 38.
184. 543 F. Supp. 1084 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). Citations are to the revised opinion issued on
Aug. 26, 1981.
185. 543 F. Supp. at 1115.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 1099.
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"EPA could not lawfully adopt a policy of denying all permits without
examining and weighing an applicant's evidence that ocean dumping...
[was] the most reasonable alternative."' 88
In reaching its holding, the Court emphasized the "legislative history
of the MPRSA and the unreasonableness of the EPA's regulations as applied to New York City."18 9 The arbitrary manner in which the EPA ordered cessation of sludge dumping concerned the Court. 90 The Court also
rejected the EPA's argument that the 1977 amendment precluded the
agency from relaxing its criteria.'9 ' According to the Court, Congress
sought only to halt the EPA's prior practice which granted interim permits on the basis of good faith efforts by municipalities to comply."9 '
While the propriety of the Court's interpretation of the 1977 amendment
was debatable, 98 the Court made it clear that economic costs as well as
94
relative environmental impacts must be considered.
Under the Reagan Administration, the EPA modified its approach
toward the regulation of ocean dumping. 9 5 A more flexible policy toward
ocean disposal, coupled with the EPA's change of attitude (which was
modified to view the ocean as a valid dumping option), weighed heavily in
the EPA's decision not to appeal the City of New York holding.' 96 Although the EPA's move generated controversy,1 9 7 congressional attitudes
toward ocean dumping were mixed. 98 Through 1982 the legislative response to the EPA's decision not to appeal the City of New York decision
remained unsettled.' 9 ' While some members of Congress questioned the
need to ban ocean disposal of sewage sludge, other members still strongly
opposed this dumping. Several unsuccessful attempts to change the ocean
dumping provisions of the MPRSA were made by both sides to the

188. Id. at 1086.
189. Spirer, supra note 132, at 41.
190. Id. The Court concluded that:
(1) such cessation 'would result in no discernible improvement in the area of
the ocean around the dumpsite,' (2) no 'workable plan' for a long-term alternative had been found, (3) the cost of the city's proposed interim solution would
far exceed the cost of ocean dumping, and (4) implementation of the city's
land-based interim solution could pose serious environmental dangers which
the EPA had taken only a 'casual approach in evaluating.'
Id. at 41-42.
191. Dumping Sludge. supra note 46. at 421.
192. Id.
193. See Spirer, supra note 132, at 42-44.
194. Dumping Battle, supra note 78, at 15,035.
195. Dumping Sludge, supra note 46, at 422.
196. Id.
197. Id. Representative Norman D'Amours (D-N.H.) has called the EPA's "decision 'a
betrayal of congressional trust' and a 'devastating blow' to efforts to end harmful dumping
practices." Id.
198. Id.
199. Spirer, supra note 132, at 47.
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Even so, Congress did amend the MPRSA relating to the ocean disposal of low-level radioactive waste by attaching a rider to the Surface
Transportation Assistance Act of 1982.201 Under the amendment, a moratorium on the issuance of permits for low-level radioactive waste dumping, except for research purposes, was to be enforced until January 6,
1985.202 After expiration of this partial moratorium, an applicant would
be required to prepare a site-specific disposal impact assessment. 03 Prior

200. Dumping Sludge, supra note 46, at 422-23; see, e.g., Spirer, supra note 132, at 4748.
201. Pub. L. No. 97-424, § 424(a), 96 Stat. 2165-67 (1983) (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. §§
1401, 1414).
202. Section 424(a)(h) of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 provides
that:
Notwithstanding any provision of this subchapter to the contrary, during
the two-year period beginning on January 6, 1983, no permit may be issued
under this subchapter that authorizes the dumping of any low-level radioactive
waste unless the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency
determines(1) that the proposed dumping is necessary to conduct research(A) on new technology related to ocean dumping, or
(B) to determine the degree to which the dumping of such substances will degrade the marine environment;
(2) that the scale of the proposed dumping is limited to the smallest
amount of such material and the shortest duration of time that is necessary to fulfill the purposes of the research, such that the dumping will
have minimal adverse impact upon human health, welfare, and amenities, and the marine environment, ecological systems, economic potentialities, and other legitimate uses;
(3) after consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, that the potential benefits of such research will outweigh any such adverse impact; and
(4) that the proposed dumping will be preceded by appropriate baseline
monitoring studies of the proposed dump site and its surrounding
environment.
Each permit issued pursuant to this subsection shall be subject to
such conditions and restrictions as the Administrator determines to be
necessary to minimize possible adverse impacts of such dumping.
Pub. L. No. 97-424, § 424(a)(h), 96 Stat. 2165 (1983) (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1414).
203. Section 424(a)(i) of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 provides
that:
(1) Two years after January 6, 1983, the Administrator may not issue a
permit under this chapter for the disposal of radioactive waste material until
the applicant, in addition to complying with all other requirements of this title,
prepares, with respect to the site at which the disposal is proposed, a Radioactive Material Disposal Impact Assessment which shall include(A) a listing of all radioactive materials in each container to be disposed, the number of containers to be dumped, the structural diagrams
of each container, the number of curies of each material in each
container, and the exposure levels in rems at the inside and outside of
each container;
(B) an analysis of the environmental impact of the proposed action,
at the site at which the applicant desires to dispose of the material,
upon human health and welfare and marine life;
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to issuance of a permit to dispose of radioactive material, the amendment
also required a joint resolution of both Houses of Congress to authorize
the Administrator of the EPA to grant such permits.2s' Although the 1981
moratorium against dumping sewage sludge has expired, the ocean dumping of this sludge continued at an increasing rate. 05
c. U.S. Policy and Problems with the MPRSA
Although the final resolution of the dilemma involving the ocean
dumping of sewage sludge has remained unresolved, the focus of the debate has shifted dramatically since the MPRSA was enacted. 0 o A singleminded preoccupation with the threat to the ocean environment by waste
dumping 0 7 has been replaced by an approach balancing the full range of

(C) any adverse environmental effects at the site which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented;
(D) an analysis of the resulting environmental and economic conditions if the containers fail to contain the radioactive waste material
when initially deposited at the specific site;
(E) a plan for the removal or containment of the disposed nuclear
material if the container leaks or decomposes;
(F) a determination by each affected State whether the proposed
action is consistent with its approved Coastal Zone Management
Program;
(G) an analysis of the economic impact upon other users of marine
resources;
(H) alternatives to the proposed action;
(I) comments and results of consultation with State officials and
public hearings held in the coastal States that are nearest to the affected
areas;
(J) a comprehensive monitoring plan to be carried out by the applicant to determine the full effect of the disposal on the marine environment, living resources, or human health, which plan shall include, but
not be limited to, the monitoring of exterior container radiation samples, the taking of water and sediment samples, and fish and benthic
animal samples, adjacent to the containers, and the acquisition of such
other information as the Administrator may require; and
(K) such other information which the Administrator may require in
order to determine the full effects of such disposal.
Pub. L. No. 97-424, § 424(a)(i), 96 Stat. 2165-66 (1983) (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1414).
204. Id. Section 424(a)(i)(4) of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982 states
that:
(B) No permit may be issued by the Administrator under this chanter for the disposal of radioactive materials in the ocean unless the Congress, by approval of a resolution described in paragraph (D) within 90
days of continuous session of the Congress beginning on the date after
the date of receipt by the Senate and the House of Representatives of
such recommendation, authorizes the Administrator to grant a permit to
dispose of radioactive material under this chapter.
Pub. L. No. 97-424, § 424(a)(i)(4), 96 Stat. 2166 (1983) (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1414).
205. Swanson & Devine, supra note 43, at 15.
206. See Spirer, supra note 132, at 44.
207. The concerns voiced by ocean preservationists, for the most part, have proven to
be overstated. Widespread contamination of the oceans has not been detected according to a

1984

OCEAN DUMPING

environmental, social and fiscal implications in the U.S. policy regarding
ocean disposal.2 0 8 As noted by one commentator:
[cihanging environmental values, technological problems and economic pressures, scientific opinion, judicial process, and political
trends converged to change the 1970s preservationist attitudes toward
the oceans. The repercussions of this change will be significant and
long-lasting. 2°"'
More knowledge has become available regarding the ocean's (1) reaction to waste dumping, (2) resiliency, and (3) assimilative capacity. There
is also more evidence relating to the likelihood that dumping in certain
ocean areas will directly and adversely affect human health. 10 When coupled with cost considerations and court rulings, this knowledge leads
some to suggest that waste dumping decision-makers need to balance "economic tradeoffs and environmental effects of disposal on land, in the air,
or in the marine environment." " As noted by New York's Mayor Koch,
the MPRSA "is one of the few environmental statutes which recognizes
that our environment is a highly complex, interrelated system and that
waste disposal strategies involve difficult but necessary trade-offs."2 ' In
some instances, ocean dumping will become the preferred option and
must be selected with a full understanding of all the consequences. s
Ocean dumping regulators must therefore consider what materials should
be dumped in quasi-containment sites, what materials should be dispersed, and what materials should not be dumped in the oceans at all. " '
Two major problems relating to the MPRSA also need to be reviewed. The first problem involves the delimitation of authority over
ocean disposal between the EPA and the Corps which has generated interagency conflict. 1 5 Under the bifurcated system adopted by Congress,
the Corps is subjected to inherently conflicting responsibilities.2 1 6 As the
major producer of dredge spoils, the Corps regulates "activities over
which its also has operational responsibility."11 7 Prior to the enactment of
the MPRSA, the Corps had almost absolute discretion in conducting

1982 study sponsored by the United Nations Environment Programme. See CEQ 1982 REPORT, supra note 23, at 45.
208. Spirer, supra note 132, at 48.
209. Swanson & Devine, supra note 43, at 15.
210. See id. at 19.

211. Swanson & Devine, supra note 43, at 19. The "EPA has expressed the belief that
it can begin to rework all of its disposal regulations to require cross-media balancing for all
waste management decisions. NACOA supports this effort by EPA." 1982 Ocean Dumping
Hearings,supra note 21, at 295 (statement'of NACOA).
212. 1982 Ocean Dumping Hearings, supra note 21, at 202-03 (statement of Edward I.
Koch).
213. Swanson & Devine, supra note 43, at 19.
214. Id.
215. Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1413(c) (1976), with 33 U.S.C. § 1413(d) and § 1413(e).
216. Ocean Dumping Progress, supra note 30, at 746.

217. Id.; see Lumsdaine, supra note 4, at 764.
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dredging activities.2 18 However, after passage of the MPRSA, the division
of regulatory control between the EPA and the Corps allowed both agencies to shirk their new duties.21 9 Since thoMPRSA was enacted, the EPA
has tended to promote relatively less stringent and environmentally protective criteria to govern dredged waste disposal.220 The result has been a
lax approach by the Corps toward applying the MPRSA to the ocean
22
dumping of dredge spoils. '
The second problem relating to U.S. regulation of ocean dumping activities involves unresolved scientific and management issues which include: (1) the development of a comprehensive waste disposal management strategy; and (2) the resolution of technical uncertainties to insure
that ocean disposal is pursued with minimal environmental risk. 222 The
United States has emphasized a regulatory approach which focuses on
specific disposal media and types of waste.223 Systematic assessments of
the various media (air, land, water) and of the synergistic impacts of all
disposal sources have been largely ignored. 22" Furthermore, scant consideration has been paid to the concept that some wastes should be con22 5
tained, others should be dispersed, and still others should be recycled.
To achieve a proper economic and ecological balance, the United States
needs to incorporate a more comprehensive approach toward managing
the overall problem of waste disposal;22 otherwise, too much dumping,
over too long a period, might be permitted based upon too many incorrect
assumptions.
Internationally, there are similar problems, but while the U.S. difficulty in allocating authority between the EPA vis-a-vis the Corps has led
to confusion and conflict in the United States, by comparison, the formulation of an international regulatory scheme might be unresolvable.
2. InternationalAgreements
In the area of international law, the First U.N. Conference on the
Law of the Sea, held in Geneva in 1958, resulted in four conventions,

218. Ocean Dumping Progress,supra note 30, at 746.
219. Id.
220. Id. The formal disagreement resolution procedures contained in the MPRSA
which could function to restrain Corns administration of the permit process have remained
largely ignored. As noted by one commentator the "EPA has been more of a collaborator
than an overseer of Corps activity: its reluctance to utilize statutory disagreement procedures and its promulgation of especially lax criteria has encouraged the Corps to continue
pre-Act practices." Id. at 758.
221. Id. at 746.
222. Swanson & Devine, supra note 43, at 18.
223. Id.
224. Id.

225. Id.
226. Id.; see 1982 Ocean Dumping Hearings, supra note 21, at 201-02 (statement of
Edward I. Koch).
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namely: (1) the Convention on the High Seas, 22 7 (2) the Convention on
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone,2 2 8 (3) the Convention on the
Continental Shelf,29 and (4) the Convention on Fishing and Conservation
of the Living Resources of the High Seas.28 0 Some of these conventions
addressed pollution issues, but methods of international enforcement and
control were quite vague and failed to abate the problems of pollution
from ocean dumping. 2 1 An explanation for that general ineffectiveness of
the early international efforts is predicated on the fact that most of these
conventions were concluded in 1958-prior to extensive scientific understanding of the actual and potential impact of dumping on the marine
23 2
environment.
In 1972, a significant contribution to international environmental law
was developed at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) held in Stockholm (Stockholm Conference). The Stockholm Conference adopted a Declaration on the Human Environment (Environment Declaration) 233 and an Action Plan.'
The Environment
Declaration called for national and international cooperation to protect
the environment and enunciated 26 basic principles.2 3 5 The first principle
of the Declaration asserted man's right to a healthy environment:
Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate
conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of
dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to protect
and improve the environment for present and future

generations .... 236
Principle 7 of the Environment Declaration urged countries to "take
all possible steps to prevent pollution of the seas by substances that are
liable to create hazards to human health, to harm living resources and
marine life, to damage amenities or to interfere with other legitimate uses

227. Done Apr. 29, 1958, [1962] 2 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (entered into force Sept. 30, 1962).
228. Done Apr. 29, 1958, [19641 2 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205
(entered into force Sept. 10, 1964).
229. Done Apr. 29, 1958, [1964] 1 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (entered into force June 10, 1964).
230. Done Apr. 29, 1958, [19661 1 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285 (entered into force Mar. 20, 1966).
231. Waldichuk, supra note 2, at 291; see Kuersteiner, supra note 54, at 160-61. "In
fact, all that was accomplished by these conventions was an attempt to deal with the
problems of nuclear pollutants and oil discharge, both with only limited success." Kuersteiner, supra note 54, at 161 n.17.
232. Kuersteiner, supra note 54, at 161.
233. Stockholm Report, supra note 1, at 3-5.
234. Id. at 6-28. The Action Plan recommended the establishment of a global environmental assessment program (Earthwatch) and certain management activities for environmental protection. Implementation measures to support these recommendations were also
outlined. Id. at 6-34.
235. Kutner, supra note 34, at 275.
236. Stockholm Report, supra note 1, at 4.
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of the sea."2 3 7 Principle 6 called for the cessation of the release of heat

and the discharge of toxic substances "in such quantities or concentrations as to exceed the capacity of the environment to render them harmless"23 8 (including the effects of nuclear weapons). These measures were
designed to ensure2 9 that serious or irreversible damages were not inflicted
upon ecosystems.

As a general rule, however, the issue of marine pollution was reserved
for negotiators at UNCLOS III and the IMCO Conference on Marine Pollution.2 40 Pursuant to this scheme, various national and international

meetings and developments concerning ocean dumping led to the Ocean

Dumping Conference. 241 In response to the recommendations adopted by

UNCHE, delegates to the Ocean Dumping Conference met in London
during October and November of 1972, and2 the product of this Confer24
ence was the Ocean Dumping Convention.

As the most comprehensive international agreement concerning
marine pollution (i.e., absent worldwide acceptance of the LOS Convention),2'4 3 the Ocean Dumping Convention has been praised for establishing

a list of contraband materials and for creating criteria to evaluate materials not specifically listed.4 Although the Ocean Dumping Convention acknowledged the ocean's ability to cope with limited amounts of waste, a
provision required an environmental impact analysis of potential damage
prior to dumping authorization. 24 5 In addition, the contracting States to
the Ocean Dumping Convention were obligated to: (1) promote effective
controls over all sources of marine pollution; (2) designate a permit authorization body; (3) keep records regarding the quality and quantity of
dumping by vessels and aircraft registered or situated in their territories;
and (4) negotiate dispute settlement procedures for resolving damages
24 6
caused by ocean dumping.

Criticism of the Ocean Dumping Convention has revolved primarily
around the Convention's enforcement procedures. 2

7

Contracting States

have retained authority to prevent and punish conduct which contravenes
the provisions of the Convention.2 4 1 Such an approach could conceivably
lead to the creation of "pollution havens";2 41 that is, a given country

237. Id.
238. Id.; see Kutner, supra note 34, at 275.
239. Stockholm Report, supra note 1, at 4.
240. Kindt, Prolegomenon To Marine Pulluion And The Law 0/ The
. Sea. At Oerview Of The Pollution Problem, 11 ENvTL. L. 67, 79 (1980).
241. Dumping Dilemma, supra note 10, at 894.
242. Id.
243. Kuersteiner, supra note 54, at 162.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Kutner, supra note 34, at 273.
247. Dumping Dilemma, supra note 10, at 895.
248. Id.
249. Id.
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could ignore illegal dumping activity or even sanction such dumping in
territorial and coastal waters to further national development policies
which were considered more important than controlling marine pollution.
Unfortunately, no specific international enforcement agency was created
by the Ocean Dumping Convention."' Vast expanses of the ocean, therefore, have remained outside international protective authority and are
subject only to the efforts of nationally supported measures. Another
weakness of the Ocean Dumping Convention involved the absence of a
method for dispute resolution.2 1
Considered as a whole, the international community has taken a
large step toward controlling pollution from ocean dumping.2 52 Yet, these
weaknesses exemplify the difficulty in creating a global regulatory
scheme. Although the Ocean Dumping Convention enhanced global
awareness, a comprehensive international agreement controlling all forms
of marine pollution would be preferable to regulate ocean dumping activities.25 The LOS Convention constitutes a significant advance in the right
direction, but the LOS Convention has fallen short in developing global
authority by generally reserving primary enforcement responsibility in
the individual countries. 2" International enforcement by IMCO would be
a preferred solution to the problem of global enforcement, particularly
since IMCO fits almost perfectly into the regime established by the LOS
Convention.
D.

Trends and Conditioning Factors

Although pollution regulation in common law countries is based primarily on statutes and conventions, case-by-case adjudication of common
law doctrines has played a limited role in the control of pollution.2 5 5 The
relevant doctrines involve court imposed tort liability and/or protection
of property rights.25 The application of common law doctrines are conditioned by a given country's attitude toward interference with property
use. The resolution of conflicting values is accomplished by balancing the
2 57
equities between the private uses and the public interests.
The common law of nuisance, for example, has been invoked in environmental litigation, but such actions have had only limited success in

250. Id. at 897.
251. Id. at 898. This deficiency was corrected by a protocol to the Convention adopted
in 1978. Ocean Dumping Convention, supra note 50, art. 11 (amended) & Appendix A.
Under this protocol, disputes may be submitted to the International Court of Justice (ICJ),
upon consent of the parties, or to arbitration, upon request of one party to the dispute. Id.
art. 11.
252. Dumping Dilemma, supra note 10, at 898.
253. Id.
254. See LOS Convention, supra note 35, arts. 194, 210.
255. See Spirer, supra note 132, at 9.
256. See Kuner, supra note 34, at 265.
257. Id.
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abating pollution. 5 8 Courts called upon to decide nuisance suits have
often been confronted with an ex post facto polluter; that is, an enterprise whose operation commenced before its effects were considered environmentally undesirable. " 9 In such a situation, the equitable balance between eliminating the pre-existing operation and the recently recognized
pollution has been occasionally adjudicated in favor of the polluter, particularly when the continued operation of the polluter is one in which the
public has a major interest." Similarly, pollution from a multiplicity of
sources has not been obviated through nuisance litigation.2 6 Courts have
also expressed a reluctance to eliminate pollution by adopting policies
which have evolved in a piecemeal fashion. 2 ' Protracted litigation may
delay the implementation of needed public projects. Accordingly, legislation has been the preferred vehicle to regulate air, water, and noise quality standards. " 3
By comparison, litigation in the international community has played
a similarly limited role in preventing and remedying transnational pollution problems. Although case law in the international environmental area
has been sparse, certain principles have evolved regarding the resolution
of disputes and the negotiation of conventions.
The first significant international case was the Trail Smelter Arbitration,26 which was held during the 1930s to resolve a dispute over the
ore smelter operations of a Canadian corporation. The operation of the
smelter had produced sulphur dioxide fumes and damaged agricultural
and timber interests in the United States." 5 In the Trail Smelter Arbitration, the tribunal held that as a matter of international law: (1) no
country could use or permit the use of its territory in a manner causing
serious transnational injury; and (2) the country from which the pollution
originated was itself responsible even though the injury might be caused
2 66
by a private company.
The next important case delimiting international customary law with
regard to environmental hazards was the Corfu Channel Case. 26 ' This
case involved two British warships which were damaged while passing

258. Id. at 266.
259. Id. at 266-67.
260. See e.g., Powell v. Superior Portland Cement, 15 Wash.2d 14, 129 P.2d 536 (1942).
261. Kutner. supra note 34, at 267.
262. See e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 257
N.E.2d 870 (1970).
263. Kutner, supra note 34, at 268.
264. (United States v. Canada), 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941); see Convention for the Settlement of Difficulties Arising From Operation of Smelter at Trail, B.C., April 15, 1935,
U.S.-Canada, 49 Stat. 3245 (1935), T.S. No. 893 (effective Aug. 7, 1935). For an overview, see
J. BARuos & D. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION (1974).
265. 3 U.N.R.I.A.A. 1905 (1941); Bleicher, An Overview of InternationalEnvironmental Regulation, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 19 (1972) [hereinafter cited as InternationalRegulation].
266. InternationalRegulation, supra note 265, at 25.
267. [19491 I.C.J. 4; see Wright, The Corfu Channel Case, 43 AM. J. INT'L L. 491 (1949).

1984

OCEAN DUMPING

through Albanian territorial waters in 1946. These ships unknowingly entered a minefield and struck mines, causing death and injury to crew
members and damage to the ships.26 s The International Court of Justice
(ICJ) stated that every country has an "obligation not to allow knowingly
its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States."2 9
On the basis of this statement, an argument has been made that International law prohibits transnational environmental injury and creates liabil70
ity for environmental degradation of the oceans.1
A 1957 decision by France to divert waters from Lake Lanoux for a
2
hydroelectric project led to the Lake Lanoux Arbitration.
' Although
Spain, as a lower riparian, objected to the project, France won the arbitration because the quality and quantity of the water normally available
was unaltered and because Spain could not prove that the project would
pollute or otherwise alter the flow of water from France to Spain2 7 2 Several important international legal principles were established. First, a
country was not entitled to the unrestricted use of waters within its own
national boundaries. 2 " Secondly, the upper riparian was required to
demonstrate that there were "no adverse effects" upon the lower riparian.2 74 Thirdly, mere assertions by the upper riparian country that the
water flow and quality would remain unchanged were insufficient, and international tribunals could properly examine the scientific validity of
2 75
those claims.
The principles elucidated in these international cases have expanded
the reach of the traditional substantive basis for nuisance protection,
which allowed "a balancing of the benefits of the defendant's activities
against the damages suffered by the plaintiff. ' 276 The paucity of cases in
this area, however, has reflected the limited utility of adjudication in establishing international regulations and securing transnational compliance with measures that are protective of the environment. Considering
the magnitude of the problem involving ocean dumping and considering
the concomitant pollution problems which threaten to overwhelm the
earth's ocean, international litigation appears to be inadequate to regulate ocean dumping activities.

268. See Corfu Channel Case, [1949] I.C.J. 4; InternationalRegulation, supra note 265,
at 16.
269. Corfu Channel Case, [1949] I.C.J. 4, 22.
270. InternationalRegulation, supra note 265, at 16 n.50, 17.
271. (Spain v. France), 12 U.N.R.I.A.A. 281 (1963) (French version). For the text of the
award in French, see 62 REVUE GgN§RALE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 79 (1958). For a
condensed text of the award in English, see 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 156 (1959) [hereinafter cited
as English Version].
272. English Version, supra note 271, at 156, 160-61; International Regulation, supra
note 265, at 26.
273. InternationalRegulation, supra note 265, at 27.
274. Id. at 28, see English Version, supra note 271, at 160-61.
275. InternationalRegulation, supra note 265, at 27.
276. Id. at 28-29.
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Policy Alternatives and Recommendations

Only limited scientific knowledge about the long-range implication of
ocean pollution exists. For example, unanswered questions remain regarding where the radioactivity which leaks from canisters in North Atlantic
waste dumpsites is going to migrate and whether radioactive substances
are being incorporated by living organisms into the food chain.17 7 With
the proper legislative initiative and concomitant funding, this scientific
informational gap could be bridged. Unified international efforts encouraging marine scientific research are essential. While a consensus on what
the law on ocean dumping should be has emerged, a major area lacking
consensus remains with respect to international regulatory and enforcement measures. Therefore, in this section three alternative approaches for
international regulation and enforcement will be discussed. The approaches are: (1) unilateral, (2) global, and (3) regional.
Prior to the enactment of the LOS Convention, there was a void regarding international agreement on dumping control procedures (to which
a majority of nations adhered; e.g., the Ocean Dumping Convention).
This situation permitted any individual country to take selective initiatives by unilaterally extending their regulatory powers into the high seas.
Since the LOS Convention, unilateral extensions continue to occur (although generally with less frequency) when a country considers that its
vital interests are threatened by the unregulated activities of foreign nations.2
Canada's action in 1970 when it adopted the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act 7 9 exemplified this type of unilateral extension.2'"
Four major criticisms are voiced by opponents to the unilateral approach. First, the oceans, as the common heritage of man, are a shared
environment used extensively for navigation. Any assumption of unilateral regulatory powers under national laws might seriously infringe upon
the utilization of this "flow resource" by other countries and peoples. 8 1
Secondly, unilateral extensions of "creeping jurisdiction" to control pollution are characterized as the most politically expedient method of extending the sovereignty of the coastal State over the high seas.2 8 2 Thirdly,
the unilateral approach is criticized because State "super programs" cannot ultimately succeed without similar efforts being exerted by neighboring countries.283 Problems would also arise with overlapping jurisdictions
and varying statutes. Finally, uses of the sea are interrelated, and each
use has..
imp.t
relating to plhutinn Tt ie acntp.d that the aim of
peaceful and efficient activities in these use areas can be realized only

277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

CEQ 1980 REPORT, supra note 5, at 19.
Okidi, supra note 121, at 2.
See CAN. REV. STAT. c.2 (1st Supp. 1970), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 543 (1970).
Special Claims, supra note 113, at 437-38.
Okidi, supra note 121, at 5.

282. Id. at 6.
283. Id. at 7.
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within the framework of regional cooperative agreements or international
2 84
agreements.
The second alternative approach suggested for the regulation of pollution on the high seas is a single international agency empowered to take
comprehensive measures of control. The rationale underlying the global
system is that the high seas beyond national jurisdiction are open for use
by all countries and peoples and therefore, control should be administered by the entire world community.8' s
Criticisms of this alternative revolve mainly around the centralized
character and hence immobility, of this type of agency. Most ocean pollution problems have regional peculiarities, and therefore, it is not necessary or even desirable to form a global superagency. Such an agency is
unlikely to achieve consensus on anything beyond general international
standards. Special regional problems would also generate disagreements
on the application of various detailed rules. In addition, the single global
agency would probably be too large and diverse to respond to particular
local needs.288 Only IMCO would have any possibility for being successful
in this capacity.
The third alternative, the regional approach, combines the best aspects of both- of the other two alternatives. Its focus is international in
character and yet national with regard to enforcement and implementation processes. The five major advantages of a regional approach are as
follows:
a. "[D]ifferences in the degrees and kinds of pollution in the various regions require differences in approaches to be followed in pollu2 87
tion control.
b. Regional mechanisms and organizations lead to the distribution of remedial technology in those areas where incidents may
occur.288
c. Regionalization encourages participation by a maximum number of countries, including developing countries which might otherwise remain at the periphery in a centralized system. 8 9
d. Efforts to establish and empower a single international regime have been considered futile, while unilateral measures are internationally objectionable. ' "
e. Regional organizations serve as forums for consultation and
confrontation in matters involving ocean pollution. 0'

284. See id. at 8.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

Okidi,
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
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However, the regional approach also has its problems. If a regional
organization lacks an international character, it may not be able to invoke
sanctions against flag States with differing ideological values.292 Another
problem area deals with the region's potential lack of a unified and coordinated effort. If the regional authority is fragmented in its scope, or selfinterested in its focus, overall goals may be difficult to legislate and pursue for the good of the entire international community.
However, these problems can be overcome. The advantages of a regional system far outweigh the disadvantages. A regional approach will
allow various nations the cooperative freedom to regulate and enforce legislation concerning ocean dumping, and yet, this approach will still permit coordinated domestic legislation over both coastal and international
dumping in waterways, without ignoring the interests of the high
seas-which fall under no one sovereign's jurisdiction.

III.

THE LAW OF THE SEA PROVISIONS

The function of the international law of the sea is constitutional: it
creates the basic system of order in the oceans. It is primarily concerned with allocating rights to use the oceans, and rights to insist
that one's 2interests
be taken duly into account in the exercise of rights
9
by others. 3
The LOS Convention establishes and codifies new duties to protect and
preserve the marine environment.2 94 In general, elaborate provisions
"both expand environmental rights and obligations and limit certain unilateral environmental actions '295 which may impair other use values. Additional duties recognized by the LOS Convention focus on the promotion
of marine scientific research and dissemination of scientific knowledge. 2"
An analysis of the pertinent provisions follows.
Pursuant to part XII, section 1, of the LOS Convention, countries
have a general obligation to: (1) "protect and preserve the marine environment"; 97 (2) "take, individually or jointly as appropriate, all measures
consistent with this Convention that are necessary to prevent, reduce and
control pollution of the marine environment from any source, using for
this purpose the best practicable means at their disposal and in accordance with their capabilities, ... ;298 and (3) "take all measures necessary to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction or control are so
conducted as not to cause damage by pollution to other States and their

292. See id. at 20.
293. Oxman, The Law Of The Sea Conference And Development: Food And Energy
Resources, 13 LAW. AM. 157, 157-58 (1981).
294. Oxman, The New Law of the Sea, 69 A.B.A.J. 156, 162 (1983) [hereinafter cited
as New LOS].
295. Oxman, Introduction: On Evaluating the Draft Convention on the Law of the
Sea, 19 SAN. DIEGo L. REV. 453, 459 (1982).
296. New LOS, supra note 294, at 162.
297. LOS Convention, supra note 35, art. 192.
298. Id. art. 194, para. 1.
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"I299In addition, States are cautioned that their polluenvironment,..
tion control efforts should not "transfer, directly or indirectly, damage or
hazards from one area to another or transform one type of pollution into
another."' 0 Three types of qualifications, however, limit these duties.
The first qualification of a country's legal obligations is found in the
language "pursuant to their environmental policies" of article 193.01 Although this text was designed to provide countries with flexibility regarding their environmental programs, the context of its adoption is related to
the remaining qualifications.302 The second qualification reserves to nations "the sovereign right to exploit their natural resources pursuant to
their environmental policies and in accordance with their duty to protect

and preserve the marine environment.

3 03

This text, while preserving a

country's right to the flexible development and management of its resources, conditions the exercise of this right on environmental considerations. 304 This textual approach attempts to harmonize competing economic and environmental interests which may effectively undermine the
latter. 8°5 The third qualification makes the legal obligation of countries to
prevent and control pollution dependent upon their "ability to discharge
that obligation" and with regard to their "stage of economic development."306 For most developing countries, this qualification renders their
30 7
obligation illusory.
Part XII, section 2, of the LOS Convention obligates nations to: (1)
cooperate on a global and regional basis with international organizations
to formulate "international rules, standards and recommended practices
and procedures . . . for the protection and preservation of the marine

environment";30 8 (2) cooperate in the promotion of scientific research and
data exchange programs regarding marine pollution; 0 " (3) cooperate "in
eliminating the effects of pollution and preventing or minimizing the
damage"; 1 0 and (4) establish appropriate scientific criteria for the formulation of international environmental "rules, standards and recommended
311
practices and procedures for the prevention, reduction and control" of

299. Id. art. 194, para. 2.
300. Id. art. 195.

301. Id. art. 193; See Stevenson & Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference On
the Law of the Sea: The 1974 CaracasSession, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 26 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as 1974 Caracas Session].
302. 1974 CaracasSession, supra note 301, at 26.
303. LOS Convention, supra note 35, art. 193; 1974 CaracasSession, supra note 301, at
26.

304. 1974 Caracas Session, supra note 301, at 26.
305. See id.
306. 1974 Caracas Session, supra note 301, at 26-27; see LOS Convention, supra note
35, art. 194, para. 1.
307. See 1974 CaracasSession, supra note 301, at 27.
308. LOS Convention, supra note 35, art. 197.
309. Id. art. 200.
310. Id. art. 199.
311. Id. art. 201.
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marine pollution.
Section 3 of Part XII contains broad provisions for the promotion of
"scientific, educational, technical and other assistance to developing
States for the protection and preservation of the marine environment and
the prevention . . . of marine pollution."3 2 Such assistance would be
deemed essential to any global effort to reduce and regulate marine pollution problems. Under Section 4, countries are obligated "to observe, measure, evaluate and analyse, by recognized scientific methods, the risks or
effects of pollution of the marine environment, ' 31 3 and to "keep under
surveillance the effects of any activities which they permit or in which
they engage in order to determine whether these activities are likely to
pollute the marine environment.3 1 1 4 Section 5 imposes a reporting obligation on countries 316 and requires that they assess the potential effects of
activities under their jurisdiction which "may cause substantial pollution
of or significant and harmful changes to the marine environment. 31 6 The
wide-ranging scope of these provisions recognizes the need for internationally binding standards and obligations regarding the marine environment. The LOS Convention also focuses on source-specific pollution in its
attempt to protect and preserve the marine environment.
In addition to land-based pollution and air-borne pollution, the third
major type of pollution to be minimized under article 194, paragraph 3, of
the LOS Convention is dumping. 3 Land-based pollution, air-borne pollution, and dumping appear to have been grouped together in paragraph
3, subsection (a), 33 8 because they constitute some of the earliest forms of
marine pollution and because they were already well-established types of
pollution when UNCLOS III was first convened in 1974. By comparison,
the newer types of marine pollution, i.e., vessel-source pollution and pollution from seabed activities, have been delimited within separate subsections 19 and more provisions of the LOS Convention have been directed
toward them. 320 In any event, article 194 imposes a basic duty upon countries to minimize "dumping." 2' 1
As previously indicated, the word "dumping" is basically defined in
article 1, paragraph 1(5)(a)(i) as "any deliberate disposal of wastes or
other matter from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea . . ."" Thus, although the word "dumping" is used, the
more popular term of "ocean dumping" is entirely appropriate, because

312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

Id. art. 202, para. a.
Id. art. 204, para. 1.
Id. art. 204, para. 2.
Id. arts. 205, 206.
Id. art. 206.
Id. art. 194, para. 3(a).
Id.
Id. art. 194, para. 3(b)-(c).
See, e.g., id. arts. 211, 217-21 (relating to vessel-source pollution).
LOS Convention, supra note 35, art. 194, paras. 1-3(a).
Id. art. 1, para. 1(5)(a)(i).
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what is meant is the deliberate disposal of wastes at sea. It should also be
noted that the primary test continues to be one of "intent"-as evidenced
by the use of the words "deliberate disposal."
Considerable attention has been directed toward defining what is not
included within the concept of "dumping," particularly since more wordage is directed toward what does not constitute dumping vis-a-vis what
does constitute dumping. 3 Article 1, paragraph 1(5)(b) excludes wastes
incidental to the "normal operations of vessels, aircraft, platforms or

other man-made structures . .

."324

from the definition of "dumping."

Such incidental wastes are governed by other provisions of the LOS Convention. Similar to the intent test for what constitutes dumping, the test
of what does not constitute dumping focuses on "purpose"3 25 (i.e., intent).
It can be argued that the establishment of offshore waste disposal facilities appears to be prohibited by article 1, paragraph 1(5)(b)(i), 32 since
under this provision such activities would constitute "dumping." Whether
the waste disposal installations mentioned in this section are to be
treated as "offshore installations" or as structures engaged in "dumping"
needs to be clarified.
Within the specific provisions covering marine pollution, article 210
governs dumping.3 2 7 Paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 210 obligate countries
to adopt laws, regulations, and other measures "to prevent, reduce and
control" dumping. 328 These obligations are similar to those adopted for
other types of marine pollution, but paragraph 3 appears to add an additional obligation for countries to monitor their industries to ensure that
illegal dumping does not occur.3 2 9 Paragraph 4 tends to place emphasis on
utilizing an international approach toward controlling dumping, 3 0 and
the crucial problems regarding ocean dumping seem to involve areas that
lie beyond coastal-State jurisdiction.3 1
Given the hypersensitive nature of certain ocean regions and of the
marine environment in general, an overall prohibition against ocean
dumping would intrinsically be the preferable approach. The option
adopted by the Ocean Dumping Convention, however, regulates rather
than prohibits waste disposal in the seas. The eventual trend toward accomplishing a regulatory scheme which protects the ocean is evidenced by
the fact that coastal-State permission is a prerequisite under article 210,
paragraph 5 of the LOS Convention before dumping can occur in territo-

323. Compare LOS Convention, supra note 35, art. 1, para. 1(5)(a), with LOS Convention, supra note 35, art. 1, para. 1(5)(b).
324. LOS Convention, supra note 35, art. 1, para. 1(5)(b)(i).
325. Id. art. 1, para. 1(5)(b)(i)-(ii).
326. Id. art. 1, para. 1(5)(b)(i).
327. Id. art. 210.
328. Id. art. 210, paras. 1-2.
329. Id. art. 210, para. 3.
330. Id. art. 210, para. 4.
331. See Stevenson & Oxman, The PreparationFor The Law Of The Sea Conference,
68 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 23 (1974).
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rial seas, in economic zones, or on the continental shelves.'32 This paragraph effectively prohibits dumping without permission in one-third of
the world's oceans. By obligating countries to utilize measures which are
"no less effective" than "global rules and standards," 333 paragraph 6 affirms this viewpoint. In the interim, the practical use of a regional approach is supported by paragraph 4 and by the "geographical situation"
requirement of paragraph 5.334
"Enforcement" with respect to dumping33 is governed by article 216.
Both national laws established in accordance with the LOS Convention
and international standards established through competent international
organizations (such as IMCO) shall be enforced:
(a) by the coastal State with regard to dumping within its territorial sea or its exclusive economic zone or onto its continental shelf;
(b) by the flag State 33
with regard to vessels flying its flag or vessels
or aircraft of its registry;
(c) by any State with regard to acts of loading of wastes or other
3 7
matter occurring within its territory or at its off-shore terminals. 1
These provisions would appear to require international acceptance of
the Ocean Dumping Convention because the Convention constitutes a
pre-existing, widely-accepted agreement established through a competent
diplomatic conference. " 8 Therefore, under the LOS Convention, coastal
States would be obligated to enforce the precepts of the Ocean Dumping
Convention in their territorial seas, economic zones, and continental shelf
areas. As indicated earlier, the area covered by the protective umbrella of
this provision only constitutes one-third of the oceans. Critics contend
that the LOS Convention provisions for enforcement are decidedly vague
and do not extend beyond those jurisdictional limitations to which the
international community bound itself in the Ocean Dumping Convention.38 9 Thus, the LOS Convention's enforcement efforts fall short of a
genuine, internationally based attempt "to clean up the ocean, or prevent
3' 40
it from getting considerably dirtier.
Even if a country absolutely prohibits ocean dumping of wastes,
problems will persist. If coastal States rigidly enforce the Ocean Dumping

332. LOS Convention, supra note 35, art. 210, para. 5.
3o.

azA.
a.. 2.

para. 6.

334. Id. art. 210, paras. 4-5.
335. Id. art. 216.
336. The original text of the Informal Composite Negotiating Text Revision 2 (ICNT/Rev.2), art. 216(b), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.2 (1980) was written as follows: "by
the flag State with regard to vessels and aircraft registered in its territory or flying its flag."
As evident from the change in language, the LOS Convention corrected an ICNT/Rev.2
technical error of modifying aircraft as fliers of State flags.
337. LOS Convention, supra note 35, art. 216, para. 1(a)-(c).
338. See id.
339. Dumping Dilemma, supra note 10, at 910-11.
340. Id. at 911.
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Convention in the coastal areas, those parties wishing to continue dumping will necessarily be forced out into the high seas areas. Thus, pollution
problems would be merely transferred, not remedied. Although most of
the high seas areas are biological deserts, any dumping would, by definition, almost invariably result in wastes sinking below the thermocline and
thereby affecting hypersensitive ecological areas. Accordingly, ocean
dumping should be strictly regulated throughout the oceans-not just in
the coastal areas.
IV.

CONCLUSION

A prohibition on ocean dumping which is too rigid is neither wise nor
practical. Studies by the scientific community have revealed that marine
ecosystems can be sufficiently safeguarded from pollution if ocean dumping involves biodegradable and nonaccumulative waste materials. However, increased scientific and regulatory attention should be directed toward identifying the conditions under which other wastes can be dumped
without causing environmental damage. The lack of empirical base data,
when coupled with reduced funding for oceanic research, will not further
an intelligent analysis of dumping disposal options.
A "multimedia approach" to waste management may avoid the transfer of pollution problems from one medium to another. The balancing of
relative harms and costs appears economically attractive but may lead to
the overemphasis of cost considerations. The focus on "management"
considerations may lead to short-term disposal decisions which ignore the
long-term consequences of ocean dumping. Those who would subsidize
industrial operations by selecting the "cheapest" disposal option (i.e., the
ocean), "ought to bear the burden of proof that no irreversible damage
will result now, or in the future."34' 1 A presumption against ocean dumping could further spur the development of new technologies for processing
wastes.
The environmental and political vulnerability of the ocean necessitates regulatory vigilance. Caution and prudence are justified by the limited knowledge which society possesses regarding the assimilative capacity of the seas. Ocean dumped wastes know no political boundaries and
represent a threat to the entire global community. Unilateral extensions
of jurisdiction should be discouraged. The example of the MPRSA highlights not only the potential interaction between national and international regulatory schemes but also the sacrifice of the marine environment by a country in furtherance of political expediency. International
attempts to protect and preserve the marine environment need to be
more fully developed. The Ocean Dumping Convention represented a
positive attempt in this direction. Although the LOS Convention did not
sufficiently capitalize upon the international regulatory gains made by the

341. 1982 Ocean Dumping Hearings,supra note 21, at 188 (statement of Jacques-Yves
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Ocean Dumping Convention, the LOS Convention has expanded the substantive duties of countries to guard the marine environment from damage via ocean dumping. Through the LOS Convention, more countries
will become bound to the precepts of the Ocean Dumping Convention.
International enforcement mechanisms remain deficient under the
LOS Convention, which generally abdicated enforcement responsibility to
the individual nations. Although the jurisdictional authority of coastal
States was expanded to include the economic zone (EEZ), vast expanses
of the ocean theoretically remain unprotected. A single international regulatory body, such as IMCO, should not be deemed the only solution. A
viable alternative would vest dumping control in regionally-based regulatory authorities. Adoption of the LOS Convention need not be interpreted to preclude regional cooperation. In fact, the regional approach
appears to be the best approach for regulating ocean dumping. Even so,
countries should remember that it is necessary to explore all avenues
which would protect and preserve the marine environment.

DEVELOPMENTS

The Extraterritorial Enforcement of U.S.
Antitrust Laws and Retaliatory Legislation
in the United Kingdom and Australia
I.

INTRODUCTION

In an effort to curb extraterritorial enforcement of U.S. antitrust
laws by American courts, the United Kingdom (U.K.) and Australia began enacting retaliatory legislation in the 1960s and 1970s known as
"blocking statues." This article will briefly examine these laws, the evolution of U.S. antitrust laws and methods of judicial enforcement of U.S.
antitrust laws overseas.
II.

THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS AND
EXTRATERRITORIAL ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS

The origin of U.S. antitrust law is derived from the passage of the
Sherman Act of 1980.1 With the zeal of what one British scholar deemed
"national religion," 2 the Sherman Act was enacted in an era heightened
by the Populist movement's mistrust of the growing concentration of
American corporate and political wealth.3 Enforcement of the Act
adopted to changing economic realities, as evidenced by the later passage
of the Clayton Antitrust4 and Robinson-Patman Acts.5
Amid a growing world economy, Congress enacted the Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act,' in 1917. The primary purpose of the Act was to
reduce trade deficits, encourage economies of scale resulting from joint
international marketing efforts and foster combinations of small business
so as to limit barriers of entry into the arena of international trade.' Significantly, much of the fervor behind British and Australian reactions to
the Webb Act, and more recently, the Export Trading Company Act of

1. Sherman Act of 1980, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
2. SHONFIELD, MODERN CAPITALISM 2 (1965).
3. Rowe, Industrial OrganizationLaw in the U.S., in ENTERPRISE LAW OF THE 80'S 178
(Rowe ed. 1980).
4. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976).
5. Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-136, 21a (1976).
6. Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1976).
7. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ECONOMIC REPORT, WEBB-POMERENE ASSOCIATIONS:

A FirY YEAR REVIEW, 8-14 (1967).
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1982,8 originates in the seemingly relaxed antitrust provisions governing
export trade in these Acts. As one author opined: "[in view of the fact
that American law condones domestic export cartels, the argument that
the Sherman Act must be enforced extraterritorially to protect free trade
in the international would seem hallow."9
The first major international enforcement effort of antitrust laws by
U.S. courts was undertaken in the landmark case of United States v. Aluminum Co. of America.10 In that 1945 decision, Judge Learned Hand established the "effects doctrine" by stating that "[any state may impose
liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside
its borders that has consequences with which the state reprehends."'
The effects doctrine was applied in United States v. Imperial Chemical." The court in Imperial Chemical ruled that a conspiracy to divide
territories on the part of British and American companies, although occurring overseas, was in violation of the Sherman Act. Since that ruling,
most courts have modified the effects doctrine by holding that it applies
only to anti-competitive behavior having a "substantial and material effect"13 upon U.S. commerce. A series of recent American decisions has
even begun to affix greater credence to the principal impact of antitrust
enforcement" and its effect on international comity. 5
Despite the more relaxed extraterritorial application of the effects
doctrine by American courts, there continues to be instances where evidence is sought from foreign nationals merely to substantiate antitrust
allegations upon which subject matter jurisdiction is based under U.S.
laws." These so-called "fishing expeditions" may be distinguished from
discovery requests made through an appointed domestic commission or
letter rogatory 17 and pursuant to a formal judicial proceeding, of which
the foreign company is a party, relating to acts by that company within
the territory of the plaintiff seeking the information. Such formal investigations are usually covered by bilateral or multilateral conventions, such

8. Export Trading Company Act of 1982, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841, 1943, 635a-4, 372 (1982)
and 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4003.
9. Sornarajah, The ExtraterritorialEnforcement of U.S. Antitrust Laws: Conflict and
Compromise, 31 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 127 (1980).
10. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
11. Id. at 443-44.
12. 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D. N.Y.), final decree, 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D. N.Y. 1952).
13. United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Information Center, Inc., TRADE REGULATION REPORTS (CCH) (p) 70,600 (S.D. N.Y. 1962).
14. Timberland Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
15. Mannington Mills v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
16. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 4, 90
Stat. 1383 (1976).
17. A formal communication in writing, sent by the court in which an action is pending
to a court or judge of a foreign country, requesting that the testimony of a witness resident
within the jurisdiction of the latter court be formally taken under its direction and transmitted to the first court for use in the pending action. FED.R.CIv.P. 28.
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8
as the 1970 Hague Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad.'
Despite less harsh application of U.S. antitrust laws on foreign companies, certain American courts and administrative agencies have continued to champion their ideal of free competition through extraterritorial
enforcement of the Sherman Act and its progeny, "provided [that] there
is some minimal contact between American market and the foreign
conspiracy." 19
The recent promulgation of blocking statutes, or laws designed to
limit the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws, by the U.K.,
Australia, and other nations, can be blamed on the failure of U.S. courts
to realize that the complex political and economic issues raised by antitrust cases are more appropriately
resolved by consultation and negotia20
tion between governments.
III. BRITISH AND AUSTRALIAN REACTIONS TO EXTRATERRITORIAL

ENFORCEMENT OF U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS

A.

British Blocking Laws

British attitudes toward extraterritorial enforcement of U.S. commerce and antitrust laws began to harden upon issuance of the Imperial
Chemical decision in 1951. This sentiment increased when the Federal
Maritime Commission (F.M.C.) attempted to impose American shipping
laws on the British shipping industry. 21 In response, Parliament enacted
the Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act of 196422 (Shipping Contracts Act). The aims of this Act were twofold: first, to offer
some protection to British shipowners against excessive claims of jurisdiction by the F.M.C. and U.S. courts; and second, to strengthen the British
position during any international negotiation or arbitration process. The
British viewed the assertion that U.S. law should fill the vacuum of international trade laws as patently violative of the "rules of international law
concerning jurisdiction and not simply offending against principles of
22'
comity.
The Shipping Contracts Act allowed the British Minister of Transport to prohibit compliance with any foreign request to produce commercial documents, which requests were felt to be an infringement of British
jurisdiction under international law.24 Furthermore, to prevent surrepti-

18. 1970 Hague Convention on Taking Evidence Abroad in Civil Commercial Matters,
758 U.N.T.S. 113 (1970).
19. Sornarajah, supra note 9, at 130.
20. Jacobs, ExtraterritorialApplication of Competition Laws: An English View, 13
INT'L LAW 645 (1979).
21. The British shipping and rail industries are state-owned enterprises that frequently
enter into price-fixing agreements concerning manufactured goods bound for the U.S.
22. United Kingdom Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act, 1964, ch. 87.
23. P AL. DEs., H.C. (5th Ser.) 1282 (1964).
24. United Kingdom Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act, 1964, ch. 87,
§§ 1(1), (2).
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tious compliance with foreign discovery requests, shippers were required
to notify the Minister of Transport of any such requests or pay a fine of
1,000 pounds sterling for failure to do so.
Despite its innovative terms, the Shipping Contracts Act's jurisdictional infringement requirement became difficult to enforce "in cases
where jurisdiction might have been considered to be concurrent, or where
an activity spanned more than one jurisdiction. 2 5 To further curtail the
abhorred "fishing expeditions," Parliament passed the Evidence Act of
1975.2 Section 2(4) of the Evidence Act generally provides that a person
shall not be required to state what relevant documents are in his possession, custody or power, nor to produce documents other than those specified in the Court order as appearing to be documents in a person's possession, custody or power. This statute was cited by the British Attorney
General in Rio Tinto Zinc v. Westinghouse Electric Corp. where it was
maintained that "the wide investigatory procedures under the U.S. antitrust legislation against persons outside the U.S. who are not U.S. citizens
constitutes an infringement of the proper jurisdiction and sovereignty of
the United Kingdom."2 8 Additionally, the U.K. prohibits certain disclosures of sensitive commercial data obtained by the government under the
Fair Trading Act of 1975.9 As a last resort, the general protections of
"crown privilege" may be asserted by a government minister or by injured private parties, pursuant to a court order, where disclosure would
be harmful to the national defense or to diplomatic relations.2
Fearing a growing ethnocentric trend of U.S. antitrust laws 3 ' and in
response to the heavy press following the Seventh Circuit's assessment of
treble damages against several British shipping companies, 2 and the attempt to obtain similar punitive damages against a British uranium producer denied access to American markets, 2 the British government decided to take dramatic action in defense of British trading overseas.
Thus, in 1980 the Protection of Trading Interests Act was passed"' as a
"response to a situation of a very particular nature which had been developing over several decades, and which in the past few years [had] become

25. Lowe, Blocking ExtraterritorialJurisdiction: The British Protection of Trading
Interests Act, 1980, 75 AM.J.INT'L L. 257 (1981).
26. Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act, 1975, ch. 34.
27. [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81.
28. Jacobs, supra note 20, at 656-57.
29. Fair Trading Act, 1973, ch. 41 under Statistics of Trade Act, 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6,
ch. 39.
30. See Conway v. Rimmer, 1968 A.C. 910 and Burmah Oil Co. v. Bank of Eng., [1979]
2 W.L.R. 473.
31. See ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 6 (1977).
32. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algon Ltd., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980). See also
973 PARL.DzB., H.C. (5th Ser.) 1538 (1979).
33. Rio Tinto Zinc, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 81.
34. The British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11.

1984

DEVELOPMENTS

much more acute." 35 The Protection of Trading Interest Act superseded
and repealed the Shipping Contracts Act of 1964. The direct retaliatory
nature of the Act is evidenced by a recent comment stating that "[t]he
Protection of Trading Interests Act was passed in retaliation [of] U.S.
antitrust enforcement efforts such as prosecution of the uranium cartel
and of several British ocean shipping companies. . . which were found to
be offensive to British interests."3 6
According to the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the Bill,
the Protection of Trading Interests Act has six substantive provisions.
Clause 1 generally provides the requisite means for the British government to circumvent measures taken or proposed to be taken under the
laws of a foreign country pertaining, and potentially damaging, to the
trading interests of the U.K. The Act specifically directs the Secretary of
State (Secretary) to take blocking action if its appears "that those [antitrust] measures, in so far as they apply or would apply to things done
outside the territorial jurisdiction of [the foreign] country by persons carrying on business in the U.K. are damaging or threaten to damage the
'3 7
trading interest of the U.K.
Once this threshold determination is made, the Secretary may not
only issue specific orders necessary to prevent damage ensuing from compliance with extraterritorial proceedings, but may also require persons in
the U.K., who carry on business in a foreign country, to notify their office
of any requirement threatened or imposed pursuant to antitrust, general
trade or security regulations. If such proceedings are perceived as threatening to British interests, the Secretary is authorized to prohibit compliance with them.
Clause 2 of the Act provides that when a person in the U.K. is required to produce for a foreign authority a commercial document which is
not within the territorial jurisdiction of the compelling country the Secretary may forbid such production. This prohibition covers all requests for
commerical data not made pursuant to an instituted civil or criminal proceeding, or of a general discovery nature. These requirements, however,
must be found to infringe upon the jurisdiction or sovereignty of the
U.K., or to be prejudicial to the U.K.'s relations with other countries.
Clause 3 of the Protection of Trading Interests Act imposes fines of
up to 1,000 pounds sterling for an unexcused or knowing violation of the
Act. It should be noted that such fines may be a less drastic penalty for
British companies to pay than would be noncompliance with U.S. antitrust proceedings.
Pursuant to proceedings under the 1975 Proceeding in Other Jurisdictions Act, clause 4 forbids British courts from complying with a re-

35. Letter from the British Embassy in Washington, D.C., to the U.S. Government
(Nov. 12, 1978), reprinted in LOWE, EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 184 (1983).
36. 44 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), at 721 (Apr. 10, 1983).
37. The British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, § 1(2).
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quest from a foreign court when the Secretary certifies that the request
infringes upon British jurisdiction or is otherwise judicial to the U.K.
This provision in effect codifies the holding in Rio Tinto Zinc v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., which permitted blocking of a discovery request
made pursuant to an American antitrust proceeding.
Clause 5 of the Act provides that any multiple damages awarded by a
foreign antitrust tribunal and determined to be detrimental by the Secretary "may neither be registered nor enforced by British Courts."" Furthermore, the Secretary has broad discretion under this provision to designate rulings as merely "concerned with the prohibition or regulation of
[competition] agreements."3 "
Clause 6 of the Act is a "lawback" provision and allows British citizens or corporations to recover from the British assets of a foreign party
awarded multiple damages any amount assessed above actual damages incurred, or treble damages. Neither this nor any other clause of the Act
proscribes compensation for the activities of British companies or their
subsidiaries occurring principally in England or overseas.
Clause 6 has proven to be the most controversial of the six substantive provisions of the Protection of Trading Interests Act beause it permits a "qualifying defendant" to recover, in a British court, against a
successful claimant not otherwise within the court's jurisdiction. Significantly, clause 6 provides that "[n]o infringement of British jurisdiction
has to be proved nor is application of the section a matter for ministerial
discretion. It is a definite right to recovery, which courts are obliged to
40
enforce.
The capability of clause 6 to nullify antitrust judgments sparked an
immediate hostile reaction in the U.S. Particularly, the U.S. Department
of State questioned the propriety of allowing a non-British corporation
doing business in the U.S. and the U.K., but principally resident elsewhere, to sue in British court in order to undo an American court's ruling.
An official Department of State communication also questioned the reasonableness of a law insisting that an antitrust judgment relate to behavior exclusively undertaken within the territory of one state.4'
However, it is the American scheme of allowing enforcement of public law in the field of private remedies, through the mechanism of treble

38. The British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, § 5(1)- Sep Mirabito
& Friedler, InternationalAntitrust 6 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 1 (1981).
39. The British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, § 5(4).
40. The British Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, § 6(5). "Qualifying
defendant" in section 6(5) of the Act pertains to the ordinary residence or place of business
of the defendant and judgments relating exclusively to activities within the forum state.
However, courts are unlikely to allow a defendant to secure the right to such "clawback"
protection by going outside the U.S. to find a course of conduct that was in reality a "domestic operation." See Lowe supra note 25, at 279.
41. Letter from Brian J. Atwood to Senator Edward M. Kennedy (Sept. 27, 1979), reprinted in part in 74 AM.J.INT'L L. 179 (1980).
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damages, that the British vehemently object to. In diplomatic correspondence, Britian took exception to a legal scheme which permits a "plaintiff
to pursue defendants for private gain thus excluding international considerations of a public nature" and further suggested that "where criminal
and civil penalties coexist, those engaging in international trade are exposed to double jeopardy . . . [and] a limited countervailing remedy
should be provided."4' 2
B.

Australian Blocking Statutes

Australia was an early leader among Commonwealth nations in the
passage of blocking statutes designed to protect a foreign government's
economic policies from the unwelcome effects of American antitrust judgments. Due to Australia's high level of concentration on and state support
of its natural resources and shipping industries, the Australians took a
decidedly hostile approach to the regulation of the international marketplace by American courts, especially via the effects doctrine. After citing
the decision of In Re Uranium Antitrust Litigation" in his address to
the American Bar Association in 1981, Peter Durate, a former Australian
Attorney General, revealed Australian attitudes toward extraterritorial
enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws by American courts when he offered
that:
[I]t is not merely that the courts lack the expertise; it is rather that it
is not part of the judicial function to decide whether a law or policy is
justified by what a court conceives to be in the national interest. That
is the political function. There is even less warrant for a court to attempt that task in relation to the law or policy of a foreign country."
In response to American attempts to obtain sensitive documents held
by Australian uranium producers through letters rogatory,' 5 the Australian Parliament enacted the Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain
Evidence) Act of 1976.4' The Foreign Proceedings Act, as it is known,
allows the Attorney General of Australia to issue directives "to ensure
that documents in [Australia] are not able to be produced to courts or
tribunals in other countries.' 7 Once the Attorney General determines
that a foreign tribunal has exercised jurisdiction in a manner inconsistent

42. Rio Tinto Zinc, [1978] 2 W.L.R. at 85.
43. 480 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
44. Address by Australian Attorney General, Senator the Hon. Peter Durack before the
American Bar Association (Aug. 12, 1981). See Ognman, Is Somebody Crying "Wolf?" An
Assessment of Whether Antitrust Impedes Export Trade, 1 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 163
(1976) for an expression of the perceived hypocrisy of U.S. antitrust enforcement.
45. Note, Shortening the Long Arm of American Antitrust Jurisdiction:Extraterritoriality and the Foreign Blocking statutes, 28 Loy. L. REv. 213 (1982).
46. Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Act, 1976, No. 121, Austl.
Acts (1976), as amended, Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Amendment Act, 1976, No. 202, Austl. Acts (1976).
47. PARL.DFs., S. (Austl.) 2186 (Weekly Hansard No. 18, 1976).
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with international law or emity, or detrimental to Australian interests, he
may take appropriate measures to block discovery requests or to prohibit
Australian citizens or residents from producing oral testimony. The Act
has been amended so as to render such orders of the Attorney General
free of judicial challenges.4" Parliament, however, has the power to disapprove any order given by the Attorney General within fifteen days of the
order's issuance.
Despite this legislation, U.S. courts persist in their attempts to secure
both documents and testimony pursuant to uranium litigation. Fearing a
succession of damaging default judgments against key uranium producers,
the Australian Parliament enacted the Foreign Antitrust Judgments (Restriction of Enforcement) Act of 1979.49 The Foreign Antitrust Judgments
Act of 1979 supplemented existing legislation and vested broad discretionary power in the Attorney General to determine whether an order
should be issued declaring that a foreign judgment not be recognized in
Australian, either in whole or in part. As in the Foreign Proceedings Act,
the Foreign Antitrust Judgments Act directed the Attorney General to
act only when the foreign judgments are violative of international law or
inimical to Australian interests.
The Foreign Antitrust Judgments Act also failed to block encroachments upon Australia's sovereignty resulting from U.S. antitrust enforcement overseas. This dilemma was characterized by one author who maintained that:
The Australian government and other uranium producers [were] in an
invidious position. Either they secure[d] compliance with the U.S. antitrust legislation, implying acquiescence in an assertion of jurisdiction
not supported by international law, or they export[ed] uranium in accordance with perceived national interests and risk[ed] the
probability of U.S. prosecution where these export practices violate[d]
antitrust provisions.50
In light of repeated discovery attempts made by American courts
pursuant to uranium and shipping legislation,5 the Australian government proposed to its parliament," in 1981, the enactment of the Foreign3
Antitrust Judgments (Restriction of Enforcement) Amendment Act.
The purpose of the Act was to give the utmost protection to Australian
48. Foreign Proceedings (Prohibition of Certain Evidence) Amendment Act, 1976, No.
202, Austl. Acts (1976).
49. Foreign Antitrust Judgments (Restriction of Enforcement) Act of 1979, No. 13,
Austl. Acts. (1979).
50. Triggs, ExtraterritorialReach of the United States Antitrust Legislation: The International Law Implications of the Westinghouse Allegations of a Uranium Producers'
Cartel, 12 MELB.U.L. REv. 251, 280 (1979).
51. See Pacific/New Zealand Shipping Conference Investigation, 43 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA), at 23 (July 1, 1979).
52. PARL. DEB., S (Austl.) 127 (Weekly Hansard No. 21, 1979).
53. This bill was introduced in the Australian Senate by the Australian Attorney General. See PARL. DEB., S. (Austrl.) 3067 (Weekly Hansard No. 12, 1981).
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laws and policies.4
The three important provisions of the proposed Act were Clauses 4-6.
Clause 4 requires the Attorney General of Australia not to issue an order
pursuant to the 1979 Foreign Antitrust Judgments Act if the conduct in
question took place in the country in which the ruling court is situated.
Going further than the British Protection of Trading Interests Act,
Clause 5 permitted an Australian party to recover all damages, not just
punitive damages, paid pursuant to overseas antitrust judgment against
the initial plaintiff, provided that the Attorney General first ordered that
the judgment was wholly or partially unenforceable in Australia. Furthermore, this "clawback" provision pierced the corporate veil by allowing a
corporation connected to the defendant corporation in the antitrust proceeding to have the same right of recovery back. 55 Finally, Clause 6 provided that any party resident in a country with blocking statutes similar
to those of Australia, namely Commonwealth nations, may sue to enforce
an overseas antitrust judgment against the original plaintiff, as long as
the Attorney General had found the underlying judgment enforceable.
Due to protracted discussions between the governments of Australia
and the United States, the proposed 1981 bill was not enacted. In its
place, a "Landmark Agreement" 6 on the extraterritorial reach of United
States antitrust laws and judgments was signed by the two
governments.5"
The agreement is broadly framed so as to promote ongoing consultations on matters of mutual interest. However, affirmative obligations are
imposed upon both governments so as to forestall a reoccurence of the
hostility which frequently arose in the antitrust arena. Specifically, Australia may inform the United States of any Australian policy which has
antitrust ramifications for the United States. Similarly, the United States
Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice must inform the
Australian government of any antitrust investigations which offset Australian laws, policies or interests. If either government feels that the actions of the other have antitrust implications, the notified party may request a consultation to avoid any conflict between the laws, policies or
material interests of the two countries. In the area of litigation, the Australian government may request the United States to participate in private antitrust proceedings before United States courts when such litigation involves matters which have been the subject of intergovernmental
consultations. The court must be informed of the substance and outcome
of these negotiations."' Lastly, both governments are to give general re-

54. See Pettit & Styles, The InternationalResponse to the ExtraterritorialApplication of United States Antitrust Laws, 37 Bus. LAW. 697 (1982).
55. Id. at 711.
56. See 55 AusTL. L.J. 773 (1981).
57. Agreement on Antitrust Cooperation, United States-Australia, June 29, 1982, 21
I.L.M. 702 (1982).
58. Pengilley, ExtraterritorialEffects of United States Commercial and Antitrust Leg-
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gard to the interests of the other in the enactment of antitrust laws or
implementation of antitrust policies.
While the agreement resulted in three notifications from the United
States to the Australian government in its first year,5 9 the spectre of hostile "blocking" or "clawback" legislation still exists. Australian Attorney
General Gareth Evans, a sponsor of the proposed 1981 bill,6 ° recently declared that he is "actively considering" whether to recommend that Prime
Minister Hawke's Labor government take further action to protect Australian companies from treble damage awards resulting from violations of
United States antitrust laws. 1 Such recommendations are likely to be in
the form of "clawback" legislation to allow Australian firms to recover
part of any such treble damage awards.
Nonetheless, a fragile balance still exists between the two governments which is very much dependent upon a sustained attitude of communication and cooperation.
IV.

CONCLUSION

As the preceding discussion has shown, nations such as Britain and
Australia have begun to implement their opposition to the extraterritorial
enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws by American courts through the enactment of blocking statutes. These laws may require a major reassessment
of U.S. antitrust laws by Congress in order to limit the reach of such laws
overseas while still preserving American trading interests in the international marketplace.
Anthony J. Carroll
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